

IVAN IV and Muscovy



Charles J. Halperin

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CHARLES J. HALPERIN

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Introduction

Ivan IV (Ivan Vasil'evich), became Grand Prince of All Rus' in 1533 at the age of three upon the death of his father. He was crowned tsar' in 1547 and died in 1584. Ivan is infamous as Ivan the Terrible (Ivan Groznyi), although *groznyi* in the sixteenth century meant "terrible" in the sense of "awe-inspiring." He is most notorious—aside from his seven marriages—for establishing the *oprichnina*¹ in 1565, an appanage whose minions, the *oprichniki*, dressed in black, rode black horses with dogs' heads and brooms on their necks, and instituted a reign of terror in Muscovy. Ivan abolished the oprichnina in 1572. The atrocities he committed do not constitute the entirety of his reign, which included reforms, conquests, and cultural achievements. Ivan continues to confuse and confound historians trying to encompass both the good and bad sides of his contradictory and paradoxical reign within a single coherent interpretation.

This anthology contains nineteen essays, eighteen previously unpublished and the nineteenth previously unpublished in English. The essays vary in length from what might more accurately be called "notes" to full-length, even excessively long articles. They also vary in their sources, from a single sentence in a diplomatic report to data bases of hundreds of records. The advantage of publishing such a heterogeneous collection as an anthology is precisely the flexibility of not having to worry about whether any individual essay is too short or too long. Each essay is based upon the appropriate sources and is as long as required to deal with its theme. For the interested reader it is more convenient to publish them between two covers, instead of nineteen separate articles in nineteen separate journals.

I have chosen to organize the articles in six thematic groups, containing from one to five chapters. Several chapters could have appeared in different groups or under a theme not included in the anthology at all. Nevertheless, I hope structuring the book around thematic parts will facilitate orienting the reader to its contents.

¹ Territories not included in the *oprichnina* were called the *zemshchina*, the "land" (*zemlia*).

Part 1, "Source Studies," contains five chapters. Chapter 1 asks why the quantitatively ambitious *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* and the qualitatively innovative *Book of Degrees* ceased in 1567 and 1563 respectively, when regional chronicles did not. The answer may be that the economic resources for such grandiose projects had run out. Chapter 2 uncovers a paradox in the relationship of the central Moscow chronicle to government documentation. The amount of data on military appointments and diplomatic activities found in the chronicle is so large that it could only have been acquired by direct access to written government records, but the quantity of errors of commission and omission, as well as factual and transcription inconsistencies, makes it highly implausible that the chronicler had direct access to written government records. Chapter 3 uncovers a significant difference between the works on the oprichnina by Germans and Livonians who defected after serving Ivan and those written in Muscovy by Muscovites during the oprichnina. The foreigners describe the semiotic elements of the oprichnina such as dogs' heads and brooms, but the domestic sources, unlike émigré sources like Kurbskii's *History* and post-Ivan Muscovite sources, uniformly omitted mention of the oprichnina's symbolic features. Perhaps it was unnecessary to write down what everyone in Muscovy knew. Chapter 4 identifies a paradox in the works of Ivan Peresvetov. Although Peresvetov was thoroughly familiar with Muscovite political, administrative, and social terminology, he only used the word "boyar" (supposedly the boyars were the prime object of his criticism) in a work on the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans which borrowed rather than censored the word from the text that was his source. Chapter 5 analyzes the presence of seals on documents, showing quantitatively that seals were not the exclusive prerogative of the landed elite, and that lay elite members used the same seal in their public activities as in their private lives, indicating that they perceived no separation between the two. Chapter 5 provides a serendipitous segue to part 2, on social history, to which it could just as easily have been assigned.

Part 2, "Social History," contains four chapters. Chapter 6 quantifies the roles of clergy as witnesses and substitute signatories in the private documentary lives of the lay elite, a practice illustrative of the high social regard for clergy by the laity. Monks played a significant role in these transactions and as "spiritual fathers" to the laity despite their self-imposed "isolation" from the outside world. Chapter 7 asks who was covered by the precedence system regulating military, administrative, and ceremonial appointments based upon a man's place in his family's genealogy and the service of his ancestors compared to that of other appointees. Although almost all scholarship treats the precedence system as an issue of boyar politics, in fact a quarter of the cases and individuals involved came from the gentry. Chapter 8 qualifies

two generalizations about Muscovite society during Ivan's reign, that families were coherent and unified social actors and that slaves were overwhelmingly native-born, by discussing admittedly a relatively few but still significant examples of fractious families and by making a case that the number of foreign slaves in Muscovy, captive prisoners of war, destined either for domestic use or re-export, has been underestimated. Chapter 9 returns to the theme of violence, evaluating apolitical violence by members of almost all social classes against their own and other classes. Non-political violence declined during the oprichnina but resumed and increased after its abolition, despite the experience of massive state violence during the oprichnina.

Part 3, "Diplomacy," contains three chapters. Chapter 10 establishes that Muscovites perceived the political culture of the Crimean Khanate as collegial and consensual, not an oriental despotism under an autocratic tyrant. Muscovites applied Muscovite social and administrative terminology to Crimea, suggesting its similarities to Muscovy. Chapter 11 focuses on instances in Muscovite-Lithuanian diplomacy in which Muscovite diplomats eschewed their usual ideological mythology by employing genuine logic (albeit not without hypocrisy and mendacity) based upon common sense, the weather, geography, economics, and history. When appropriate, Muscovite diplomats not only listened to what their Lithuanian counterparts said, but heard them and engaged what was said. Chapter 12 uses the observation of Queen Elizabeth I of England that Ivan was known to prefer beautiful women to illustrate the cultural differences between the English and Muscovite understanding of love and marriage. It is intriguing that Ivan did not take umbrage at her assessment of his admiration for physical beauty as a violation of Russian Orthodox Christian doctrine and royal Muscovite marital protocol that saw marriage as a spiritual and/or dynastic union not based on "chemistry."

Part 4, "Economy," contains one chapter. Chapter 13 explores the practical implications of the existence in Muscovy of only small coins, either 100 or 200 to the ruble, but no ruble coin, when Muscovites could spend or donate hundreds of rubles, even a thousand, in a single transaction. How much all those Muscovite coins weighed and how tens of thousands of coins could be counted and transported remain puzzling questions.

Part 5, "Intellectual History," contains two chapters related to my long-standing interest in the myth of the "Rus' Land" and other "land" terminologies. Chapter 14 concludes that the phrase the "Pskov land," like its counterpart the "Novgorodian land," served no ideological purpose because "land" concepts only applied to polities with dynastic lines. During Ivan's reign both Novgorod and Pskov local "patriotic" texts invoked not these particularist terms but the Rus' Land as the object of their attention. Chapter 15 looks at how the concept of the "Rus' Land" figured in Muscovite thought of

the time. The term survived, although Ivan's coronation as tsar could have dictated its displacement by the concept of the Russian tsardom. A curious occurrence of "the Rus' Land" in diplomacy with Lithuania inadvertently endorsed a counter-usage of the myth as legitimating Lithuanian pretensions to the Kievan inheritance.

Part 6, "Ivan IV," contains three chapters that address Ivan's personality and role. Chapter 16 probes references to Ivan's "anger" and "wrath." Although depictions of Ivan's temper resonate with his image as a volatile and arbitrary tyrant, Muscovites applied the same terms to God and biblical rulers and asserted that "anger" and "wrath" were sometimes justified, and sometimes no more than a formulaic cause to place someone in "disgrace." Chapter 17 poses the previously unasked question of whether Ivan was charismatic. If charismatic leadership is morally neutral, as Weber implied when he created the concept of personal rather than divine charisma, then Ivan should be described as charismatic, literally bigger than life. Chapter 18 rounds the circle because it could have been included in Part 1. It examines whether discarding all problematic or contested sources about Ivan and his reign and relying only on irrefutably authentic documentary sources would "solve" the problem of understanding Ivan's actions as ruler. Without question such an epistemological exercise would fail to achieve that goal.

Part 7, "Historiography," contains one chapter. Chapter 19 compares the English-language version of Ruslan Skrynnikov's Russian-language classic monograph on Ivan's rule, *Reign of Terror* to the original Russian. Although the revised text that Skrynnikov prepared for translation omitted much detail, and added and restructured some material, it still successfully conveys his main conclusions and modes of analysis.

No "magic bullet" will ever fully "explain" Ivan the Terrible's half-century reign in Muscovy, but I hope that the chapters of this anthology will contribute to a better understanding of some aspects of his life and of Muscovite history during the sixteenth century.

Because I do not assume that all readers will read the anthology from cover to cover *seriatem*, I treat the bibliography of each chapter as autonomous, so full references to publications appear multiple times. In addition I repeat background material, such as on the Byzantine calendar, whenever appropriate.

Source Studies

Chapter 1

Why Did the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* and the *Book of Degrees* Remain Unfinished?

Two literary texts usually attributed to the reign of Ivan IV share several attributes. The *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* (*Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*) is a massive world history in the chronicle form of annals comprising 10,000 pages, later bound in ten volumes, with 16,000 illustrations. The *Book of Degrees* (*Stepennaia kniga*) is the first history of Rus' organized thematically, not in chronicle annals but in chapters ("degrees") devoted to rulers from St. Vladimir of Kiev to Ivan IV. Both texts were highly innovative, the former in scale and graphic format, the latter conceptually. And both remained unfinished. Despite the fact that it was unfinished and structured differently, the *Book of Degrees* served as a source of the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation*. In addition, again, although both were unfinished, both were copied, in different fashion, in the seventeenth century.

There is no consensus among scholars on why the texts remained unfinished, in part if not in large measure because there is no consensus on who patronized them and when work on them stopped. Thus these three key questions of patronage, date of cessation of work, and cause of discontinuation are as inextricably related as the texts themselves, because self-evidently no one could have worked on the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* until some version of the *Book of Degrees* already existed. Although some historians do attribute the incompleteness of the texts to the same or similar causes, it is not necessarily the case that work on both texts was terminated for the same reasons. After some background information and preliminary remarks to introduce

I wish to thank the anonymous reader of an earlier draft of this chapter for compelling me to rethink my argument, even though he probably still disagrees with me. I also wish to thank Sergei Bogatyrev and Brian Boeck for bibliographic assistance, and Brian Boeck for consultation. I remain solely responsible for all errors.

the problem of provenance, this article will consider existing theories¹ and then suggest that an additional factor, cost, should be taken into consideration in analyzing why the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* and *Book of Degrees* remained unfinished.

The Importance of the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation*

The *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* (hereafter LLS, from the initials of its Russian-language name) begins with the Old Testament and proceeds to Rus' and then Muscovite history. Its last two volumes discuss Ivan's reign. The last annal in the text records events in the year 1567, after Ivan IV established the *oprichnina* in 1565. After that LLS simply stops; it does not end. No other chronicle during Ivan's reign or even after Ivan's death in 1584 ever picked up the thread by continuing its comprehensive narrative of domestic Muscovite history and foreign relations based upon unlimited access to both the state archives and the archives of the metropolitan, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in Muscovy. As a result historians writing histories of Ivan's reign shift when they approach 1568 from relying for their information primarily upon Muscovite chronicles, which present Ivan's actions in a very positive light, to citing the accounts left by Germans who had entered Ivan's service but later defected to write scathing denunciations of Ivan as a sadistic tyrant.² This radical alteration of the source base goes unmentioned in some scholarly histories of Ivan's reign, depriving uninformed general readers of any appreciation of what the termination of LLS means for historical analysis of the *oprichnina* and subsequent events such as Ivan's installation of converted Chingissid Simeon Bekbulatovich on the grand-princely throne of Moscow in 1575³ or the death of Ivan's eldest son, Tsarevich Ivan Ivanovich, in 1581. Obviously, historians who do not mention the termination of LLS make no attempt to explain it.⁴ Other historians do allude to the termination of LLS but do not

¹ The historiography of the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* is far too vast to cite in full here. I have tried to address the most recent scholarship, which contains citations to all previous publications.

² See chapter 3.

³ Charles J. Halperin, "Simeon Bekbulatovich and the Mongol Influence on Ivan IV's Muscovy," *Russian History* 39, 3 (2012): 306–30.

⁴ For example, Daniil Natanovich Al'shits, *Nachalo samoderzhaviiia v Rossii: Gosudarstvo Ivana Groznogo* (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1988); Boris Nikolaevich Floria, *Ivan Groznyi* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1999); Isabel de Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Sergei Eduardovich Tsvetkov, *Ivan Groznyi 1530–1584* (Moscow: ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2005); and Dmitrii

comment on how its cessation changes the presentation of post-1567 events compared to those in earlier years.⁵

Dating the termination of work on LLS is complicated by the fact that its “editor” inserted interpolations and comments into the margins of the manuscript. The most famous interpolation, in the *Tsar’s Book* (*Tsarstvennaia kniga*), the tenth and final volume of LLS, concerns the supposed succession crisis of 1553, when it was feared that Ivan was terminally ill. Disagreement arose over whether he should be succeeded by his infant son, Tsarevich Dmitrii,⁶ or his grown first cousin, the appanage Prince Vladimir Andreevich Staritskii.

Book of Degrees

The *Book of Degrees* devoted Degree 17 to the reign of Ivan IV. The basic narrative proceeds to 1560 and then just stops, but there are three interpolations in the text, the latest of which mentions the Muscovite conquest of Polotsk⁷ in 1563.

It is important to keep in mind that LLS contains major narrative material for the years 1561 to 1567—including a long account of the creation of the oprichnina beginning in December 1564 and running through January 1565—that is absent from the *Book of Degrees*. For brevity and clarity the *Book of Degrees* summarized and reshaped the narrative material it utilized, but it simply omitted events after 1560, save for the interpolations.

Scholars by and large agree that the *Book of Degrees* was composed in the metropolitan’s court, although they do not entirely agree under which metropolitan or by whom. Most attribute it to Metropolitan Afanasii, the former archpriest Andrei, Ivan’s spiritual father (*dukhovnyi otets*),⁸ although others attribute a role to other clerics, Afanasii’s predecessor, Metropolitan Makarii

rii Mikhailovich Volodikhin, *Ivan Groznyi: Bich Bozhii* (Moscow: Veche, 2006) (although see n. 5 below for another book of his).

⁵ For example, Boris Mikhailovich Kloss, *Nikonovskii svod i russkie letopisi XVI–XVII vekov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), 207; Andrei Pavlov and Maureen Perrie, *Ivan the Terrible* (London: Pearson, Longman, 2003), 5; Viacheslav Valentinovich Shaposhnik, *Ivan Groznyi: Pervyi russkii tsar’* (St. Petersburg: Vita Nova, 2006), 310; and Dmitrii Volodikhin, *Ivan IV Groznyi* (Moscow: Veche, 2010), 92.

⁶ This was the first Tsarevich Dmitrii, son of Ivan’s first wife, Tsaritsa Anastasiia, who died in infancy shortly after the succession crisis, not the second Tsarevich Dmitrii, son of Ivan’s seventh wife, Mariia Nagaia, who outlived his father but died or was murdered in childhood and later canonized.

⁷ At that time Polotsk belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; it is now Polatsk in Belarus.

⁸ On this status, see chap. 6.

or Archimandrite Levkii of the Moscow Kremlin Chudov Monastery, which belonged to the metropolitan.⁹

Did All Chronicle-Writing in Muscovy Stop in 1567?

In his classic 1992 monograph *Reign of Terror*, Ruslan Skrynnikov reproduced his earlier argument that Ivan's terror destroyed independent Muscovite political thought. The Muscovite Ambassadorial Bureau (Posol'skii prikaz) was in charge of official chronicle writing, which included the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation*, but its leadership was physically exterminated. The execution of Ivan Viskovatyi, at one time head of that bureau, ended "Muscovite chronicle writing" (*moskovskoe letopisanie*). This repression also affected provincial chronicle centers; the execution of the abbot (*igumen*) and leading monks of the Pskov Caves Monastery (Pecherskaia lavra) "interrupted" (*oborval*) Pskov chronicle writing. The "complete cessation" (*polnoe prekrashchenie*) of chronicle work resulted. The word *oprichnina* was banned, which made it literally impossible to write a chronicle of the remaining years of Ivan's reign.¹⁰ In a later, more popular work, Skrynnikov added the observation that with the termination of Moscow chronicle writing "a cultural tradition of 500 years was broken."¹¹

By "Muscovite chronicle writing" Skrynnikov may have meant "chronicle writing in the city of Moscow," not in all of Muscovy, because his next sentence stipulated that provincial chronicle writing was "also" affected. He did not write that it was "also terminated." Skrynnikov's prose was sloppy.

Skrynnikov's reference to the breakdown of a 500-year tradition was equally careless. The *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* derives from a much more recent tradition, begun at some time in the first half of the fifteenth century, of

⁹ See Gail Lenhoff and Ann Kleimola, eds., "*The Book of Royal Degrees*" and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness/"*Stepennaia kniga tsarskogo rodosloviia*" i genezis russkogo istoricheskogo soznaniia (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2011).

¹⁰ Ruslan Grigor'evich Skrynnikov, *Tsarstvo terrora* (St. Petersburg: Nauka, Sankt-Peterburgskoe otделение, 1992), 526–27. On this monograph, see Charles J. Halperin, "Ruslan Skrynnikov's *Reign of Terror* in the Historiography of Ivan the Terrible," in Ruslan Skrynnikov, *Reign of Terror*, trans. Paul Williams (Leiden: Brill and Bronze Horseman, 2015), xviii–xxxi. On Skrynnikov's view of Ivan's personality and reign, see Charles J. Halperin, "Ruslan Skrynnikov on Ivan IV," in *Dubitando: Studies in History and Culture in Honor of Donald Ostrowski*, ed. Brian J. Boeck, Russell E. Martin, and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2012), 193–207. On the English translation, see chap. 19.

¹¹ Ruslan Skrynnikov, *Velikii gosudar' Ioann Vasil'evich Groznyi* (Smolensk: Rusich, 1996), 2: 329–30.

what post-1991 Russian scholars continue to call, following Soviet precedent, all-Rus' (*obshcherusskii*) chronicles, meaning chronicles whose scope encompassed events in the entire country rather than in a single city or region. That tradition began with the compilation of the common source of the *Novgorod IV* and *Sofia I* chronicles, dated—often by the same scholars—to either 1448 or the 1430s, still a hot-button issue among historians and literary scholars (*literaturovedy*) who study medieval and early modern East Slavic chronicle writing.¹² The year 1567 did mark a major discontinuity in the Rus' chronicle writing tradition, but “only” of approximately 125 years.

Vadim Koretskii noted that Skrynnikov made chronicle writing a victim of Ivan's terror but disputed Skrynnikov's conclusion that all chronicle writing ceased. Only “official” chronicle writing ended in 1567, not to be resumed until the Romanovs with the *New Chronicle* (*Novyi letopisets*) of the 1630s. Unofficial chronicle writing continued in peripheral cities such as Novgorod and Pskov, and in monasteries, including the Iosif-of-Volokolamsk, Kirillo-Belozero, and Solovetskii Monasteries. He also mentioned a single example of gentry chronicle writing by Mikhail Andreevich Bezdniin, which survives (Koretskii published it), and the chronicle of Patriarch Iov,¹³ which does not survive but can be reconstructed, he claimed, from its influence on later narratives and shows that Russian Orthodox Church chronicle writing also continued.¹⁴

The division of chronicles into “official” and “unofficial”¹⁵ was standard in Soviet scholarship, and survives in post-Soviet and even Western scholarship on chronicles.¹⁶ LLS is deemed an “official” chronicle because it was supposedly compiled by the Ambassadorial Bureau. This concept also underlies Dmitrii Volodikhin's reference to the cessation of “tsarist” (*tsarkoe*) chronicle writing in 1567.¹⁷

¹² Charles J. Halperin, “Text and Textology: Salmina's Dating of the ‘Chronicle Tales’ about Dmitry Donskoy,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 79, 2 (2001): 248–63. Azbelev and Bobrov (see references below) disagree vehemently on the subject.

¹³ The metropolitan of Moscow was raised to the rank of patriarch in 1589.

¹⁴ Vadim Ivanovich Koretskii, “Solovetskii letopisets kontsa XVI v.,” in *Letopisi i khroniki*, 1980 g.: V. N. Tatishchev i izuchenie russkogo letopisaniia, ed. B. A. Rybakov (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 223–43; Koretskii, “K voprosu o neofitsial'nom letopisanii vremeni Oprichniny,” in *Letopisi i khroniki*, 1984: *Sbornik statei*, ed. V. I. Buganov (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), 88–112; Koretskii, *Istoriia russkogo letopisaniia vtoroi poloviny XVI–nachala XVII v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 3, 11–33, 73–106, 107–75.

¹⁵ An intermediate category, “semi-official,” also existed but is not germane.

¹⁶ Nancy S. Kollmann, “The *Litsevoi svod* as Graphic Novel: Narrativity in Iconographic Style,” *Kritika* 19, 1 (2018): 79.

¹⁷ Volodikhin, *Ivan IV Groznyi*, 92.

This categorization of chronicles is flawed and misleading. There were three types of official sources, state, church, and mixed. However, narratives, including chronicles, fail to meet the criteria to qualify them as "official." They were not promulgated as civil or canon law, they had no consequences in policy, and they did not intrude into real life. Consequently, even if we could trace any chronicle to a government patron, that would not suffice to label such a chronicle "official."¹⁸ If there were no official chronicles, then the companion category of "unofficial" chronicles also disappears. The evidence that a government bureau compiled LLS is flimsy. The *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* used the same imported French paper as some diplomatic books, and supposedly Ivan personally edited the entries in the *Tsar's Book*. That the same imported French paper was utilized by the Ambassadorial Bureau and the scribes and illustrators preparing the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* does not entail that the latter, like the former, were employees of the government. It is equally plausible that the government bought paper abroad for a church project, either as its contribution to the endeavor or simply as a commercial agent to be appropriately reimbursed. There is no consensus on the authorship of the interpolations in the *Tsar's Book*. The Ambassadorial Bureau possessed copies of chronicles, as did the Tsar's Archive. Ivan himself and his diplomats accessed these manuscripts in order to find historical justification for state policy at home and abroad. Such usage does not demonstrate that any government office compiled or wrote chronicles. That associate boyar (*okol'nichii*) Aleksei Adashev possessed manuscript drafts of chronicle entries on recent events in no way entails that he wrote, compiled, or edited chronicles.¹⁹ In any event there was no interruption in 1567 of writing official government sources such as the diplomatic books (*posol'skie knigi*) which contained the same justifications of Ivan's policies as would have appeared in a continuation of LLS.

The *Book of Degrees* was neither a chronicle nor an "official" church source; it was not promulgated by the Russian Orthodox Church. The cause of its termination, like that of the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation*, could have had nothing to do with its official or unofficial status.

Like the bureaucrats of the Ambassadorial Bureau, boyars may have owned and read chronicles and other literature, but the evidence for the sixteenth century that any boyar wrote a chronicle is too slim to be persuasive.

¹⁸ Charles J. Halperin, "What is an 'Official' Muscovite Source from the Reign of Ivan IV?" in Lenhoff and Kleimola, *The Book of Royal Degrees and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness*, 81–93.

¹⁹ Valentin Viktorovich Morozov, "Letopisets 1568 goda (Atributsiia i sostav)," in *Russkaia knizhnost' XV–XIX vv.*, ed. T. V. Dianova (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii muzei, 1989), 155–63.

The so-called “secret” chronicle of boyar Ivan Mstislavskii, not included in Koretskii’s list, is another dubious case for which there is no reliable evidence.²⁰

Not all historians accept the existence of the hypothetical compilation of Patriarch Iov, sometimes attributed to his monastic cellmate Iosif. Iankel’ Solodkin declares that Koretskii’s conclusions about Patriarch Iov’s chronicle are mere guesses, lacking any evidence.²¹

Discarding the distinction between official and unofficial chronicles (or narratives in general) does not completely invalidate Koretskii’s objection to Skrynnikov’s claim that all Muscovite chronicle writing ceased in 1567. However, monastic and lay “short” chronicles pose a different problem.²² Following the seminal studies of Aleksei Shakhmatov, specialists in chronicle writing conceive of chronicles as compilations, that is, texts constructed from previously existent annals. To be sure, a compiler can not only edit such annals but also compose new ones for contemporary events. In the absence of a paper trail it is not always possible to distinguish annals based upon no-longer-extant chronicle compilations and annals invented *ex post facto* by the chronicler. No hard or fast rules apply. In addition, specialists in chronicle writing also refer to laconic “chronicle notes” (*letopisnye zapisi*), brief notices of events that might be considered the raw data on the basis of which annals could be composed.²³ However, such “notes” could also derive from oral sources. By default determining which entries on events between 1568 and 1584 that

²⁰ Ia. G. Solodkin, “Tainaia ‘khronika’ boiarina I. F. Mstislavskogo (K istorii chastnogo letopisaniia v Rossii XVI v.),” *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 57 (2006): 945–49, but cf. Iankel’ Gutmanovich Solodkin, *Istoriia pozdnego russkogo letopisaniia: Uchebnoe posobie* (Moscow: MALP, 1997), 14–21; A. S. Usachev, “Kniaz’ I. F. Mstislavskii—zabytyi knizhnik XVI v.?” *Vestnik Nizhnevartovskogo gosudarstvennogo humanitarnogo universiteta*, Seriia “Istoricheskie nauki,” 1 (2011): 15–25. On early seventeenth-century “boyar chronicles,” see Paul Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great: The Struggle for Power, 1671–1725* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 35–40; Sergei Bogatyrev, “Three Takes on One Legend: Polyphony in Muscovite Court Culture,” *Kritika* 19, 1 (2018): 19.

²¹ Koretskii, *Istoriia russkogo letopisaniia*, 107–75; Solodkin, *Istoriia pozdnego russkogo letopisaniia*, 21–28.

²² *Letopis’* means “chronicle,” so the diminutive form *letopisets* has sometimes been translated as “little chronicle” (as in the *Little Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom*, *Letopisets nachala tsarsva*), but that becomes confusing because historians refer to *kratkie letopisetsy*, literally: short little chronicles. The phrase is either redundant or implies the existence of “long little chronicles,” which would be an oxymoron. Therefore I have translated *letopisets* just as “chronicle”; I include the Russian name of both types of chronicles in parentheses. *Vremennik* is also translated as “chronicle.”

²³ Ia. G. Solodkin, “Tsarstvovanie Ivana Groznogo v russkom letopisanii kontsa XVI–nachala XVII vv.,” in *Rosiiskaia monarkhiia: Voprosy istorii i teorii* (Voronezh: Izdatel’stvo “Istoki,” 1998), 50–71.

survive in later “short chronicles” were written during the years 1568 to 1584 can only be done on a case-by-case basis. Density of data, chronological inconsistencies, and obvious anachronisms carry the most weight in such an analysis. These notices provide no new information and omit many events.²⁴ Ignatii Zaitsev’s short chronicle from the Volokolamsk Monastery contains brief chronicle notices, out of chronological sequence, on events from 1567 to 1571.²⁵ The *Solovetskii Monastery Chronicle* from the second half of the sixteenth century drew much of its information from Novgorod and Pskov chronicles.²⁶ A miscellany from the late sixteenth century contains only chronicle notes (*zapisi*).²⁷ A chronograph from Novgorod²⁸ contains two relevant chronicle notes, the first of which misdates creation of the oprichnina to 1563.²⁹ A Kirillo-Belozero miscellany contains chronicle-style notes that begin in 1552/1553 and run through 1582/1583.³⁰ Even if some of the entries in these chronicles have historical value or quote authentic historical documents,³¹ it would be imprudent to assume that they constitute evidence of the existence of chroni-

²⁴ V. I. Koretskii, “Bezdninskii letopisets kontsa XVII veka iz sobranii S. O. Dolgova,” *Zapiski otdela ruskopisei* GBL 38 (1977): 191–208, here 207–08; Koretskii, *Istoriia russkogo letopisaniia*, 73–106.

²⁵ A. A. Zimin, “Kratkie letopistsy XV–XVI vv.,” *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 5 (1950): 21–22.

²⁶ M. N. Tikhomirov, “Maloizvestnye letopisnye pamiatniki,” *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 7 (1951): 217–36, here 224–28 on events 1567–84; O. A. Novikova, “O vtoroi redaktsii tak nazyvaemogo Solovetskogo letopistsa,” in *Knizhnye tsentry drevnei Rusi: Solovetskii monastyr*, ed. S. A. Semiachko (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2001), 214–54; I. A. Lobakova, “‘Skazanie vkratse’ o Solovetskikh igumenakh,” in *Knizhnye tsentry Drevnei Rusi: Knizhniki i rukopisi Solovetskogo monastyria*, ed. S. A. Semiachko (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2004), 171–74; S. N. Kisterev, “Ob avtorakh pervoi i vtoroi redaktsii Solovetskogo letopistsa XVI veka,” *Letopisi i khroniki. Novye issledovaniia* 2013–2014, 383–410.

²⁷ Manuscript GIM, Syn. 88–92, no. 939.

²⁸ A “chronograph” (*khronograf*) is not a chronicle but a world history.

²⁹ Mikhail Nikolaevich Tikhomirov, *Kratkie zametki o letopisnykh proizvedeniiakh v rukopisnykh sobraniakh Moskvy* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1962), 159–60, no. 149; GIM Zabelin 261.

³⁰ Iu. V. Ankhimiuk, “Zapisi letopisnogo kharaktera v rukopisnom sbornike Kirillo-Belozerskogo sobraniia—novyi istochnik po istorii Oprichniny,” *Arkhiv russkoi istorii* 2 (1992): 121–29, here 128–29.

³¹ The *Mazurin Chronicle* (*Mazurinskii letopisets*), which Andrei Bogdanov titles the *Chronicle of Isidor Snazin* (*Letopisets Isidora Snazina*), cites the church council decree on Ivan IV's fourth marriage. Andrei Petrovich Bogdanov, *Letopisets i istorik kontsa XVII veka: Ocherki istoricheskoi mysli “perekhodnogo vremeni”* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia istoricheskaiia biblioteka Rossii, 1994), 14–62.

cles written during Ivan's reign after the cessation of LLS.³² They attest interest in history, but not chronicle writing.

Longer chronicles and other narratives from the Time of Troubles and later (the 1617 *Khronograf* now attributed to Prince Simeon Shakhovskoi, Ivan Timofeev, the *Moscow Chronicle* [*Moskovskii letopisets*], the *Piskarev Chronicle* [*Piskarevskii letopisets*], the *Abbreviated Chronicle* [*Sokrashchennyi vremmenik*], and the *Latukhin Book of Degrees* [*Latukhinskaia Stepennaia kniga*]) contain so much garbled information or misinformation that the possibility that they are based upon inextant annals or chronicles from the latter decades of Ivan's reign must be excluded.³³

However, Koretskii's critique of Skrynnikov retains some probative value. The entries in the Novgorod (specifically the *Novgorod II Chronicle*) and Pskov chronicles (specifically the *Pskov III Chronicle*) for the years between 1567 and 1584, qualitatively and quantitatively, bespeak contemporary chronicle writing. Moreover, they did not shy away from recounting Ivan's destructive actions.³⁴ Skrynnikov erred in positing an interruption of Pskov chronicle writing subsequent to Ivan's execution of leading Pskov monks, supposedly compilers of that chronicle. Therefore we cannot conclude that Ivan terrified chronicle writers into abandoning their craft or that chronicle writings could not assimilate Ivan's atrocities into the chronicle tradition. In no case does any chronicler draw the inference that Ivan was evil. He was prone to anger, but sometimes he was misled by evil advisors who urged him to leave the country or persecute innocent individuals or cities, and sometimes he was convinced to do the wrong thing by lies. However, no chronicler urged his overthrow or celebrated his demise. It should also be noted that while avoiding blaming Ivan directly, even official Muscovite documentary sources from the period of the oprichnina, land cadastres, in evaluating the baneful effects of Ivan's punitive raid on the Novgorod hinterland in 1569–70, also mentioned murders and other violence committed by *oprichniki*, without ever attributing these crimes to Ivan's initiative or asserting that they violated Ivan's instructions.³⁵

³² N. A. Kazakova, "Letopisnye izvestiia i predaniia o prebyvanii Ivana IV v Vologde," *Vspomogatel'nye istoricheskie distsipliny* 10 (1978): 200–06.

³³ Charles J. Halperin, "How Quickly They Forgot: Ivan IV in Muscovite Historical Memory," *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, Seriia 2: Istoriiia* 63, 1 (2018): 223–43.

³⁴ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter PSRL] (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Eduarda Pratsa, 1841), 3: 253–63; *Pskovskie letopisi* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1955), 2: 261–63.

³⁵ Charles J. Halperin, "Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Ivan IV's *Oprichnina*," *Kritika* 18, 1 (2017): 95–124.

"Tales" about Novgorod's destruction by Ivan's minions and Pskov's defense against the armies of Stefan Bathory, king of Poland, might very well have been written independently of chronicle writing, even if the former was subsequently included in the corpus of chronicles. That "Tale" also contains some anomalies and exaggerated statistics, although it seems to have been written by an eyewitness.³⁶

Therefore, we can with justification modify Skrynnikov's judgment. All-Rus' chronicle writing did cease in 1567, never to be resumed during Ivan IV's reign. However, provincial chronicle writing in Novgorod and Pskov did not cease at that time. Therefore any explanation of why work stopped on LLS in 1567, or earlier in 1563 in the *Book of Degrees*, must also allow for the fact that work on other chronicles did not.

Moreover, the chronicle genre itself did not disappear. In the seventeenth century new chronicles, both "all-Rus'" and local, appeared, including literally the *New Chronicle* (*Novyi letopisets*), and a new provincial chronicle tradition arose in newly conquered Siberia.³⁷ Concerning Ermak's campaigns only chronicle notes survive from 1584–85;³⁸ no full-fledged Siberian chronicle dates to earlier than the second quarter of the seventeenth century. What did not appear, or reappear, were annals in any form for the years 1568 to 1584 that could possibly derive from or fill the gaps in LLS.

Who Wrote Chronicles

A major issue within the debate over early fifteenth-century all-Rus' chronicles is whether that inextant protograph was a government- or church-sponsored chronicle, which raises yet another significant problem, who wrote Rus' chronicles. Presumably, whether laymen or clerics wrote a chronicle would have some bearing on the circumstances that could terminate that chronicle. Donald Ostrowski's position is unambiguous:

I do not accept the prevailing consensus that some Rus' chronicles are "grand-princely" and others are "metropolitanate." All were "metro-

³⁶ Ibid., 105–06, 119–20.

³⁷ Ia. G. Solodkin, *Ocherki po istorii obshcheruskogo letopisaniia kontsa XVI–pervoi treti XVII vekov* (Nizhnevartovsk: Izdatel'stvo Nizhnevartovskogo gosudarstvennogo gumanitarnogo universiteta, 2008); Solodkin, *Zarozhdenie sibirskogo letopisaniia: Istochnikovedcheskie ocherki. Monografiia* (Nizhnevartovsk: Izdatel'stvo Nizhnevartovskogo pedagogicheskogo instituta, 2005); Solodkin, *Zarozhdenie sibirskogo letopisaniia: XVII–pervoi poloviny XVIII vv. Spornye i maloizuchenyye voprosy* (Nizhnevartovsk: Izdatel'stvo Nizhnevartovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 2018).

³⁸ Solodkin, *Zarozhdenie sibirskogo letopisaniia: Istochnikovedcheskie ocherki*, 3 n. 1.

politanate" or "eparchial" in that all were written, compiled, and edited by monks or prelates, and all received the approval of the reigning prelate in a diocese. No chronicle writing can be traced to any grand-princely scriptorium.³⁹

Although discussing the authorship of medieval and early modern Rus' chronicles is complicated by the fact that most chronicles are anonymous,⁴⁰ it is certainly obvious and well known, a "banal truism," as Aleksandr Bobrov writes, that "old Rus' chronicles [*drevnerusskie letopisi*] were compiled primarily (*po preimushchestvu*) in monasteries."⁴¹ Even the most cursory survey of the evidence attests to the validity of that proposition. The *Tale of Bygone Years* (*Povest' vremennykh let*) from the Kievan period was associated with the monk Nestor of the Kievan Caves Monastery (Pecherskaia lavra) and the monk Sylvester of the Vydubitskii Monastery. Certainly the attribution of chronicles to twelfth–fifteenth century princely courts derives from no more than content analysis and *cui bono* argumentation. The case of the two medieval city-provinces which lacked their own dynasties and therefore could not generate princely chronicles is more complicated. Medieval Novgorod chronicles were compiled in the chancellery of the archbishop in the St. Sophia Church and in a series of monasteries and churches, including the Khutyn', Klopskii, Panteleimon, and Lisitskii Monasteries.⁴² In Pskov clerics at the Trinity Church carried out major chronicle writing.⁴³ However, that is not the entire story. Bobrov highlights the role of a layman, Matfei Mikhailovich Kusov, an employee of the Novgorod archbishop, as supervisor of chronicle writing. Kusov probably wrote his own private family chronicle too, His father was a chorister (*kliroshanin*) of the St. Sophia Church.⁴⁴ Hans-Jürgen Grabmüller discerns two chronicle traditions in Pskov. In addition to ecclesiastical authorship,

³⁹ Donald Ostrowskii, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 153 n. 42.

⁴⁰ Hans-Jürgen Grabmüller, *Die Pskover Chroniken: Untersuchungen zur russischen Regionalchronistik im 13.–15. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975), 10.

⁴¹ Aleksandr Grigor'evich Bobrov, *Novgorodskie letopisi XV veka* (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2001), 243.

⁴² *Ibid.*; Sergei Nikolaevich Azbelev, *Letopisanie Velikogo Novgoroda: Letopisi XI–XVII vekov kak pamiatniki kul'tury i kak istoricheskie istochniki* (St. Petersburg: Blints; Moscow: Russkaia panorama, 2016). Bobrov sees a significant discontinuity in Novgorod chronicle writing after Novgorod's annexation by Muscovy in 1471; Azbelev, on the other hand, emphasizes the seven-century-long continuity of Novgorod chronicle writing.

⁴³ Grabmüller, *Die Pskover Chroniken*.

⁴⁴ Bobrov, *Novgorodskie letopisi XV veka*, 80–84, 86, 179–81, 248, 249.

he sees an urban chronicle-writing tradition under the direction of the “mayor” (*posadnik*) of Pskov. For the chronicles written during Ivan’s reign, the absence of evidence dominates. Kloss convincingly demonstrated that the *Nikon Chronicle* (*Nikonovskaia letopis’*) through 1530 was compiled under the direction of Metropolitan Daniil. However, his analysis of the evolution of the *Nikon Chronicle* after 1530 eschews all questions of authorship or sponsorship, focusing entirely upon the dating of several intermediate compilations of what I call the *Continuations of the Nikon Chronicle*. As mentioned, there is no doubt that the *Book of Degrees* was compiled by monks or prelates. Persuasive evidence linking Adashev to the *Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom* (*Letopisets nachala tsarstva*) is lacking, but so is any evidence of its authorship or sponsorship. To assert that its author was a monk or prelate in the absence of evidence is hardly convincing; it would be preferable to take an agnostic approach admitting that we just do not know who compiled it. It cannot be asserted that because chronicles espoused a providential theory of history written in Church Slavonic, only a monk or prelate could have written a chronicle. The professionally literate members of the bureaucratic class (*d’iaki*, literally: “secretaries”) were religious, and one translated Latin into Slavonic, another wrote a *vita* in Slavonic, and the most famous bureaucrat of Ivan’s reign, the head of the Ambassadorial Bureau Ivan Viskovatyi, proved himself very knowledgeable about iconography and read patristic texts. There was no diglossia between chancery Russian and Church Slavonic, and the Moscow elite, lay and clerical, shared a single religious culture.⁴⁵ This evidence does not prove that Viskovatyi or any other bureaucrat ever wrote a chronicle; nevertheless, it does suggest that we should discard the assumption that only a monk or prelate *could* compile a chronicle. I do not know what evidence documents Ostrowski’s assertion that the chief prelate in a diocese had to approve any chronicle written by a cleric therein or even that a chronicle written by a monk was submitted for approval to his monastery’s abbot.

The question of lay or ecclesiastical authorship of chronicles remains open.

⁴⁵ Charles J. Halperin, “The ‘Russian’ and ‘Slavonic’ Languages in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 85, 1 (2007): 1–24; Halperin, “The Culture of Ivan IV’s Court: The Religious Beliefs of Bureaucrats,” in *The New Muscovite Cultural History: A Collection in Honor of Daniel B. Rowland*, ed. Valerie Kivelson, Karen Petrone, Nancy Kollmann, and Michael Flier (Bloomington: Slavica, 2009), 93–105.

When and Why Did Work Stop on the *Book of Degrees*?⁴⁶

Gail Lenhoff and Andrei Usachev date the beginning of work on the *Book of Degrees* to 1555 or 1556, which is confirmed by the watermarks on the earliest although fragmentary manuscripts of the text, and its completion to the early 1560s, no later than 1563, to which Nikolai Pokrovskii and Aleksei Sirenov assent. Ol'ga Zhuravel's analysis of the handwriting of the text confirms these dates.⁴⁷ Usachev's reference to the "complete" (*polnyi*) text of an incomplete work is confusing.⁴⁸ He means the text as we now have it.

Pokrovskii argued that work stopped because the clerics of the metropolitan's chancery in the Chudov Monastery could no longer defend Ivan's increasingly oppressive policies after 1560, and therefore gave up trying to do so.

Pokrovskii's theory that the *Book of Degrees* was an Aesopian criticism of Ivan's behavior fails to take into account that the compilers of LLS had no problem narrating Ivan's actions and Muscovite history through 1567. The *Book of Degrees* was a compilation, an adaptation of longer chronicle entries to its novel structure. It cannot be proven that the LLS treatment of these years already existed, or already existed but was inaccessible to the compilers of the *Book of Degrees*, when those compilers chose not to carry their presentation beyond 1560, but the anomaly remains. Pokrovskii implied that the clerics creating the *Book of Degrees* were more critical of Ivan's rule than the unknown clerical or lay compilers of LLS. Certainly Metropolitan Filipp had a different view of the oprichnina than Ivan, but Ivan's deportment had not crossed the line to mass terror by 1563.

Two historians have proposed an alternative dating of the *Book of Degrees*. Sergei Bogatyrev⁴⁹ calculates a longer shelf life to watermarks to defend the notion that paper from the 1550s could have been used to begin the *Book of Degrees* in the 1560s. He asserts that it is still unclear whether Degree 17 on

⁴⁶ Charles J. Halperin, "Stepennaia kniga on the Reign of Ivan IV: Omissions from Degree 17," *Slavonic and East European Review* 89, 1 (2011): 56–75.

⁴⁷ A. S. Usachev, "Drevneishie spiski Stepennai knigi: Filigranologicheskie issledovaniia," in Lenhoff and Kleimola, "The Book of Royal Degrees" and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness, 11–31; O. D. Zhuravel', "O pocherkakh drevneishikh spiskov Stepennai knigi i o nekotorykh voprosakh ee rannei istorii," in Lenhoff and Kleimola, "The Book of Royal Degrees" and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness, 33–49.

⁴⁸ Usachev, "Drevneishie spiski," 30.

⁴⁹ Sergei Bogatyrev, "The Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy: The Stabilization of the Text and the Argument from Silence," in Lenhoff and Kleimola, *The "Book of Royal Degrees" and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness*, 51–68.

Ivan IV was part of the original plan for the work, although that notion is “quite probable,” or added later. Bogatyrev identifies the Compilation of 1560 as the main source of the *Book of Degrees*, which obviously precludes dating the beginning of its composition before 1560. That dependence on the Compilation of 1560 explains, in his view, why the text breaks off so arbitrarily in 1560: its source ran out. However, the text was “finished and extended” under Metropolitan Filipp, who took office in 1566 and continued as metropolitan until 1568, when he was deposed.⁵⁰

Bogatyrev begs two questions. Like Pokrovskii, he does not ask whether the compiler of the *Book of Degrees* had access to annals after 1560 from a source later than the Compilation of 1560. The most significant event of 1560 was the death of Ivan’s first wife, Anastasiia, which is not mentioned, so Bogatyrev concludes that the text was compiled before the only legitimate termination point of a discussion of Ivan’s reign. Secondly, Bogatyrev does not address the question of how—or even where—the *Book of Degrees* could have been compiled during the oprichnina. Indeed, one wonders how Metropolitan Filipp found time to work on the text at all during his chaotic term as metropolitan. Bogatyrev does not indicate what passages originated only with Filipp.

Lenhoff has made a persuasive argument that the structure of the *Book of Degrees* from the beginning entailed writing Degree 17, so that the extensive Degree 1 on St. Vladimir and the equally extensive Degree 17 on Ivan IV would frame the work.⁵¹ Such a conception would not be inconsistent with ending the degree before the end of Ivan’s reign. Finally, given that the *Book of Degrees* was unfinished, Bogatyrev’s use of the word “finished” is confusing. Like Usachev, Bogatyrev probably means that the text achieved its surviving form.

Edward Keenan, as Bogatyrev notes, also sees the 1560s manuscripts as only drafts. Keenan’s dating is significantly later than Bogatyrev’s. He wrote that the text “took final shape” around the time of Ivan’s death. A draft was written during Afanasii’s lifetime (he died in 1575), which was a source of LLS, but the “use by” date on the paper on which it was written allowed for twenty years to pass. The “earliest independent *documentary* evidence” (Keenan’s emphasis) of the existence of the text is the Dumin copy, noted in a 1597 Solovki Monastery inventory. Keenan connects the later history of the text to Boris

⁵⁰ Bogatyrev, “*The Book of Degrees of the Royal Genealogy*,” quotations: “quite probable,” 57 n. 24; “finished and extended,” 68.

⁵¹ Gail Lenhoff, “The Construction of Russian History in the *Stepennaia kniga*,” *Revue des études slaves* 76 (2005): 31–50, especially 42 n. 44.

Godunov.⁵² As we shall see, some scholars also connect the history of LLS to Godunov's supporters.

Apparently Keenan thought paper of a certain watermark could sit around unused much longer in the second half of the sixteenth century than in the second and third quarters of the seventeenth century, to which he assigned plus or minus five-year dates to the compositions written on them. It is not obvious why Godunov supporters thought the *Book of Degrees*, which exalted a dynasty to which Godunov did not belong, would help him as *éminence grise* in Tsar Fedor's reign. However, the phrase "took final shape" still rings false for an unfinished literary work. Keenan provided no rationale for why no one worked on the first draft between at least 1575 and 1584.

When and Why Did Work on LLS Stop?

Historians have dated the beginning of work on LLS to as early as the 1550s and the termination of work on LLS to as late as the reign of Ivan IV's son and heir, Tsar Fedor Ivanovich. Overwhelmingly, watermark dates drive the debate over the dating of manuscripts. The reason such dates cannot definitively resolve the question is simple: we do not know how long paper of a certain mark was in use in Muscovy.

Scholars using watermark, paleographic, or textual evidence sometimes provide dates for individual volumes of LLS, but the dating of the tenth volume, the *Tsar's Book*, in fact, constitutes dating of cessation of LLS as a whole. Such datings range from the early 1560s (before 1562) through the late 1570s/early 1580s up to 1584–85. I will not regurgitate all of them here.⁵³ Bogatyrev offers the most circumspect conclusion: LLS "cannot be dated precisely,"⁵⁴

⁵² Edward L. Keenan, "The *Stepennaia kniga* and the Godunovian Renaissance," in Lenhoff and Kleimola, "The Book of Royal Degrees" and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness, 69–79, quotations: "took final shape," 71; "used by," 73; "earliest independent," 74.

⁵³ E. S. Sizov, "K voprosu o datirovke Shumilovskogo toma Litseвого letopisnogo svoda XVI v.," in *Problemy paleografii i kodikologii v SSSR* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), 126–27; A. A. Amosov, "Litsevoi letopisnyi svod: Istoriograficheskie zametki," in *Mir istochnik-ovedeniia (sbornik v chest' Sigurda Ottovicha Shmidta)*, ed. A. D. Zaitsev et al. (Moscow: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, Istoriko-arkhivnyi institut; Penza: Penzenskaia oblastnaia administratsiia, Departament kul'tury, 1994), 41–42; Amosov, *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod: Kompleksnoe kodikologicheskoe issledovanie* (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1998), 20–21, 167–75, 188; Bogatyrev, "Three Takes on One Legend," 21 n. 17; S. M. Kashtanov, "K izucheniiu Litseвого letopisnogo svoda Ivana Groznogo," *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 2011* (2014): 63–72.

⁵⁴ Bogatyrev, "Three Takes on One Legend," 21.

which is true, although that has not restrained anyone from proffering dating conclusions.

Many historians and literary specialists quite rightly emphasize that it took a while, indeed years, for LLS to be compiled. LLS was a “work in progress” that never achieved completion. Consequently “when” LLS was written must be a range of years, but “when” work ceased should be a finite date. However, several scholars posit interruptions followed by resumption of work. Assigning completion of the “basic” or “base narrative” of LLS to a finite period, followed by a hiatus and then further expansion or editing, serves to create multiple “final” dates of work on the text. With an unfinished work, there is no way to tell when further editing and writing constitutes not a continuation of a work in progress but a new work in imitation of a completed or at least no longer active literary work.

I have arranged references in rough chronological order by date of publication, save for combining discussion of multiple publications by the same author.

Evgenii Sizov used content analysis of the eighth volume of LLS, the Shumilovskii, to argue that an anachronistic reference to the 1508 reburial of Vasilii, son of appanage prince Vladimir Andreevich, in the Archangel Cathedral proves that the text was written after 1574, when Vasilii died, but before the unmentioned death of Tsarevich Ivan, also buried there, in 1581. Sizov carefully establishes on the basis of paper, illustrations, and handwriting that this passage is not an interpolation. He correlates this conclusion with the view of Nikolai Likhachev, accepted by Sigurd Shmidt, that the last volume of LLS was edited at the end of the 1570s or the beginning of the 1580s.⁵⁵ Unfortunately, we do not know if the volumes of LLS were compiled *seriatem*.

As mentioned below, Amosov later proposed that multiple teams of scribes and illustrators worked on different volumes simultaneously. Therefore the dating of the Shumilov volume might not be conclusive for the dating of other volumes.

We must immediately note a conceptual hole in this analysis which applies to all theories of the termination of LLS. The year 1567 constitutes the latest annal in LLS. No annal survives for the years 1568 and later. Therefore, by 1570 there was nothing for the LLS compiler to compile. (Valentin Morozov argues that such annals did exist, and therefore work on LLS continued until Ivan’s death and later; see below.) And therefore the more important cessation date for LLS might not be when editors stopped editing the text but when chroniclers stopped writing contemporary annals to be edited. The LLS

⁵⁵ Sizov, “K voprosu o datirovke Shumilovskogo toma,” 126–41.

annals for 1561–67 are far too extensive to have been written years later from memory.

Vladimir Kobrin wrote that the political situation changed too quickly for chroniclers to adapt; therefore, the “most detailed chronicles end.”⁵⁶ Actually, only one “most detailed chronicle,” LLS, ended; detailed Novgorod and Pskov chronicles continued unabated.

Iankel’ Solodkin concluded that the collapse of Ivan’s policies was so bad that it was no longer possible to narrate the history of his reign.⁵⁷ Of course, it obviously was possible for Novgorod and Pskov chroniclers to write histories of the remainder of Ivan’s reign.

Aleksandr Amosov musters massive watermark evidence to substantiate Kloss’s conclusion that work on LLS began in 1568–69 and that the “basic text” was completed by 1576. In the process he maligns the use of paleographic or aesthetic evidence as too subjective to produce valid dating. He rejects dating that presupposes that paper sat around for ten to fifteen years before it was used as inconsistent with current knowledge of bureaucratic paper usage.⁵⁸ He opines that all scholars studying LLS believe that Ivan ordered its compilation.⁵⁹ In passing Amosov endorses the theory that the compiler of LLS utilized both the *Solovetskii Chronicle* of Iov, as proposed by Koretskii, and Ivan IV’s *First Epistle to Kurbskii*, as proposed by Daniil Al’shits and Sergei Bakhrushin.⁶⁰

In an earlier article, more clearly than in his monograph, Amosov notes that compiling LLS took years. Three or four teams of scribes and illustrators simultaneously worked on different volumes utilizing the same paper. Work began during 1568–69, but ceased only when Ivan died. Some scholars believe that Ivan redacted the text, but Amosov refers to an otherwise unidentified editor who approved work at each stage. Because the text was incomplete, the portrayal of Ivan’s reign remained unfinished. Amosov also claimed that sources from the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century support the supposition that another book of LLS on the end of Ivan’s reign survived until then.⁶¹ Although this article contains no documentation, Amosov took this idea from Morozov, discussed below.

⁵⁶ Vladimir Borisovich Kobrin, *Ivan Groznyi* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989), 107.

⁵⁷ Solodkin, *Istoriia pozdnego russkogo letopisaniia*, 14.

⁵⁸ Amosov, *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*, 188, 198–99, 211–12.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 190.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 161–62, 308–09.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 43–45.

Amosov did not necessarily contradict himself in writing that the “basic work” was finished by 1576 but additional (editorial?) work continued until Ivan’s death, but taken together these two assertions complicate analysis. That LLS was fruitlessly tied up “in press” for eight years seems odd, especially since during that time no new annals for post-1567 years were incorporated into LLS.

To determine watermark dating based upon extant instances of a given mark, Amosov employs a statistical methodology that has subsequently been questioned by Elena Ukhanova (see below).

I repeat that the references to the “basic text” as “completed” are imprecise. There is no way to define the “basic text” of an unfinished work; we only know the text as it has survived. The textual link between Ivan’s *First Epistle to Kurbskii* and LLS has not played any role in the controversy over the authenticity of the Kurbskii-Groznyi correspondence. Nitpicking aside, Amosov’s exclusive focus on watermarks means that he elides any consideration of historical context. The period 1568–75 encompasses the oprichnina, the burning of Moscow, and probably the installation of Simeon Bekbulatovich as grand prince of All Rus’. A two-year, even a one-year difference in dating entails major changes in what was going on concerning Ivan, Moscow, and Muscovy, and watermark datings are too imprecise to pin down dating to such a narrow window.⁶²

Igor’ Danilevskii opined that the extinction of the chronicle genre in the sixteenth century derives from the genre’s eschatological function. Expectations of the End of Times meant that chronicles had outlived their utility.⁶³ Nevertheless, Novgorod and Pskov chronicles had not outlived their utility, and seventeenth-century authors and readers still wrote new chronicles.

Morozov incorporated his earlier articles into his monograph. In a 1986 article he cited a note by I. E. Zabelin of an extract from the Armory (Oruzheinaia palata) income-expense books for 1639 that a bill had been sent to the Treasury Bureau (Kazennyi prikaz) for “five tsar’s [*tsarskie*] books, parts 1, 2, 4, 6, 7.” Because the Tsar’s Book bears the annotation “part 4,” he concluded that parts 6 and 7 must be LLS for the years between 1568 and 1584.⁶⁴

⁶² As Brian Boeck pithily phrased it, watermarks provide macro dating, not micro dating.

⁶³ Igor’ Nikolaevich Danilevskii, *Povest’ vremennykh let: Germenevicheskie osnovy izucheniia letopisnykh tekstov* (Moscow: Aspect Press, 2004).

⁶⁴ V. V. Morozov, “‘Istoriiia Groznogo’ v letopisanii sovremennikov (Opyt pervichnoi formalizatsii),” in *Matematika v izuchenii srednevekovykh povestvovatel’nykh istochnikov: Sbornik statei*, ed. B. M. Kloss (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 102.

I do not know on what basis Morozov inferred that the “books” in question were LLS. When bound, probably later, LLS constituted ten volumes, just up to 1567, which does not match. If LLS never left the Kremlin, as some historians cited below claim, there would have been no need for any bureau to acquire it in 1639. The extract says nothing about the contents of the books. Finally, if LLS volumes for 1568 to 1584 ever existed, not only did they disappear, but they also left no textual traces in any post-1584 chronicle text.

In a 1983 article Morozov argued that LLS’s conception of Ivan, judging by miniatures, changed from the first to the second redaction (variant). (The second variant reflected editorial intervention.)⁶⁵ Such a judgment of the textual and visual portrayal of Ivan in the entire LLS for all variants is premature. In particular, it does not deal with the numerous inconsistencies in Ivan’s portrayal in LLS, for example, whether he is bearded and what kinds of headpiece he wears.

In a 1989 article Morozov doubted that the Tsar’s Archive was in charge of Muscovite chronicle writing, meaning LLS, and asserted that its compiler was undoubtedly a professional book-man.⁶⁶ He did not specify whether a professional book-man could be a layman.

In his 2005 monograph Morozov, who applied the term “official” to LLS, wrote that it was sad that Koretskii claimed that official chronicle writing ceased for sixty years after 1568. He criticized Kloss’s estimate of how many years it took to compile LLS because we do not know how many scribes and illustrators worked on it. The list of disgraced members of the elite correlates to events in 1564–70. He disputed Amosov’s assertion that work on the text ended in 1568. LLS, he claimed, was not finished until 1580–81. For much of the sixteenth century LLS was stored in the Tsar’s Treasury. The direct source of LLS was the Compilation of 1568, but work continued even later, as indicated by the section on Tsar Fedor. Although it would appear that only a cleric, specifically a monk, had the requisite knowledge of Scripture to compile LLS, its content speaks otherwise. We do not know where LLS was compiled, but the candidates are royal and ecclesiastical scriptoria in Moscow, Aleksandrovskaiia Sloboda, and Sviiazhsk (which can be dismissed). Aleksandrovskaiia sloboda would be consistent with use of the same paper there for printing, but no source confirms that LLS was written there. Historians have to remember that LLS was not written in order that interpolations could be inserted into it. Rather, Morozov agrees with Amosov and eighteenth-cen-

⁶⁵ V. V. Morozov, “Ivan Groznyi na miniatyurakh Tsarstvennoi knigi,” in *Drevnerusskoe iskusstvo: Rukopisnaia kniga. Sbornik Tretii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), 232–40.

⁶⁶ Morozov, “Letopisets 1568 goda,” 158, 160.

tury noble historian Mikhail Shcherbatov that the redactor worked during the reign of Tsar Boris, to convince Tsar Fedor to rely on Boris Godunov.⁶⁷

The Compilation of 1560 is not hypothetical; a manuscript has been found. Morozov's Compilation of 1568—which would supposedly explain the last entry in LLS for 1567—is apparently hypothetical. Morozov infers its existence and content from LLS.⁶⁸ Morozov at least raises the question of where LLS might have been compiled, but he can only imply in Moscow, and finesses the question of royal or church patronage. Somehow the unknown compilers and redactors stopped their basic narrative in 1567 because their source, the Compilation of 1568, “ran out,” but that did not stop authors and compilers from adding a section on Tsar Fedor. How LLS extolled Godunov remains a mystery.

Aleksandr Filiushkin noted that the official Muscovite chronicle reflected in the LLS ended in 1567. He takes issue with Solodkin's theory by observing that it is unclear which event produced by Ivan's failed policies at that time could have so unnerved the chronicler as to preclude further narrative writing. He criticizes Danilevskii's theory that chronicles lost their eschatological function because the year 7077 in the Byzantine calendar from the creation of the world, 1568–69 CE, was expected to see the apocalypse. Such logic cannot explain the continued writing of regional and short chronicles, unless the end of the world had no meaning for them. Koretskii concluded that only official chronicles ended, but local and private chronicles continued, especially the *Pskov III Chronicle*, which contains a 1567 compilation. Filiushkin seems to endorse Koretskii's interpretation of the evolution of the Solovetskii Monastery chronicle through the 1580s but qualifies his invocation of Koretskii's theory of the chronicle of Patriarch Iov by writing that “some scholars” (implicitly: but not all scholars) accept it. Filiushkin also mentions isolated entries post-1567 in the Kirillo-Belozero Monastery or Vologda chronicles reflected in the *Ustiug (Archangel) Chronicle*.⁶⁹ Filiushkin seems to have critiqued existing theories of the termination of the chronicle writing in 1567 without presenting a theory of his own.

Disregarding Filiushkin's references to official chronicles and short monastic or private chronicles, Filiushkin's remarks remain incomplete with-

⁶⁷ V. V. Morozov, *Litsevoi svod v kontekste otechestvennogo letopisaniia XVI veka* (Moscow: Indrik, 2005), 8, 26–28, 57–58, 85, 255–56.

⁶⁸ Morozov, “Letopisets 1568 goda,” 155–63.

⁶⁹ A. I. Filiushkin, “Izobrazhenie Livonskoi voyny v russkom letopisanii XVI–XVII vv.,” in *Issledovaniia po istorii srednevekovoi Rusi: K 80-letiiu Iuriiu Georgievicha Alekseeva* (Moscow: Al'ians-Arkheo, 2006), 349–54.

out an alternative solution to the question. If he considers the issue open, he should have said do.

Seemingly inconsistently, however, in a book published two years later Filiushkin referred to Muscovite eschatological expectations and messianic hopes in any year with the number “7,” including 7070 (1561–62) and 7077 (1568–69), which were “close” to the dates of the beginning and ending of the oprichnina.⁷⁰ However, in this discussion he does not relate that phenomenon to the cessation of chronicle writing. The “closeness” of the dates involved to the creation and abolition of the oprichnina is forced.⁷¹

Konstantin Erusalimskii observed that a significant part of Ivan’s reign, after 1567 to be specific, was not covered by court history writing (*dvorovoe istoriopisanie*).⁷² Ivan opposed the elite in the Ambassadorial Bureau in charge of chronicle writing, but, he insists, the real crisis of court historiography might be tied to criticism of the legends incorporated into chronicles by the Ambassadorial Bureau.⁷³ I have questioned above whether the Ambassadorial Bureau patronized chronicle writing. Moreover, the diplomatic books (*posol’skie knigi*) from Ivan IV’s reign regurgitated more than one legend, such as Ivan’s descent from Prus, the brother of Augustus Caesar, and the legend of Monomakh’s Cap (*shapka*), to which Ivan did not object.

In a later article Erusalimskii confirms the contention of Kloss and Amosov of Ambassadorial Bureau participation in the creation of LLS by a textual parallel between LLS and the “stenographic account” of Ivan’s negotiations with Antonio Possevino in 1581–82. He extrapolates that the official LLS was continued through the coronation of Tsar Fedor. There is no contradiction between dating the “basic” work on LLS to the 1570s and early 1580s and its continuation that late. Unnamed “leaders of diplomatic affairs” (who could not have included Viskovatyi, who was dead by this time) were the “initiators, censors, [and] proof-readers” of Russia’s visual memory in the form of miniatures. LLS coverage of Fedor’s coronation compels rethinking when work on the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* ceased. The military-diplomatic situation in the second half of the 1570s demanded a glorious victory to top off the narrative, like the taking of Polotsk had done for the *Book of Degrees*.

⁷⁰ Aleksandr Il’ich Filiushkin, *Andrei Kurbskii* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2008), 117.

⁷¹ On Andrei Iurganov’s apocalyptic interpretation of the oprichnina, see Charles J. Halperin, “Cultural Categories, Councils and Consultations in Muscovy,” *Kritika* 3, 4 (2002): 662–63.

⁷² I assume that this phrase means government-sponsored chronicle writing.

⁷³ K. Iu. Erusalimskii, “Istoriia na posol’skoi sluzhbe: Diplomatiia i pamiat’ v Rossii XVI veka,” in *Istoriia i pamiat’: Istoricheskaiia kul’tura do nachala novogo vremeni*, ed. Lorina P. Repina (Moscow: “Krug,” 2006), 721.

The successful 1577 Livonia campaign might have inspired continued work on LLS from 1577 to 1581, but Ivan's exchange of letters with Bathory forced him to reconsider the past, and the death of Tsarevich Ivan make continued work impossible until Tsar Fedor's reign.⁷⁴

In both his earlier and later articles Erusalimskii associated LLS with the Ambassadorial Bureau, but I do not know how to integrate his analysis here that the deteriorating foreign policy and military situation, the catastrophes of the Livonian War, and the death of Tsarevich Ivan sounded the death knell of LLS, with his earlier view that Ivan terminated the project because LLS incorporated legendary material. A massive text that never left the Kremlin seems a poor instrument of Muscovite diplomacy; no foreign envoy would ever see the miniatures or read the text. Textual borrowing does not prove common patronage. Moreover, LLS never actually stops according to Erusalimskii, it only catches its breadth until inspired by new events, which raises the same objections as Morozov's analysis. The use of the conquest of Polotsk by the *Book of Degrees* to end on a high note did not work: a brief interpolation is no substitute for a defensible narrative.

Tat'iana Oparina wrote that Ivan's reign of terror led to an interval in chronicle writing of several decades.⁷⁵ She must mean until works from the Time of Troubles, but work on LLS ceased permanently and the "interval" did not apply to Novgorod and Pskov.

Sergei Kashtanov used watermarks to date each of the ten LLS volumes, and then sought to correlate its contents with the political situation of that time. He opined that work began in the 1550s, no later than 1563, under Metropolitan Makarii, during which time the first two volumes on biblical and world history were compiled. The death of Makarii in 1563 and the creation of the oprichnina led to a hiatus. In addition, Ivan might have been satisfied with the endorsement of his coronation as tsar by the patriarch of Constantinople and therefore lost some of his incentive to pursue the project. Work resumed during 1568 and continued to the early 1580s. Kashtanov assigned completion of the Shumilov copy to 1579–80 and the Synodal manuscript and the *Tsar's Book*, which together cover Ivan's reign from 1533 to 1567, to 1581–83. There is no way that such a project could have been undertaken without the financial resources of the royal Treasury, which alone could cover the cost of supplies such as Alexandrian paper and paints and of labor for artists and illustrators. Unfortunately we have no quantitative information on those costs.

⁷⁴ K. Iu. Erusalimskii, "Litsevoi svod v diplomatii Ivana Groznogo," *Vestnik Nizhegorodskogo universiteta im. N. I. Lobachevskogo*, no. 6 (2017): 24–33.

⁷⁵ Tat'iana Anatol'evna Oparina, "Problema istochnikov deportatsii livonskikh plenikov v Rossiю," in *Baltiiskii vopros v kontse XV–XVI vv.: Sbornik nauchnykh statei*, ed. A. I. Filiushkin (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2010), 244.

Kashtanov agrees with Petr Sadikov that the Simeon Bekbulatovich episode was connected with Ivan's campaign to become king of Poland. Interest in the *LLS* volumes from the mid-1570s in Rus'-Tatar relations was connected to the presence of a baptized Tatar tsarevich on the throne of Moscow. Ivan edited *LLS*, including the *Tsar's Book*, at the very end of his life, probably after the death of Tsarevich Ivan. Kashtanov hypothesized that the intended audience of the text was Ivan, his sons, courtiers close to him, clergy, foreign merchants and envoys, and even all "progressive humanity" and/or the "people" (*narod*), but it is impossible to tell. Kashtanov admitted that his arguments were not definitive, but insisted that the distinction between the first two volumes of *LLS*, which must have been compiled by a learned cleric, perhaps Makarii himself, and the remaining volumes is unimpeachable.⁷⁶

Kashtanov's theory of the evolution of *LLS* presupposes that the government, led by Ivan, and the Russian Orthodox Church, including at least Metropolitan Makarii although Kashtanov mentions no other metropolitan, collaborated on its compilation. Why the beginning of the oprichnina, when the level of violence was relatively low, should have inhibited work on *LLS* when the mass terror of the later oprichnina did not escapes me. Kashtanov's attempt to correlate political events and the composition of each volume—most of which I have omitted—is forced. Rus'-Tatar relations *always* interested chroniclers; the presence of a Tatar tsar (*not* tsarevich; Simeon was former tsar of Kasimov) on the throne was superfluous in arousing attention to the Tatars. Ivan had officially hidden the oprichnina from the Poles and Lithuanians. He probably did the same for Simeon Bekbulatovich, which undermines Sadikov's theory. Kashtanov has Ivan editing *LLS* during the years after the death of Tsarevich Ivan, exactly when Erusalimskii claims that it was impossible for anyone to work on *LLS*. How a text of the size of *LLS* could be intended for a sizable audience, including foreign diplomats and merchants who could not read Slavonic, makes one wonder. How productively scribes and illustrators could work on *LLS* in Moscow (for the sake of argument; Kashtanov does not specify the geographic location of their scriptorium) during the 1570 Moscow executions and the 1571 Crimean burning of the city remains unclear. Kashtanov does not address that issue. Kashtanov in effect concluded that the authors/compilers of the first two *LLS* volumes were not the authors/compilers of the remaining eight volumes.

Ukhanova takes issue with Amosov's mathematical analysis of watermarks, but confusingly accepts Kloss's conclusion that work on *LLS* was "finished" by 1575 and insists that it was "completed" no later than the end of the 1570s. Close to 1580 Ivan wrote the interpolations in the *Tsar's Book*. Ukhanova

⁷⁶ Kashtanov, "K izucheniiu Litsevogo letopisnogo svoda," 57–79.

reconciles these views by suggesting that after 1576 there was an interruption in work on LLS.⁷⁷

Aside from the terminological issue of the “finishing” and “completion” of an unfinished work, here again the concept of a “work in progress” permits gaps in production and obfuscation on dating completion. Despite Boeck’s obiter dictum below, even twenty-five years after the fall of the USSR, not all scholars in Russia knew that Ivan did not edit LLS.

Gail Lenhoff follows Kloss and Ukhanova in dating the beginning of work on LLS to 1568 and the stoppage of work to 1576. Because LLS did not censor the names of appanage princes and boyars from the Synodal manuscript, its function must have been archival. “Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how anyone working in the Oprichnina under close supervision of the tsar would have been that careless that often.” LLS used the *Book of Degrees* but did not imitate its format.⁷⁸

The lack of censorship of the names of disgraced courtiers in the Synodal manuscript during the oprichnina could have several explanations: LLS was not edited during the oprichnina, Ivan was not closely supervising the editing, or simply that Muscovite scribes were not familiar with the concept of “non-person” and did not follow George Orwell’s depiction of the state in 1984 and of Stalinist historiography of changing the past to suit the political exigencies of the present. Perhaps Lenhoff was being sarcastic in suggesting that Ivan did not supervise the revision of LLS; she is certainly highly skeptical that he composed hymns.

Brian Boeck writes that “[s]omeone at the court of Ivan IV, aka ‘the Terrible,’ financed an expensive and expansive effort to visualize world history and Russia’s place within it,” a message similar to other texts of the period, but “[f]or unknown reasons, the ambitious project was abandoned before completion.” “Only recently” has LLS garnered major scholarly attention with the publication of the 2008 facsimile edition and the creation of a digital version; these generated an “explosion of interest” that doubled the relevant bibliography in a decade.” Nevertheless, “much about LLS and its intended purpose remains to be discovered.” “A detailed analysis of codicology and paleography put an end to previous attempts to date the project to earlier decades of Ivan’s reign” before the 1570s. Why was the text left in an “unfinished state”? “For several historians the unpredictable and violent personality of Ivan IV has provided a ready, but illusory, explanation.” The most incomplete volume, the

⁷⁷ E. V. Oukhanova [Ukhanova], “Problemy izucheniia bumagi *Litseвого letopisnogo svoda*,” *Revue des études slaves* 87, 3–4 (2016): 321–35.

⁷⁸ Gail Lenhoff, “The ‘Book of Degrees’ and the ‘Illuminated Chronicle’: A Comparative Analysis,” *Revue des études slaves* 87, 3–4 (2016): 337–49.

Tsar's Book, was "defaced by various editorial inventions, deletions, and marginal additions" by a "zealous editor." Although some additions are similar to Ivan's *First Epistle to Kurbskii*, theories that Ivan or Viskovatyi made those edits have been discredited.

There is at present no scholarly consensus about why the project was never finished. The forceful editorial interventions in the final volumes suggest that the depiction of more contemporary 16th-century events became highly contentious. Whole sequences of completed pages were rejected, scuttled, and redesigned. Not all of them could be redrawn and repainted before the project was abandoned. The visualization of the marginal additions caused a kind of crisis of confidence for the illustrators.

Although many scholars see the death of Ivan as the date of termination of work on LLS, the section on Tsar Fedor "suggests that the project was either continued or revived under Ivan's successor."⁷⁹

Boeck is unfortunately vague as to the identity of the "someone" who underwrote the costs of this costly project, which express the same concepts as unspecified "other" projects from his unspecified "period." He says nothing about the identity of the "zealous editor." He not only dismisses Ivan as a possible "zealous editor," but denies that Ivan's behavior could have caused cessation of work on the project, which continued into Tsar Fedor's reign. He dates the implicitly temporary cessation of work to a "crisis of confidence" on the part of the illustrators and scribes, who could not cope with the demands of the "zealous editor." We cannot know whether work on LLS stopped because work by the illustrators stopped, or vice versa; we have no evidence of the sequence of events. However, only a comprehensive analysis of all the interpolations will permit drawing a conclusion as to whether Ivan's behavior inspired them. If so, then Ivan's actions set in motion the course of events that led to the cessation of work on LLS. Despite that, it seems, after Ivan IV's death the project was resumed by writing a section on Tsar Fedor, and despite this resumption of work, Boeck still deems the text unfinished. LLS does not contain text or illustrations for the years 1568 to 1584, nor did the scribes and illustrators who resumed work on LLS after 1584 fill that gap. What happened to the unknown "zealous editor" after 1584 escapes comment, but clearly in Boeck's view that editor had sufficient clout to virtually scuttle the project for an indeterminate number of years. Boeck does not specify when the "zealous editor" edited the text, so the duration of the hiatus remains indeterminate in

⁷⁹ Brian J. Boeck, "Problems and Possibilities of a 'New' Muscovite Source," *Kritika* 19, 1 (2018): 9–15, quotes 9, 10, 10 n. 1, 11.

his exposition. *Prima facie* only two men in Muscovy during Ivan's reign had both the resources and the authority to initiate or terminate LLS, Ivan himself, and whoever was metropolitan at the time. Other than Filipp, who was otherwise occupied opposing the oprichnina, no metropolitan after 1568 seems to have had the influence necessary to fill that role, and Boeck excludes Ivan as well. Boeck's view leaves the puzzle of LLS unsolved. Even if Boeck has found the reasons for the interruption of the project, he does not address its abandonment under Tsar Fedor. Boeck raises more questions than he answers, or, to be fair, could answer in a brief article. Again, Ukhanova does not share his judgment as to the possibility that Ivan edited LLS.

Morozov calls attention to a pencil sketch in the *Tsar's Book* of Ivan's 1553 illness, an incomplete miniature, described (but not reproduced?) by Sergei Platonov in his 1906 publication of the text, which shows a sick Ivan, Vladimir Staritskii refusing to swear an oath to Tsarevich Dmitrii as Ivan's heir, and boyar Prince Vladimir Vorotynskii standing opposite (and presumably opposing) Staritskii.⁸⁰ Until very recently I did not appreciate the significance of this miniature. I do not have access to the 1906 publication, and as far as I know the sketch has never been reproduced or printed. It has never been cited in any discussion of the credibility of the interpolated narrative of the 1553 succession crisis. Moreover, it may not be the only extant miniature illustrating the narrative of the interpolations about 1553. It was only after I noticed Morozov's reference that I paid attention to Shaposhnik's description of a miniature for 1553 of Ivan reclining in bed while the oath of allegiance to Tsarevich Dmitrii is being administered to the boyars, which may or may not be the same miniature described by Morozov.⁸¹ These miniatures, assuming for the moment that they are different, must have been drawn after that interpolation was written. Their existence demonstrates illustrator willingness at least to attempt to deal with the "zealous editor's" intrusions into LLS, and might qualify Boeck's theory of the cessation of work on LLS.

As noted above, Bogatyrev concludes that LLS cannot be precisely dated, but he does not eschew presenting an approximate date, seconding Kloss's view that work took place between 1568 and 1575, such that LLS remained a "work in progress" during the 1570s. Morozov rejects the idea that the section on Tsar Fedor was a later addition, which means that work did not stop, it merely paused, between approximately 1575 and 1586. Bogatyrev calculates that the process of writing LLS took fifteen years. The patrons of LLS, he opines, could have been followers of Metropolitan Afanasii, who had already resigned as metropolitan, such as Nikita Parfeniev, who continued to work for

⁸⁰ Morozov, *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*, 169, citing *PSRL*, vol. 13, pt. 2 (1906), table VIII.

⁸¹ Shaposhnik, *Ivan Groznyi*, 190.

his successors, including Filipp, and others who shared Afanasii's belief that the ruler should consult his subjects.⁸²

Bogatyrev thus argues that work on LLS took place during and after the oprichnina, during and after the metropolitanate of Filipp, during and after the last years of Ivan IV's reign not covered by the text. Actually, if work continued from 1568 to 1586, then it occupied eighteen, not fifteen, years, but that ignores the hiatus. Bogatyrev implies that LLS was a project of the metropolitan, but Filipp, as I have repeatedly observed, had far more serious problems with which to deal than an illustrated chronicle, he had no history of literary activity, and there is no direct connection between him and any manuscript of LLS. More to the point, the connection between LLS and the metropolitan's chancery remains undocumented. Finally, as Bogatyrev has cogently shown better than anyone else, the theory that the ruler should consult his subjects was so pervasive in sixteenth-century Muscovy that linking it particularly to Afanasii seems unjustified.⁸³

Nancy Kollmann declares that "[f]rom the 1550s to the 1590s the church hierarchy, tsarist court and wealthy monasteries commissioned immense projects of painting and illustration—frescoes, icons, illuminated hagiographies, and chronicles." Citing Kloss and Morozov on dating, even though they do not agree (Kloss 1568–76, Morozov mid-1570s to early 1580s), LLS was "one spectacular project produced in Kremlin workshops in the 1560s and 1570s." Kollmann extends the period of artistic innovation to include Tsar Fedor's reign. However, LLS constituted the "road not taken." "It was never completed, never copied, and it never left the Kremlin." "The production of official chronicles waned after the 1570s" and history writing resumed only in the seventeenth century. "The few chronicles produced were shorter and more focused." By the end of the seventeenth century, the genre of *historia* was appearing.⁸⁴

Kollmann associates LLS with such a lengthy period that it is virtually deprived of context. Cessation of work in the 1570s remains unmotivated. Notable is the lack of any gaps in the continuity of cultural innovation, despite the traumatic events of the second half of Ivan's reign. Kollmann locates the creative center of LLS in the Moscow Kremlin, but leaves open whether in a government or ecclesiastical scriptorium. When Kollmann writes that LLS was never "copied," she means "imitated," because the sixteenth-century Synodal Copy and *Tsar's Book* were copied in the seventeenth century as the *Alex-*

⁸² Bogatyrev, "Three Takes on One Legend," 21 n. 17, 34, 40–41.

⁸³ Sergei Bogatyrev, *The Sovereign and His Counsellors: Ritualised Consultations in Muscovite Political Culture, 1350s–1570s* (Saarijärvi: Gummerus, 2000).

⁸⁴ Kollmann, "The *Litsevoi svod* as Graphic Novel," 54, 76–79.

ander Nevskii Chronicle (*Aleksandro-Nevskaia letopis'*) and the Lebedev Chronicle (*Lebedevskaia letopis'*).⁸⁵ Her capsule history of chronicle writing during the latter half of Ivan's reign and through the seventeenth century is compromised by her disregard for Novgorod and Pskov chronicles and her low estimation of seventeenth-century chronicles.

Dating Unfinished Literary Works

Only a lengthy but hardly comprehensive examination of theories of when and why work on LLS stopped can fully illustrate how broadly scholars disagree. Work on LLS may have begun in the 1550s or 1560s. Work could not have begun until the *Book of Degrees* had reached a significant stage or had stopped permanently. Ivan, government bureaus, the metropolitan, or someone else may have patronized—and funded—the project. Work on LLS may have stopped with or without one or more interruptions in the 1570s, early 1580s, or mid-1580s. Its compilation may be the work of clerics, of government agencies, or lay professional scribes. It may have been compiled in Moscow or Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda. Work may have ceased or gone on hiatus because of external political events such as the death of Metropolitan Makarii, the beginning of the oprichnina, the reign of terror of the oprichnina, or the death of Ivan IV, or more simply because of the demands of its redactor, who may have been Ivan, Metropolitan Afanasii, or some otherwise unknown layman or cleric. The famous *Tsar's Book* interpolations could not have been written until there was a text to edit, but that may have been anywhere from the mid-1570s to the early 1580s.

The lack of scholarly consensus on all these issues derives from the state of the existing manuscripts. There are no colophons declaring who was writing/compiling/copying/illustrating LLS, nor when, nor where. Watermarks provide only approximate dating, which is vitiated by the fact that all scholars agree that work on LLS, even if unfinished, continued for years. We do not know how many scribes or illustrators worked on LLS, but certainly it took groups. Yet not a single source outside LLS noted the existence of teams of scribes and illustrators working on LLS for years in a scriptorium. We can only guess at who employed them.

⁸⁵ For collations of the originals and copies, see V. V. Morozov, "Sootnoshenie tekstov Tsarstvennoi knigi, Sinodal'nogo toma Litsevo go letopisnogo svoda XVI v., Aleksandro-Nevskoi i Lebedevskoi letopisei," in Zaitsev, *Mir istochnikovedeniia*, 38–41; E. A. Belokon', V. V. Morozov, and S. A. Morozov, comps., *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod XVI veka: Metodika i izuchenie razroznennogo letopisnogo kompleksa* (Moscow: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 2003), 203–06, appendix II.

Bobrov observes the irony that the composition of the *Book of Degrees* occurred “almost simultaneously” with the cessation of “official” chronicle writing in the LLS, in the 1560s.⁸⁶ In a sense this restates that the former was a source of the latter. The real irony is that the *Book of Degrees* was unfinished when it became a source of LLS. The literary histories of the two texts illustrate a major point that has not received sufficient attention. The *Book of Degrees* ended its main narrative in 1560, but annals for 1561–67 do survive in LLS. There is no methodologically perfect mechanism for determining when those annals were composed and therefore whether the compiler of the *Book of Degrees* chose not to utilize them or had no access to them. That work, at least editorial work, on LLS continued after 1567 does not explain why no annals from 1568 to 1584 survive. The evidence that they ever existed is dubious. Scholars may need to distinguish between the date when chroniclers stopped composing annals for Ivan’s reign and the date when compilers stopped compiling a compilation or chose not to continue the narrative further. Here the difference between the *Book of Degrees* and LLS stands out: it is theoretically possible that the compiler chose to end its narrative in 1560 even though he might have had access to later annals, whereas after 1567 the compiler of LLS did not have that option. The abrupt cessation of the *Book of Degrees* narrative and the insertion of three interpolations up to 1563 suggests, on the other hand, that cessation of work on the *Book of Degrees* was unplanned, because it lacks any reasoned conclusion.

I think it is inescapable that chroniclers who wrote about post-1567 events in Novgorod and Pskov chronicles were neither so confused nor so traumatized by Ivan’s arbitrary and excessive violence that they could not write about them. In actuality all Muscovites, not just literate members of the elite, lay or clerical, had a ready-made completely adequate religious conceptual framework for interpreting Ivan’s actions that permitted them to continue recording them. If Ivan acted badly, that was God’s punishment for Muscovite sins, often inspired by the enemy of all true, Orthodox (*pravoslavnye*), Christians, the devil. This closed explanatory system permitted an author to narrate events, however deplorable, even about the worst excesses of the oprichnina.

Some historians correlate the evolution of the *Book of Degrees* and LLS to ongoing political events too much, and others too little, actually, not at all. Isolating either text from its historical—as opposed to literary—contexts is unwise, but the degree of mutual influence is almost impossible to determine because so much about Ivan’s reign remains unknown. Playing devil’s advocate, I would propose the following tentative, duly qualified, connections.

⁸⁶ Bobrov, *Novgorodskie letopisi XV veka*, 6.

The *Book of Degrees* and the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* were begun when Muscovy was still basking in the sunlight of foreign expansion, already successful in Kazan' and Astrakhan', and successful so far in Livonia, crowned by the capture of Polotsk in 1563, a time of domestic reform and cultural creativity. Only a prosperous and optimistic society and culture could possess the ambition to launch such ambitious projects. This optimism came into question no later than 1564, with defeats in Livonia and Kurbskii's defection, but it did not necessarily result in the cessation of work on the *Book of Degrees* because the onset of pessimism did not immediately result in the termination of the composition of annals. Even the creation of the oprichnina did not terminate the literary community's ability to record the narrative of events. But in 1567 the annals stopped. To be sure, this was on the eve of the escalation of oprichnina violence to the level of mass terror, including the murder of former metropolitan Filipp, the assault on the cities of the northwest, and the Moscow executions, as well as the Crimean burning of Moscow. Nevertheless Novgorod and Pskov chroniclers could still do their jobs. This higher level of pessimism did not end until 1572 with the Muscovite defeat of the Crimeans at Molodi and the abolition of the oprichnina. However, by this time no new annals for 1568 or thereafter had been produced, so work on LLS could only be editorial. This second potentially fruitful period of work on LLS could have lasted until 1577, when Ivan led a successful invasion of Livonia. After 1578 the Livonian War went sour. Even though ending the Livonian War brought economic and political relief, optimism, especially after the death of Tsarevich Ivan left a mentally, emotionally, and physically challenged Fedor as heir to the throne, would have been in short supply. The addition to LLS of the coronation of Tsar Fedor strikes me not as a continuation of LLS but an imitation of or appendix to LLS.

This scenario, however, rests upon feet of clay. We really have no idea how the scribes and illustrators of LLS reacted to events after 1567, save what they wrote for the period from December 1564 through 1567, which was quite neutral.⁸⁷

No historical theory has succeeded in tying the cessation of work on the *Book of Degrees* to events in the early 1560s or the cessation of work on LLS to 1567 or any subsequent period of Muscovite history during Ivan's reign. I would suggest that another factor that should be taken into consideration which might provide a better explanation, albeit just as indirectly, not only of the cessation of work on the *Book of Degrees* and LLS but also the continuation of work on Novgorod and Pskov chronicles, namely economics.

⁸⁷ Some contemporary Muscovite sources treated the oprichnina as no more than a fact of life (Halperin, "Contemporary Russian Perceptions," 95–124).

Cost of Production

Historians have not completely disregarded the economics involved in the projects. Gail Lenhoff has examined the costs of creating the *Book of Degrees*.⁸⁸ The main expense was not the direct cost of paper but rather the indirect costs of research, revision, and the composition of new passages. Kashtanov concluded that only the royal Treasury could afford to finance LLS. Boeck describes LLS as an expensive project.

Usachev contributes two relevant insights about the cost of production of written texts. Neither Novgorod nor Moscow contained a sufficient number of copyists to complete their respective copies of the *Great Menology*. Novgorod had to import scribes from Pskov, and Moscow had to import scribes from Novgorod. Even large monasteries needed to hire freelance scribes for big projects, such as the *Nikon Chronicle* compiled at the Chudov Monastery in the Moscow Kremlin.⁸⁹ Freelance scribes, lay and clerical, had to be paid. Indeed, it was common practice to pay even in-house scribes in a monastery for copying work. Pay for copying was so common that scribes who did not receive financial remuneration made it a point to add a colophon saying so. Rates ran from 20–30 *altyny* to 2–3 rubles per manuscript.⁹⁰ Usachev, however, was studying straight copying. The compilers who wrote or revised annals and the illustrators of LLS arguably could have received greater compensation for more demanding jobs. We do not know how many scribes and illustrators worked in LLS, but Usachev's analysis suggests copying by hand was not a speedy reproduction method.

By the 1560s at the latest the Muscovite economy was on the cusp of a major depression. The *Book of Degrees* and the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* may simply have proved too expensive to complete in straightened economic times. If the *Book of Degrees* was too ambitious qualitatively, in creating a new narrative genre, the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* was too ambitious quantitatively, in its sheer size, and graphically, in its illustrations. We do not know who sponsored this enormous project, although it is hard to imagine that anyone other than the tsar or the metropolitan commanded the resources necessary to undertake it. To be sure, we do not know how to calculate the "costs" of either project in monetary terms. Nevertheless, attributing the cessation of

⁸⁸ Gail Lenhoff, "The Economics of a Medieval Literary Project: Direct and Indirect Costs of Producing the *Stepennaia kniga*," *Russian History* 34, 1–4 (2007): 219–37.

⁸⁹ Andrei Sergeevich Usachev, *Knigopisanie v Rossii XVI veka po materialam datirovannykh vykhodnykh zapisei*, 2 vols. (Moscow-St. Petersburg: Al'ians-Arkheo, 2018), 1: 305–16.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1: 210, 247, 256, 261, 369, 302 n. 371, 424.

compilation of the *Book of Degrees* and the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* to economic factors provides a rather obvious explanation of the continuation of work on regional chronicles after 1567. They were cheaper to produce. Regional chronicles were far less ambitious in scope and concept. They could be continued using only local resources. Note that even the sack of Novgorod did not interrupt Novgorod chronicle writing; only the Swedish occupation of Novgorod during the Time of Troubles did that.

Perhaps the answer to the question of why work on the *Book of Degrees* and the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* stopped is to be sought by following the money.

Chapter 2

Chronicles and Government Sources

Historians studying the reign of Ivan IV must deal with sources of varying genres. Some historians distinguish narrative sources such as chronicles from documentary sources such as office registers and diplomatic papers. Such a distinction is compromised by the fact that chronicles utilized information from government documents. This chapter explores this overlap by comparing the matching data in chronicles, on the one hand, and register and diplomatic documents, on the other. It then raises the question of what kind of access chroniclers, who did not work for the government and were not writing official government sources, had to official government documents.¹

Introduction

In his still valuable survey of Russian chronicles and their cultural and historical significance, Academician Dmitrii Likhachev traced the interplay between chronicles and government documentation such as military registers (*razriady*) and diplomatic papers (*posol'skie dela* found in "diplomatic books," *posol'skie knigi*) to the reign of Grand Prince Ivan III (1462–1505). He demonstrated that chronicles were infused with the contents of government documentation, or, as he called it, "working papers" of the Muscovite *prikazy* (bureaus). This was done by experienced chancellery officials (*kantseliaristy*). These chronicle passages were written in chancery Russian (*delovoi iazyk*) rather than Church Slavonic, and derived their information from bureaucratic

¹ Charles J. Halperin, "What is an 'Official' Muscovite Source from the Reign of Ivan IV?," in *"The Book of Royal Degrees" and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness/"Stepennaia kniga tsarskogo rodosloviia" i genezis russkogo istoricheskogo soznaniia*, ed. Gail Lenhoff and Ann M. Kleimola (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2011), 81–93.

paper forms (*prikaznoe deloproizvodstvo*). In short, chronicles and government sources interacted.²

One can quibble with some of Likhachev's assertions: Most government bureaus were not called prikazy until the 1570s, and we do not know who wrote most chronicles, clerics or laymen. Likhachev implied that chroniclers simply read government documents, a supposition this chapter will call into question. However, Likhachev had undoubtedly identified a significant development in Muscovite literary culture. He was certainly correct in positing that the supposed linguistic "barrier" between chancery Russian and Church Slavonic could not have precluded such literary borrowing.³ This chapter will trace chronicle use of military and diplomatic data by comparing chronicle entries on Muscovite field army commanders in the registers and the dispatch and reception of embassies from and to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (and some of the substance of diplomacy between the two countries) in the diplomatic papers for the reign of Ivan IV. My goal is to assess the degree of affinity between chronicle and documentary sources in order to examine the mechanism by which government information was transferred to chronicles.

It is not practical here to compare all chronicles to all registers and diplomatic books for the fifty-one years of Ivan IV's reign. For convenience, in this exercise I have chosen to compare one chronicle to one register and two diplomatic books. None of these texts, it should be noted, is a "raw" primary source. The chronicle was compiled from previous chronicles and non-chronicle texts to which original text was added, the register and diplomatic books from original primary documentation which were redacted into a finished and polished product. We do not have access to this "raw" material.

The chronicle and register employed here are surrogates, the diplomatic books a sample. What I shall call the *Nikon Chronicle* is what was published as the *Nikon Chronicle*⁴ but is actually the *Nikon Chronicle Continuation*. Technically the *Nikon Chronicle*, compiled by Metropolitan Daniil, ended with the year 1530, before Ivan IV's accession in 1533. The published *Nikon Chronicle* includes passages from all the chronicles that contributed to the ongoing continuation of the *Nikon Chronicle* proper. These chronicles included the *Voskresenskaia letopis'* (*Voskresensk Chronicle*), *Letopisets nachala tsarstva* (*Chron-*

² Dmitrii Sergeevich Likhachev, *Russkie letopisi i ikh kul'turno-istoricheskoe znachenie* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1947), 354–62.

³ Charles J. Halperin, "The 'Russian' and 'Slavonic' Languages in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy," *Slavonic and East European Review* 85, 1 (2007): 1–24.

⁴ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter PSRL] 13 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965).

icle of the Beginning of the Tsardom),⁵ and the extant portions of the *Litsevoi letopisnyi svod* (Illustrated Chronicle Compilation), the *Tsarstvennaia kniga* (Tsar's Book), *Aleksandro-Nevskaia letopis'* (Alexander Nevskii Chronicle), and the *Lebedevskaia letopis'* (Lebedev Chronicle). I have subsumed all of them under the rubric "the Nikon Chronicle" because I am not concerned with the relationships among chronicles. Consequently backtracking the published *Nikon Chronicle* to its constituent parts was not necessary. Central Muscovite chronicle writing stopped in 1567, so there are no entries in the *Nikon Chronicle* for the remainder of Ivan IV's reign, from 1567 to 1584, that can be compared to either military or diplomatic sources.

The 1475–1598 *Register*⁶ is hardly the only register that covers Ivan IV's reign, but it is the largest and most accessible. The lack of a correspondence between data in the *Nikon Chronicle* and 1475–1598 *Register* does not preclude a connection to another register.

The extant diplomatic books (*posol'skie knigi*) are organized by the identity of the country with whom Muscovy was carrying on relations. Not all diplomatic books survive, and those that do have gaps. I have selected two published books of Muscovite-Lithuanian relations, called "Lithuanian affairs" (*litovskie dela*), because Muscovite relations with Poland-Lithuania⁷ were extremely intense and both books contain rich data. The books cover the periods 1533–60⁸ and 1560–71.⁹ Unpublished diplomatic papers for Muscovite relations with Lithuania pertain to the period after 1571, and are irrelevant to this study in the absence of comparable chronicle entries.

Chronology is secondary. One does not need to compare chronicles to other genres of sources to find chronological discrepancies; chronicles them-

⁵ The *Voskresenskaia letopis'* and the *Letopisets nachala tsarstva* provided the basis for the two redactions of the *Nikon Chronicle*, the former for the earlier redaction to 1542, the latter for the later redaction to 1553, which are printed in *PSRL* 13 as the left and the right column respectively. Citations will identify columns.

⁶ *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966).

⁷ Lithuania was united with Poland before the Union of Lublin in 1569 by a common monarch who was king in Poland and grand duke in Lithuania. The creation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569 did not affect the diplomatic records studied here.

⁸ *Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva* [hereafter *SRIO*], vol. 59 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1887) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim*, 2: 1533–1560.

⁹ *SRIO*, vol. 71 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1892) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim*, 3: 1560–1571.

selves may differ in the dates they assign to events. Dating events in all genres of sources runs into a different but endemic problem in Muscovite sources, the calendar. In the Muscovite calendar, from the creation of the world, the year began on 1 September, so a Muscovite year overlapped two Common Era years. If I know the month then I can date the year exactly; if the month is not known, it is impossible to determine in which CE year an event took place. However, chronological ambiguities do not impugn the pattern of relations between chronicles and government sources of the entire period from 1533 to 1567.¹⁰ Therefore I use Byzantine years without worrying about greater precision but provide approximate CE years in the appendices. However, I will point out discrepancies between the year in the chronicle and that in the *Register* or diplomatic papers.

Of course the *Register* documents far more field armies and the diplomatic papers describe far more embassies than the chronicles, but military and diplomatic affairs occupy a substantial chunk of chronicle space, so there is more than sufficient data to correlate.

Chronicles and Registers: Upper Field Army Officer Corps

Because most of Ivan IV's reign was spent in warfare, it is hardly surprising that military affairs occupied the attention of the *Nikon Chronicle*. When discussing the actions of a Muscovite field army, the chronicle usually names what I shall call the upper officer corps, not just the commander-in-chief of the army but anywhere from three to thirty-eight high-ranking officers. A Muscovite field army consisted of a varying number of divisions (*polky*, sometimes translated as "regiments"). A five-division field army included the Main Division (Bol'shoi polk), whose highest-ranking officer was in command of the entire army (unless the ruler was present), the Right Division (Pravaia ruka, literally: Right Hand), the Left Division (Levaia ruka, literally: Left Hand), the Advance Division (Peredovoi polk), and the Rear Guard (Storozhevoi polk). However, a field army could consist of only three divisions (Main Division, Advance Division, and Rear Guard), or more than five divisions. If the ruler participated in the campaign, he commanded his own division, the Sovereign's Division (Gosudarev polk). In addition, the Register could mention the artillery (*nariad*) and even scouts (*iartoul*), which were not called "divisions." There is even one case of a two-division field army, with a Main Division and Advance Division but no Rear Guard, and one odd case of a four-division field army, with a Right Division without a Left Division. Divisions mostly had two ranking commanders (*voevody*), sometimes one in a small, usually three-divi-

¹⁰ My last comparison to the *Register* dates to 1563, to the diplomatic papers, to 1567.

sion field army, or even three or more in a full five-division field army, up to over ten. In short, the chronicle provided extensive information on the entire upper officer corps of a Muscovite field army, by my rough count, a total of 305 names¹¹ for the 31 field armies (some of which are variants) for which I have found matches in the *Register* of 1475–1598.¹²

Not every chronicle upper officer corps list can be related to passages in the register I am using, but that does not mean that it does not appear in any register. A 7060 officer corps list of a three-division field army sent against the Cheremis' in the Kazan' Khanate has no parallel in the 1475–1598 Register:

Main Division: boyar Prince Semen Ivanovich Mikulinskii

Advance Division boyar majordomo (*dvoretskoi*) Danilo Romanovich
[Iur'ev],¹³ Boris [Ivanovich] Saltykov

Rear Guard: boyar Prince Petr Semenovich Serebrianyi.¹⁴

The most we can say by examining the Register is that Saltykov was stationed in Sviiashsk, the staging area for middle Volga River campaigns.¹⁵

Similarly a rare two-division field army was sent against Kazan' in 7062:

Main Division: Prince Semen Ivanovich Nikulinskii [Mikulinskii],
Prince Iurii Ivanovich Kashin [Kashin-Obolenskii]

¹¹ Each occurrence of a name in an upper officer corps list counts as one name. Of course the same names reoccur repeatedly, but the biographies and career trajectories of the officers fall outside the scope of this chapter.

¹² It is difficult to apply the word "general" to anyone but the commander-in-chief of an entire field army, and doing so provides no obvious solution to how to label his second-in-command, the second "commander" (*voevoda*) of the Main Division. In regulations and lawsuits over precedence (*mestnichestvo*) these officers are referred to as "first *voevoda*," "second *voevoda*," etc. The unit and officer titles for regiments of the musketeers (*strel'tsy*) do not fit a field army, because the commander of a musketeer regiment of 500 men was called a "captain" (*golova*), a rank lower than that of any division officer in a field army. Moreover, it was pretty much the case that even the smallest division of a field army was larger than a musketeer regiment. On the musketeers, see Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV's Professional Infantry, The Musketeers (*strel'tsy*): A Note on Numbers," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 30, 1 (2017): 96–116.

¹³ The *Nikon Chronicle* sometimes uses abbreviated name references in its narrative which I have expanded from context by interpolating words in brackets.

¹⁴ PSRL 13: 198.

¹⁵ *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 134.

Advance Division: Fedor Ivanovich Umnyi-Kolychev.¹⁶

and a three-division field army later in the same year against Astrakhan':

Main Division: Prince Iurii Ivanovich Pronskii, Mikhailo Petrovich Golovin

Rear Guard: Stepan Sidorov

Advance Regiment: Ignatei Mikhailovich Veshniakov, Shiriai Kobiakov

but note that the divisions are not in their normal order for a tripartite field army because the Advance Regiment should be ahead of the Rear Guard, and this entry greatly resembles another one, also for a campaign against Astrakhan' in the same year, with slightly different commanders, for which there is a match in the Register (appendix 2.1: Chronicles and the Military Register, no. 17).

Comparing the personnel listed in the *Nikon Chronicle* to that in the matching Registry draws our attention to the different renditions of individual names. Sometimes names have patronymics, sometimes they do not. Sometimes the patronymics are in the form of "Ivan Vasiliev syn" (Ivan the son of Vasili) appropriate for gentry, sometimes in the form of "Ivan Vasil'evich," the form appropriate for boyars and also the standard modern form. Sometimes the same officer is described with one form of patronymic in one source but the other form in another source. Here I identify the discrepancy without resolving the issue of whether the officer was a boyar or a member of the gentry. One would not expect variation in patronymic form, if only because the number of boyars was relatively small and anyone in the elite could hardly avoid knowing who was and who was not a boyar. However, sometimes courtesy dictated presenting men with the boyar form of patronymic who might not have been entitled to it. Technically the boyar form was appropriate only to a man who currently held boyar office in the Royal Council, not necessarily to someone just because he came from a boyar family, i.e., a family of the boyar class from which at least one male attained boyar status. Sometimes sources include a nickname, sometimes not. Brothers with the same first name (and obviously the same patronymic) could be distinguished by calling one "the older" (literally: bigger, *bol'shoi*) and the other "the younger" (literally: the smaller, *men'shoi*), but these qualifiers do not always appear, and where they appear in an officer's name varies.¹⁷ Then there are spelling variations, such as "Fedor" and "Feodor," the use of soft signs, or variation between "N"

¹⁶ PSRL 13: 238.

¹⁷ In this study the only case is that of the brothers Ivan Vasil'evich Morozov, Elder and Younger.

and “M” (Nikita versus Mikita). A family name could be a compound of two or even three family names, but different sources might list them in different combinations or permutations or use one family name alone. (The hyphen between elements of a compound family name is probably a modern editorial interpolation; I have not spotlighted the hyphen’s presence or absence.) Sometimes a source provides additional biographical information, such as an office (governor, majordomo), which may not appear in other sources. Finally, sometimes we just have scribal errors. In some cases the sources employ spellings different than those current in modern scholarship; I insert the modern version in parentheses. These variations suggest the fluidity of Muscovite elite names in the sixteenth century, but also shed some light on the degree of precision with which a chronicler copied his register source.

The evidence on upper officer corps lists is presented in tabular form in appendix 2.1: Chronicles and the Register. The 31 upper officer corps lists for which we can compare the *Nikon Chronicle* and the Register reveal considerable coincidence and considerable variation, some significant, some probably insignificant. One hundred fifty-seven names (51.8%) coincide exactly, 141 names (46.2%) coincide but with variation, only 7 names (2.9%) in the *Nikon Chronicle* passages do not occur in the matching *Register* list.¹⁸ The *Register* confirms an impressive ca. 98 percent of all upper officer corps names in the data base. These numbers lowball potential errors by not taking into consideration names in the *Register* which are not found in the chronicle, which total 17.¹⁹ If we assume that all of these names should have been included in the chronicle’s lists, then the total of names (including those uniquely in the chronicle) should be 342. In this hypothetical case, identical, 157 names, falls to 45.9 percent; not identical, 141, falls to 41.2 percent, and errors, both of commission (7)²⁰ and omission (37), a total of 44, rises to 12.9 percent.²¹ Therefore, when highballing the error rate the *Nikon Chronicle* still got ca. 87.1 percent of all identities correct. It seems unfair to expect the chronicler to be in the loop of last-minute alterations in field army upper officer corps appointments. It must be remembered that we are most likely dealing with copyists working from what were already edited manuscripts. No chronicle field army officer list coincides completely with the *Register*. Discrepancies include different spelling of a name, sequence of name elements, omission or addition of a name element, differences in the form of patronymic, and addition or deletion of the office held by an officer. The total number of such errors (there can be more

¹⁸ Rounding explains the total of 100.9 percent.

¹⁹ Appendix 2.1, nos. 14 (2), 19 (19), 22 (9), 24 (14), 27 (1), 29 (2), 30 (4), 31 (4).

²⁰ Appendix 2.1, nos. 10 (2), 14 (2), 19 (1), 29 (1), 31 (1).

²¹ Even with rounding this comes to an even 100 percent.

than one error in one name) is 155 for 31 records.²² Compared to that number, the quantity of obvious scribal errors is puny: eight in the chronicle (appendix 2.1, nos. 3, 6, 14, 15, 20, 22, 24) and three in the *Register* (appendix 2.1, nos. 7, 8, 31). In no case is a scribal error in the *Register* reproduced in the chronicle (and no chronicle scribal error appears in the *Register*). If we attribute the number of “minor” errors to copyists, then we would have to describe the chroniclers’ copying skills as seriously flawed. There are different kinds of discrepancies in dating. Sometimes one source gives only the month, and the other the day of the month (appendix 2.1, nos. 1, 7, 15, 19). Once one sources gives the season and the other the month; fortuitously the month belongs to that season (appendix 2.1, no. 13). Differences in year, which is serious for the purpose of constructing a narrative, occur four times (appendix 2.1, nos. 12, 18, 20, 24). They could derive from different stages of a campaign. There is never more than a single year disparity.

The primary question is whether the chronicler who authored the first version of a field army upper officer corps had direct access to a document from the *Register* or Registry Bureau (*Razriadnyi prikaz*) and was copying verbatim. If we knew where the chronicle was compiled physically, in what location, we could better judge if the compiler could have gotten his information directly from a central bureaucratic office located in the Kremlin. For example, if, as we know to be the case before 1530, the compiler of the *Nikon Chronicle* proper worked in the Chudov Monastery in the Moscow Kremlin, then at least the physical possibility of such access would be plausible. Unfortunately we lack such information. It is not definitely established whether the chronicler was even a monk, or, as many historians, without adequate evidence, have argued, a government bureaucrat, in the Ambassadorial Bureau or the Treasury (*Kazna*) or some other office, in even closer proximity to where the government documents were generated, an issue beyond the scope of this chapter. It is beyond question that the chronicler lived in the city of Moscow itself; no one outside the city could possibly amass the sheer quantity of data on the upper officer corps of Muscovite field armies.

The significant quantity of “minor” errors in names, even allowing for the ambiguities of our exercise, undermines the argument that the chronicler was copying a government document. Almost half the time he failed to make a “true,” i.e., verbatim, copy of a field army upper officer corps list. That would be very sloppy work indeed. Yet almost 98 percent of the time the chronicler got the identity of an officer “right,” a reliability rate that, it would seem, required considerable access to government documents, because it is difficult to imagine that a list of officers would be transmitted orally. Moreover, the types

²² Because of the varying number of divisions in each record, averages or means would be meaningless.

of discrepancies—an omitted or added officer, let alone an added division—on the other hand bespeak the possibility of far more flawed transmission of data from the government office to the chronicler's scriptorium.

The evidence of diplomatic information does not resolve this conundrum.

Chronicles and Diplomatic Personnel

The *Nikon Chronicle* arguably devotes at least as much space to Muscovite foreign relations as it does to Muscovite warfare. However, the brief, sometimes extremely laconic, *Nikon Chronicle* allusions to the comings and goings of Muscovite and foreign diplomatic personnel and terse summaries of negotiations do not even come close to the exhaustive stenographic record of such negotiations, reproductions of extensive diplomatic correspondence, regurgitation of administrative position papers, and administrative paper, incoming and outgoing, to Muscovite officials on how to deal with incoming and outgoing foreign embassies, found in the diplomatic papers. The disparity in volume precludes much comparison. What can be compared most of all are the names of the relevant diplomatic personnel, both Muscovite and Polish-Lithuanian, and some albeit simplified notation of the topics of interest in foreign relations. What is striking is that the *Nikon Chronicler* accurately rendered the names of the players and never “missed” the conclusion of a truce between the two countries.

I have collated 45 chronicle entries with the far longer rendition of the relevant events in the diplomatic books (appendix 2.2: Chronicles and the Diplomatic Papers). I reproduce the Muscovite versions of the Polish, Lithuanian, and Ruthenian names of the personnel from the Kingdom of Poland/Grand Duchy of Lithuania,²³ because those are the forms found in both the chronicle and the diplomatic books.²⁴ The extent of biographical information available to the chronicler—the multiple titles and offices that diplomats from Lithuania bore—is striking. I adumbrate the substance of the diplomatic exchange when the chronicle repeats or summarizes the content of the diplomatic books.

Discrepancies in dates between the *Nikon Chronicle* and the diplomatic books are not excessive in number or off by more than a year. There is only one case of confusion over the social status of a Muscovite diplomat (appen-

²³ For the convenience of the reader I have added the proper names (or at least, one form of the proper name) in parentheses, notably for Radziwills and Chodkiewicz.

²⁴ Not so the ranks of Muscovite diplomatic personnel. Specialists agree that there was a hierarchy, but there is no consensus on how to translate the terms, a question secondary to the present chapter. When necessary, for convenience I translate *posol* as “ambassador,” *gonets* as “envoy,” and *poslannik* as “courier.” The sources did not always specify the rank of diplomatic representatives from Lithuania to Muscovy.

dix 2.2, no. 35), and only three anomalies in counting the number of the elite and commoners in the typically large embassies from Lithuania (appendix 2.2, nos. 38, 42, 45). The quality of the diplomatic information in the chronicle matches that of the military information in the chronicle. How the chronicler acquired the diplomatic data is even more of a puzzle than how he acquired the military data.

No chronicler sitting outside a Moscow Kremlin gate could have acquired the information on Muscovite diplomacy with Lithuania included in the *Nikon Chronicle*. A well-informed cleric, say from one of the Kremlin churches, might recognize Muscovite diplomatic personnel, but there is no way he could identify foreign diplomats, let alone acquire from the rumor mill his precise and accurate information on the substance of the negotiations. On the other hand, given Muscovite government paranoia about the leaking of national security matters to foreigners, let alone foreign diplomats, it is inconceivable that Ivan IV and the Royal Council would permit a chronicler to have access to the diplomatic archives. Minor inconsistencies in personnel and chronology might tend to support this notion that the diplomatic papers were closed to outsiders, but they might derive from scribal errors, and it is equally difficult to imagine another mechanism whereby the chronicler acquired his information. The Ambassadorial Bureau did not hold press conferences or release press statements. We can also rule out mental telepathy.

Conclusion

The *Nikon Chronicle*—and therefore its sources, the Muscovite chronicles which were published at first as part of the *Nikon Chronicle*—possess a wealth of overwhelmingly accurate information on the composition of the elite officer corps of Muscovite field armies as well as on the Muscovite and foreign personnel who participated in Muscovite foreign relations with Poland-Lithuania, the issues that animated Muscovite diplomatic relations with Poland-Lithuania, some of the positions both sides took, the series of embassies and epistles that regularly crossed the border in both directions, and the chronology of the truces that tried to avert war between the two parties. Of course the chronicle's information was not perfect, but then neither was the military information in the *Register*. The registers sometimes presented alternative officer corps lists which the scribe admitted he could not reconcile. The diplomatic books do not contain that kind of error, but they are tendentious. Fortuitously the surviving published diplomatic books for Poland-Lithuania cover the entire period of Ivan IV's reign narrated in the chronicle.

However, the discrepancies, let alone contradictions, between the chronicles and the government documents that contain essentially the same data

make it extremely unlikely that the chronicler had direct access to the manuscript archives of either the Registry or Ambassadorial Bureaus, and national security concerns would have hampered allowing the chronicler such access in both cases, but overwhelmingly in the case of diplomatic records. Yet the chronicler cannot have been receiving his upper officer corps lists or names of foreign diplomatic representatives orally. Whether so much data could be transferred to the chronicler through oral transmission seems unlikely. Sixteenth-century Muscovite scribes did not know shorthand, and carrying paper and stylus around to write down what one heard from “informed government sources” would have been most awkward. We are left with a seemingly unsolvable paradox. We know that the chronicler was a Muscovite insider, with access to highly sensitive government information, but we cannot identify how that information was transmitted from manuscript documents held by the central bureaucracy to the chronicler to be preserved in manuscript chronicles.

Appendix 2.1. Chronicles and the Register

1. 7043 (1534) field army sent against Lithuania
Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 87–88, left column):
 Main Division: boyar Prince Mikhail Vasil’evich Gorbatiy,
 Prince Nikita Vasil’evich Obolenskii
 Advance Regiment: boyar Master of Horse (*koniushii*) Prince
 Ivan Fedorovich Telepnev, Prince Nikita Borisovich Turenin
 Right Division: Prince Petr Ivanovich Repnin,* Prince Petr
 Feodorov syn Okhliabinin
 Left Division: Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Repnin,* Prince Ivan Se-
 menov syn Mezetzskii
 Rear Guard: Prince Ivan Ivanovich Belevskii, Vasilii Petrov
 syn Borisov

It was not uncommon for brothers to be assigned to the same field army, even the same division. I will indicate brothers serving in the same field army by an asterisk.²⁵

²⁵ On this phenomenon, see Charles J. Halperin, “Brothers-in-Arms: Kinship and Military Service During the Reign of Ivan IV,” in *Everyday Life in Russian History: Quotidian Studies in Honor of Daniel Kaiser*, ed. Gary M. Marker, Joan Neuberger, Marshall Poe, and Susan Rupp (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2010), 169–85; on the conclusions of this article, see appendix 2.3, “Brothers-in-Arms,” below.

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 85–86).²⁶ The *Nikon Chronicle* and the *Register* date the campaign to November, but the *Nikon Chronicle* entry contains the day of the month, 28, lacking in the *Register*.

Advance Regiment: Prince Ivan Fedorovich Telepnev-Obolenskii (with the second family name); Mikita, not Nikita, Borisovich Turenin (although Telepnev-Obolenskii remains “Nikita”)

Right Division: Prince Petr Fedorovich Okhliabinin (“Feodor,” not “Fedor” in the patronymic, different form of patronymic)

2. 7043 (1534) field army sent against Lithuania

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 81–82, right column, variant of appendix 2.1, no. 1):²⁷

Main Division: Prince Mikhail Vasil’evich Gorbati, Prince Mikita Vasil’evich Obolenskii

Advance Division: boyar Master of Horse Prince Ivan Fedorovich²⁸ Telepnev, Prince Mikita Borisovich Turenin

Right Division: Prince Petr Ivanovich Repnin,* Prince Petr Okhliabinin

Left Division: Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Repnin,* Prince Ivan Semenovich Mezetskii

Rear Guard: Prince Ivan Ivanovich Belevskii, Vasilii Petrovich Borisov

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 85–86):

Main Division: Prince Nikita (not Mikita) Obolenskii

Advance Division: Prince Ivan Fedorovich Telepnev-Obolenskii (with Obolenskii)

Right Division: Prince Petr Fedorovich (with patronymic) Okhliabinin

Left Division: Prince Ivan Semenov syn (different patronymic form) Mezetskii

²⁶ My tables contain only sufficient information to indicate the differences between chronicle and *Register* forms; I do not reproduce whole names except when necessary and do not indicate identical names.

²⁷ Comparison of the two *Nikon Chronicle* variants of this field army upper officer corps lists does not speak to the question of how their compilers altered the *Register*’s data, so I will not present such an analysis here or below.

²⁸ Note that the earlier redaction of the *Nikon Chronicle* was not consistent in always using “Feodor” instead of “Fedor.”

Rear Guard: Vasilii Petrov syn Borisov (different patronymic form)

3. 7043 (1534) field army sent against Lithuania

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 88, left column):

Main Division: boyar Novgorod governor (*namestnik*) Boris Ivanovich Gorbatiy, Vasilii Andreevich Sheremetev

Advance Division: Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Kurb'skii (Kurbskii),²⁹ Prince Dmitrii Feodorovich Paletskii

Right Division: Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Kubenskii, Ivan Semenovich Vorontsov*

Left Division: Dmitrii Semenovich Vorontsov,* Feodor Semenov syn Kolychev

Rear Guard: Prince Feodor Mikhailovich Kupr'skii (Kurbskii),* Prince Ivan Mikhailov syn Zasekin

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 86):

Main Division: Gorbatiy (does not indicate Novgorod governor)

Advance Division: Kurbskii (without the soft sign in Kurb'skii); Dmitrii Fedorovich (not Feodorovich) Paletskii

Rear Guard: Kurbskii (without the hard sign in Kupr'skii); Ivan Chiulok Mikhailov syn Zasekin (with the nickname "Chiulok")³⁰

4. 7043 (1534) field army sent against Lithuania

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 88, right column, variant of no. 3):

Main Division: boyar Novgorod governor Prince Boris Ivanovich Gorbatiy, Vasilii Andreevich Sheremetev

Advance Division: Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Kurb'skii (Kurbskii)* Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Paletskii

Right Division: Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Kubenskii, Ivan Semenovich Vorontsov*

Left Division: Pskov governor Dmitrii Semenovich Vorontsov,* Fedor Semenovich Kolychev

Rear Guard: Prince Fedor Mikhailovich Kurb'skii (Kurbskii),* Prince Ivan Mikhailov syn Ivanovich Zasekin

²⁹ Given Prince Andrei Kurbskii's notoriety for his correspondence with Ivan IV and his *History of the Grand Prince of Moscow*, I will regurgitate all spelling variations of his family name in the original and repeat the version current in scholarship in parentheses in each case.

³⁰ Modern Russian *chulok* (stocking)?

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 86):

Main Division: Gorbatyi (omits Novgorod governor)
 Advance Division: Prince Mikhailo (not Mikhail) Mikhailovich Kurbskii (omits soft sign)
 Right Division: Prince Mikhailo (not Mikhail) Ivanovich Kubenskii
 Left Division: Vorontsov (omits Pskov governor); Fedor Semenov syn (different patronymic form) Kolychev
 Rear Guard: Kurbskii (omits soft sign); Prince Ivan Chulok (with nickname) Mikhailov syn Zasekin

5. 7043 (1534) field army sent against Lithuania

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 89, left column):

Main Division: Prince Feodor Vasil'evich Telepnev-Ovchin, Prince Ivan Timofeev syn Trostenskii
 Advance Division: Prince Konstantin Ivanovich Kurliatev*
 Rear Guard: Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Kurliatev*

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 86):

Main Division: Prince Fedor Vasil'evich Ovchin Telepnev (different sequence of family names)
 Advance Division: Konstantin (not Konstantin)

6. 7043 (1534) field army sent against Lithuania

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 83, right column, variant of appendix 2.1, no. 5):

Main Division: Prince Fedor Vasil'evich Telepnev Ovchin-Obolenskii, Prince Ivan Timofeevich Trostenskii
 Advance Division: Prince Kostiantin Ivanovich Kurletev (Kurliatev)*
 Rear Guard: Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Shkurletev (Kurliatev)* (the gratuitous initial letter "Sh" is an obvious copyist's error)

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 86):

Main Division: Ovchin Telepnev (not Ovchin Obolenskii); Ivan Timofeev syn (different patronymic form) Trostenskii
 Advance Division: Prince Konstantin (not Kostiantin) Kurliatev (not Kurletev)
 Rear Guard: Kurliatev (not Shkurletev)

7. 7043 (1535) field army sent against Lithuania

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 94–95, left column):

Main Division: boyar Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich Shuiskii, Prince Danil Dmitrievich Pronskii

Advance Division: boyar Master of Horse Prince Ivan Feodorovich Telepnev Obolenskii, Prince Feodor Mikhailovich Kurbskii, Prince Vasilii Feodorov syn Okhliabinin

Right Division: Prince Andrei Dmitrievich Rostovskii, Prince Nikita Borisovich Turenin

Left Division: Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Repnin, Prince Ivan Mikhailov syn Troekurov

Rear Guard: boyar Prince Ivan Danilovich Penkov, Vasilii Petrov syn Borisov

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 87):

The *Nikon Chronicle* and the *Register* date the campaign to June, but the *Nikon Chronicle* entry contains the day of the month, 28.

Advance Division: Prince Fedorovich Ovchin Telepnev (with “Ovchin” but without “Obolenskii”); Prince Vasilii Fedorovich Okhliabinin (not “Feodorov syn” but “Fedorovich,” both different spelling and different patronymic form)

Right Division: Mikita (not Nikita)

Left Division: Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Troekurov (different patronymic form)

Rear Guard: Vasilii Petrov syn Borisovich (an obvious scribal error for Borisov)

8. 7043 (1535) field army sent against Lithuania

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 85–86, right column, variant of appendix 2.1, no. 7):

Main Division: boyar Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich Shuiskii, Prince Danil Dmitrievich Pronskii

Advance Division: boyar Master of Horse Prince Ivan Fedorovich Telepnev Obolenskii, Prince Fedor Mikhailovich Kurb'skii (Kurbskii), Prince Vasilii Feodorov syn Okhliabinin

Right Division: Prince Andrei Dmitrievich Rostovskii, Prince Nikita Borisovich Turenin

Left Division: Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Repnin, Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Troekurov

Rear Guard: boyar Prince Ivan Danilovich Penkov, Vasilii Petrov syn Borisov

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 87):

Main Division: Prince Danila (not Danilo) Dmitrievich Pronskii

Advance Division: Prince Ivan Fedorovich Ovchin Telepnev (not Telepnev Obolenskii); Vasilii Fedorovich (different patronymic form) Okhliabinin

Right Division: Prince Mikita (not Nikita) Turenin

Rear Guard: Vasilii Petrov syn Borisovich (scribal error for Borisov)

9. 7049 (1541) field army against the Crimeans

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 138, left column):

Main Division: boyar Prince Dmitrii Feodorovich Bel'skii, boyar Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Shuiskii, boyar Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Kubenskii

Advance Division: Prince Ivan Ivanovich Turuntai Pronskii, Prince Vasilii Feodorovich Okhliabinin

Right Division: Prince Ivan Vasil'evich Shemiaka Pronskii, Semen Semenovich Bezzubtsov (Bezzubtsev)

Left Division: Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Troekurov, Prince Vasilii Semenovich Mezetskii

Rear Guard: Prince Iurii Ivanovich Temkin Rostovskii, Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich Chiulok Ushatyi

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 101–02):

Main Division: Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich (not Feodorovich) Bel'skii

Advance Division: Prince Ivan Ivanovich (without Turuntai) Pronskii; Prince Vasilii Fedorovich (not Feodorovich) Okhliabinin

Right Division: Prince Ivan Shemiaka Vasil'evich (not Vasil'evich Shemiaka) Pronskii

Rear Guard: Prince Ivan Ivanovich Temkin (without Rostovskii), Prince Vasilii Chiulok Vasil'evich (not Vasil'evich Chiulok) Ushatyi

10. 7049 (1541) field army against the Crimeans

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 107–08, right column, variant of no. 9):

Main Division: boyar Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Bel'skii, boyar Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Shuiskii, boyar Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Kubenskii

Addition to Main Division: Tsarevich Shigalei Shibanskii with
 boyar Prince Iurii Mikhailovich Bulgakov
 Advance Division: Prince Ivan Ivanovich Turuntai Pronskii,
 Prince Vasilii Fedorovich Okhliabinin Iaroslavskii
 Right Division: Prince Ivan Vasil'evich Shemiaka Pronskii,
 Semen Semenovich Bezzubtsov (Bezzubtsev)
 Left Division: Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Troekurov Eroslavskii
 [Iaroslavskii], Prince Vasilii Semenovich Mezetskii
 Rear Guard: Prince Iurii Ivanovich Temkin Rostovskii, Prince
 Vasilii Vasil'evich Ushatyi

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 101–02):

Main Division: Prince Mihailo (not Mikhail) Ivanovich
 Kubenskii; (does not contain the Addition to the Main
 Division)
 Advance Division: Prince Okhliabinin (without Eroslavskii)
 Right Division: Prince Ivan Shemiaka Vasil'evich (reverses
 word order) Pronskii
 Rear Guard: Prince Iurii Ivanovich Temkin (without Ros-
 tovskii); Prince Vasilii Chiulok (with Chiulok) Vasil'evich
 Ushatyi

11. 7053 (1545) field army sent against Kazan'

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 146):

Main Division: Prince Semen Ivanovich Punkov
 Advance Division: Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev
 Rear Guard: Prince David Paletskii

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 109):

Main Division: Prince Semen Ivanovich Mikulinskii (not
 Punkov, but actually Punkov-Mikulinskii); Prince Vasi-
 lii Ivanovich Osipovskii (omitted in the chronicle, a major
 discrepancy)
 Advance Division: Prince Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev Bol'shoi
 (with "Bol'shoi" to differentiate him from eponymous
 younger brother)
 Rear Guard: Prince Davyd (not David) Fedorovich (with pat-
 ronymic) Paletskii

12. 7058 (1549) field army sent against Kazan'

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 158–59):

Main Division: boyar Prince Dmitrii Feodorovich Bel'skii;
 Prince Volodimer Ivanovich Vorotynskii
 Advance Division: Prince Petr Ivanovich Shuiskii, Prince Vasilii Feodorovich Lopatin
 Right Division: boyar Prince Aleksandr Borisovich Gorbatyi;
 Uglich majordomo Prince Vasilii Semenovich Serebrenyi (Serebrianyi)
 Left Division: Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Vorotynskii, Boris Ivanovich Saltykov
 Rear Guard: boyar Prince Iurii Mikhailovich Bulgakov, Prince Iurii Ivanovich Kashin

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 121):

The *Register* includes this field army sub anno 7057, not 7058 as in the *Nikon Chronicle*, but in both texts it is followed by events dated 24 November, the most conspicuous chronological disparity between the *Nikon Chronicle* and this *Register*.

Main Division: Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich (not Feodorovich) Bel'skii
 Advance Division: Prince Vasilii Fedorovich (not Feodorovich) Lopatin
 Rear Guard: Kashin-Obolenskii (not Kashin)

13. 7059 (1551) field army sent against Kazan'

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 163):

Main Division: former tsar' of Kazan' Tsar' Shigalei, boyar Prince Iurii Mikhailovich Bulgakov, boyar majordomo Danilo Romanovich Iur'ev³¹
 Advance Division: Prince Petr Andreevich Bulgakov, associate boyar (*okol'nichei*) Ivan Feodorovich Karpov*
 Right Division: boyar Master of Horse Ivan Petrovich Feodorov, Prince David Feodorovich Paletskii
 Left Division: boyar Grigorii Vasil'evich Morozov, Prince Andrei Vasil'evich Nagaev
 Rear Guard: boyar Ivan Ivanovich Khabarov, associate boyar Dolmat Feodorovich Karpov*

³¹ Danilo Romanovich Iur'ev headed the Great Court (Bol'shoi Dvoret), Ivan's royal household, to which all regional majordomos reported.

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 131):

The *Nikon Chronicle* dates this campaign to the spring, the Register more precisely to April.

Main Division: Danila (instead of Danilo) Romanovich Iur'ev

Advance Division: Prince Petr Andreevich Kurakin (instead of Bulgakov but actually Bulgakov-Kurakin); Ivan Fedorovich (not Feodorovich) Karpov

Right Division: Ivan Petrovich Fedorov (not Feodorov); Prince Davyd (not David) Fedorovich (not Feodorovich) Paletskii

Left Division: Prince Andrei Vasil'evich Nagaev-Romodanovskii (not Nagaev)

Rear Guard: Dolmat Fedorovich (not Feodorovich) Karpov

14. 7060 (1552) field army sent against Kazan'

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 184):

Main Division: boyar Prince Ivan Feodorovich Mstislavskii, servitor (*slug*)³² Prince Mikhailo Ivanovich Vorotynskii*

Advance Division: boyar Prince Ivan Ivanovich Pronskii, Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Khilkov

Right Division: boyar Prince Petr Mikhailovich Shcheniatev, Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurb'skii (Kurbskii)

Left Division: Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Mikulinskii, Dmitrii Mikhailovich Pleshcheev

Rear Guard: boyar Prince Vasilii Semenovich Serebrianyi, Semen Vasil'evich Sheremetev*

Sovereign's Division: boyar Prince Volodimer Ivanovich Vorotynskii,* Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev*

Register (Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598, 135–36):

Main Division: Prince Ivan Fedorovich (not Feodorovich) Mstislavskii; servitor Prince Mikhaila (not Mikhailo) Vorotynskii

Right Division: Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbskii (without the soft sign)

Rear Guard: boyar Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Nemogo-Obo-lenskii; Mikhaila Ivanovich Voronogo-Volynskii (a major discrepancy, two officers different than the two in the *Nikon Chronicle*)

³² Servitor (*slug*) was a special and highly honored office held by only one individual at a time.

15. 7061 (1553) field army sent against Kazan'
Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 210):
 Main Division: boyar Prince Aleksandr Borisovich Gorbatiy,
 boyar Zakharii Petrovich Iakovlia
 Advance Division: boyar Prince Semen Ivanovich Mikulinskii,
 boyar majordomo Danilo Iur'evich (scribal error for Iur'ev)
 Rear Guard: Petr Andreevich Bulgakov, Prince David Feodor-
 ovich Paletskii

 Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 137):
 The *Nikon Chronicle* dates to 6 September, the *Register* only to
 September.
 Main Division: Iakovl' (instead of Iakovlia)
 Advance Division: Danila (instead of Danilo) Romanovich
 (with patronymic) Iur'ev (correct spelling of family name)
 Rear Guard: Davyd (not Davyd) Fedorovich (not Feodorovich)
 Paletskii
16. 7062 (1553) field army sent against Kazan'
Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 234):
 Main Division: boyar Prince Semen Ivanovich Mikulinskii,
 boyar Petr Vasil'evich Morozov
 Advance Division: boyar Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev, associ-
 ate boyar armorer (*oruzhnichei*) Lev Andreevich Saltykov
 Rear Guard: Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurb'skii (Kurbinskii),
 Mikhaila Voronovo (not in the *Nikon Chronicle*)

 Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 143-44):
 Main Division: Prince Iurii Ivanovich Kashin ordered by Ivan
 to join (not in the *Nikon Chronicle*)
 Advance Division: boyar Ivan Vasilevich Sheremetev Bol'shoi
 (with Bol'shoi); Fedor Ivanovich Umnyi-Kolychev ordered
 by Ivan to join (not in the *Nikon Chronicle*)
 Rear Guard: Kurbinskii (without the soft sign); Mikhaila Iva-
 novich Voronogo (with patronymic); Dmitrii Mikhailovich
 Pleshcheev ordered by Ivan to join
17. 7062 (1554) field army sent to Astrakhan'
Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 236):
 Main Division: Prince Iurii Ivanovich Pronskii Shemiakin,
 Mikhailo Petrovich Golovin

Advance Division: Master of the Bedchamber (*postel'nichei*) Ignatei Mikhailovich Veshniakov, Shiriai Kobiakov
 Rear Guard: Stefan Grigor'ev syn Sidorov, Prince Andrei Bulgak Boriatinskii

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 144):

Main Division: Mikhaïla (not Mikhailo) Petrov syn (different form of patronymic) Golovin
 Advance Division: Shiriai Vasil'ev syn (with patronymic) Kobiakov
 Rear Guard: Andrei Bulgak Grigor'ev syn (with patronymic) Boriatinskii

18. 7063 (1554) field army sent to Kazan'

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 247):

Main Division: boyar Prince Ivan Feodorovich Mstislavskii, boyar Danila Romanovich [Iur'ev], Ivan Petrovich Iakovlia*
 Advance Division: boyar Zakharii Petrovich,* Mikhailo Voronovo, Ivan Men'shoi Vasiliev syn Sheremetev
 Rear Guard: boyar Mikhail Iakovlevich Morozov, Prince Vasilii Svitskii; Prince Vasilii Tokmakov

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 147):

The *Nikon Chronicle* apparently dates the campaign to 1555, the Register to 1554.

Main Division: boyar majordomo (missing in chronicle) Danilo (not Danila) Romanovich; Ivan Vasil'evich (different form of patronymic) Men'shoi Sheremetev
 Advance Division: Zakharii Petrovich Iakovlia (with last name); Mikhailo Ivanovich (with patronymic) Voronogo (spelling variant)
 Rear Guard: Vasilii Andreevich (with patronymic) Sitskii; Prince Vasilii Ivanovich (with patronymic) Tokmakov-Nozdrovaty (with second last name)

19. 7063 (1555) field army sent against the Crimeans

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 256):

Main Division: boyar Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev, associate boyar Lev Andreevich Saltykov

Advance Division: associate boyar Aleksei Danilovich Basmanov; Bakhteiär Zuzin
 Rear Guard: Dmitrii Mikhailovich Pleshcheev; Stepan Sidorov

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 149):

The Register dates the campaign to 2 June, the *Nikon Chronicle* only to June.

Main Division: (added) Prince Volodimer Andreevich commander Prince Iurii Vasil'evich Lykov
 Advance Division: (does not contain Basmanov); associate boyar Aleksei Danilovich Pleshcheev (not in chronicle); Bakhteiär Grigor'ev syn (with patronymic) Ziuzin
 Rear Guard: Stepan Grigor'ev syn (with patronymic) Sidorov

20. 7064 (1555) field army sent against Lithuania

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 261):

Main Division: Prince Andrei Nokhtev, Petr Petrov (obvious copyist error)
 Advance Division: Semen Sheremetev
 Rear Guard: Zakharii Pleshcheev

Register: (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 153):

The Register records this campaign under 7063.

Main Division: Andrei Ivanovich (with patronymic) Nokhtev; Petr Petrovich (correct patronymic) Golovin (with family name)
 Advance Division: Novgorod majordomo (with office) Semen Vasil'evich (with patronymic) Sheremetev
 Rear Guard: Zakharii Ivanovich (with patronymic) Pleshcheev

21. 7064 (1556) field army against Sweden

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 263):

Main Division: boyar Prince Petr Mikhailovich Shcheniatev, boiarin Prince Dmitrii Feodorovich Paletskii
 Advance Division: Semen and Nikita Vasil'evichi Sheremetevy*³³
 Right Division: Prince Andrei Ivanovich Nokhtev, Ivan Men'shoi Vasil'evich Sheremetev

³³ This "shorthand" form for listing brothers was fairly common in Muscovite sources during Ivan IV's reign.

Left Division: Zakharii Ivanovich Ochin, Mikhailo Petrovich Golovin*

Rear Guard: Prince Dmitrii Semenovich Shastunov, Petr Petrovich Golovin*

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 153):

Main Division: Novgorod governor (with office) Paletskii

Advance Division: Novgorod majordomo (with office) Semen; Ivangorod governor (with office) Mikita (not Nikita) Vasil'evichi Sheremetevy

Left Division: Zakharii Ivanovich Ochin-Pleshcheev (with second last name); Mikhaila (not Mikhailo) Petrovich Golovin

22. 7066 (1557) field army against Livonia

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 287):³⁴

Main Division: tsar' Shigalei, boyar Prince Mikhailo Vasil'evich Glinskii, Danilo Romanovich [Iur'ev], Cherkasskii Prince Sibok

Advance Division: Tsarevich Takhtamysh, boyar Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev Bol'shoi, Aleksei Danilovich Basmanov, Cherkas Prince Ivan Maashik [Prince Ivan Amashuk Cherkasskii], Danilo Adashev

Right Division: Tsarevich Kaibula, boyar Prince Vasilii Semenovich Serebrianyi,* associate boyar Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev Men'shoi, Prince Iurii Repnin

Left Division: boyar Prince Petr Semenovich Serebrianyi,* Mikhailo Petrov syn Golovin

Rear Guard: Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kur'b'skii (Kurbetskii) (the soft sign after the "r" is probably an uncounted scribal error), Petr Petrov (scribal error incomplete name)

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 170–71):³⁵

Main Division: Prince Mikhaila (not Mikhailo) Glinskii; Danila (not Danilo) Romanovich Iur'ev; (not in chronicle) with Shigalei Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Khvorostinin; (not in chronicle) with artillery Ivan Matveev syn Lykov-Liakh

³⁴ I have omitted enumeration of auxiliary units and relatives.

³⁵ Here (as elsewhere without comment) I have omitted enumeration of all the division captains (*golovy*) in addition to auxiliary units and relatives.

Advance Division: (the names are in a different order in the Register than in the chronicle); Dmitrii Grigor'ev syn Pleshcheev, aide-de-camp (*pristav*) to Tokhtamysh (not in chronicle); Fedor Voksherin, aide-de-camp to Cherkas Prince Ivan Amashik (not in chronicle); Temka Fedorov syn Ignat'ev (not in chronicle); Danilo Fedorov syn (with patronymic) Adashev

Right Division: Prince Vasilii Semenovich Serebrenoi (different spelling); Mikhaila Ignat'ev syn Saltykov, aide-de-camp to Tsarevich Kaibula (not in chronicle); Iurii Petrovich (with patronymic) Repnin

Left Division: Prince Petr Semenovich Serebrenyi (different spelling); Mikhaila (not Mikhailo) Petrovich (different patronymic form) Golovin

Rear Guard: Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbskii (different spelling³⁶); Ivan Petrov syn Novosil'tsov (compete patronymic and family name); Ivan Semenov syn Kurchev (not in chronicle); Pavel Zabolotskii (not in chronicle)

Obviously the chronicler was unaware of several additional officer assignments.

23. 7066 (1558) field army sent against Livonia

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 300):

Main Division: Prince Petr Ivanovich Shuiskii; Prince Fedor Ivanovich Troekurov; Andrei Ivanovich Shein

Advance Division: boyar Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurb'skii (Kurbskii); Danilo Fedorovich Adashev

Right Division: boyar Prince Vasilii Semenovich Serebrianyi, Bogdan Iur'ev syn Saburov

Left Division: Prince Petr Shchepin-Obolenskii, Vasilii Vasil'ev syn Rozladin-Kvashnin

Rear Guard: Prince Grigorii Ivanovich Temkin, Prince Grigorii Golova Zvenigorodskii

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 173–74):

Main Division: Pskov governor (with office) Shuiskii

Advance Division: Kurbskoi (different spelling)

Right Division: Serebrenogo (different spelling)

³⁶ Here as elsewhere I have disregarded family names ending in -oi, Kurbskoi, and provided standardized modern forms, Kurbskii.

Left Division: Shchepin (no Obolenskii), Rozladin (no Kvashnin)

Rear Guard: Prince Grigorii Petrovich (with patronymic but without "Golova") Zvenigorodskii

24. 7067 (1558) field army sent against Livonia

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 313–14):

Main Division: boyar Petr Vasil'evich Mikulinskii Punkov, boyar Petr Vasil'evich Morozov

Advance Division: boyar Prince Vasilii Semenovich Serebrenyi (Serebrianyi),* Mikita Romanov (scribal error for Romanovich) Iur'ev

Right Division: boyar Prince Iurii Ivanovich Kvashnin, Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev Men'shoi

Left Division: boyar Prince Peter Semenovich Serebrianyi,*³⁷ Ivan Buturlin

Rear Guard: Mikhailo Iakovlevich Morozov, Fedor Ignat'ev syn Saltykov

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 175–77):

Main Division: Tsarevich Tokhtamysh (not in the chronicle); Petr Mikulinskii (without Punkov); (all of the following are not in the chronicle) Prince Mikhailo Petrovich Repnin, Semen Stepanov syn Narmatskii; Dmitrii Grigor'ev syn Pleshcheev, aide-de-camp for Tokhtamysh, Grigorii Ivanov syn Zabolotskii with the artillery

Advance Division: Serebrenogo (Serebrianyi) (different spelling); Nikita (not Mikita) Romanovich (correct patronymic) Iur'ev; (the following names are not in the chronicle): Fedor Vasil'evich Sheremetev, Prince Andrei Petrovich Teliatvskii with Tsar Shigalei, Boris Ivanov syn Sukin

Right Division: Men'shoi Sheremetev (different word order); (additional names) Prince Petr Danilovich Shchepin, Roman Alfer'ev, Andrei Mikhalkov

³⁷ Note that the *Nikon Chronicle* itself was inconsistent in spelling the family name of two brothers in the same field army.

Left Division: Serebrenyi (different spelling³⁸), Ivan Andreevich (with patronymic) Buturlin; (additional names) Mikhaila Petrovich Golovin; Grigorii Nikitin syn Sukin

Rear Guard: Mikhaila (not Mikhailo); (additional name) Prince Semeika Danilov syn Gagarin

Clearly a major supplement to the officer corps of this field army was not known to the compiler of the *Nikon Chronicle*

25. 7067 (1559) field army sent against the Crimeans

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 315):

Main Division: servitor Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Vorotynskii, Prince Danilo Odoevskii

Advance Division: Prince Ivan Ivanovich Kashin, Vasilii Ivanovich Umnyi Kolychev

Rear Guard: Prince Fedor Vasil'evich Sisiev, Prince Andrei Okhlebinin

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 170):

The Register assigns the campaign of this field army to 7066, not 7067 as in the *Nikon Chronicle*; consequently it appears in a different sequence in the Register than the succession of field armies in the chronicle.

Main Division: Mikhaila (not Mikhail); Danilo Semenovich (with patronymic) Odoevskii

Rear Guard: Siseev (not Sisiev); Prince Andrei Petrov syn (with patronymic) Okhliabinin (different spelling)

26. 7067 (1559) field army to the Dnieper River

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 316):³⁹

Main Division: Danilo [Fedorovich Adashev], Shiriai Kobia-
kov, captain Iakov Bundov

Advance Division: Ignatii Zabolotskii, captain D'iak Rzhevskii

Rear Guard: captain Timka Ignat'ev, Vasilii Pivov

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 179):

³⁸ The *Register* too spells the family name of the two brothers differently when describing the same field army.

³⁹ In this case I have listed the captains because we can compare the chronicle and the *Register*.

Main Division: associate boyar (with status) Adashev; Shiriai Vasil'ev syn (with patronymic) Kobiakov, Bundov captain of musketeers (with "musketeers")

Advance Division: Ignatei Ushakov syn (with patronymic) Zabolotskii

Rear Guard: Temka Fedorov syn (with patronymic) Ignat'ev; Pivov captain of musketeers (with "musketeers")

27. 7068 (1560) field army sent against Livonia

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 323):

Main Division: boyar Prince Ivan Fedorovich Mstislavskii, Prince Vasilii Semenovich Serebrianyi, Prince Ivan Kashin; Mikhailo Iakovlevich Morozov, Tsarevich Ibak of Astrakhan'

Artillery: Grigorii Nagoi

Advance Division: boyar Ivan Petrovich Iakovlev, Ivan Men'shoi Vasil'evich Sheremetev

Right Division: boyars Prince Petr Ivanovich Shuiskii, Mikita Vasil'evich Sheremetev

Left Division: boyar Prince Mikhailo Petrovich Reprnin, Dmitrov majordomo Petr Petrovich Golovin

Rear Guard: Prince Andrei Ivanovich Nokhtev Suzdalskoi, associate boyar Mikita Romanovich Iur'ev

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 184–85):

Main Division: Prince Ivan Ivanovich (with patronymic) Kashin; Grigorii Nikitin syn Sukin with Tsarevich Ibak (Tsarevich Ibak appears in the *Nikon Chronicle* but not Sukin); Mikhaila (not Mikhailo) Morozov; Grigorii Ivanovich (with patronymic) Nagoi

Advance Division: Iakovlia (not Iakovlev); Sheremetev-Men'shoi (not Men'shoi Vasil'evich) Sheremetev

Rear Guard: Nikita (not Mikita) Iur'ev

28. 7068 (1560) field army sent against Livonia

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 325):

Main Division: boyar Prince Vasilii Semenovich Serebrianyi, associate boyar Mikita Romanovich Iur'ev

Advance Division: boyar Mikita Vasil'evich Sheremetev*

Rear Guard: boyar Ivan Men'shoi Vasil'evich Sheremetev*

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 185):

Rear Guard: (does not mention “Men’shoi”)

29. 7068 (1560) field army sent to Livonia

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 326):

Main Division: boyar Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kuprskii (Kurbskii), associate boyar Danilo Fedorovich Adashev

Advance Division: Prince Petr Ivanovich Gorenskii, Ivan Sharapov syn Zamytskii

Rear Guard: Prince Fedor Ivanovich Troekurov, Vasilii Vasil’evich Rozladin-Kvashnin

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 189):

Main Division: Kurbskii (not Kuprskii)

Advance Division: Dmitrii Pushkin (instead of Zamytskii); Prince Ivan Andreevich Zolotoi (not found in the *Nikon Chronicle*)

Left Division: Prince Grigorii Fedorovich Meshcherskii (the *Nikon Chronicle* does not record the Left Division; it is very odd to find a Left Division without a Right Division)

Rear Guard: Ivan Andreevich Buturlin (instead of Rozdalin-Kvashnin)

30. 7069 (1560) field army sent to Livonia:

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 327):

Main Division: boyar Prince Ivan Fedorovich Mstislavskii, boyar Mikhailo Iakovlevich Morozov, associate boyar Aleksei Fedorovich Adashev, Prince Fedor Ivanovich Troekurov, Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Ovchin, Prince Ivan Petrov syn Okhliabinin

Advance Division: Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kupr’skoi (Kurbskii), Prince Petr Ivanovich Gorenskii

Right Division: boyar Prince Petr Ivanovich Shuiskii, boyar Aleksei Danilovich Basmanov

Left Division: boyar Ivan Petrovich Ialovlia, Prince Grigorii Fedorovich Meshcherskii

Rear Guard: boyar Prince Andrei Ivanovich Nokhtev Suzdal’skii, Ivan Andreevich Buturlin

Artillery: associate boyar Danilo Fedorovich Adashev, Dmitrii Pushkin

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 189):

The divisions are not listed in the same order as in the chronicle or, more importantly, as is standard in the Register, in which the artillery might appear with the Main Division or after the Rear Guard but the Advance Division always appears before the Right Division (the commander of the Advance Division outranked the commander of the Right Division in precedence).

Main Division: Mikhaila (not Mikhailo) Iakovlich (not Iakovlevich, although the Register form was probably then what is probably now the usual oral contraction) Morozov

Artillery: Dmitrii Fedorov syn (with patronymic) Pushkin

Right Division: Prince Volodimer Andreevich's majordomo
Prince Andrei Petrovich Khovanskii (not in the chronicle);
Mikhailo Lopatin (not in the chronicle)

Advance Division: Kurbskii (different spelling); Prince Ivan
Adreevich Zolotoi (not in the chronicle)

Left Division: Mikhail Cheglov (not found in the chronicle)

Rear Guard: Ivan Andreev syn (different form of patronymic)
Buturlin

31. 7071 (1563) field army sent to Polotsk

Nikon Chronicle (PSRL 13: 348–49):

There are two anomalies in the *Nikon Chronicle* account of this field army. A record of the Advance Division appears by itself (348) before the proper account of the full five-division field army (349), and that five-division record not only repeats the Advance Division section but includes it out of sequence, after instead of before the Right Division.

(348) Advance Division: Tsarevich Tokhtamysh, Tsarevich Bekbulat, Prince Vasilii Mikhailovich Glinskii, Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev Bol'shoi,* Aleksei Danilovich Basmanov, Grigori Ivanov syn Nagovo, Prince Iurii Petrovich Repnin

(349) Main Division: Prince Volodimer Andreevich, boyars
Ivan Dmitreevich Belskii, Prince Ivan Ivanovich Shuiskii,
Prince Vasilii Semenovich Serebrenyi (Serebrianyi)*, Prince
Semen Dmitreev syn Paletskii

Right Division: Tsar' Semion Kasaevich Kazanskii, boyars
Prince Ivan Fedorovich Mstislavskii, Prince Andrei Ivanovich Nokhtev-Suzdalskii, Prince Petr Semenovich Serebrenyi (Serebrianyi)*, Roman Pleshcheev, Fedets Fedorov syn Nagovo

Advance Division (as above)

Left Division: Tsarevich Kaibula, Prince Ivan Ivanovich Pronskii, Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich Nemoi, Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev Men'shoi,* Prince Iurii Fedorov syn Boriatinskii, D'iak Rzhevskii

Rear Guard: Tsarevich Ibak, boyars Prince Petr Mikhailovich Shcheniatev, Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurb'skoi (Kurbskii), Ivan Mikhailovich Vorontsov, Prince Aleksandr Ivanovich Iaroslavov with Tsarevich Ivak

Scouts: Prince Andrei Petrovich Teliatetskii, Ivan Andreevich Buturlin

Sovereign's Division (because Ivan IV personally led this field army): Court (*dvorovye*) boyars Ivan Petrovich Iakovlia, Prince Petr Ivanovich Gorenskii-Obolenskii

Artillery: Mikhailo Ivanovich Voronovo-Volynskii, Boris Ivanovich Sukin

Register (*Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598*, 197–98):

Right Division: Fedor Nagoi (instead of Fedets Fedorov syn Nagovo, different first and last name version and without patronymic)

Left Division: Nemogo (instead of Nemoi); Ivan Men'shoi Vasil'evich Sheremetev (instead of Ivan Vasil'evich Sheremetev Men'shoi, changing word order); (Rzhevskii does not appear in the Register)

Advance Division: Ivan Bol'shoi Vasil'evich Sheremetev (instead of Sheremetev Bol'shoi, changing word order); Pleshcheev-Basmanov (instead of Basmanov); Prince Andrei Dmitriev syn Dashkov (not in the *Nikon Chronicle*); Vasilii Mikhailov syn Starogo-Miliukov (not in the *Nikon Chronicle*)

Rear Guard: Kurbskoi (instead of Kurb'skii); Prince Aleksandr Ivanov syn (different patronymic form) Iaroslavov

Artillery: boyars Mikhailo Petrovich Repnin (not in the chronicle); Boris Ivanov Sukin (should be either Ivanovich, as in the *Nikon Chronicle*, or Ivanov syn; either way this is a scribal error); Ivan Grigor'ev syn Vyrodkov (not in the chronicle)

Appendix 2.2. Chronicles and the Diplomatic Papers

1. 7045 (1536) envoy Nikodim Ianov syn Tikhonovskii to Moscow (*PSRL* 13: 114, left column; *SRIO* 41–62, no. 5)

2. 7045 (1536) Timofei Khludenev from Moscow (*PSRL* 13: 114, left column, 1415; *SRIO* 50, 54–55, 60)
3. 7045 (1537) *voevoda* (commander) of Polotsk and marshal *pan* (lord) Ian Iur'evich Glebovich; marshal of Vitebsk, *voevoda*, and *derzhavets* (holder) of Dorogitskii *pan* Matei Voitevich Okhmistrov; and *pisar'* (scribe) Ven'tslav Nikolaev, all adherents of the "Roman law" (*rimskii zakon*) (Catholics) to Moscow to sign a five-year truce (*PSRL* 13: 116; *SRIO* 59, 60–108, no. 6)
4. 7046 (1537–38) courier Savin Oliabiev from Moscow (*PSRL* 13: 121, 122; *SRIO* 59, 130–43, no. 8)
5. 7050 (1542) Ian Iur'evich Glebov, *voevoda* of Polotsk; *pan* Nikodim Ianovich Tekhonskii; and *pisar'* Nikolai Nikolaev syn Andreiushev to Moscow to sign a seven-year truce (*PSRL* 13: 141–42; *SRIO* 59, 143–70, no. 9)
6. 7050 (1542) boyar Vasilii Grigorievich Morozov, Uglich and Kaluga majordomo Fedor Semenovich Vorontsov, and secretary (*d'iak*) Postnik Gubin from Moscow to sign the seven-year truce (*PSRL* 13: 142; *SRIO* 59, 170–99, no. 10)
7. 7050 (1542) return of envoys in appendix 2.2 no. 6 (*PSRL* 13: 144, *SRIO* 59, 199–206, no. 11)
8. 7057 (1549) *pan* Stanislav Petrovich Kishka, *voevoda* of Vitebsk; *pan* Jan Iur'ev syn Komaevskoi, *derzhavets* of OzhsK and Perelomsk; and *pisar'* Gleb Esmanov to Moscow to sign a five-year truce (*PSRL* 13: 157; *SRIO* 59, 264–307, no. 18)
9. 7058–7059 (1549) Mikhail Iakovlevich Morozov, Petr Vasil'evich Morozov and *d'iak* Bakak Metrifanov from Moscow to conclude a truce (*PSRL* 13: 157–58; *SRIO* 59, 307–33, no. 19)
10. 7061 (1553) *pan* Pavel, bishop of Vilna; *pan* Ian Mikolaevich Rodivilov (Radziwill); and Nikolai Nikolaevich Rodivilov (Radziwill) sent Gaika to Metropolitan Makarii and the boyars with an epistle requesting them to petition Ivan to make peace with Poland-Lithuania (*PSRL* 13: 233; *SRIO* 59, 362–69, no. 24)

11. 7061 (1553) Mikita Sushchov to initiators of appendix 2.2, no. 10; envoy Andrei Stanislavov to Moscow to announce forthcoming envoy Stanislav Dovoina, Polotsk *voevoda* to Moscow (PSRL 13: 233; SRIO 59, 369–78, no. 25)
12. 7061 (1553) *pan* Stanislav Dovoina arrives, *pan* Ostap Volovich and *pisar'* Petr Smeshka to Moscow to negotiate an eternal peace (PSRL 13: 234; SRIO 59, 378–81, no. 26)
13. 7061 (1553) the result of appendix 2.2, no. 12 was not an eternal peace but only a two-year truce (PSRL 13: 234; SRIO 59, 381–420, no. 27)
14. 7062 (1554) boyar Vasilii Mikhailovich Iur'ev, treasurer Fedor Ivanovich Sukin and Secretary Ishuk Bukharin from Moscow (PSRL 13: 235; SRIO 59, 420–46, no. 28)
15. 7063 (1555) Fedor Vasiliev syn Voksherin from Moscow with news of the conquest of Astrakhan' (PSRL 13: 247–48; SRIO 59, 446–57, no. 29)
16. 7063 (1555) Iurii Vasiliev syn Tishkevich, adherent of the Greek Law (*grecheskii zakon*) (Orthodox Christian), to Moscow with congratulations on the Muscovite conquest of Astrakhan' and a private peace initiative with Metropolitan Makarii (PSRL 13: 248–49; SRIO 59, 456–65, no. 30)⁴⁰
17. 7065 (1555) Metropolitan Makarii sends his clerk (*d'iachok*) Savluk Turpeev from Moscow to deliver his epistle (PSRL 13: 258; SRIO 59, 465–85, no. 31)
18. 7065 (1555) Turpeev returns to Moscow (PSRL 13: 262; SRIO 59, 465–85, no. 31)
19. 7064 (1556) envoys Prince Stepan Zbarzhskii, Vitebsk *voevoda*; *pan* Ian Shimkovich, marshal, and *pisar'* Ventslav Mikolaev to Moscow to sign a six-year truce with boyar Ivan Mikhailovich Vorontsov, treasurer

⁴⁰ The diplomatic books explained that the Polish lords (*pany*) wanted war, but the *voevoda* of Vilna opposed war; the *Nikon Chronicle*, probably out of discretion rather than ignorance, omitted that information.

- Fedor Ivanovich Sukin, and secretary Boris Shchekin⁴¹ (*PSRL* 13: 263–64; *SRIO* 59, 485–516, no. 32)
20. 7064 (1556) envoys boyar Ivan Mikhail Vorontsov, treasurer Fedor Ivanovich Sukin, and secretary Boris Shchekin from Moscow to ratify the six-year truce (*PSRL* 12: 272; *SRIO* 59, 513–31, no. 33)
 21. 7064 (1556) envoys deliver the truce documents to Moscow, unnamed in the chronicle, according to the diplomatic papers led by Grigorii Viktorin (*PSRL* 13: 273; *SRIO* 59, 531–38, no. 34) (a rare case where the *Nikon Chronicler* failed to record the name of a diplomat from Lithuania)
 22. 7066 (1558) Roman Vasil'evich Olfer'ev from Moscow, returns to Moscow. The chronicle provides an extensive summary of the contents of the negotiations involving Poland-Lithuania, the Crimean Khanate, and Prince Dmitrii Vishnevetskii (*PSRL* 13: 292; *SRIO* 59, 538–51, no. 35)⁴²
 23. 7067 (1558) courier Ian Iur'evich Volchkov, Vilna Master of Horse, to Moscow with a proposal that Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy unite against the Muslim Tatars (*PSRL* 13: 300; *SRIO* 59, 551–61, no. 36)
 24. 7067 (1558–59) Vasili Tishkovich, *voevoda* of Podlasie and *starosta* (elder, head) of Minsk; marshal Nikolai Shimkovich Poshivsheskii; and *pisar'* Sangaiko to Moscow. The chronicle discusses extensively their proposal for an eternal peace and Moscow's reply suggesting another truce while complaining of Polish-Lithuanian tribute (*dan'*) payments to the Crimean Khanate (*PSRL* 13: 316–17; *SRIO* 59, 561–80, no. 37)
 25. 7067 (1559) Roman Pivov from Moscow (*PSRL* 13: 318; *SRIO* 59, 580–91, no. 38)

⁴¹ The diplomatic papers do not mention secretary Shchekin but instead refer to secretary Ivan Mikhailov (Viskovatyi), who was in charge of Muscovite foreign policy. However, Shchekin had been involved in the negotiations and shows up both in the chronicle and in the diplomatic books in the next item in appendix 2.2, no. 21.

⁴² Prince Dmitrii Vishnevetskii (Dmytro Vyshnevetsky), head of the Zaporozhian Sich Cossacks in Poland-Lithuania, entered Ivan IV's service in 1556 and left it in 1562; both events were topics of heated diplomatic exchanges between Sigismund Augustus and Ivan IV.

26. 7068 (1560) envoy Andrei Ivanov to Moscow, received by Aleksei Fedorovich Adashev, treasurer Fedor Ivanovich Sukin, and secretary Ivan Mikhailov (Viskovatyi) (*PSRL* 13: 322; *SRIO* 59, 591–98, no. 39)
27. 7068 (1560) Martin Volotkov (according to the *Nikon Chronicle*) alias Martin Volodkovich (the variant spelling in the diplomatic books) to Moscow with a private message (*PSRL* 13: 323; *SRIO* 59, 598–607, no. 40)
28. 7068 (1560) Mikita Sushchov (see appendix 2.2, no. 11) from Moscow to provide Lithuanian diplomats with documentary proof that Livonia was the patrimony of Moscow (*PSRL* 13: 327; *SRIO* 59, 607–20, 41)
29. 7068 (1560) associate boyar Fedor Ivanovich Sukin and Court secretary Grigorii Shapkin from Moscow to seek a bride for Ivan IV (*PSRL* 13: 329–30; *SRIO* 71, 1–10, no. 1)
30. 7069 (1561) Ian Shimkov, Ian Gaiko and *pisar'* Martin Volotkov (see appendix 2.2, no. 28) to Moscow to discuss peace and Ivan IV's marriage. The chronicle contains a very knowledgeable discussion of the stumbling blocks to both, including territorial disputes, the religion of the bride, and the disposition of potential children from the marriage (*PSRL* 13: 331; *SRIO* 71, 23–46, no. 3)
31. 7070 (1562) Barkolab Korsak to Moscow, coincident with Muscovite acquisition of a letter in Tatar concerning Polish-Lithuanian attempts to sic Crimea on Muscovy (*PSRL* 13: 340; *SRIO* 71, 46–67, no. 4)
32. 7070 (1562) correspondence of King Sigismund Augustus with Metropolitan Makarii and boyars in Moscow (*PSRL* 13: 344–45; *SRIO* 71, 88–120, no. 6)
33. 7071 (1563) the King of Poland and Royal *Rada* (council) members *pan* Nikolai Ianovich Radivil (Radziwill), *voevoda* of Vilna; *pan* Nikolai Iur'evich Radivil (Radziwill), *voevoda* of Troki; and Grigorii Aleksandrovich Khotkevich (Chodkiewicz) send Pavel Berezhitskoi to Moscow in response to the Muscovite conquest of Polotsk,⁴³ asking for a stop to the shedding of Christian blood by making peace. Ivan IV forwarded the letter to boyar Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Belskii and other boyars. (*PSRL* 13: 364; *SRIO* 71, 121–31, no. 7)

⁴³ Polotsk was then part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; now it is Polatsk in Belarus.

34. 7071 (367) courier Iurii Bykovskii and Voitekh Snovitskii to Ivan, the metropolitan, and the boyars with a letter from Valerian, bishop of Vilna and the *pans* (PSRL 13: 367; SRIO 71, 131–51, no. 8)

35. 7071 (1563) courier Andrei Fedorov syn Klobukov from Moscow, according to the *Nikon Chronicle*, on 11 July, according to the diplomatic books, on 10 June. The *Nikon Chronicle* index (PSRL 14 [Moscow: Nauka, 1965], 79) calls him a secretary (*d'iak*) but the diplomatic book classifies him as a member of the gentry (*syn boiarskii*). He was to discuss Prince Dmitrii Vishnevetskii's departure from Moscow (PSRL 13: 368; SRIO 71, 151–63, no. 9).
This kind of chronological discrepancy occurs fairly often between the chronicle and the diplomatic books. In some cases it is a result of the difference between when instructions were issued and when they were carried out.

36. 7072 (1563) courier Vasilii Andreev syn Matskeev Kornofel' to Moscow about a truce extension (PSRL 13: 369; SRIO 71, 163–73, no. 10)

37. 7072 (1564) courier Andrei Khoruzhei to Moscow with a letter complaining of Muscovite territorial conquests (PSRL 13: 372; SRIO 71, 173–87, no. 11). The *Nikon Chronicle* paraphrases King Sigismund Augustus's letter, retaining the Polish-Ruthenian word *maetnost'* (properties) just as Muscovite diplomatic correspondence does.

38. 7072 (1564) envoys *kraichei* (table attendant) and *starosta* of Belsk *pan* Iurii Aleksandrovich Khotkevich (Chodkiewicz); Slonim *starosta* *pan* Grigorii Bogdanovich Volovin; and *d'iak* (this may be a slip of the quill, it should be *pisar'*) Mikhailo Galaburda (Garaburda, see below Appendix 3.2, no. 42) to Moscow. The *Nikon Chronicle* counted 70 "courtiers" (*dvoriane*) and 2,000 "people" (*liudi*) in the embassy, whereas the diplomatic book mentions five "courtiers" and 394 "people" aside from petty bourgeois merchants (*meshchanskie kuptsy*) and 553 horses, except those belonging to the merchants (PSRL 13: 358; SRIO 71, 187–302, no. 12)

39. 7173 (1565) from the Royal *Rada*, Vilna bishop Valerian; Vilna *pan* Grigorii Aleksandrovich Khotkeva (Chodkiewicz); and *pan* Ian Eronimovich Khotkev sent an epistle with Lenart Uzloskii to Moscow to the boyars Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Belskii and Ivan Bol'shoi Vasil'evich Sheremetev (PSRL 13: 398; SRIO 71, 302–15, no. 13)

40. 7074 (1566) Volodimer Matveev syn Zhelnynskii left Moscow to respond to appendix 2.2, no. 39 (*PSRL* 13: 399–400; *SRIO* 71, 315–27, no. 14)
41. 7074 (1566) Lithuanian envoy Iariaga leaves Moscow (*PSRL* 13: 401; *SRIO* 71, 328–36, no. 15)
42. 7074 (1566) ambassadors Iurii Aleksandrovich Khodkevich (Chodkiewicz), *pan* of Troki, *starosta* of Belsk; Iurii Vasil'evich Tishkevich, *voevoda* of Brest, *starosta* of Volkovysk; and *pisar'* and *derzhavets* of Svislochsk Mikailo Kharaburda (usually spelled Garaburda in the Muscovite sources, the form I use below) arrived in Moscow. Both the *Nikon Chronicle* and the diplomatic book counted 1289 horses, but the *Nikon Chronicle* referred to 10 “courtiers,” the diplomatic book to 9. The diplomatic book’s 850 “people” and 56 merchants matches the *Nikon Chronicle*’s 906 “people.”

The *Nikon Chronicle*, in an extraordinary example of news gathering, names the 10 gentry, while the diplomatic book lists 4 gentry signing the truce and 6 gentry (two new names plus the previous four) as accompanying scribe Garabuda. The names in the diplomatic book are close enough to those in the chronicle that there is very little if any doubt of their identity and every name in the diplomatic books matches a name in the chronicle (*PSRL* 13: 402, 403 *SRIO* 71, 336–431, no. 16). Table 2.1 makes it easier to follow the enumeration:

Table 2.1. Polish Gentry in the 1566 Delegation to Moscow

<i>Nikon Chronicle</i>	List of four*	List of six†
Stret' Mikhailov syn Tishkevich	Stret' Tishkov	Stret' Tishkov
Ian Milolaev syn Narbut		
Stepan Stanislavov syn Raiskii		Stepan Raiskii
Semen Zhdanov syn Korsakov	Semen Zhdanov	Semen Zhdanov
Iurii Pukhal'skii		Fedor Potukhalskii
Fedor Iur'ev syn Tishkevich		
Mikhailo Gavrilov syn Tishkev		
Fedor Furt Elen'skii	Fedor Fursov	Fedor Furs
Ivan Nougorodets		
Ivan Ivanov syn Zvezda	Ivan Zvezda	Ivan Zvezda

* *SRIO* 71, 411.

† *SRIO* 71, 421.

Therefore, although four names in the *Nikon Chronicle* (Ian Mikolaev syn Narbut, Fedor Iur'ev syn Tishkevich, Mikhailo Gavrilov syn Tishkev, and Ivan Nougorodets) remain uncorroborated by the diplomatic book, it is fairly safe to infer that they are also reliable.

43. 7075 (1567) courier Vasilii Zagorovskii to Moscow. The chronicle provides an excellent summary of the issue to be negotiated: the Polish-Lithuanian assertion that Muscovy had built a fort on Lithuanian soil, which Moscow insisted was Muscovite patrimony. Both sources explain the delay in the Muscovite reception of the Lithuanian embassy by an epidemic. (*PSRL* 13: 406, 403; *SRIO* 71, 431–47, no. 17)
44. 7075 (1567) Ambassadors Fedor Ivanovich Umnyi Kolychev and comrades leave Moscow (*PSRL* 13: 407; *SRIO* 71, 449–97, no. 18)
45. 7075 (1567) Prisoner exchange, former Polotsk voevoda Stansilav Stanislavovich Dovoina and 10,000 Hungarian gold coins for Prince Vasilii Temkin. Ivan sent Prince Ivan Tevelkelevich and secretary Osif Il'in to conduct the exchange at the Smolensk border, to be protected by Vasilii Kolychev and Mikhailo Kambulov with many men. The diplomatic book contains an earlier agreement to the exchange whose details coincide with the *Nikon Chronicle* narrative of how it was conducted (*PSRL* 13: 408, *SRIO* 71, 421–22, 440–41)

Appendix 2.3. Brothers-in-Arms

Correlating kinship and military service among the Muscovite officer corp during the reign of Ivan IV poses several difficulties. Boyars who served in field armies would certainly have been assigned offices high enough to be reported in the registers, but the overwhelming majority of gentry who served fell below the floor of ranks worthy of mention. The actual number of brothers serving simultaneously in a field army must have been much higher than the records would show. The total would be further hyped by the prevalence of families with more than two sons in military service at the same time. In addition, we lack any adequate standard of comparison, because in contemporary foreign military practice entrepreneurs raised companies on their own but in Muscovy the government assigned soldiers to commands. Furthermore, for a variety of reasons we cannot project seventeenth-century Muscovite military practice back onto sixteenth-century Muscovy. For one thing, the foreign officer component of the seventeenth century was absent in the sixteenth.

The twenty cases of brothers serving in different divisions in the same field army in appendix 1.1 are therefore not outliers. For the years covered it closely coincides with data compiled just from the Register.⁴⁴ It may or may not be statistically significant that appendix 3.1 does not include any case of brothers serving in the same field army division. However, by using only the Register but for the entire course of Ivan IV’s reign, I previously identified 83 cases of brothers serving in the same division.

Subsequently I took a different approach to the problem. Using the Name Index, I came up with a very rough count of all servitors named during the fifty years of Ivan’s reign, other than the paired brothers, of 4,559. This number was far too high for me to backtrack every reference to control for field army assignments, but we know that such entries certainly contain the bulk of the names. In the process I found two unique pairs I had previously missed. Seventy-two pairs of two, plus 5 cases of 3 brothers together yields a total of 149. The total of all servitors named was 4,704. Paired brothers constituted approximately 3 percent of total servitors.

Paired Brothers in Service:	149
Unpaired Servitors:	4,559

Total Servitors:	4,708

⁴⁴ Halperin, “Brothers-in-Arms,” 177, table 5, “Boyars in Command of Different Polky of the Same Field Army.”

I then looked for unpaired brothers simultaneously in service. Of course the names of many servitors appear without patronymics, and I could hardly look up all the genealogies. The same last name and same patronymic sufficed to identify brothers. In nearly all cases the brothers overlapped chronologically. As long as they served during Ivan's reign I included them. The real problem is that this sample privileges boyars, who were much more likely than gentry to be given positions worthy of inclusion in the Register, such as lead voevoda or governor, and less likely to be "pair-able." Given clan size, they were perhaps more likely to generate eponymous cousins. I could hardly control for that. Nevertheless, I found 397 individuals with brothers simultaneously in service with whom they never served together. This leads to two conclusions. First, a man with a brother or brothers in service was two-and-a-half times more likely NOT to serve with him/them. Second, the total number of men in service with brothers in service, paired or not, is 546, or approximately 11 percent of the total number of servitors. This is probably still far too low.

Pair brothers in Service:	149
Unpaired Brothers in Service:	397

Total of Men with Brothers in Service:	546

The true dimensions of brothers serving together in the same division or different divisions of a Muscovite field army remain unknown and perhaps unknowable.

Chapter 3

Ivan IV's Germans and the *Oprichnina*

The value of foreigners' accounts of Muscovy as historical sources has long been contested in Russian historiography. Nowhere is this issue more important than for the study of the reign of Ivan IV, which is so complex and contradictory that historians never cease searching for additional evidence. Arguably the most significant event during Ivan's reign was his creation of the *oprichnina*, his weapon of mass terror. Foreigners' accounts, specifically three accounts written by four Germans who entered Ivan's service and then fled the country, occupy a crucial place in the study of the *oprichnina*, supplying information which is otherwise virtually absent in Muscovite sources. The termination of the central Moscow chronicle tradition in 1567 greatly enhances the value of the foreigners' accounts for Ivan's reign from 1567 to 1584. The unique data in the Germans' accounts have inspired considerable controversy, as does almost everything to do with the *oprichnina* or for that matter with Ivan. Here I will examine what these sources tell us about the *oprichnina*, not so much to confirm or deny the veracity of their contents as to contrast their evidence with contemporary Muscovite sources. Doing so reveals a very clear pattern: the Muscovite sources engaged only the pragmatic features of the *oprichnina* but remained silent on its semiotic elements, the symbolic features that reflected the *oprichnina*'s ideological significance, which the foreigners' sources have no compunction in addressing. It remains unknowable whether the silence of contemporary Muscovite sources can be explained by the fact that Muscovite authors thought of the symbolism of the *oprichnina* as a political third rail or because the meaning of that symbolism was so obvious to Muscovite natives that there was no need to articulate it. Whether their silence makes the evidence of the foreigners' accounts more or less credible is another matter. At this stage of research it suffices to conclude that this pattern of inclusion and exclusion impugns the argument that the assertions of the foreigners must be rejected simply and solely on the basis of the lack of corroboration in the Muscovite sources.

Foreigners' Accounts

Methodologically the problem of the accuracy of the contents of foreigners' accounts is unsolvable, which is why in historiography the pendulum swings back and forth between critical and positive evaluations of their value.¹ On the one hand, if foreigners' accounts must be evaluated as a whole, then the tendentiousness, errors, and lies that infuse each and every source must compel historians to disregard them. The foreigners projected their own domestic fears and prejudices onto Muscovy.² On the other hand, if each datum in an account by a foreigner can be evaluated individually, then the foreigners' accounts also contain information that can be confirmed in Muscovite sources, a foundation for taking their unique observations seriously. Every genre of source has its own weaknesses. Certainly for Ivan's reign narrative sources of all kinds, not just chronicles but tales too, are distorted by bias and commit factual faux pas. Diplomatic sources, including diplomatic correspondence, are replete with deliberate lies and infused with delusional ideological myths. Given the paucity of sources, especially for Ivan's reign, it is understandable that historians are reluctant to dismiss any source as totally useless, because even total fantasy has value for illuminating the mentality of its creator and suggesting perceptions of Muscovy. Historians often play favorites among foreigners' accounts, according greater credibility to one over another as the "most" reliable. To a certain extent, as will partially be demonstrated below, this is unavoidable, because the foreigners' accounts contradict each other. Moreover, all accounts omit something, so none is complete or perfect.

The three foreigners' accounts discussed here form a coherent group, Heinrich von Staden's *The Land and Government of Muscovy*,³ Albert Schlichting's *A Brief Account of the Character and Brutal Rule of Vasil'evich, Tyrant of Mus-*

¹ See the recent comments of Valerie A. Kivelson, "How Bad Was Ivan the Terrible? The Oprichnik Oath and Satanic Spells in Foreigners' Accounts," in *Seeing Muscovy Anew: Politics—Institutions—Culture. Essays in Honor of Nancy Shields Kollmann*, ed. Michael S. Flier, Valerie A. Kivelson, Erika Monahan, and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2017), 67–68.

² Charles J. Halperin, "Sixteenth-Century Foreign Travel Accounts to Muscovy: A Methodological Excursus," *The Sixteenth-Century Journal* 6 (1975): 89–111; Halperin, "In The Eye of the Beholder: Two Views of Seventeenth-Century Muscovy," *Russian History* 24, 4 (1997): 409–23.

³ Heinrich von Staden, *The Land and Government of Muscovy. A Sixteenth-Century Account*, trans. Thomas Esper (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967).

covy,⁴ and Johann Taube and Elert Kruse's *Epistle*⁵ were all written by men who had, not necessarily voluntarily, spent time in Muscovy and in Ivan's service. Staden, of bourgeois origin, alone came to Muscovy of his own free will, as a mercenary, although he may also have served Ivan as a translator and did operate a business, a tavern, as an entrepreneur. Schlichting, perhaps a Pomeranian noble, was captured at Ozerishche and served as a translator in Muscovy. Taube and Kruse, Livonian nobles, were captured separately and liberated from prison in order to serve Ivan together in several capacities. They were assigned to assist Duke Magnus, Ivan's puppet "king" of Livonia, gain support in Livonia. They wrote their account of Ivan jointly. Staden, who had the morals of a thug, stands out like a sore thumb here; certainly, had they met him, Schlichting, Taube, and Kruse would have viewed him as a criminal social inferior. However, these four men shared two characteristics which justify analyzing their accounts as a group. First, all wholeheartedly shared the "black book" clichés of Ivan and Muscovy based upon images of the sultan and Ottoman Turks found in the German pamphlet literature (*Flugschriften*) of the Livonian War. Indeed, Taube and Kruse's account appeared in pamphlet form.⁶ None of these accounts reproduced the seeming ambivalence in judging Ivan and Muscovites of the Livonian chronicles, which occasionally contain passages, suitably minimized, that portray Ivan and Muscovites in a positive light.⁷ Second, all four spent considerable time in Muscovy: Taube arrived in 1559 and left in August 1571, so he stayed in Muscovy for twelve years and eight months. Kruse arrived in August 1560 and left in August 1571, so he stayed in Muscovy for eleven years. Staden arrived in May 1564 and left in 1576, so he stayed in Muscovy for twelve years and eight months. Finally, Schlichting arrived in November 1564 and left in October 1570, so he stayed

⁴ Hugh F. Graham, trans., "A Brief Account of the Character and Brutal Rule of Vasil'evich, Tyrant of Muscovy (Albert Schlichting on Ivan Groznyi)," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 9 (1975): 204–72. On questions associated with Schlichting's authorship of this text and its multilingual manuscript tradition, see I. V. Dubrovskii, "Latinskie rukopisi sochinenii Al'berta Shlikhtinga," *Russkii sbornik* 18 (2015): 74–94.

⁵ M. G. Roginskii, trans., "Poslanie Ioganna Taube i Elerta Kruze," *Russkii istoricheskii zhurnal* 8 (Petrograd, 1922): 10–59.

⁶ Cornelia Soldat, *Erschreckende Geschichten in der Darstellung von Moskovitern und Osmanen in den deutschen Flugschriften des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts/Stories of Atrocities in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century German Pamphlets About the Russians and Turks*, with a Foreword by David Goldfrank (Lewiston, ME: The Edwin Mellon Press, 2014). On Taube and Kruse's pamphlet, see 245–52.

⁷ Charles J. Halperin, "The Double Standard: Livonian Chronicles and Muscovite Barbarity during the Livonian War (1558–1582)," *Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana* 1 (23) (2018): 126–47.

in Muscovy for six years and one month.⁸ Whether Staden was an *oprichnik* is contested. No other of these Germans was, but all resided in Muscovy for much or all of the oprichnina years, unlike, for example, Alexander Guagnini, who plagiarized Schlichting, and Paulus Oderborn, who plagiarized Guagnini. In theory, therefore, we could be dealing with eyewitness observers, albeit all their accounts were written after they had fled Muscovy and we have no way of determining to what extent their prejudices and the polemical purposes for which they wrote distorted what might have been empirical reportage.

It is unnecessary to discuss everything in these three accounts about the oprichnina, let alone their contents as a whole about Ivan and/or Muscovy. The narrative of the creation of the oprichnina in the Aleksandro-Nevskii Chronicle, the vita of Metropolitan Filipp on his opposition to Ivan and subsequent martyrdom, and the "Tale" of Ivan's sack of Novgorod in the Novgorodian chronicles, all domestic sources, more than adequately recount those events. Tracing Ivan's atrocities in the foreigners' accounts would not be productive; there is no way to confirm their details, but the synodical memorial lists corroborate most of the deaths. Rather, I will focus on four (or perhaps three) key semiotic features of the oprichnina in these accounts: whether the oprichniki carried dogs' heads and brooms on their horses' necks (which is either one feature or two), the oprichnik oath, and the pseudo-monastic brotherhood at Aleksandrovskaia sloboda. Doing so is much facilitated by specialized articles on the dogs' heads and oath.⁹ For context I will recapitulate unique information on the oprichnina court (*dvor*, "compound") in Moscow and the tabu on uttering the word *oprichnina* after its abolition in 1572. To retain some sense of the individuality of the sources, I will first present the relevant passages from each text together, with some preliminary commentary. After that we will turn to a comprehensive discussion of these three/four elements of oprichnina symbolism in both Muscovite and foreign sources.

⁸ Marshall T. Poe, *"A People Born to Slavery": Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography, 1476–1748* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 85, table 5: "Major Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Resident European Authors."

⁹ Charles J. Halperin, "Did Ivan IV's *Oprichniki* Carry Dogs' Heads on Their Horses?," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 46 (2012): 40–67; Kivelson, "How Bad Was Ivan the Terrible?" 67–84.

Taube and Kruse

Taube and Kruse¹⁰ attribute both dogs' heads and brooms to the oprichniki:

Also his oprichniki (or those set apart) had to have a recognizable token when riding, like this: dog heads on the horses' necks and by their quivers a hand broom. This meant that they first of all wanted to bite like a dog and [furthermore] sweep out everything left in the land.

After the Almighty, in forbearance of his anger, had watched these insufferable things, in fatherly anger he finally fulfilled the tyrant's desire that he had often wished, [namely] that he would like to see Moscow turned to nothing but coal and ashes, which was also the meaning of the war insignia he carried, the dog heads and brooms, and awakened his least respected enemy, the Crimean Tatar, who in May of 1571 appeared with approximately 40,000 men.¹¹

Note that Taube and Kruse do not specify whether Ivan himself carried a dog's head and broom on the neck of his horse, or how the oprichnina infantry (probably musketeers [*strel'tsy*]) or "poor" oprichniki who could not afford a horse, could carry dogs' heads and brooms on the necks of the horses they did not have.¹²

Taube and Kruse report the following on the oprichnik oath:

Each one of them had to take a special oath, composed in the following manner: "I swear to be loyal to the sovereign and grand prince and his state, to the young princes and the grand princess, and not to keep silent about any evil that I know or have heard or will hear of it if anyone is plotting evil against the tsar and grand prince, his state, the young princes or the tsaritsa.... I swear not to eat or to drink together with members of the *zemshchina*, and not to have anything to do with them. To this I kiss the cross."¹³

¹⁰ Halperin, "Did Ivan IV's *Oprichniki* Carry Dogs' Heads on Their Horses?," 47, describes all four Germans as "West Europeans." It would have been more precise to describe Taube and Kruse, from Livonia, as East Europeans, or to categorize all four men as "Europeans" or just "Germans."

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 48; "Poslanie Ioganna Taube i Elerta Kruze," 38, 51–52.

¹² "Poslanie Ioganna Taube i Elerta Kruze," 38, 47. Cf. Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV's Professional Infantry, the Musketeers (*strel'tsy*): A Note on Numbers," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 30 (2017): 96–116.

¹³ Translation adapted from Kivelson, "How Bad Was Ivan the Terrible?," 75–76.

On the pseudo-monastic brotherhood of oprichniki at Aleksandrovskaja sloboda, the oprichnina's first capital, Taube and Kruse wrote:

He, the grand prince, formed from out of all his brave, just, chaste regiments his own special oprichnina, a special brotherhood, to which he assigned 500 men, most of them of common origin, all proud, bold, dishonorable and soulless fellows.

This order was intended for committing special atrocities, as is obvious from the following reasons it was created and its foundation. First of all, the monastery or the place where the brotherhood was founded was located in none other than Aleksandrovskaja sloboda, where the majority of the oprichniki, except for those sent out as couriers or carrying out judicial service in Moscow, had their residences. He himself was the igumen, Prince Afanasii Viazemskii was the cellarer (*kelar'*), Maliuta Skuratov the sexton (*ponomar'*). And they and others designed the regimen of the monastic life. He rang the bell himself together with his sons and the sexton. Early in the morning at the fourth hour all the brothers had to be in church; all those who did not appear, except those suffering from bodily illness, were not spared, whether of high or low class, and had to serve eight days of penance. At this gathering he sings with the brothers and the subordinate priests from the fourth to the seventh hour. When the eighth hour passes, he goes back to church, and every one must appear immediately. Then he again leads the singing until the tenth hour. By this time a meal is already ready and all the brothers sit down at the table. He, as an igumen, remains standing while they eat. Each brother brings a mug, vessels, and dishes to the table, and everyone is served very expensive food and drink. The drink consists of wine and honey. What cannot be eaten or drunk must be carried away on plates and in mugs to be given to the poor, although the majority of the time the leftovers are taken home by the brothers. When the meal is over, the igumen sits down to the table....

After that [a respite for torture and executions:], each of the brothers must appear in the dining room or refectory, as they call it, for an evening prayer lasting until the ninth hour.

All the brothers and he [Ivan] first of all carry long black monastic staffs with sharp tips, with which they can pin peasants by their feet, as well as long knives under the outer clothes, one *lokot*¹⁴ long or even longer, so that when they decide to kill someone, it would not be nec-

¹⁴ A *lokot* is 18 inches long.

essary to send for the executioners and swords, but to have everything prepared for torture and executions.¹⁵

Several details from this lengthy depiction of Ivan's oprichnina brotherhood merit comment. Note that Taube and Kruse, following European animus against Ivan's title as "tsar," call him "grand prince." The wording is ambiguous about whether the 500 men *are* the corps of oprichniki, or whether they were selected *from* the corps of oprichniki, the larger personnel of his "regiments." Taube and Kruse erroneously malign the oprichniki as low born; the great majority were gentry. The mention of high-born and low-born brothers, as well as rich and poor oprichniki, partially gives to lie to the assertion that the oprichniki were overwhelmingly low-born. If they were inventing Ivan's assistants in running the brotherhood whom they named, they chose well; Prince Viazemskii and Skuratov were certainly among Ivan's closest associates and favorites during the early years of the oprichnina. I do not know what the "subordinate [*podchinennymi*] priests" means; there is no mention, as far as I can tell, of any performance of a sacrament or liturgy. Taube and Kruse declare that Ivan included his two sons, Tsarevich Ivan, born 1554, who was eleven years old in 1565, and Tsarevich Fedor, born 1557, who was eight years old in 1565, as members of the brotherhood. To put it mildly both were too young to be anything other than novices in a monastic order, if that. One wonders if they could possibly have followed the regimen of the adult "brothers." It seems more likely that they were there so that they could be protected by the oprichniki at all times. I know of no scholarship on this point.¹⁶ Taube and Kruse report the exception for indisposed *oprichniki* unable to answer the summons to prayer, the kind of practical qualification of the rules that rings true, as does the subversion of the rule about leftovers by the less charitable-minded oprichniki. Although as igumen Ivan seems to eat and drink the same food and liquids as the brethren, he does so after they have finished and he does so alone. The brothers' pointed staffs (like the one Ivan supposedly wielded to kill Tsarevich Ivan in 1581) and the long knives have nothing to do with the religious functions of the brotherhood.

Taube and Kruse refer to four attributes of the oprichnina: dogs' heads, brooms, the oprichnik oath, and the pseudo-monastic brotherhood.

¹⁵ "Poslanie Ioganna Taube i Elerta Kruze," 38–40.

¹⁶ Ivan specified that his sons were to be included in the oprichnina. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter PSRL] 29 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 344.

Staden

According to Staden the oprichniki carried only brooms on their horses' necks, which he mentions in passing in recounting the oprichnik oath:

The princes and boyars who were taken into the oprichnina were ranked not according to riches but according to birth. They then took an oath not to have anything to do with the *zemskie* [land] people or form any friendship with them. Those in the oprichnina also had to wear black clothes and hats; and in their quivers where they put their arrows, they carried some kind of brushes or brooms tied on the ends of sticks. The oprichniki were recognized in this way.

In accordance with their oath, the oprichniki were not permitted to say a single word to those in the *zemshchina*, nor marry persons from the *zemshchina*; and if the father and mother of a person in the oprichnina lived in the *zemshchina*, that person was not allowed to go to them ever again.¹⁷

Staden's oprichnina is more "aristocratic" than Taube and Kruse's. Staden declares that ranks in the oprichnina depend upon birth, in contrast to the equal treatment of noble and commoner, let alone the inconsistent reference to the majority of oprichniki as low-born, in Taube and Kruse. Note the valid allusion to the black clothing of the oprichniki. An oprichnik black robe has survived.¹⁸ Kivelson calls attention to Staden's elaboration of the oprichnik oath compared to Taube and Kruse to forbid not only socializing with members of the *zemshchina*, but even one's parents if the father was not an oprichnik.¹⁹

Staden does not mention a pseudo-monastic brotherhood with Ivan as igumen, but he devotes five pages to describing the oprichnina court (*dvor*) in Moscow, the only such description extant. Despite its length, it merits reproduction in full here, for reasons adumbrated below:²⁰

At a gunshot's distance west of the palace, in a square on high ground, the Grand Prince ordered the houses of many princes, boyars, and

¹⁷ Staden, *The Land and Government of Muscovy*, 18, 30.

¹⁸ Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zimin, *Oprichnina Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury "Mysl'," 1964), 344, a large black-and-white illustration.

¹⁹ Kivelson, "How Bad Was Ivan the Terrible?," 75–76.

²⁰ In this quotation brackets are Esper's except where otherwise indicated.

merchants destroyed. The square was walled; the first six feet from the ground of burned brick. Above, the walls were brought together to a point without a roof or loopholes and they were 780 feet long and broad. There were three gates, one in the east, the second in the south, and the third in the north. The north gate stood opposite the palace, and was fastened with tin-covered plates. Inside, when the gate was opened and closed, two enormous oak logs were set in the ground, and two large holes [were cut] through them. A bar, which was set in the wall, could be pulled or put through the large logs to the other side on the right, when the gates were closed. These gates were covered with lead. On the gates, there were two carved and painted lions, the eyes of which were set with mirrors. There was a double-headed eagle, carved from wood and painted black, with outspread wings. One [lion] stood with its mouth open, looking toward the zemshchina. The other looked in the same way toward the [oprichnina] court. Between these two lions the black, double-headed eagle stood with its breast toward the zemshchina, wings extended.

Within this structure three vast buildings were constructed. On the peak of each stood a double-headed eagle, carved from wood and painted black, with its breast facing the zemshchina. From these main buildings a passage led over the court to the southeast corner. There, in front of the room and hall, a small cottage with a porch was built even with the ground. For the length of this cottage and porch the wall was three feet lower to catch the sun and a breeze. The Grand Prince usually ate here in the morning and at noon. In front of this cottage was a cellar full of large pieces of wax. This was the Grand Prince's special square. Because of the dampness, this square was covered with white sand two feet deep.

The south gate was only large enough for a man to ride in and out. All the chancelleries were built here, and all debtors were chastised [here] with sticks or cudgels until a priest began to say mass and a bell pealed.²¹ In addition petitions of the oprichniki were signed here and sent to the zemshchina. What was signed here was just, and, in accordance with the mandate, was not questioned in the zemshchina.

Here and outside, the servants of the princes and boyars kept all their horses. When the Grand Prince rode to the zemshchina, they could immediately follow him [on horseback]. The princes and boyars were not permitted to enter or leave the [oprichnina] court by the east gate. That was exclusively for the horses and sleigh of the Grand Prince.

²¹ This is the "righter" (*pravezh*) penalty for debtors.

The structure extended this far to the south. Then came a small gate that was nailed shut on the inside. There was no gate on the west side, but there was a large square without buildings.

On the north side there was a large gate fastened with tin-covered iron plates. Here were all the kitchens, cellars, bakeries, and baths. In the cellars there were various kinds of mead and several [areas] full of ice. Upstairs there were large chambers built of planks with stone supports, and all the planks were cut through with carvings of foliage. All the animals and fish were hung here; from the Caspian Sea come most of the fish, such as *beluga* [white sturgeon], sturgeon, *sevruga* [stellated surgeon], and sterlet [small sturgeon]. There was a small door through which food and drink could be carried from the kitchens, cellars, and bakeries to the court on the right. The bread that [Ivan] himself eats is unsalted.

There were two staircases here, which led up to the large chambers. One was opposite the east gate. A small scaffold like a square table stood in front of this stairway. The Grand Prince climbed on this to mount and dismount his horse. These stairways were flanked by two columns upon which the roof and a wooden vault rested; and on the columns and vault there were carvings of foliage. All the [upper] rooms opened out on a balcony that extended to the wall. The Grand Prince could go from the rooms onto this balcony and over the wall to the church, which stood outside the walls in front of the court in the east. This church was cross-shaped, and its foundation was eight logs deep. It stood unroofed for three years. The bells that the Grand Prince robbed and took from Great Novgorod hung near this church. The other staircase was on the right as one came through the east gate. Every night at the foot of these staircases, below the balcony, five hundred harquebusiers guarded the chamber or hall where the Grand Prince usually ate. The princes and the boyars had the night watch on the south side.

This entire structure was built of pure fir. All this wood was cut from a forest called Klin. Near this forest, eighteen miles from Moscow on the main road to Tver' and Great Novgorod, there is an unfortified settlement also called Klin, and a post station. The only tools used by the carpenters or construction workers for this beautiful building were an axe, chisels, a plane, and a piece of iron like a crooked knife set in a handle.

When the Tatar Khan Devlet-Girei had the suburbs and the monasteries set afire, as soon as a monastery caught fire a bell would peel three times, again and again, until the fire reached this mighty court

and church. The fire spread from here [the oprichnina court] to the entire city of Moscow and the palace [Kremlin]. All ringing of bells was forgotten. All the bells in this church melted into the ground. No one could escape this fire. The lions that had been within the moat beneath the walls were found dead in the marketplace. After the conflagration not a single cat or dog remained in an areas within the walls.

With that [the burning of Moscow in 1571—CJH] the oprichnina came to an end,²² and no one was permitted to allude to it with a single word under pain of the following punishment: he was stripped to the waist and driven through the marketplace with whips.²³

It is impossible not to recognize in this description an eyewitness account or at worst an extensive second-hand account based upon the detailed testimony of an eyewitness. The level of detail is simply too great. There is something peculiar in Ivan's creating his own oprichnina court in Moscow. Appanage princes usually did so; Prince Vladimir Staritskii certainly did. The novelty here is, first, that Ivan did not need an appanage court in Moscow because he was still tsar and the Kremlin palace was still his official residence. Second, a typical appanage court was constructed inside the Kremlin, for proximity to the ruler, but the oprichnina court was built outside the Kremlin. Its location is reliably attested in the chronicles. No one but Staden, however, provides virtually a brick-by-brick, stone-by-stone, building-by-building description. Several details stand out: the use of the color black; the presence of lions and two-headed eagles, symbols of the dynasty and royal power; the construction of a church inside the compound (except for St. Basil's, of course, the Kremlin cathedrals are, as their name conveys, *inside* the Kremlin); and the scale of the project. Despite the obvious obsession with security, almost isolation, and certainly autarky, time and resources were still employed for purely decorative purposes such as carving on wood. Aleksandr Iurganov and following him filmmaker Pavel Lungin interpreted the image of the Moscow oprichnina court in apocalyptic terms as the Temple in Jerusalem, the future site of Christ's Second Coming,²⁴ but even if one does not accept that theory, the semiotic elements in the architecture must be given their due. For that reason I have included the complete description here.

²² Staden, *The Land and Government of Muscovy*, 52 n. 64. This is a copyist's error, because Staden knew that the oprichnina was abolished in 1572, not 1571 (Esper's note).

²³ *Ibid.*, 48–52.

²⁴ A. L. Iurganov, "Oprichnina i strashnyi sud," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 3 (1997): 52–75; Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan the Terrible Returns to the Silver Screen: Pavel Lungin's Film *Tsar'*," *Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema* 7, 1 (2013): 61–72.

At the very end of the description of the Moscow oprichnina Court, Staden mentions a tabu on saying (or, presumably, writing) the word *oprichnina* after the institution was abolished in 1572, another symbolic, not just political, reflection on the *oprichnina*. Muscovite sources from the last years of Ivan's reign do not confirm that assertion.

Staden, like Taube and Kruse, denies Ivan his title as "tsar."

Another detail should thrill historians who try to correlate Ivan's medical problems, specifically fused bones, to the oprichnina. Staden's mention of the scaffold used by Ivan to mount and dismount his horse would permit inferring that Ivan's osteophyte problem was already manifest by the period of the oprichnina and inhibited him from mounting a horse without a prop.

Staden mentions brooms, the oprichnik oath, the pseudo-monastic brotherhood, the Moscow oprichnina court, and the tabu on the word after the oprichnina's abolition.

Schlichting

Schlichting mentions neither dogs' heads nor brooms on the necks of the oprichniki horses. He does briefly mention the oprichnik oath:

Ivan then set about recruiting the Oprichniki, that is, assassins whom he bound to his person with a very strong vow of obedience.²⁵

Schlichting does describe the pseudo-monastic brotherhood at Aleksandrovskaia sloboda:

We should make some observations concerning the Prince's religious practices and observances. In the palace at Aleksandrovskaia (really a charnel-house), Ivan normally wears the full dark habit of a monk, with a cowl like those worn by the Basilian brothers, save that the cowl is lined with goat fur. Senators and everyone else must follow his example, don a cowl and a habit, and go about thus attired except the Oprichniki (assassins) serving as guards and watchmen. Each morning the Grand Prince rises for Matins and wearing his habit goes to church carrying a lantern, a spoon and a bowl. All the others do the same thing, for anyone who omits this observance receives a thrashing. The Grand Prince addresses everyone as brother and all the rest likewise call him brother too. He is careful to follow monk's regimen. Sitting apart like an abbot he dines alone with the bowl he always has

²⁵ "A Brief Account of the Character and Brutal Rule of Vasil'evich, Tyrant of Muscovy," 218.

with him and all the rest do likewise. After the meal he returns to his cell or to a private room while all the others similarly go back to their chambers. Each takes his bowl, knife and lantern with him, for failure to remove all these objects is considered a sin. The Prince performs such rites for several days when, as he thinks he is rendering God His due, and then he leaves the cloister, resumes his normal mode of life.²⁶

Certainly this passage, which, like those in Taube and Kruse, and Staden, titles Ivan "Grand Prince" rather than "tsar," pertains to the same pseudo-monastic order as mentioned in greater detail by Taube and Kruse, but there are differences. Both are situated in Aleksandrovskaiia sloboda. Schlichting seems ambiguous on the question of whether only oprichniki belong to the brotherhood. His comment about oprichniki guards might mean that the brotherhood excluded oprichniki, who served as bodyguards and watchmen, or it might mean that it included oprichniki except those who served as bodyguards and watchmen. Schlichting also implies the most aristocratic brotherhood of the three sources, even more than Staden, with his reference to "senators," presumably boyars. At the same time, he harkens back to Taube and Kruse in the egalitarian element of the brotherhood in that everyone eats the same and they address each other as "brothers," that is equal, even Ivan, who is not addressed as igumen. The narrative is unclear whether Ivan eats alone as igumen as in Taube and Kruse, unless he means that Ivan resembles an igumen, although he is not one, in eating alone. It is equally ambiguous whether everyone eats alone or whether the other "monks" resemble Ivan only in carrying around their bowls. Schlichting does not mention Viazemskii or Skuratov. Nor does Schlichting ascribe choral singing, i.e., praying, to Ivan or led by Ivan. Ivan attends Matins, he does not "sing" it. It may be no more than an oversight but Schlichting writes that all the brothers carry knives without specifying that Ivan also carries one, which is as close as he comes to Taube and Kruse's description of their pointed staffs and knives for non-religious purposes. Schlichting's account is consistent with Taube and Kruse on Ivan's monastic life-style at Aleksandrovskaiia sloboda.

Schlichting, then, mentions neither dogs nor brooms, but does refer to the oprichnik oath and pseudo-monastic brotherhood. He does not describe the oprichnik Moscow court or mention a tabu on the term after 1572.

²⁶ Ibid., 232.

Semiotic versus Pragmatic Aspects of the Oprichnina

The following table summarizes the evidence of the three accounts by Germans formerly in Ivan's service:

Table 3.1. German Sources and Oprichnina Semiotic Attributes

	Dogs' heads	Brooms	Oath	Brotherhood	Moscow court	Tabu
Taube and Kruse	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Schlichting	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Staden	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y

Taube and Kruse mention dogs' heads and brooms, Staden only brooms, Schlichting neither. All three sources mention the oath of the *oprichniki*. Taube and Kruse, and Schlichting mention the monastic brotherhood, but not Staden. Staden alone describes the Moscow oprichnina court and the tabu on the word *oprichnina* after its abolition; neither Taube and Kruse, nor Schlichting do so.

There is no pattern here. All we can say is that some authors did not mention some aspects of the oprichnina that other authors did mention, whether from ignorance or carelessness, or deliberately, remains an open question. However, to see these three foreigners' accounts in proper perspective we need to take into account additional sources.

Dogs' heads of one kind or another, carried by Ivan and/or a noble, are also mentioned in two other foreign sources, an account by an Italian, Monsignor Gerio, Prior of Ingilterra and a pamphlet, *Wahrhafftige Zeitung von grausamen Feindt der Christenheit der Moscowiter*, both from the sixteenth century. In addition a seventeenth-century Muscovite candlestick base has an engraving of an oprichnik with both a dog's head and a broom on the neck of his horse.²⁷

The early seventeenth-century *Piskarev Chronicle* (*Piskarevskii letopisets*) mentions brooms.²⁸ Incidentally, the narrative of the clerk Ivan Timofeev

²⁷ Halperin, "Did Ivan IV's *Oprichniki* Carry Dogs' Heads on Their Horses?," 47–50 (Taube and Kruse), 50–51 (Gerio), 51–53 (pamphlet), 56–59 (candlestick base).

²⁸ O. A. Iakovleva, ed., "Piskarevskii letopisets," *Materialy po istorii SSSR*, 2: *Dokumenty po istorii XV–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk, 1955), 76.

from the Time of Troubles ascribed black clothes and black horses to the oprichniki.²⁹

Prince Andrei Kurbskii, a boyar who defected to Poland-Lithuania, alludes to the oprichnik oath in his *History of the Grand Prince of Moscow*, written in exile:

[Ivan] gathered around him foul men from the entire Russian Land, filled with every kind of evil, and, furthermore, he bound them with terrible oaths and forced the accursed ones to have no dealings with their friends and brethren but also with their very parents, and to please him in everything and to carry out his bloodthirsty orders.³⁰

Kurbskii did not mention black horses, black robes, dogs' heads, or brooms. Despite that, he still thought that the oprichniki were from Hell. In writing that the oprichniki could not speak to their parents, he assumed that there were no cases of fathers and sons joining the oprichnina, which was obviously false in at least one case, the Basmanovs, father Aleksei and son Fedor, unlike the more precise Staden, who wrote that oprichniki could not speak to their parents if their fathers did not belong to the oprichnina.

The aspects of the oprichnina that I have traced in the three German defector accounts and in other sources might all be described as semiotic. They convey the symbolism of the oprichnina, its ideology. Unfortunately that symbolism permits multiple interpretations. There are at least seven theories of the symbolism of the dogs' heads, including that of Taube and Kruse that the oprichniki were Ivan's loyal dogs who would bite traitors. Various historians also see the dogs' heads as a reflection of the image of the Dominicans, the "dogs of the pope," or as an apocalyptic allusion to the dogs of Hell, or as derivations from dog-headed monsters.³¹ Andrei Bulychev discusses the sacred functions assigned to brooms in popular and book culture as a means

²⁹ *Vremmenik Ivana Timofeeva*, ed. O. A. Derzhavina (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1951), 13. Kivelson implies that the narrative of the creation of the oprichnina in the Aleksandro-Nevskii Chronicle mentions black clothes and black horses, but it does not. See Kivelson, "How Bad Was Ivan the Terrible?," 70–71; *PSRL*, 29, 144–45; Charles J. Halperin, "Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Ivan IV's *Oprichnina*," *Kritika* 18, 1 (2017): 99–100.

³⁰ Translation adapted from J. L. I. Fennell, ed., *Prince A. M. Kurbsky's History of Ivan IV* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 248–49. Although Kivelson cites Kurbskii, she takes a far more skeptical position on the authenticity of the text than I do. Kivelson, "How Bad Was Ivan the Terrible?," 76–77.

³¹ Halperin, "Did Ivan IV's *Oprichniki* Carry Dogs' Heads on Their Horses?," 45–47.

of purification or a weapon.³² Kivelson interprets the oprichnik oath as an expression of purification and cleansing, which could derive from and certainly matches both magical spells and theological imperatives to abandon one's secular life and follow Christ, as laity or clergy.³³ I tend to view the oath as conveying isolation and autonomy. Obviously the monastic brotherhood added a strong religious element to the identity of the oprichniki. The symbolism of the Moscow oprichnina court employs royal dynastic visual images, lions and the two-headed imperial eagle, but the architectural conception of the compound as a whole conveys a variety of messages, including a sense of apartness. A tabu partakes of the sacred or cursed.

Ivan could have ordered his courtiers or musketeers to arrest and execute people even if they did not wear black clothes, ride black horses with dogs' heads and brooms on their necks, take an oath to renounce friends and families, or join a pseudo-monastic brotherhood. Those elements of the oprichnina did not serve purely pragmatic functions.

All the sources that provide information on the semiotic features of the oprichnina share one negative characteristic: They were *not* written in Muscovy during Ivan's reign. Either they were written outside Muscovy, whether by foreigners, such as our German defectors, or a Muscovite emigré, namely Kurbskii, or in Muscovy but *after* Ivan's reign, during the Time of Troubles, such as Timofeev or the Piskarev Chronicle. This can hardly be coincidental.

That this provenance was purposeful can be confirmed by looking at what the sources written in Muscovy during the oprichnina do say about it.³⁴ Those sources dealt with the oprichnina as an institution, the administrative consequences of its creation, land assignments, personnel, and repressive functions, including executions and depredations. The supposed loss of the putative oprichnina archive in the Moscow fire of 1571 did not destroy all manuscripts, narrative and documentary, which depict the oprichnina in action.³⁵ Although the word oprichnina derives from that for the portion of her late husband's estate that a widow was entitled to (*oprish'*), institutionally the oprichnina was an appanage (*udel*).³⁶ As such it had a defined territory and personnel with a varying decree of judicial autonomy. The oprichnina carried

³² Andrei Alekseevich Bulychiev, *Mezhdru sviatymi i demonami: Zametki o posmertnoi sud'be opal'nykh tsaria Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Znak," 2005), 140–46.

³³ Kivelson, "How Bad Was Ivan the Terrible?," especially 74–84.

³⁴ Halperin, "Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Ivan IV's Oprichnina," 95–124.

³⁵ On the inextant oprichnina archive, see Ruslan Grigor'evich Skrynnikov, *Tsarstvo terrora* (St. Petersburg: Nauka, Sankt-Peterburgskoe otделение, 1992), 10.

³⁶ Vasiliï Osipovich Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia Duma Drevnei Rusi*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Sinodal'naia Tipografiia, 1902), reprinted in Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia Duma Drevnei*

the exclusivity factor of an appanage to a new level, requiring all oprichniki to live on oprichnina land and all non-oprichniki living on oprichnina land to be expelled, but these deportations and confiscations differed in degree rather than kind from previous appanage practice. To be sure, the greatest difference between the oprichnina and a "normal" appanage was that the holder of the oprichnina was simultaneously ruler of the country. A normal appanage holder was a non-ruling member of the royal family such as Ivan's cousin Prince Vladimir Andreevich. For this reason it was an anomaly for the oprichnina "holder" to have a separate Court in Moscow, which he did not need, let alone one outside the Kremlin. These considerations lend Staden's description of the Moscow oprichnina court a semiotic context which would otherwise be lacking in a normal appanage court in the city of Moscow.

Domestic Muscovite sources written during the oprichnina (or during the remainder of Ivan's reign after its abolition, from 1572 to 1584) uniformly do *not* address precisely the semiotic attributes of the oprichnina evidenced in foreign and Muscovite sources written outside Muscovy or in Muscovy after Ivan's death. Muscovite sources written in Muscovy during the oprichnina dealt only with the pragmatic aspects of the oprichnina that more or less applied to or were extrapolations from that of an appanage. How this contrast in subject matter can be explained remains to be seen, but for the moment I would suggest that it is unlikely that Russian Orthodox Christians could not understand the semiotic elements of the oprichnina when Russian Orthodox Christianity contains so many symbolic elements, the liturgy and iconography for starters. Possibly the reticence of Muscovites in Muscovy during the oprichnina to write about the semiotic elements of the oprichnina was a product of discretion and caution, the attitude that it was too risky politically to address the semiotic aspects of the oprichnina, but the blunt references to oprichnina atrocities in the cadastral records, albeit written late in the oprichnina, weaken the plausibility of that theory. It is a cliché that foreigners' accounts of Muscovy mention features of Muscovite that were so well-known to natives that natives did not bother to write them down. This consideration makes it more likely that sources written in Muscovy during the oprichnina did not allude to its semiotic elements because they were too familiar.³⁷

Rusi: Dobrye liudi Drevnei Rusi (Moscow: Ladomir, 1994), 345, called it a parody of an appanage.

³⁷ I owe this theory, which I find far more persuasive than my own initial explanation, to Paul Bushkovitch,

Conclusion

The four Germans who served Ivan and then served him up to European contempt by describing him as a tyrant in their tell-all writings did not need to go beyond the typical evil stereotypes of the Ottomans. Of course, interpolating exotic liveries with dogs' heads, extreme oaths, and sacrilegious pseudo-monastic brotherhoods into their accounts served sensationalist purposes. Even if the accounts were not intended for public consumption, gruesome and compulsive details reinforced Russophobia in their readers. However, Taube, Kruse, Schlichting, and Staden could choose what images they incorporated into their accounts, could select what elements of Muscovite reality "fit" their biased conceptions of Ivan, Muscovy, and the oprichnina. Obviously the semiotic symbols and behavior, in their judgment, served rather well in that department.

The errors, fantasies, and distortions in the three foreigners' accounts preclude dismissing out of hand the possibility that these semiotic features of the oprichnina were fictional creations. The absence of corroborating contemporary Muscovite evidence of the dogs' heads, brooms, oaths, pseudo-monastic brotherhood, oprichnina compound architecture, and tabu on the term is a fact that cannot be overlooked. However, the consistent absence of any reference in contemporary Muscovite sources to any semiotic content of the oprichnina constitutes a significant pattern that undermines the argument that such Muscovite silence definitively precludes accepting any of the passages in the foreigners' accounts on the semiotic elements of the oprichnina as credible. Those details may or may not be accurate, but the questions of their validity must be decided on their own merits without relying on the lack of contemporary Muscovite confirmation. The silence of contemporary Muscovite sources on the semiotic elements of the *oprichnina* does not disprove the reliability of the descriptions of those elements in the accounts of Ivan's Germans. If the explanation of that silence is Muscovite familiarity with the symbolic elements of the oprichnina, it might even enhance the reliability of the accounts of the renegade Germans.

Chapter 4

Ivan Peresvetov and Ivan IV's Muscovy

The provenance of the literary works attributed to Ivan Peresvetov remains disputed. Different scholars assert that there was a man named "Ivan Peresvetov" who wrote several petitions and tales in the late 1540s and early 1550s, while others contend that "Ivan Peresvetov" was a pseudonym for someone else who wrote those texts at that time, and still others conclude that the texts were written in the seventeenth century.¹ This chapter will not attempt to resolve these disagreements. The strongest evidence that the man Ivan Peresvetov wrote the texts attributed to him is a reference in the Inventory of the Tsar's Archive from the 1550s indicating the reception of a manuscript (which has not survived) by Ivashka (a diminutive version of the name "Ivan") Peresvetov. The strongest evidence supporting a seventeenth-century dating of the texts is the fact that all extant manuscripts date to the seventeenth century.² For the sake of argument I will assume that the works date to the mid-sixteenth century, regardless of who wrote them; for convenience I will refer to the author as "Peresvetov."

Peresvetov's works fall into two categories, those which are directly about Muscovy (the *Small Petition* and the *Big Petition*), and those which purport to be about the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires (*The Tale of the Founding and*

¹ Notable contributions to the discussion include Werner Philipp, *Ivan Peresvetov und seine Schriften zur Erneuerung des Moskauer Reiches* (Berlin: Ost-Europa-Verlag, 1935); Daniel C. Matuszewski, "Peresvetov: The Ottoman Example and the Muscovite State" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1972); Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zimin, *I. S. Peresvetov i ego sovremenniki: Ocherki po istorii russkoi obshchestvenno-politicheskoi mysli sere diny XVI veka* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1958); Andrei Vital'evich Karavashkin, *Russkaia srednevekovaia publitsistika: Ivan Peresvetov, Ivan Groznyi, Andrei Kurbskii* (Moscow: Prometei, 2000), 27–126; Daniil Al', *Pisatel' Ivan Peresvetov i Tsar' Ivan Groznyi: U istokov izve chnoi diskussii—kak obustroit' Rossiiu* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr "BLITs," 2002).

² S. O. Shmidt, ed., *Opis' tsarskogo arkhiva XVI veka i arkhiva Posol'skogo prikaza 1614 goda* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1960), 31.

Capture of Constantinople, The Narration on Books, The Tale of Sultan Mehmed, The First Prophecy of the Philosophers and Doctors, The Second Prophecy of the Philosophers, and The Tale of Emperor Constantine). However, one of the few if not the only conclusion shared by all scholars regardless of their interpretation of the provenance of the texts is that the works on the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI Paleologos, and the Ottoman conqueror of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed II the Conqueror (Magmet-Saltan), are allegories about sixteenth-century Muscovy. Therefore Peresvetov's theme was always Muscovy. Consequently it is appropriate to explore Peresvetov's use of Muscovite terminology in his works, including social, political, administrative, and economic words. I have concentrated on the *Complete Redaction* (*Polnaia redaktsiia*) according to the Museum Copy, as published by Aleksandr Zimin, to which page references will be supplied in parentheses in the text.³ I have not recorded retention of the quoted passages in other redactions and variants, but I will present a small number of passages in them which significantly revise the original. I conclude, first, that Zimin exaggerated Peresvetov's allusions to Muscovite institutions by invoking inference in cases when Peresvetov did not employ the proper terminology, and second, that there is a curious anomaly in Peresvetov's allusions to one, indeed the leading, social class in Muscovy, the boyars, who are called boyars in just one text, but exclusively called "magnates," a more generic word, everywhere else. Because of this text-based anomaly, it is necessary to discuss each of Peresvetov's texts individually.

"The Tale of the Foundation and Taking of Constantinople" ("Povest' ob osnovanii i vziatii Tsar'grada) notes that Emperor (*tsar'*, basileus) Constantine inspected the city's walls with his boyars (*boliiare*) (128). He wished advice (*sovet*). So did Mehmed, who consulted (*sovetovav*, *sovetaiushch'*) with his pashas⁴ and with his "council" (*sinklit*), a word used for the Royal Council (*duma*) in Muscovy. It was a cliché of Muscovite thought that a ruler consults his elite and officials, but this practice was hardly confined to Muscovy. The idea derives from the Old Testament.⁵ Constantine likewise consults his boyars (*boliiari*) and *strategoi* (a word taken from the Greek) (135). Patriarch Afanasii gathered boyars (*boliiari*) and councillors (*sovetniki*), another term found in Muscovite sources for Ivan's reign, to urge Constantine to flee the city (137).

³ A. A. Zimin, ed., *Sochineniia I. Peresvetova* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1956), 123–84.

⁴ I will not trace Peresvetov's usage of Ottoman and Muslim terminology, a separate subject.

⁵ Sergei Bogatyrev, *The Sovereign and His Counsellors: Ritualised Consultations in Muscovite Political Culture, 1350s–1570s* (Saarijärvi: Gummerus, 2000); Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV Consults his Elite Subjects," *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, seriia 2: *Istoriia*, no. 4 (2016): 69–76.

Constantine replies to the boyars (*boliari*) and magnates (*velmozhi*) that he will remain in the city and share the fate of his people (138). The word "magnates," a generic for the upper elite, primarily the boyars, appears in Muscovite sources for Ivan's reign, but only in highly rhetorical contexts. The Byzantine boyars (*boliari*) fall into confusion when the walls of the city are breached (141). Mehmed captures boyars and strategoi (*boliaria*, *boliar*, *strategi*).

After the fall of the city Patriarch of Constantinople Afanasii and his *druzhina* were brought before Mehmed (146). During the Kievan period the word *druzhina* meant a prince's retinue, but the term in sixteenth-century Muscovite sources appears only in saints' lives to denote bandit gangs.⁶ Neither the Kievan nor the contemporary usage fits this context. Here *druzhina* might mean something like "entourage." This is an historical, if not archaic, usage of the word at best, as odd in sixteenth-century Muscovy as it would have been in seventeenth-century Muscovy.

According to "The Tale of Sultan Mehmed" ("Skazanie o Magmete-Saltane") during the minority of Emperor Constantine, the magnates (*velmozhi*) took advantage of the opportunity to perpetrate injustice (151). Mehmed pays all his officials from his treasury (*kazna*), the word for the Muscovite state treasury, so no one can extort money from the populace. He appoints no magnates (*velmozhi*) to governorships (*namestnichestvo*) (the word for governor in Muscovy was *namestnik*) so that they cannot commit any injustice (152). A fanciful description of the judicial duel in the Ottoman Empire nevertheless uses the Muscovite word "field" (*pole*), the open area on which combat took place, to denote that judicial practice. Trials also involve the taking of oaths, another Muscovite practice, although obviously Muslim Turks would not, as in Muscovy, "kiss the cross" to take an oath (154).⁷

Constantine let magnates (*velmozhi*) run wild; their injustice resulted in God's anger against both Constantine and his magnates (*velmozhi*) (154). Mehmed established just courts in all cities, where "judicial books" (*knigi sudebnyia*) informed verdicts, almost certainly an allusion to the 1550 Muscovite law code (*Sudebnik*). Judges were paid (*izobrochil*) in cash from the sultan's treasury (*kazna*) by royal grant (*tsarskie zhalovaniia*). I do not think that *izobrochil* is an allusion to Muscovite *obrok*, meaning quit-rent, not salary, but a Muscovite royal grant was called a *zhalovanie*. Mehmed's officials administered cities, districts (*volosti*), patrimonial lands (*votchiny*), and conditional land grants (*pomest'e*). Tax collectors (*zborshchiki*) were paid (*obrochil*) salaries (*zhalovanie*) by the treasury (*kazna*) to ensure that the monies they collected

⁶ *Biblioteka literatury drevnei Rusi*, 13: XVI vek (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2005), 308, 376.

⁷ See Zimin's commentary on this convoluted passage in *Sochinennia I. S. Peresvetova*, 284–85, but compare Zimin, *I. S. Peresvetov i ego sovremenniki*, 417.

went to the treasury (*kazna*) (155). The terms for district, patrimonial lands, and conditional land grants are all Muscovite. Zimin likens the tax collectors to “urban officials” (*gorodovye prikazchiki*), which might be translated as “town managers,” who sometimes received salaries in money, sometimes in land,⁸ but Peresvetov did not use the Muscovite technical term. Moreover, tax collection was only one part of the responsibilities of the “town managers.”

The Ottoman Janissaries are described as “excellent shooters” (*gorazdykh strel'tsov*) (156), using the Muscovite word for Ivan's professional musketeer infantry, *strel'tsy*.⁹

Subjects out of favor in the Ottoman Empire were in “disgrace” (*opala*), a technical term for those Muscovites barred from the tsar's presence. Mehmed favored free servitors, not slaves (*kholopy*, here *prokholopiti*, “enslaved”), which overlooked the minor problem that the Janissaries were slaves.¹⁰ This is the most prevalent Muscovite term for slaves. The text also refers to the “full (slave) and reported (slave) books” (*polnye i dokladnye knigi*), which echoes two categories of Muscovite slaves, “full” and “reported,” as well as the concept of slave “books,” i.e., books of records of slave contracts, which became Muscovite practice at this time. Mehmed refused to use “slaves” (*kholopy*) as warriors, but Constantine's magnates (*velmozhi*) did so, with baneful consequences because slaves do not fight well. After the Ottoman conquest, Mehmed freed captured Greek slave-soldiers and enlisted them in his own division (*polk*), the Muscovite word for the five main units of a field army. Emancipated slaves fought well for the sultan, because they were free, not how they had fought for the Greek magnates (*velmozhi*) (157).

Mehmed's government fixed prices for merchants (*gosti*), the Muscovite term for elite merchants, and “trading people” (*torgovye liudi*), the Muscovite term for all other merchants. The tsar's “regulation” (*ustav*) recorded those prices; this is the Muscovite term for statutes, or compilations of regulations such as a customs book (158).

Mehmed told all his soldiers who wanted to die to follow him into battle; those who were not ready to die he would execute and place their families in disgrace (*opala*) (159).

Medmed assigned to the ten-men (*desiatskie*), hundred-men (*sotniki*), and thousand-men (*tysiachniki*) in his division (*polk*) responsibility for ensuring

⁸ *Sochineniia* I. S. Peresvetova, 287.

⁹ Charles J. Halperin, “Ivan IV's Professional Infantry, The Musketeers (*strel'tsy*): A Note on Numbers,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 30, 1 (2017): 96–116.

¹⁰ It also finesses the long tradition of slave-warriors (*mamluks*) in Islamic countries, although by this time the Ottomans had already conquered Egypt and eliminated its Mamluks.

that there was no gambling, drunkenness, theft (*tatba*), or banditry (*razboi*) by his troops on campaign. Ten-men (*desiatskie*), hundred-men (*sotniki*), and thousand-men (*tysiachniki*) would investigate "evil people" (*likhie liudi*) held in prison to determine their guilt, who should be executed in three days except for those in disgrace (*opala*). If ten-men (*desiatskie*), hundred-men (*sotniki*), and thousand-men (*tysiachniki*) were criminals, they would be executed without exception. Action should also be taken against false accusers (*iabedniki*) (159). Zimin interpreted these administrative measures against crime as based upon the Muscovite anti-brigandage (*guba*) legislation.¹¹ He had some foundation for doing so. The anti-brigandage institutions were directed against "evil people" (*likhie liudi*) and did involve summary capital punishment. Alternatively these were called banditry (*razboinyi*) measures, eventually under the jurisdiction of the central Banditry Bureau (*Razboinyi prikaz*). However, Peresvetov's text never uses the word "anti-banditry" (*guba*). The anti-banditry structure involved summoning grand juries to investigate known criminals, but no grand juries appear in Peresvetov's account. The anti-banditry procedures were assigned to non-salaried local, sometimes elected, anti-banditry elders (*gubnye starosty*) assisted by sworn-men (*tseloval'niki*), none of whom is mentioned in the text. The ten-, hundred-, and thousand-men supposedly in the Ottoman Empire were salaried soldiers, not as in Muscovy unsalaried civilians (if often ex-soldiers) outside the chain-of-command. The thousand-man (*tysiatskii*), like the retinue (*druzhina*) is an anachronistic archaicism to the head of the urban militia in Kievan Rus'. The office had been abolished in Moscow in the fourteenth century and was no longer in use. On the whole I think the connection between what Peresvetov describes and Muscovite anti-banditry institutions is tenuous.

Emperor Constantine judged theft (*tati*), bandits (*razboiniki*), and slanderers (who made false accusations) (*iabedniki*) in the presence of magnates (*vel-mozhi*) who merely put criminals on *okup*. The rich are bandits (*razboinicheskii*) (160). This is not standard sixteenth-century Muscovite usage, which designated elite, i.e., rich, lawbreakers as "strong men" (*sil'nye liudi*), colloquially translated as "big shots," a variant of which appears below. The crimes/criminals named, as indicated above, come from Muscovite terminology. *Okup* however is confusing; it usually means "ransom," normally from foreign captivity; in context it appears to mean "set free on bail," but a different possibility appears below.

"The First Prophecy of the Philosophers and Doctors" ("Pervoe predskazanie filosofov i doktorov") refers to Grand Prince Vasilii III, Ivan IV's father, as "autocrat of the Russian tsardom" (*samoderzhets russkogo tsarstva*) (162),

¹¹ Zimin, I. S. *Peresvetov i ego sovremenniki*, 365.

which is perhaps anachronistic because only with Ivan IV's coronation as tsar in 1547 could the Muscovite Grand Principality be described as a tsardom, but is still credibly sixteenth-century, when "autocrat" was used unofficially to describe the independent or pious ruler.¹²

In his "Short Petition" ("Kratkaia chelobitnia") Peresvetov describes himself as the "slave" (*kholop*) of Ivan IV (182), standard operating procedure when a servitor petitioned the tsar. He describes himself as having performed "gentry service" (*dvorianskaia sluzhba*), meaning he was a mercenary in Polish, Hungarian, and Czech service (164). This is a problematic phrase. It uses an adjective for the gentry from the noun *dvoriane*, which in sixteenth-century Muscovy meant "member of the Royal Household or Court [Dvor]," somewhat awkwardly "courtier." The word *dvoriane* did not come to denote "gentry" as a whole until the seventeenth century, when it became the Muscovite translation of the Polish "szlachta." In the sixteenth century gentry were *deti boiarskie*, literally: sons of boyars, a term absent in Peresvetov's works.

Peresvetov notes that upon his arrival in Muscovy he had been granted a conditional landed estate (*pomest'e*), the right term, which he lost because of Muscovite red tape (*volokita*), an infamous and very pervasive term in Muscovy. He suffered innumerable insults (*obidy*), the standard Muscovite term (164), and was persecuted by "oppressive people" (*nasil'nye liudi*) (165); the word *nasilie* shares its root with *sil'nyi* (strong).

The "Tale of Emperor Constantine" ("Skazanie o tsare Konstantine") notes that God punished Constantinople for the injustices and arrogance of Constantine's magnates (*velmozhi*) (165). The magnates (*velmozhi*) enriched themselves and debased justice. The lazy, rich magnates (*velmozhi*) never thought about defending the city (167).

The "Conclusion" (*kontsovka*) records twice that God gave authority to warriors, not to magnates (*velmozhi*), to protect justice (168, 169).

The "Big Petition" ("Bol'shaia chelobitnia") reiterates the phrases and themes we have already seen. Peresvetov calls himself Ivan's slave (*kholop*) (170). He uses the diminutive form of his first name, Ivashko (171). He informs Ivan that he had written a memo (*pamiat'*), but the magnates (*velmozhi*) had intercepted it and prevented Ivan from receiving it (172). A memo (*pamiat'*) in the Muscovite bureaucracy was an in-house document, for example, from one official to another, so its use by Peresvetov does not quite fit, but it is a technical term. Peresvetov notes that he could not enter Muscovy without an "order" (*prikaz*) (172), which might be translated here as "permission slip." Ivan or boyars or officials could issue "orders" (*prikazy*) to lower officials, who were therefore called "officials who carry out orders" (*prikaznye liudi*), a phrase

¹² Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV as Autocrat (*samoderzhets*)," *Cahiers du monde russe* 55, 3–4 (2014): 197–213.

commonly mistranslated as meaning officials who worked in central administrative bureaus (*prikazy*). However the term *prikaz* for bureau did not come into wide use until the 1570s.

Quoting a third person, Petr, voevoda of Wallachia, the text in effect accuses Ivan of granting "feedings" (*kormleniia*) to magnates (*velmozhi*) over cities and districts (*volosti*), who used them for self-enrichment and to persecute Christians (173). A Muscovite administrator on a "feeding" (*kormlenie*) did not receive a salary but instead was supported, "fed by," the people in the territory he administered. This system was much criticized during Ivan's minority and the period of "reforms" that followed. Peresvetov is right in step with this feature of Muscovite politics at the time.

Petr describes Mehmed as paying judges from the treasury (*kazna*) so that they would not illegally extract funds and favors from the people. Annual salaries (*zhalovanie*) were determined by an administrative charter (*ustav*) (174). Peresvetov's use of the word "grant" (*zhalovanie*) for salaries is appropriate; "grants" could be in money, in kind, in land, or even in authority.

Warriors should be paid from the treasury (*kazna*). If warriors are not paid from the treasury (*kazna*), then soon there would be no treasury (*kazna*), meaning foreign invasions would deprive taxpayers of the ability to pay taxes. Warriors should receive annual salaries (*zhalovaniia*) from the treasury (*kazna*). In the Greek tsardom the magnates (*velmozhi*) dominated (175).

Peresvetov refers to a "Muscovite" (*moskovitin*) Vaska Mertsalov, presumably an emigre,¹³ in the service of Petr of Wallachia (176). A sixteenth-century Muscovite would not have called himself a "Muscovite"; he would have called himself a "Russian" (*russkii*). Someone from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, however, would refer to a resident of the Grand Principality of Moscow or the Muscovite Tsardom as a "Muscovite."

Mehmed comes from a bandit clan (*razboinicheskii rod*). Peresvetov prays to God not to let the magnates (*velmozhi*) destroy Ivan's tsardom (*tsarstvo*) as they had the Greek tsardom (178). The slander of Mehmed's social origins duplicates that articulated no later than the fifteenth century by Muscovite book-men about Temir-Aksak, i.e., Timur, the Central Asian conqueror.¹⁴ Left to their own devices, embezzlers retain one hundred rubles for every ten they transmit to the treasury (*kazna*), as did the magnates (*velmozhi*) of Emperor Constantine who received "feedings" (*kormleniia*) for governorships (*namest-*

¹³ *Sochineniia* I. S. Peresvetova, 12, "emigre from Moscow" (*vykhodets*).

¹⁴ Charles J. Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380–1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 23 (1976): 48–52.

nichestvo) (179). Note that the Byzantine Empire apparently not only used Russian administrative institutions but also currency.

False denouncers (*iabedniki*) bring phony lawsuits to rip-off Christians, but Mehmed prevents that through his regulations (*ustav*). Security of person and property is so guaranteed that a man's word could secure a transaction for even a thousand rubles (180).

Petr of Wallachia decries the theft (*tatba*), bandits (*razboi*), and insults (*obidy*) rampant in Constantinople under Constantine because of the magnates (*velmozhi*) (181). The entire tsardom was mortgaged (*zalozhilosia*) to the magnates (*velmozhi*) (182). The verb for mortgaging land comes from Muscovite practice. The magnates (*velmozhi*) compelled Constantine to reward them not according to their clan (*rod*) or their patrimony (*votchina*) or their service in war or their wisdom, but to serve evil purposes (183). Here "clan" (*rod*) is the proper Muscovite term for princely or non-princely lineages, but a literal translation hardly clarifies Peresvetov's meaning. He appears to be saying that the magnates made Constantine reward them not according to what they deserved by their social origin (*rod*), "family inheritance" (*votchina*) or merit.

Fittingly, the "Big Petition" ends with a typical Peresvetov prayer to God to save (Ivan's) tsardom from the magnates (*velmozhi*) (184).

The Chronograph sub-redaction (*izvod*) contains several interesting revisions pertinent to our theme. In the "Tale of the Books and Sultan Mehmed ("Skazanie o knigakh i Magmete-Saltane") Mehmed orders the translation from Greek into Turkic of "legal books and law-codes" (*knigi zakonnye i sudebniki*) (219). The 1550 Muscovite Law Code (*sudebnik*) could not have been translated from Greek, so I believe that the reference is to Byzantine state and ecclesiastical codes such as the civil *Law Book for People* (*Zakon sudnym liudem*) or the *Pilot's Book* (*Kormchaia kniga*) of canon law. This text prescribes capital punishment for "predators" (*khishchniki*), a figurative term for criminals, and mentions a customs' transit tax (*myt'*), very valid Muscovite terms not mentioned in the earlier version (219).

The Shchukin manuscript of the "Big Petition" of the *Incomplete Redaction* (*Nepolnaia redaktsiia*) replaces the description of Peresvetov's putative Muscovite mentor, Mikhail Iur'evich, as a magnate (*velmozh*) with the word "boyar" (*boiarin*) (238). This substitution resonates with a passage in the early seventeenth-century *Tale of Peter, Voevoda of Wallachia* (*Skazanie of Petre, voevode voloskom*), a reworking of the "Big Petition" no longer attributed to Peresvetov, in which Peter advises Ivan to treat the boyars (*boiare*) like children (348). Such secondary appearances of the term "boyar" in later texts reflect the anomaly in terminology for the elite which will be discussed below.

Before turning to that anomaly, let us first recapitulate the Muscovite terminology that does occur in the primary redaction of Peresvetov's works. I have alphabetized the Russian terms according to the Cyrillic alphabet.

Terms used correctly:

boliar (boyar)
velmozh (magnate)
volokita (red tape)
volost' (district)
votchina (patrimony)
gost' (select merchant)
desiatskie (ten-men)
zhalovanie (grant)
zalozhitsia (to mortgage)
kazna (treasury)
kormlenie (feeding)
namestnichestvo (governorship)
nasil'nye liudi (oppressors)
obida (insult)
opala (disgrace)
pamiat' (memo)
prikaz (administrative order)
pozhalovati (to issue a grant)
pole (judicial duel)
polk (field army division)
polnye i dokladnye knigi (full slavery and reported slavery books)
pomest'e (conditional land grant)
razboi (banditry)
razboinik (bandit)
rod (clan)
rubl' (rouble)
samoderzhets (autocrat)
sinklit (council)
sotnik (hundred-man)
sovet (advice)
sovetniki (advisors)
sovetovavshe (having taken council with)
strel'tsy (musketeers)
sudebnik (law code)
tatba (theft)
torgovye liudi (trading people)

kholop (slave)
ustav (regulatory code)
iabednik (slanderer).

Clearly Peresvetov possessed considerable accurate knowledge of Muscovite terminology, not just about government and administration but also about society, the economy, and the military. Nevertheless, that expertise should not be exaggerated. He used some terms quite problematically:

dvorianskaia sluzhba (military/mercenary gentry service)
druzhina (retinue, here “entourage”)
otkup, otkup (ransom, farming out taxes, but used as bail)
tysiatskii (thousand-man).

Finally, there are many additional contemporary Muscovite terms which for one reason or another did not find their way into Peresvetov’s works. Here are only a few:

bezchest’e (dishonor, although he did know “disgrace” and “insult”)
duma (royal council)
guba (anti-brigandage institution) (despite Zimin)
gubnaia starosta (anti-brigandage elder) (despite Zimin)
gubnoi tseloval’nik (anti-brigandage sworn-man) (despite Zimin)
deti boiarskie (gentry)
kabala (limited contract slavery, although Peresvetov knew both generic slavery and at least two specific types of slavery, full and reported)
mestnichestvo (precedence, the system of assigning offices based upon family genealogy and past service).

The most unexpected observation to be made about Peresvetov’s usage of Muscovite terminology is a previously unnoticed pattern. According to Zimin Peresvetov hated the boyars.¹⁵ In and of itself that is not particularly notable. As the elite, the boyars were the “whipping boy” of Muscovite political polemics. There was literally no one else worth blaming for almost anything anyone thought wrong in Muscovy, at least among secular social classes. Certainly Ivan IV was prone to attribute all evils to the boyars, if not alone, then certainly first and foremost. (The boyars either blamed each other or bureaucrats, but that is another matter.) Peresvetov lauded the “warriors” (*voinniki*), usually and legitimately interpreted as a reference to the gentry (*deti boiarskie*),

¹⁵ *Sochineniia I. S. Peresvetova*, 13.

the mounted archers and conditional-land holders who were the military and social foundation of the regime, although, as noted above, Peresvetov never used the term for the gentry. The detailed enumeration of Peresvetov's vocabulary reveals that he referred to the boyars *as boyars* only in the "The Tale of the Foundation and Taking of Constantinople." In all other texts he talks only about the magnates. The strength of that bifurcation of terminology is corroborated by the presence of one (but only one) substitution of "boyar" for "magnate" in any of the variants of all other Peresvetov texts and of one (but only one) such interpolated passage in a reworking of a Peresvetov text not by Peresvetov. "Boyar" was a Muscovite term, "magnate" a bland generic. If Peresvetov wanted to direct the reader's animosity directly, exclusively, and fiercely against the Muscovite boyars—surely one of his main objectives in writing petitions to Ivan, who needed no encouragement to blame the boyars for opposing his policies—then why did he in texts other than the "The Tale of the Foundation and Taking of Constantinople" not employ the term?

This peculiarity in Peresvetov's use and non-use of the word *boyar* cannot be blamed upon the fact that *The Tale of the Foundation and Taking of Constantinople* is based upon an earlier text about the Ottoman seizure of Constantinople in 1453, *The Tale of the Taking of Constantinople by the Turks* (*Povest' o vziatii Tsar'grada turkami*) by a supposed eyewitness, Nestor-Iskander, a Slav converted to Islam (Iskander or Iskander is the Arabic version of "Alexander"). Peresvetov was following his source in referring to boyars in that text, along with magnates (*velmozhi*), the "council" (*sinklit*, here the Senate), Mehmed II's consultations (*sovetavashe*), and even the "entourage" (*druzhina*) of Patriarch Afanasii.¹⁶ The English translation of Nestor-Iskander's *Tale* obscures the parallel use of two words for members of the elite, although that makes for a more literate text.¹⁷

¹⁶ L. A. Dmitriev and D. S. Likhachev, eds., *Pamiatniki literatury drevnei Rusi: Vtoraia polovina XV veka* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1982), complete text 216–57 (original on even-numbered pages, modern Russian translation on odd-numbered pages): *boliar*: 226, 244 (three times, 252, 256, 262 [twice]); *velmozhi*: 220, 232, 234, 240, 252 [twice], 258; *sovetovashe*: 236; *sinklit*, 256; *druzhina*: 262. The text also uses "megistan" for "magnate" (Commentary, 603).

¹⁷ Walter K. Hanak and Marios Philippides, trans., *The Taking of Constantinople (Of Its Origins and Capture by the Turks in the Year 1453) by Nestor-Iskander (From the Early Sixteenth-Century Manuscript of the Troitse-Sergieva Lavra, No. 773)* (New Rochelle: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1998), 199 (original on even-numbered pages, translation on odd-numbered pages) translate *vel'mozhi* as "dignitaries" (26–27), "nobility" (32–33), and "great lords" (32–33, 46 and 49, 58–59, 71–72, 74–75); *boliar* as "nobles" (38–39, 56–57, 64–65 [twice]) "great lords" (70–71, 92–93); *sinklit* as "Senate" (46–47, 80–81); *sovetniki* as "counselors" (62–63); *sovet* as "council" (840–41, of Mehmed, n. 85 "divan"); and *vsia druzhina* as "all your troops" (of Patriarch Athanasius, 90–91).

That Peresvetov was merely following his literary model in using both *bo-liar* and *velmozh* in his narrative of the fall of Constantinople only compounds the anomaly. He *chose* to preserve the usage of “boyar” in his “The Tale of the Foundation and Taking of Constantinople” and *not* to use it in his other works, although using it would have reinforced his allegorical descriptions of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires in Muscovite guise and was much more precise in referring to contemporary Muscovy. This anomaly resists explanation at present. More research is needed on Peresvetov’s language before we can propose a theory to explain this puzzling anomaly.

Chapter 5

Lay Elite Seals: Who Had Them and When They Used Them

The use of seals with the name of the seal-holder on them to authenticate documents dates back at least as far as ancient times. In Rus', from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries, princes, their officials, urban officials, and bishops all used seals.¹ In sixteenth-century Muscovy during the reign of Ivan IV several types of seals were in use. Most scholarly attention has focused on state seals, the Great Seal and the Little Seal, particularly their symbolism, as well as on Ivan's ring seal and his travel seal, a brief experiment during Ivan's minority.² Elena Kamentseva and Nikolai Ustiugov mention the seals of central bureaus (*prikazy*) and local administrative offices, but their examples all date to the seventeenth century.³ As far as I have been able to determine, scholars have made no more than passing remarks concerning the use of seals in adminis-

¹ Valentin Lavrent'evich Ianin, *Aktovye pečati drevnei Rusi X–XV vv.*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1970).

² Günther Stökl, *Testament und Siegel Ivan IV.* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973), 41–69 on the Great Seal, illustrations of the Great, Small, and Ring Seal at the end of the book, unpaginated, see nos. 1, 12, 13, 14, 18, 45, 46; John H. Lind, "Ivan IV's Great State Seal and His Use of Some Heraldic Symbols during the Livonian War," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 33 (1985): 481–94, illustrations 490; Nadezhda Aleksandrovna Soboleva, *Rossiiskaia gorodskaiia i oblastnaia geraldika XVIII–XIX vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 153–67; Soboleva, "O datirovke bol'shoi gosudarstvennoi pečati Ivana IV," in *Rossiiia na putiakh tsentralizatsii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 179–86; M. M. Krom, "Putnaia pečat' Ivana IV," in *Issledovaniia po istorii srednevekovoi Rusi: K 80-letii Iuriiia Georgievicha Alekseeva* (Moscow-St. Petersburg: Al'ians-Arkheo, 2006), 140–44; N. A. Soboleva, *Očerki istorii Rossiiskoi simvoliki: Ot tamgi do simvolov gosudarstvennogo suvereniteta* (Moscow: Iazyki slavianskikh kul'tur, 2006), 157–69.

³ Elena Ivanovna Kamentseva and Nikolai Vladimirovich Ustiugov, *Russkaia sfragistika i geraldika* (Moscow: Vysshiaia shkola, 1963), 107–54; Kamentseva, *Russkaia sfragistika i geraldika: Uchebnoe posobie* (Moscow: Ministerstvo Vysshei i srednei Spetsial'nogo Prosveshcheniia, 1983), 18–23. The new seal used by the Novgorod governor (*namestnik*) in diplomatic relations with Sweden qualifies as a state seal, not a regional seal (Lind, "Ivan IV's Great Seal," 487).

tration and jurisprudence by the lay elite during Ivan's reign. Moreover, such comments primarily concern their technical aspects such as illustrations.⁴ This chapter will discuss neither royal nor episcopal seals in use during Ivan's reign,⁵ but seals used primarily by members of the lay elite⁶ on documents pertaining to either public or private affairs.⁷

Utilizing readily accessible anthologies of published documents and publication of documents in monographs or articles, I have assembled a database of 221 documents that contain references to 288 seals.⁸ A document may contain more than one seal, so the number of records in the database exceeds the number of documents. For this reason as appropriate I provide statistics on the number of documents as well as the number of records. Undoubtedly access to more esoteric publications, let alone archival fonds, would reveal more documents with more seals, but for Ivan's reign, 288 instances in which lay elite members affixed seals to documents constitutes a very respectable database. I relied upon textual references to who affixed a seal to the document, not upon the seal itself. Apparently most of the time the seal has not survived. When it does, the document's editors describe the seal, but the present chapter will not address questions of either the material composition of the seals or illustrations on the seals, just textual references to seals.⁹

⁴ Kamentseva and Ustiugov, *Russkaia sfragistika*, 151.

⁵ I also excluded the seal of the cellarer of Trinity Kaliazin Monastery, Asaf, affixed to a 1537/1538 voluntary boundary determination document (*raz'ezzhaia gramota*). It is not clear whether he employed the seal ex officio as an official of the monastery or as a witness. This is the only case of a monk affixing his seal to a document that I encountered in my research.

⁶ "Lay elite" is the most convenient description of the overwhelming majority of seal-users, but I would not insist that state peasants belonged to the elite. Excluded "royal" seals includes seals by appanage princes who were members of the royal family.

⁷ I have also excluded seals that appear on Muscovite diplomatic documents found in the "ambassadorial books" (*posol'skie knigi*), such as those described in Nikolai Petrovich Likhachev, *Razriadnye d'iaki XVI veka: Opyt istoricheskogo issledovaniia* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Belashova, 1888), 6–22; boyars Prince Sitskii and M. V. Kolychev and secretary Tret'iak Grigor'evich Likhachev all affixed their seals to a 1575 document concerning Swedish affairs.

⁸ See appendix 5.1 for the citations.

⁹ In addition to Kamentseva and Ustiugov, *Russkaia sfragistika i geraldika*, 151, which cites a publication of the 1562 seal of Prince Ivan Andreevich Bulgakov, see appendix 5.1, nos. 8 & 9, 53 & 54, 87, 127 & 128 & 129, 146 (records linked by an ampersand derive from the same document).

The goal of this chapter was to determine who had a seal and how and when the seals were used. Knowing when use of seals was required would have been most helpful, but we do not know enough to formulate comprehensive rules for seal usage. The sources reflect the expectation that in certain cases officials would affix seals—and therefore possessed seals. In nine cases where officials worked at least in pairs on land boundary or ownership issues and one member of the team affixed his seal and the other did not, the document explains that the other official was elsewhere on the tsar's service when the document was compiled. This occurred with Andrei Vasil'ev syn Timofeevich Bezsonov in 7068¹⁰ (no. 161), Inoi Ivanov syn Odyntsev in 7070 and 7071 (nos. 171, 176, 179, 182, 183 [said to be in Rzhev]), Prince I. A. Zvenigorodskii in 7070 (no. 174), Ivan Ivanovich Pushkin in 7071 and 7072 (no. 198 [said to be at Polotsk¹¹], 190), and Grigorii Stefanov syn Pil'menov in 7072 (no. 222, said to be in Novgorod).

In one case from 1557, Ivan himself affixed his seal to a judgment charter because the official in charge had been dispatched on service, and apparently the document had to have someone's seal to authenticate it.¹² As much as in signatures, to affix one's seal to a document required a physical presence.¹³

However, in five other documents with six seals, the document does not explain why one participating official did not affix his seal: majordomo (*dvoretskii*) Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Paletskii in 7047 (no. 25), S. D. Batiushkov in 7050 (no. 51), Dmitrii Grigor'ev syn Koverzin twice in 7052 (nos. 70–71 and 72), and Dmitrii Ivanov syn Temirev in 7059 (no. 96). We cannot attribute the failure of these individuals to affix their seals to documents to the fact that they did not have seals, since Paletskii used his seal once in the database (no. 152). We might speculate that either the reason for the absence of an official's seal was not known or it was known that the reason was not government service elsewhere, but there is no way to corroborate such inferences.

In one case, no. 66, we have a unique explanation for the non-appearance of a seal. Treasurer I. I. Tret'iakov did not affix his seal to a 1543 judgment charter (*pravaia gramota*) in a lawsuit between suburban residents of Kolomna and a filial of the Belyi Peskovyi Trinity Monastery because the defendants

¹⁰ Below I explain my use of Muscovite years from the Creation of the World, not Common Era years.

¹¹ Then Polotsk in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, now Polatsk in Belarus.

¹² *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka: Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1997), no. 277, 1: 249–263.

¹³ Charles J. Halperin, "Three 'Hands' and Literacy in Muscovy during the Reign of Ivan IV: 'I Affix My Hand,' 'By My Own Hand,' and 'My Man's Hand,'" *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 51, 1 (2017): 29–63.

claimed that they were exempt from his jurisdiction, i.e., they had a judicial immunity charter (*zhalovannaia gramota*). Oddly, Ia. G. Zhenchiuzhenov, aide (*tiun'*) of Kashira governor (*namestnik*) Prince A. V. Vorotynskii, did affix his seal to the document. Although the full context of this lawsuit remains unclear, if for jurisdictional considerations an official could not rule on a case, then obviously he could not affix his seal to the document that resolved it.

According to a 1564 judgment charter in a lawsuit between a monk of the Bogoiavlenskii Monastery and Lavr Leont'ev syn Meshkov Babkin, a gentry man, Ivan, who presided, asked Meshkov if he recognized the seal of boyar Prince Ivan Zvenigorodskii on a land survey which recognized the monk's ownership of the land. Meshkov replied that he could not recognize the seal. Ivan found Meshkov's response unconvincing. The seal would have contained Zvenigorodskii's name. Ivan later ruled in favor of the elder because, as the charter specified, the survey contained the seals of Zvenigorodskii and a second official, the council gentry man (*dumnyi dvorianin*, a member of the gentry who had been promoted to the Royal Council, Duma), Dmitrii Pivov.¹⁴ In a 1578 decree Ivan instructed officials sent to resolve a land ownership dispute to consult previous cadastres of the land, and specifically to pay attention to the seals and signatures on the documents.¹⁵

Therefore, we may conclude that usage of seals was standard operating procedure in Muscovite administration. The database substantiates the following conclusions: Usage of seals on public documents was ubiquitous during all of Ivan's reign chronologically and geographically. Seals were used in private documents, but to a much lesser extent. Users of seals were almost all male, but women, at least in the boyar class, could also have seals. Boyars and gentry predominate among seal users, but usage of a seal was not their exclusive privilege. Secretaries, also part of the elite, could also use seals, although why professional scribes, who were trained to sign documents, needed seals, remains mysterious. A unique case of state peasants using seals demonstrates that at the very least peasants were not barred from doing so. In a small number of instances individuals affixed both seals and signatures to documents. The purpose of doing so remains elusive, but these instances do preclude the assumption that anyone who used a seal was illiterate. Finally, men used the same seal in both public and private functions; the seals convey the name of the seal user but not his social status or administrative position, demonstrating that to the lay elite there was no distinction between their pub-

¹⁴ *Akty Rossiiskogo gosudarstva: Arkhivy moskovskikh monastyrei i soborov XV–nachalo XVII vv.* (Moscow: Ladomir, 1998), no. 75, 175–90.

¹⁵ Sergei Mikhailovich Kashtanov, *Iz istorii russkogo srednevekovogo istochnika: Akty X–XVI vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1996), no. 13, 207.

lic and private activities, a previously unappreciated reflection of the mentality of the lay elite classes in Muscovy¹⁶ during the reign of Ivan IV.

In the database each record references a single use of a seal by a single person. I coded the date and type of document, the name of the seal user, the gender of the seal user, the social status of the seal user, the office of the seal holder or the function of the document, whether the seal pertains to an earlier document cited in the published document, and whether the seal user also signed the document.

Because the Muscovites used a calendar from the creation of the world in which the year began on 1 September, unless we know the month in which a document was written, we cannot assign a specific Common Era year to it. Therefore I utilized the Muscovite year to sort the documents in chronological order, disregarding more precise dating even when available. The results appear in table 5.1. For the reader's convenience, I have provided CE equivalents; 1533/1534 means any time between 1 September 1533 and 31 August 1534.

Table 5.1. Use of Seals by Year

CE year	Muscovite year	Documents	Records	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
1533/1534	7042	6	7	1–7
1534/1535	7043	2	4	8–11
1535/1536	7044	1	1	12
1536/1537	7045	5	9	13–21
1537/1538	7046	2	3	22–24
1538/1539	7047	3	6	25–30
1539/1540	7048	5	7	31–37
1540/1541	7049	5	7	38–44
1541/1542	7050	7	10	45–54
1542/1543	7051	11	14	55–68
1543/1544	7052	4	7	69–75
1544/1545	7053	2	2	76–77
1545/1546	7054	3	4	78–81
1546/1547	7055	2	2	82–83
1547/1548	7056	2	2	84–85
1548/1549	7057	5	6	86–91
1549/1550	7058	0	0	

¹⁶ Nancy Shields Kollmann, *By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 213.

CE year	Muscovite year	Documents	Records	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
1550/1551	7059	4	6	92–97
1551/1552	7060	5	6	98–103
1552/1553	7061	4	7	104–10
1553/1554	7062	6	8	111–18
1554/1555	7063	7	8	119–26
1555/1556	7064	6	9	127–35
1556/1557	7065	3	3	136–39
1557/1558	7066	7	9	140–47
1558/1559	7067	7	9	148–57
1559/1560	7068	7	8	158–64
1560/1561	7069	4	4	165–68
1561/1562	7070	15	19	169–87
1562/1563	7071	2	3	188–90
1563/1564	7072	6	10	191–200
1564/1565	7073	4	4	201–204
1565/1566	7074	4	4	205–08
1566/1567	7075	9	9	209–17
1567/1568	7076	4	4	218–21
1568/1569	7077	6	8	222–29
1569/1570	7078	2	2	230–31
1570/1571	7079	5	9	232–40
1571/1572	7080	0	0	
1572/1573	7081	2	2	241–42
1573/1574	7082	4	6	243–48
1574/1575	7083	2	2	249–50
1575/1576	7084	0	0	
1576/1577	7085	8	9	251–59
1577/1578	7086	1	2	260–61
1578/1579	7087	9	10	262–71
1579/1580	7088	2	2	272–73
1580/1581	7089	7	7	274–80
1581/1582	7090	4	4	281–84
1582/1583	7091	4	4	285–88
1583/1584	7092	0	0	

Ivan IV became Grand Prince in February 1533 upon the death of his father, Grand Prince Vasilii III; Ivan IV died in March 1584, so the entries for the first and last years of Ivan's reign reflect partial years. For convenience I count the length of Ivan's reign as 51 years, disregarding the partial nature of the first and last year. For 221 documents, that produces an average per annum of 4.33; for 288 records that produces an average per annum of 5.64. At least the former statistic should ideally be compared to the aggregate number of all documents produced per year that could have contained seals. Such a statistic is simply not available. Nevertheless, for the reign of Ivan IV, this quantity of documents and records is very reassuring for satisfying any doubts that there is sufficient evidence to sustain analysis.

There are four years with zero documents or records, 7058, 7080, 7084, and 7092, so we have data from 47 of the 51 years of Ivan's reign. The blank years are so widely distributed—they do not constitute a consecutive block—that we need not suspect any significant causal factor. Zero years may be considered accidents of manuscript survival. I will return to their distribution in a moment.

The total number of document is 225, not 221, because as a result of back-references to previous documents, the same document can appear more than once, under different years, in the database; see table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Back References

Type of document	Number of documents	Number of records	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
Judgment Charter	3	4	102, 103, 140, 141
Limited service slavery contract	1	1	162
Petition	1	1	217
Survey	2	2	120, 193

The distribution of records and documents per the decades of Ivan's reign is calculated in table 5.3. Because two-thirds of each Muscovite year occurs in the second CE year (January through August, versus September through December), I counted the latter year when identifying the number of years per decade for the first and last decades of Ivan's reign.

Table 5.3. Use of Seals by Decade

Decade	Period	Total years	Documents	Avg.	Records	Avg.	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
1530s	1533–39 7042–47	7	19	2.71	30	4.29	1–30
1540s	1540–49 7048–57	10	46	4.60	61	6.10	31–91
1550s	1550–59 7058–67	10	49	4.90	65	6.50	92–156
1560s	1560–69 7068–77	10	61	6.10	73	7.30	157–229
1570s	1570–79 7078–87	10	33	3.30	42	4.20	230–71
1580s	1580–84 7088–92	5	17	2.40	17	2.43	272–88

The annual averages reveal no serious anomalies. The lowest figures occur in the first and last decades, and in between rise to highs during the 1560s, almost a bell curve.

Although the division of Ivan's reign into four periods in table 5.4 has been legitimately questioned by historians because it distorts certain continuities, it still retains some heuristic value. Ivan's minority lasted from his accession to the throne at age three to his coronation and marriage at age sixteen. The period of reforms ends with Ivan's creation of the oprichnina, his state-within-a-state and the instrument of his mass terror. The years after the abolition of the oprichnina are lumped together under a generic "end of reign" title; they are not unified by any consistent theme.

Table 5.4. Use of Seals by Periods of Ivan's Reign

Name	Period	Total years	Documents	Avg.	Records	Avg.	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
Minority	1533–46 7042–55	14	58	4.15	83	5.92	1–83
Reforms	1547–64 7056–73	18	94	5.22	121	6.72	84–204
Oprichnina	1565–72 7074–80	7	30	4.29	36	5.14	205–40
End of reign	1573–84 7081–92	12	43	3.58	48	4.00	241–88

Again the highest quantities and averages occur during the middle of Ivan's reign. The push to stabilize land boundaries and ownership during the Reforms, motivated by the desire for stability in taxation allocation, might explain how it has the highest number of documents and records and their averages. The low numbers for the final years of Ivan's reign are still high enough to inspire confidence.

Using the schema of periods of Ivan's reign confirms the randomness of the zero years in the database: none during Ivan's minority, one (7058) during the Reforms, one during the oprichnina (7080), and two during Ivan's final years (7084, 7092). For the latter two years, the first of these years, perhaps by coincidence, coincides with the Simeon Bekbulatovich episode,¹⁷ and the second denotes a very short partial year.

Because the geographic distribution of documents by district revealed no significant patterns, I did not code "location" in the database. Most of the eighteen districts named constitute the usual suspects for documentation involving the Muscovite lay elite: Dmitrov, Dvina, Iaroslavl', Kashira, Klin, Kolomna, Kostroma, Mtsensk, Nizhnii Novgorod, Pereslavl', Riazan', Ruza, Starodub, Suzdal', Tver', Vladimir, Vologda, Volok, and Zvenigorod. Only Dvina (nos. 96, 100) and Mtsensk (no. 231) are somewhat unusual, but the number of documents in each—two and one respectively—suggests accidental manuscript survival.

¹⁷ In 1575 Ivan "abdicated" the throne of All Rus' and elevated a converted Chingisid (descendant of Chingis Khan) to the grand princely throne. Ivan retained the title of "Prince of Moscow." In 1575 Ivan demoted Simeon and made him grand prince of Tver'. See Charles J. Halperin, "Simeon Bekbulatovich and the Mongol Influence on Ivan IV's Muscovy," *Russian History* 39, 3 (2012): 306–30.

Document type (table 5.5) poses certain problems. Because back-referenced documents were often of a different type than the document in which they were cited, the numbers of documents is again 225, not 221. Should an extract (*vypis', otpis'*) from a survey (cadastre) be categorized separately or subsumed under surveys? I chose to aggregate the numbers to demonstrate the degree to which surveys generated seals. "Reports" (*doklady*) of a variety of types of transactions could be aggregated or reclassified with the referenced type of document; the total count of reports in the database is ten, not all of which are presented as separate categories in table 5.5. Reports always move a case up the administrative ladder for approval, frequently to men of boyar status. Because this impacts who could affix a seal to a document and to indicate the variety of document types which were referred up the administrative ladder for approval, I have retained multiple report categories of documents.

Table 5.5. Document Type of Seal Usage

Document type	Documents	Records	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
Assign land*	30	34	12, 149, 153, 154, 196, 197, 204, 207, 210, 216, 218, 219, 225, 230, 231, 236, 237, 241, 248, 264, 265–67, 272, 273, 274, 277–70, 283, 284, 286
Bill of sale report (<i>kupchaia dokladnaia</i>)	3	3	49, 220, 221
Bill of sale [†]	4	4	168, 232, 238, 251
Charter (<i>gramota</i>)	8	9	30, 53, 54, 83, 147, 155, 163, 215, 270
Customs charter (<i>tamozhnia</i>)	1	3	233, 234, 235
Decree (<i>ukaz, ukaznaia gramota</i>)	3	3	209, 229 259
Donation (<i>dannaia gramota</i>)	13	16	45, 46, 58, 59, 87, 119, 121, 122, 137, 139, 148, 152, 156, 166, 187, 214
Grant of privileges (<i>zhalovannaia gramota</i>)	1	1	55
Instruction (<i>nakaz, nakaznaia gramota</i>)	5	9	92, 93, 94, 186, 199, 200, 239, 240, 259
Judgment charter (<i>pravaia gramota</i>)	24	40	5–7, 10, 11, 26–29, 33–35, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 51, 52, 64, 66–68, 95, 101–03, 124, 125, 127–29, 140, 141, 167, 184, 185, 205, 256, 263 [‡]
Land division (<i>mezhevaia gramota</i>)	1	1	182

Document type	Documents	Records	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
Land exchange (<i>menovnaia</i>)	2	2	134, 181
Limited service slavery contract (<i>kabal'naia gramota</i>)	1	1	162 (back reference)
Petition (<i>chelobitnaia</i>)	2	2	145, 217 (back reference)
Quit-rent charter**	12	18	74, 75, 80, 81, 175, 177, 178, 126, 165, 191, 192, 201, 226–28, 246, 247
Report (<i>doklad</i>)	1	1	118
Report bill of sale	1	1	112
Report donation	1	1	117
Report survey	1	1	4
Report trial record	1	1	32
Slavery sales report ^{††}	1	1	224
Survey ^{††}	63	77	2, 3, 8, 9, 13–19, 23, 24, 25, 31, 36–41, 50, 56, 57, 60, 63, 65, 84–86, 91, 98, 99, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 120, 123, 130–32, 135, 136, 138, 142, 150, 151, 157, 160, 171–73, 180, 193, 198, 203, 208, 211–13, 232, 242, 243, 244, 250, 260, 261, 268, 271, 275, 276, 281, 282, 285
Survey decree	1	1	144
Tax charter (<i>sotnaia gramota, sotnia</i>)	3	3	78, 222, 262
Tax exemption charter (<i>l'gotnaia gramota</i>)	10	14	20, 21, 100, 104, 113–16, 249, 252–54, 258
Tax receipt (<i>platezhnaia gramota, raspiska</i>)	3	3	257, 287, 288
Tax survey (<i>sotnia, sotnaia gramota, sotnitsa</i>)	19	26	22, 61, 62, 69, 70–73, 76, 82, 158, 159, 161, 169, 170, 174, 176–79, 183, 188–90, 194, 195
Testament (<i>dukhovnaia gramota</i>)	6	6	1, 79, 88, 111, 143, 164
Trial record (<i>sudnyi spisok</i>)	5	6	77, 89, 90, 133, 146, 269

* *Otdel'naia, mezhevaia, vvoznaia, delovaia, otvodnaia/zapis', gramota, otpis', nakaznaia pamiat'* (no. 265) could have been classified under "instruction."

[†] *Kupchaia* includes an extract (*otpis'*) of a bill of sale report.

[‡] Because of back references, nos. 102, 103, 140, and 141 occur in two document types.

** *Obrochnaia gramota*, includes one quit-rent extract.

†† *Dokladnaia polnaia. Polnyi kholop* was one category of slave, a “full” or “total” slave, different from limited service contract slavery.

‡† *Pistsovaia kniga* could also be translated as “cadastre.”

The range of document types reflects the diversity of the Muscovite administrative and legal universe, but contains no surprises. The most numerous documents and records were land surveys, which determined boundaries and ownership, followed by land assignment documents, which usually assigned a conditional-land estate (*pomest'e*) to a conditional estate land-holder (*pomeshchik*). Land was the basic form of wealth in Muscovy, and land allotments supported the gentry cavalry who constituted the foundation of the Muscovite military. If we add up the figures for all land-related document types (assign land; bills of sale and reports of bills of sale; donations [most documents in the database conveying donations to monasteries concerned land] and land donation reports; land divisions; land exchanges; surveys with survey extracts, decrees, and reports of surveys), the totals are 113 documents and 139 records, or approximately half of all documents and all records. The next largest category is, unsurprisingly, tax-related documents (customs charters; quit-rent documents; tax charters; tax exemption charters; receipts; and tax surveys), whose totals are 48 documents and 67 records, or approximately 21 percent of all documents and 23 percent of all records.

The names of those lay elite people affixing seals to documents merits closer attention than can be provided by our incomplete sources. It is not always possible to determine whether names refer to the same person or different people, nor have I made more than modest good-faith efforts to do so. It seemed pedantic to list and provide document numbers for all 187 names in the database. I have chosen a compromise solution. I have not reproduced the 137 names that occur only once, nor provided references to their record numbers. For the 28 names that occur twice, I have listed the names but not the record numbers. For the remainder, those individuals who show up between three and seven times, table 5.6 provides full names and record numbers.

Table 5.6. Names of Seal Users¹⁸

Frequency	Name	Total	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
1		137	
2	Vasilii Ivanov syn Brekho		
	Prince Ivan Andreevich Bulgakov		
	Ivan Andreevich Buturlin		
	Prince Mikhail Temriukovich Cherkasskii		
	Uslum Ivanovich Danilov		
	Prince Danilo Andreev syn Drutskii		
	Ivan Grigor'evich Golovin		
	Kurbat Andreev syn Izmailov		
	Poriak Il'ich Kvashnin		
	Prince Fedor Semenov syn Mezetskii		
	Prince Semen Fedorov syn Mishurin		
	Agrippina Morozova (one of the two women seal-users, discussed below)		
	Andrei Ivanov syn Pisemskii		
	Grigorii Semenovich Pleshcheev		
	Ivan Ivanov syn Pushkin		
	Fedor Vasil'ev syn Rzhevskoi		
	Zakharii Andreev syn Satin		
	Prince Petr Ivanovich Shuiskii		
	I. D. Sobakin		
	V. Iu. Trakhaniot		
	Zakharii Iur'evich Trakhaniot		
	Rtisha Vasil'ev syn Unkovskii		
	Fedor Semenovich Vorontsov		

¹⁸ Even when the documents or their editors did not maintain the distinction between boyar patronymics in “-ovich/evich” and gentry patronymics with “syn,” I have imposed absolute uniformity in format, so it is in most cases immediately obvious if a man was boyar or gentry class.

Frequency	Name	Total	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
	Gavrila Fedorovich Zabolotskii		
	Argun Ivanovich Zakhar'in		
	Dmitrii Andreev syn Zamytski		
	Ivan Zlobin		
	Ignatii Zubov	28	
3	Ivan Dmitriev syn Bobrov		10, 15, 18
	Fedor Ivanovich Buturlin		211–13
	Tret'iak Mikhailov syn Dubrovin		108, 110, 185
	Danilo Romanovich Iur'ev		87, 89, 101
	Nikita Romanovich Iur'ev		206, 215, 217
	Vasilii Ivanov syn Molchanov		276–78
	Roman Ignat'ev syn Obraztsov		31, 50, 51
	Prince Petr Borisovich Romodanovskii		150, 146, 188
	Prince Ivan Andreevich Zvenigorodskii		169, 172, 177
		9	
4	Fedor Grigor'evich Adashev		57, 61, 64, 65
	Prince Ivan Danilov syn Gagarin		251, 252, 258, 264
	Prince I. A. Kutuzov		106, 114, 116, 122
	Prince V. A. Kutuzov		84–86, 91
	Ia. I. Saburov		105, 113, 115, 121
	Mikhail Ivanov syn Shishelov		268, 271, 285, 286
	Aleksandr Semenov syn Upin Sliznev		22, 60, 62, 63
	Semen Grigor'ev syn Solovtsov		2–5
5		8	
	Prince I. I. Kubenskii		6, 42, 47, 52, 90
	Dmitrii Mikhailov syn Pivov		170, 173–75, 178
	Lev Andreevich Saltykov		127, 130, 147, 155, 163
		3	
6	Vasilii Ivanov syn Naumov		153, 171, 176, 179, 182, 183
		1	
7	Prince Fedor Ivanovich Khvorostinin		255, 256, 259, 262, 263, 269, 270

Frequency	Name	Total	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
	Ivan Petrovich Zabolotskii		38–41, 96, 97, 100
		2	

The most frequent users of seals included both prominent boyars and far from prominent gentry. What strikes me is that nearly three-quarters (137 of 187, 73%) of all seal users used their seals only once, and only 12 percent (23 of 187) more than twice. No single boyar with major administrative duties such as a majordomo dominates the database with a disproportionate number of occurrences in records. Indeed, no individual even appears in double-digits. The reasonable inference is that the use of seals was a very widespread phenomenon, not confined to a handful of workaholic courtiers. The social status and offices held by seal users will confirm this conclusion.

Only three records refer to the use of seals by two women, both from the boyar class (*boiaryny*). Women had the legal right to engage in property transactions which might have entailed the use of seals, but of course they did not serve as state officials, the major source of seal-affixing behavior. Even when women did deal in property or judicial proceedings, most often men, typically relatives, acted on their behalf. This is why so few women signed documents. The three records of women using seals, however, are still instructive. In 7042 Marfa Eropkina affixed her own personal seal to her testament, affirming that she had paid the debts of her late husband, Ivan Andreevich Eropkin (no. 1). Simply by itself this document demonstrates that women, or at least boyar women, could have their own seals. Agripinna Morozova, who in the documents calls herself *Agrafena*, perhaps her name as a nun, affixed a seal to two documents. When in 7065 she donated land to the Simonov Monastery as stipulated in the testament of her late husband, Ivan Grigor'evich Morozov, she used his seal (no. 137), but the following year, 7066, when she donated a village to Metropolitan Makarii to pay for memorial prayers for her late husband, her son, and her whole clan, also according to the stipulations of her late husband's testament, she used her own seal. She specified that the metropolitan would take possession of the village only after her death (no. 139). Obviously she had her own seal and acted as executor of her husband's testament in both cases. It is not fully clear why she switched to her own seal for the second transaction.

The social status of Eropkina and Morozova might have been the determining factor in their use of seals; absent any other cases of female seal use, we cannot delve further. But we can address the broader issue of the social status of male seal users. Of course, attempting to do so raises difficult questions of detail. Historians do not agree on who was a boyar during Ivan's reign, or when a particular man became a boyar. I have taken a very liberal approach

to identifying boyars by using the term to mean the social class from which boyars were chosen, not just men who were boyars at the time a particular document was composed. If any member of a clan ever achieved that status at any time, I counted any male from that clan as of boyar status. This elides the possibility if not indeed probability that men of the same family name as a boyar belonged to a lesser branch of the clan which did not enjoy boyar status, or perhaps were not even related to the boyar at all. Except when the latter situation was extremely likely, I have chosen to err by overestimating rather than underestimating boyars in the database. It must be remembered that in the sources the son of a boyar who had not yet been awarded boyar rank by the ruler is called a member of the gentry (*syn boiarskii*), a social nicety I am violating. In table 5.7 each occurrence of a person using a seal was counted separately. Given the statistics in table 5.6, we know that no individual dominates the database, so I was more interested in the aggregate volume of seal usage by members of each social class. Because no one ever affixed his seal to a document more than once, we do not need to count documents separately from records in this table. A boyar who held the office of majordomo was more likely to generate administrative paper requiring his seal, so I have counted them separately. As shown in the table, this was not true of gentry majordomos, who undoubtedly administered smaller “households” for the ruler.

Table 5.7. Social Status of Seal Users

Status	Total	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
Administrative aide	3	7, 48, 66
Appanage boyar* (<i>udel'nyi</i>)	1	165
Assistant secretary (<i>pod'iachei</i>)	2	9, 132
Associate boyar (<i>okol'nichii</i>) [†]	6	78, 127, 130, 147, 155, 183
Boyar	80	20, 26, 28, 33, 38–41, 45, 47, 49, 52, 53, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64, 65, 67, 70, 72, 76, 82, 83, 96, 97, 100, 112, 118, 119, 133, 135–39, 142, 145, 146, 148–50, 152, 156, 161, 164, 166, 168, 169, 172, 177, 181, 187, 188, 190, 194, 196, 198, 199, 204, 205, 208, 209, 211–14, 220, 221, 225, 232–34, 236, 239, 266, 267, 283, 287
Boyar majordomo	22	6, 30, 32, 35, 42, 77, 87, 89, 90, 101, 117, 167, 206, 215, 217, 255, 256, 259, 262, 263, 269, 279
Chingissid [‡]	1	55

Status	Total	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
Council gentry (<i>dumnyi dvorianin</i>)	5	170, 173, 174, 175, 178
Gentry	145	1–5, 8, 10–19, 21, 22, 24, 29, 31, 34, 36, 37, 43, 44, 46, 50, 51, 54, 58, 60, 62, 63, 68, 69, 71, 73–75, 79, 84, 85, 86, 91, 95, 98, 99, 102–11, 113–16, 120–22, 123–26, 128, 129, 131, 134, 140, 141, 143, 144, 151, 153, 154, 157–60, 171, 176, 179, 180, 182–84, 186, 189, 193, 195, 197, 200, 201–03, 207, 210, 216, 218, 219, 222–24, 230, 231, 237, 240–45, 248–52, 257, 258, 260, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271–80, 281, 282, 284–86, 288
Gentry majordomo	1	27
Gentry metropolitan decurion (<i>desiatil'nik</i>)	1	88
In-law of tsar**	2	229, 238
Peasant	3	226, 227, 228
Secretary (<i>d'iak</i>) ^{†‡}	15	23, 25, 80, 81, 92, 93, 94, 184, 191, 192, 235, 246, 247, 253, 254

* Prince Andrei Petrovich Khovanskoi was a majordomo of Prince Vladimir Andreevich Staritskii.

† Includes simultaneously armorer and majordomo.

‡ Tsar' Shigalei Shigavliarovich.

** Prince Mikhail Temriukovich Cherkasskii, Ivan's brother-in-law via his marriage to Mariia Cherkasskaia. Cherkasskii did not hold boyar rank.

†† Includes a secretary assigned to the Master-of-Horse (no. 23).

Aggregating all boyars of the tsar,¹⁹ including one associate boyar and all boyar majordomos but not an appanage boyar of lesser status, produces a count of 108, or over a third of all occurrences of seal users, 37.5 percent. Total gentry of the tsar, including conciliar gentry, the highest rank a member of the gentry could attain, but excluding one gentry man who served the metropolitan,²⁰ generated 146 records, over half of the database, 50.6 percent. Only 45 of

¹⁹ Ivan IV was crowned tsar in 1547, but I mean all of Ivan's boyars beginning in 1533, when he inherited the title of "grand prince."

²⁰ Episcopal administration closely resembled state administration. Charles J. Halperin, "The Administrative Culture of the Russian Orthodox Church during the Reign of Ivan IV," in *Culture and Identity in Eastern Christian History: Papers from the First Biennial Conference of the Association for the Study of Eastern Christian History and Culture (ASEC), Inc.*, ed. Russell E. Martin and Jennifer Spock, with the assistance of M. A. Johnson (Columbus: Department of Slavic and East European Languages and Literatures, Ohio State University, 2009), 63–81.

188 records belong to individuals who were neither the tsar's boyars nor the tsar's gentry, or only 43, if we exclude one appanage boyar and one metropolitan's gentry man, lacked any connection to the two top landed social classes of Muscovy.

But the remaining seal holders are still worthy of some attention. In one case the administrative "aide" to a boyar affixed a seal. This is a throwback to the period of slave administrators in the Muscovite principality. In this case the aide, Grigorii Berberini, attached to the governor of Kashira, boyar Prince Ivan Danilovich Penkov, seems to have had his own seal. Berberini's situation might be an outlier. More significant are two other one-of-a-kind cases, one of a serving Tatar Chingissid, Shah Ali, a Muslim, prominent in Muscovite-Kazani relations, who in 1543 put his seal on a grant of privileges to the Trinity Sergius Monastery. Of course, Shah Ali's integration into the Muscovite elite was limited because as a Muslim he could not marry a Russian Orthodox Christian woman. In the other case the cultural integration of a non-Muscovite was far greater. Prince Mikhail Cherkasskii was not a Tatar but a Kabarda Circassian, a convert to Russian Orthodoxy, and also Ivan's brother-in-law, the brother of Ivan's second wife, Tsaritsa Mariia Temriukovna Cherkasskaia. Although Prince Cherkasskii never received boyar rank, he was very high up at Ivan's court, until Ivan ordered his execution in connection with the Crimean burning of Moscow in 1571. More or less conspicuously absent are merchants, including elite merchants (*gosty*) and "trading people" (*torgovye liudi*), who might have served as tax farmers and therefore generated administrative paper to which seals could be attached.

The appearance of sixteen secretaries, fifteen "full" secretaries and one assistant secretary, each of whom occurs once, is both surprising and not so surprising. Seals were not markers of noble birth (*rodovitost'*), which boyars and gentry possessed, but secretaries, let alone peasants, did not. It is hardly surprising that secretaries would participate in administrative activities producing documents with seals. What is at least a little surprising is that these secretaries did not sign or did not *just* sign documents, but affixed their seals, meaning, of course, that they *had* seals. Secretaries constituted the literate corps of the entire administrative apparatus, they wrote documents, and they signed documents by the hundreds, if not the thousands. Why secretaries would have seals is somewhat mysterious. Possessing a seal also set them on an equal footing in authenticating documents with their social superiors, the boyars and gentry.

An even greater social anomaly are the seals of peasants, even if the three seals all come from the same document, a quit-rent allocation, from the Far North, Kargopol', where gentry were conspicuously absent as permanent residents. Nikula Grigor'ev is described as an elder, meaning a peasant, not

a monastic, elder. Vereshchaga Evseev and Mikhail Timofeev are described as sworn-men (*tseloval'niki*), peasants who vouched for the completion of the activities of someone else, in this case a tax collector. According to the document, Grigor'ev and [all?] the sworn men signed and sealed the charter. That northern state peasants could sign a charter occasions no surprise, although why they should sign *and* seal the charter remains as puzzling as other cases of duplicate sign-and-seal individuals to be discussed below, but the problem is whether the charter meant that *all* sworn-men signed and sealed it. The document names additional, undoubtedly peasant, parties to the transaction, despite the gentry format of two of their patronymics, Semen Sharko Semenov, Makar Sozonov syn Lopukhin, Ivan Afanas'ev syn Taletskii, and Istoma Piminov. The document does not specify that these men also signed and sealed the charter, so I have excluded them from the database. That any state peasants possessed seals is extraordinary, literally, in that this is the only incidence of their occurrence in the database, and symbolically, in that state peasants were far below secretaries on the social scale. Even if we minimize the significance of a single record with multiple peasant seals as a fluke, there is no indication in the document that the peasants committed a fatal social faux pas by using a seal, and therefore we must conclude that no drastic social strictures precluded a state peasant from having a seal, which is in and of itself highly suggestive of the social (and administrative) fluidity of Muscovite society during the reign of Ivan IV. The upper echelons of the state peasantry in the Russian North occupied positions in Muscovite society higher than their designation as "peasants" would suggest.

There was no separation of judicial and administrative functions in Muscovy. The same people performed both activities *ex officio* as governors, for example. Consequently my division of the documents by function in table 5.8 is intended only to highlight the inclusion of judicial charters in the document mix and to foreground the importance of regulating access to land, the primary form of wealth in Muscovy. I did not find it possible to assign all records to a category of function; the total records included in the table is 251, not 288.

Table 5.8. Function of Documents with Seals

Function	Total	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
Administrative	64	6, 12, 25, 30, 32, 42, 48, 49, 77, 80, 81, 83, 92–94, 101, 104, 112, 117, 118, 138, 147, 155, 163, 168, 191, 192, 206, 215, 216, 217, 220, 221, 229, 230, 232, 235, 238, 245, 246, 247–49, 251–55, 257–59, 262, 266, 267, 270, 273, 274, 279, 280, 283, 284, 286–88
Judicial	33	7, 10, 11, 26–29, 33, 34, 51, 52, 66–68, 89, 90, 124, 125, 127–29, 133, 234, 140, 141, 146, 167, 184, 185, 205, 256, 263, 269
Surveying	154	2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 50, 53, 54, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 84, 85, 86, 91, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 126, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 142, 144, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 186, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 218, 219, 222, 223, 225, 231, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 250, 260, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271, 275, 276, 277, 278, 281, 282, 285

The Muscovite officials who were assigned to resolve boundary and land-ownership disputes are called *pistsy* (singular: *pisets*), which literally means “writer.” For this linguistic reason, sources refer to cadastres as the “writing” (*pismo* or *pis'mo*) of the *pistsy*. When necessary, the *pistsy* could function as judges, presiding over trials and issuing judgment charters (nos. 10, 11). The *pistsy* worked in teams, usually one gentry-man and one assistant secretary. Usually the gentry-man would affix his seal and the assistant secretary would affix his signature. Because the most frequent function of *pistsy* was to determine boundaries, I have translated the term as “surveyor,” which does not do justice to their multiple functions. Nor were “surveys” conducted only by officials called *pistsy*. We also have two cases of assistant secretaries carrying out surveys by themselves (nos. 9, 20) and one case of a secretary doing so (no. 23). In addition, a survey could be performed by an anti-brigandage elder (*gubnaia starosta*) (no. 144), key-keepers (*kliuchniki*) (nos. 102, 103), and even a town manager (*gorodovoi prikazchik*) (no. 123). In short almost any Muscovite official could be called upon to perform a survey of one kind or another. This variety in the office of survey-takers, whether called *pistsy* or not, takes a back

seat to the clear dominance of the function socially by the lay elite landed class: 147 survey records belong to boyars or gentry.

Signatures and seals were both reliable means of authenticating a document. Why anyone would affix both his signature and his seal to a document is not obvious. Yet fourteen records based upon eleven documents of seven document types display that pattern. No one document type, no one document, no one seal user can account for such a heterogeneous distribution of signature-seal combinations even within such a small data set. Table 5.9 provides the references.

Table 5.9. Signatures and Seals

Document type	Number of documents	Number of records	Appendix 5.1 record nos.
Assign land	3	3	266, 267, 272
Donation	1	1	152
Judgment charter	2	3	64, 140, 141
Quit-rent allotment	2	4	64, 226, 227, 228
Receipt	1	1	257
Survey	2	2	25, 132
Testament	1	1	79

Let us examine the records individually.

A 7047 land boundary survey and trial record (*mezhevaia pamiat', sudnyi spisok*) by majordomo Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Paletskii and secretary Ivan Alekseev syn Shamskoi was signed and sealed by Shamskoi (no. 25), although majordomos usually affixed their seals to such transactions and Prince Dmitrii Paletskii both signed and sealed a 7067 donation charter (see below) (no. 145).

In a 7051 judgment charter, *pisets* Fedor Grigor'evich Adashev attached both his signature and his seal. The trial was presided over by three *pistsy*, himself, Prince Roman Daniilovich Dashov, and secretary Ivan Tret'iak Mikhailov syn Dubrovin. No one else affixed a seal to the document (no. 64).

In a 7054 survey conducted by judges (*sud'i*) Ivan Borov Timofeev syn Shchelepin and assistant scribe Fedor Fat'ianov, both affixed their signatures, but only Shchelepin affixed his seal (no. 132).

In 7054 the testament of Elizarei Isakov (Khudiak) Tabakov was presented to the metropolitan for probate; the metropolitan's Vladimir official (*prikazshchik*) and black [?] governor (*namestnichestvo*) Ivan Konanov syn Shemiakin heard the testament, and then signed and affixed his seal to it (no. 79).

A 7066 land allotment charter refers to a judgment charter signed and sealed by judges (*sud'i*) Tret'iak Matusov and Istoma Nosov (nos. 140, 141).

A 7067 donation charter by the executors of the testament of Prince Davyd Fedorovich Paletskii, namely Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Paletskii, Prince S. I. Gundorov, and Prince I. B. Romodanovskii, was signed and sealed only by Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich Paletskii (no. 145).

A 7077 quit-rent allotment charter, previously mentioned, was signed and sealed by (at least) three peasants, elder Nikula Grigor'ev, and sworn-men Vereshchaga Evseev and Mikhail Timofeev (nos. 226, 227, 228).

A 7085 receipt for quit-rent paid was signed by selected judge (*izliublennoi sud'ia*) Nikon Ermolin syn, who affixed his signature and seal (no. 257). In my statistics I classified Nikon Ermolin syn as gentry, but this transaction took place in Dvina district, so it is not impossible that he was a state peasant. The absence of a family name would not be typical for a gentry-man.

Argun Ivanovich Zakar'in affixed his signature and seal to two 7087 land assignment charters (nos. 266, 267), the only occurrences of his seal in the database.

Finally, in a 7088 land allotment extract, anti-brigandage elder Andrei Mikhailov syn Argamakov affixed his signature and seal (no. 272).

There is no apparent pattern to this usage of signature and seal combination. Boyars, gentry, secretaries, and peasants did it. The number of examples is too small to draw conclusions from the fact that the *only* peasants in the database did it or that Argun Zakhar'in, whom I have classified as boyar because of his family name although he could be gentry, did so in every record of his in the database. The combination occurs in government documents, in a document from the ecclesiastical administration (probate), and, in a private document (a donation charter). Instances of individuals who affixed signature and seals occurred during all four periods of Ivan's reign. It can be found in documents for which only one individual was responsible, in documents by one individual when at least two participated, or for multiple parties to a transaction. I can identify no factor common to all eleven documents. Nevertheless, the incidence of this as yet inexplicable and seemingly redundant practice does unquestionably prove one, albeit negative, point: It would be absolutely invalid to infer that because someone used a seal, he could not sign his name.

Conclusion

Lay members of Muscovite society, mostly elite but not exclusively so, mostly male but not exclusively so, affixed their seals to documents in all periods of Ivan IV's reign, on multiple types of documents, and pretty much in all re-

gions of Muscovy. Sometimes, for unknown reasons, they signed documents as well as affixing their seals to them, so use of a seal does not denote its user's illiteracy. Royal seals and ecclesiastical seals were not the only seals in use in Muscovy at the time.

It is still the case that signatures on documents far outnumber seals on documents, especially on private legal documents. While the use of seals may have been mandatory on surveys and land allocation documents, although the evidence is contradictory because sometimes the absence of a seal by a surveyor is not justified, it was far from mandatory on testaments or bills of sale. Why people sometimes chose to use seals on such transactions when they were not required cannot be answered. We know far too little about the use of signatures in Muscovy during Ivan's reign, let alone seals, to speculate about how mostly elite men went about deciding whether to seal or to sign a document, especially since we have no explanation of those cases in which men did both.

For all that, the most significant conclusion to be drawn from studying lay elite seals during Ivan's reign does not pertain to any of these parameters. All of the seals discussed here were personal seals. They contained the name of the user, sometimes with the notice as "the seal of," and sometimes with illustrations. What is more important is what they did *not* contain. They did not contain social status (aside from the title "prince," which was considered part of a man's name) or office or institutional affiliation. There are no seals for central government bureaus or local government offices. Muscovite seals could hardly transmit a family or clan coat-of-arms or heraldic symbol, lacking in Muscovy, but could have emphasized clan name in some form, particularly given the strong clan consciousness demonstrated by boyar and gentry clans, especially in precedence matters. The seals identify the *person* to whom they belonged, and no more.²¹ Personal seals were, to be redundant, *personal*.²² For all the collective elements in Muscovite social identity, the seal might constitute an island of individualism, denoting one and only one person, neither a collective nor a function. Moreover, these seals were utilized for both public affairs, in administrative or judicial charters, and, if much less frequently, in private affairs, in testaments and bills of sale, rent, or land-allotment charters. Many of the bills of sales or testaments are semi-public, involving government approval or authorization. However, the database contains one case of an individual using his seal in both the public and private domain. Boyar Danilo

²¹ While the possibility that the minimization of information on the seal about its holder derives from lack of space on the seal cannot be dismissed, the perception of the seal as personal would remain.

²² Of course, signatures were also personal, but the impersonal technology of seals would have permitted a less personal approach to identifying the seal holder.

Romanovich Iur'ev, brother of Ivan's first wife Anastasiia, affixed his seal to a land assignment, a trial record, and a judgment charter (nos. 265, 89, 101), all unequivocally part of his public duties, but also to a donation charter in which he was executor of the testament of a fellow boyar, Ivan Dmitrievich Volodimerov (no. 87), a legal function, to be sure, but a purely private one. To the lay Muscovite elite, as far as seals were concerned, there was no division between their public and private activities.

Historians of early modern Russia have long emphasized that in Muscovite society relations between ruler and subject were personalized, a phenomenon best articulated in petitions. Historians of modern Russia are only beginning to distinguish civic or private spheres of activity external to government control. These distinctions would not have resonated with the Muscovites who affixed their seals to documents during Ivan's reign, to whom there was no wall separating what may strike modern historians as the separate spheres of their lives. Seals, curiously enough, serve as markers of a previously unnoticed and unappreciated overlap between the public and the private spheres in the lives of Ivan IV's subjects.

Appendix 5.1

Names of seal-users are supplied only when there are multiple seal-users in a document.

Abbreviations

AFZKh 1	<i>Akty feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia i khoziaistva XIV–XVI vekov</i> , pt. 1 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1951).
AFZKh 2	<i>Akty feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia i khoziaistva</i> , pt. 2 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1956).
AFZKh 3	<i>Akty feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia i khoziaistva</i> , pt. 3 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1961).
Antonov and Baranov	A. V. Antonov and K. V. Baranov, "Akty XV–XVI veka iz arkhivov russkikh monastyrei i tserkvei," <i>Russkii diplomatarii</i> 3 (1998): 3–44.
ARG	<i>Akty Rossiiskogo gosudarstva: Arkhivy moskovskikh monastyrei i soborov XV–nachalo XVII vv.</i> (Moscow: Lodomir, 1998).

- ASZ 1 *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Arkheograficheskii tsentr," 1997).
- ASZ 2 *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, vol. 2 (Moscow: "Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli", 1998).
- ASZ 3 *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2002).
- Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1 A. Fedotov-Chekhovskii, comp., *Akty otnosiashchiesia do grazhdanskoi raspravy drevnei Rossii*, vol. 1 (Kiev: Tipografiia I. and A. Davidenko, 1860).
- Iaroslavl' A. V. Antonov, "Iaroslavskie monastyri i tserkvy v dokumentakh XVI–nachala XVII veka," *Russkii diplomatarii* 5 (1999): 13–67.
- Istoricheskie 1 *Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheogracheskoiu kommissiei*, vol. 1, 1841.
- Iuridicheskii 1 *Akty, otnosiashchiesia do iuridicheskago byta drevnei Rusi*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaiia kommissiia, 1857).
- Kaliazin *Akty Troitskogo Kaliazina monastyria XVI v.* (Moscow-St. Petersburg: Al'ians Arkheo, 2007).
- Kashtanov Sergei Mikhailovich Kashtanov, *Iz istorii russkogo srednevekovogo istochnika: Akty X–XVI vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1996).
- Klin A. V. Antonov, "Klinskie akty XV–XVI veka," *Russkii diplomatarii* 4 (1998): 53–110.
- Kostroma A. V. Antonov, "Kostromskie monastyri v dokumentakh XVI–nachala XVII veka," *Russkii diplomatarii* 7 (2001): 52–218.

- Likhachev 1 N. P. Likhachev, *Sbornik aktov sobrannykh v arkhivakh i bibliotekakh*, 1: *Dukhovnye i sgovornye gramoty*, vyp. 2 *Gramoty pravye* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1895).
- Simonov *Akty feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia i khoziaistva: Akty moskovskogo Simonova monastyria (1506–1613)* (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1983).
- Riazan' *Pamiatniki russkoi pis'mennosti XV–XVI vv.: Ri-azanskii krai* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978).
- RIB 32 *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vol. 32 (Petrograd: Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, 1915).
- Sadikov P. A. Sadikov, "Iz istorii oprichniny XVI v.," *Istori-cheskii arkhiv* 3 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1940), 113–303.
- Sobrannye 1 *Akty sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi imperii Arkheograficheskoiu Ekspeditsiei Imperator-skoi Akademii Nauk*, 1: 1294–1598 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia II otdeleniia sobstvennoi EIV Kantse-liarii, 1836).
- Solovetskii 1 *Akty sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii severa Rossii kontsa XV–XVI v. Akty Solovetskogo monastyria 1479–1571 gg.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1988).
- Solovetskii 2 *Akty sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii severa Ros-sii kontsa XV–XVI v.: Akty Solovetskogo monastyria 1572–1584 gg.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1990).
- Spasskii *Akty Suzdal'skogo Spaso-Efim'eva Monastyria 1506–1608 gg.* (Moscow: "Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli. RGADA Akty Russkikh Monastyrei," 1998).

1. AFZKh 2, no. 127, 119–20.
2. ASZ 1, no. 64, 54.
3. ASZ 1, no. 314, 304–12
4. Simonov, no. 41, 44–45

5. Simonov, no. 46, 48–52—Semen Grigor'ev syn Solovtsov
6. Simonov, no. 46, 48–52—Prince I. I. Kubenskii
7. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 45, 47–52
8. ARG, no. 125, 294–98—Andrei Semenov syn Karaulov
9. ARG, no. 125, 294–98—Iakov Semenov syn Shchelkalov
10. Riazan', no. 65, 101–03—Ivan Bobrov
11. Riazan', no. 65, 101–03—Iarets Normatskoi
12. RIB 32, no. 134, 241–44
13. AFZKh 1, no. 13, 34–35
14. AFZKh 1, no. 14, 35
15. AFZKh 2, no. 145, 141–42—Ivan Dmitriev syn Bobrov
16. AFZKh 2, no. 145, 141–42—Zakhar'ii Andreev syn Postnik Satin
17. AFZKh 2, no. 145, 141–42—Ivan Mikhailov syn Rakov
18. ARG, no. 45, 132–33—Ivan Dmitriev syn Bobrov
19. ARG, no. 45, 132–33—Zakhar'ii Andreev syn Postnik Satin
20. RIB 32, no. 135, 244–45—S. V. Sobakin
21. RIB 32, no. 135, 244–45—Andrei Ivanov syn Pisemskoi
22. AFZKh 2, no. 148, 143
23. Simonov, no. 59, 64–65—Stefan Fedotov
24. Simonov, no. 59, 64–65—Fedor Volyn'tsov
25. Kaliazin, no. 85, 86–88
26. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 49, 58–64—Prince I. V. Obolenskii
27. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 49, 58–64—I. Iu. Podzhigin
28. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 49, 58–64—Gavrila Fedorovich Zabolotskii
29. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 49, 58–64—Rtisha Vasil'ev syn Unkovskii
30. Kashtanov, no. 1, 224–27
31. AFZKh 3, no. 2, 12–13
32. Simonov, no. 63, 68–75
33. Klin, no. 6, 65–75—Gavrila Fedorovich Zabolotskii
34. Klin, no. 6, 65–75—Ritsha Vasil'ev syn Unkovskii
35. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 53, 69–75
36. Riazan', no. 67, 104–05—Andrei Ivanov syn Pisemskoi
37. Riazan', no. 67, 104–05—Mikita Fedorov syn Evlashkov
38. AFZKh 2, no. 159, 152–53
39. AFZKh 2, no. 160, 153–54
40. AFZKh v. 2, no. 161, 154–55
41. Klin, no. 8, 76–77
42. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 55, 76–86—I. I. Kubenskii
43. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 55, 76–86—F. F. Khidyrschikov
44. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 55, 76–86—G. L. Klement'ev
45. AFZKh 2, no. 169, 161—Prince Andrei Dmitrievich Rostovskii

46. AFZKh 2, no. 169, 161—Ivan Ivanov syn Tret'iakov
47. ASZ 1, no. 228, 200–03—Prince I. I. Kubenskii
48. ASZ 1, no. 228, 200–03—Gavrila Andreev syn Tyrtov
49. Spasskii, no. 49, 109–10
50. Spasskii, no. 51, 112–22
51. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 56, 86–92
52. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 57, 92–110—I. I. Kubenskii
53. Kashtanov, no. 2, 227–28—Poriak Il'ich Kvashnin
54. Kashtanov, no. 2, 227–28—Boris Aleksandrov syn Stupishin
55. Sobrannye 1, no. 199, 178
56. ARG, no. 18, 58–59—Prince R. D. Dashkov
57. ARG, no. 18, 58–59—Fedor Grigor'evich Adashev
58. ARG, no. 50, 138–39—Stepan Ivanov syn Zlobin
59. ARG, no. 50, 138–39—Dalmat Fedorovich Karpov
60. Simonov, no. 68, 80
61. Simonov, no. 69, 80–81
62. Simonov, no. 70, 81
63. Simonov, no. 71, 82
64. Simonov, no. 72, 82–86
65. Simonov, no. 73, 87
66. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 57, 92–110—Ia. G. Zhenchiuzhenov
67. Iaroslavl', no. 4, 16–26—Semen Aleksandrovich Pleshcheev
68. Iaroslavl', no. 4, 16–26—Vasilii Ivanov syn Bereshchinskii
69. AFZKh 2, no. 178, 174–78—Vasilii Ivanov syn Brekhov
70. AFZKh 2, no. 178, 174–78—Ivan Grigor'evich Golovin
71. AFZKh 2, no. 179, 178–82—Vasilii Ivanov syn Brekhov
72. AFZKh 2, no. 179, 178–82—Ivan Grigor'evich Golovin
73. Simonov, no. 78, 91–92
74. RIB 32, no. 151, 264–65—Timofei Andreev syn Karamyshev
75. RIB 32, no. 151, 264–65—Mikita Kozlov syn Miloslavskii
76. Kostroma, no. 108, 214–15
77. *Savvin Storozhevskii monastyr' v dokumentakh XVI veka (iz sobranii Ts-GADA)* (Moscow: Arkhiv russkoi istorii, 1992), no. 13, 18–21
78. AFZKh 2, no. 189, 190–91
79. AFZKh 3, no. 4, 14–16
80. Kashtanov, no. 11, 153–54—Postnik Gubin
81. Kashtanov, no. 11, 153–54—Odinets Nikiforov
82. AFZKh 2, no. 198, 198–200
83. RIB 32, no. 165, 287–88
84. ARG, no. 54, 143–44
85. ARG, no. 55, 144

86. ARG, no. 52, 140–41
87. Simonov, no. 95, 106–07
88. Kostroma, no. 3, 56–58
89. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 63, 115–17—Danilo Romanovich Iur'ev
90. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 63, 115–17—I. I. Kubenskii
91. Riazan', no. 70, 107
92. Solovetskii 1, no. 168, 105—Chudin Mitrofanov
93. Solovetskii 1, no. 168, 105—Fedor Dmitriev syn Syrkov
94. Solovetskii 1, no. 168, 105—Dmitrii Fomin syn Gorin
95. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 64, 117–18
96. RIB 32, no. 183, 318–19
97. RIB 32, no. 184, 319–20
98. Simonov, no. 108, 119–21
99. Simonov, no. 109, 121–23
100. Solovetskii 1, no. 173, 108
101. Likhachev 1, XII, 220–36—Danilo Romanovich Iur'ev
102. Likhachev 1, XII, 220–36—Ivan Ivanov syn Zherebiatnikov
103. Likhachev 1, XII, 220–36—Semen Timofeev syn Kolbetskoi
104. Solovetskii 1, no. 190, 116
105. Solovetskii 1, no. 195, 118—Ia. I. Saburov
106. Solovetskii 1, no. 195, 118—I. A. Kutuzov
107. Antonov and Baranov, no. 23, 31–33—Prince Fedor Semenov syn Mezetskii
108. Antonov and Baranov, no. 23, 31–33—Tret' iak Mikhailov syn Dubrovin
109. Riazan', no. 18, 28–30—Prince Fedor Semenov syn Mezetskii
110. Riazan', no. 18, 28–30—Tret' iak Mikhailov syn Dubrovin
111. AFZKh 2, no. 248, 250–52
112. ASZ 3, no. 491, 409
113. Solovetskii 1, no. 196, 119—Ia. I. Saburov
114. Solovetskii 1, no. 196, 119—I. A. Kutuzov
115. Solovetskii 1, no. 197, 119—Ia. I. Saburov
116. Solovetskii 1, no. 197, 119—I. A. Kutuzov
117. Kaliazin, no. 122, 128
118. Riazan', no. 23, 32–33
119. Istoricheskie v. 1, no. 162, 298–99
120. Istoricheskie v. 1, no. 163, 299–314
121. Solovetskii 1, no. 201, 121—Ia. I. Saburov
122. Solovetskii 1, no. 201, 121—I. A. Kutuzov
123. Kaliazin, no. 127, 133–34
124. Iuridicheskii 1, no. 52 VI, 215–18
125. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 66, 128–33

126. RIB 32, no. 194, 373–80
127. Spasskii, no. 91, 161–92—Lev Andreevich Saltykov
128. Spasskii, no. 91, 161–92—Andrei Vasil'ev syn Lodygin
129. Spasskii, no. 91, 161–92—Vasilii Mikhailov syn Gireev
130. Spasskii, no. 92, 192–215
131. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 59, 111–13—Ivan Borov Timofeev syn Shchelepin
132. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 59, 111–13—Andrei Fat'ianov
133. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 68, 144–45
134. RIB 32, no. 198, 417–22
135. Iaroslavl', no. 10, 31–34
136. AFZKh 2, no. 268, 272–73
137. Simonov, no. 116, 128–29
138. Iuridicheskii 1, no. 20, 53–54
139. AFZKh 1, no. 45, 59–60
140. AFZKh 2, no. 273, 277–78—Tret'iak Matusov
141. AFZKh 2, no. 273, 277–78—Istoma Nosov
142. AFZKh 2, no. 273, 277–78—Prince Semen Ivanovich Viazemskii
143. Spasskii, no. 102, 229–31
144. Klin, no. 13, 81–82
145. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 71, 165–95
146. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 72, 195–96
147. Kashtanov, no. 3, 138
148. ARG, no. 109, 246
149. ASZ 3, no. 178, 150
150. Kaliazin, no. 133, 141—Prince Ivan Borisovich Romodanovskii
151. Kaliazin, no. 133, 141—Ivan Ivanov syn Pushkin
152. Kostroma, no. 4, 58–59
153. Kostroma, no. 89, 196–97—Vasilii Ivanov syn Naumov
154. Kostroma, no. 89, 196–97—Inoi Ivanov syn Ordyn'tsev
155. RIB 32, no. 208, 430–31
156. RIB 32, no. 209, 431–32
157. ARG, no. 64, 155–59
158. ARG, no. 65, 159—Davyd Ivanov syn Sliznev
159. ARG, no. 65, 159—Diatlo Grigor'ev syn Moskov
160. ARG, no. 66, 159–60
161. Kostroma, no. 5, 59–60
162. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 75, 207–17—unknown
163. RIB 32, no. 211, 424–25
164. Likhachev 1, XIII, 39–49
165. Sobrannye 1, no. 256, 279–80

166. Kostroma, no. 8, 68–70
167. Iuridicheskii 1, no. 52 VII, 218–30
168. Riazan', no. 30, 41–42
169. AFZKh 2, no. 294, 301–02—Prince Ivan Andreevich Zvenigorodskii
170. AFZKh 2, no. 294, 301–02—Dmitrii Mikhailov syn Pivov
171. AFZKh 3, no. 9, 20–28
172. ARG, no. 70, 164–71—Prince I. A. Zvenigorodskii
173. ARG, no. 70, 164–71—Dmitrii Mikhailov syn Pivov
174. ARG, no. 71, 171–73
175. ARG, no. 73, 173–74
176. ARG, no. 110, 247–48
177. Simonov, no. 128, 140–43—Prince A. V. Zvenigorodskii
178. Simonov, no. 128, 140–43—Dmitrii Mikhailov syn Pivov
179. Simonov, no. 130, 144–47
180. Solovetskii 1, no. 256, 169
181. Antonov and Baranov, no. 6, 15–16
182. Kostroma, no. 11, 71–73
183. Kostroma, no. 13, 74–79
184. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 75, 207–17—F. G. Davydov
185. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 75, 207–17—Tret'iak Mikhailov syn Dubrovin
186. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 76, 217
187. Likhachev 1, XV, 55–56
188. Sobrannye 1, no. 261, 287–89—Prince Ivan Borisovich Romodanovskii²³
189. Sobrannye 1, no. 261, 287–89—Ivan Ivanov syn Pushkin
190. Iaroslavl', no. 14, 37–39
191. Sobrannye 1, no. 265, 300–01—Vasilii Stepanov syn Ugrimov
192. Sobrannye 1, no. 265, 300–01—Leontii Anan'in
193. ASZ 1, no. 242, 216–17
194. Simonov, no. 140, 167–68—Dmitrii Andreevich Buturlin
195. Simonov, no. 140, 167–68—Ivan Mikhailov syn Taratin
196. ASZ 3, no. 182, 152–53—Il'ia Ivanovich Pleshcheev
197. ASZ 3, no. 182, 152–53—Men'shoi Fedorov syn Domnin
198. Antonov and Baranov, no. 7, 16–18
199. Likhachev 1, II, 243–44—M. V. Godunov
200. Likhachev 1, II, 243–44—V. K. Zamytskii
201. Solovetskii 1, no. 275, 182
202. Spasskii, no. 132, 263–64
203. Antonov and Baranov, no. 8, 18–19

²³ This document apparently confuses the names of the men who affixed seals to it.

204. Iaroslavl', no. 17, 41–42
205. Simonov, no. 154, 191–201
206. ASZ 3, no. 157, 133–34
207. RIB 32, no. 224, 452–53
208. Riazan', no. 33, 45
209. ASZ 2, no. 458, 388–89
210. ASZ 2, no. 459, 389–90
211. Spasskii, no. 147, 286–91
212. Spasskii, no. 148, 291–304
213. Spasskii, no. 149, 304–06
214. Antonov and Baranov, no. 9, 19
215. RIB 32, no. 228, 457–58
216. Sadikov, no. 8, 198–99
217. Riazan', no. 83, 116–21—Nikita Romanovich Iur'ev
218. Sluzhilykh 1, no. 169, 140
219. ASZ 1, no. 194, 163–64
220. Sadikov, no. 21, 215–16
221. Sadikov, no. 27, 223–24
222. AFZKh 2, no. 347, 365–87
223. AFZKh 2, no. 353, 394
224. Sluzhilykh 1, no. 147, 122–23
225. ASZ 1, no. 172, 142–43
226. Solovetskii 1, no. 321, 207—Nikula Grigor'ev
227. Solovetskii 1, no. 321, 207—Vereshchaga Evseev
228. Solovetskii 1, no. 321, 207—Mikhail Timofeev
229. Spasskii, no. 151, 307–08
230. ASZ 1, no. 153, 126–27
231. ASZ 3, no. 407, 333–34
232. Sobrannye 1, no. 280, 315–16
233. Sobrannye 1, no. 282, 320–28—Petr Danilovich Pronskii
234. Sobrannye 1, no. 282, 320–28—Alexei Mikhailovich Staroi
235. Sobrannye 1, no. 282, 320–28—Semen Fedorov syn Mishurin
236. ASZ 2, no. 96, 104–05—Zakhar'ii Iur'evich Trakhaniot
237. ASZ 2, no. 96, 104–05—Matvey Ushakov syn Chemodanov
238. Sadikov, no. 51, 256–57
239. Likhachev 1, III, 244–45—Grigor'ii Semenovich Pleshcheev
240. Likhachev 1, III, 244–45—Kiprian Ivanov syn Dedebshin
241. Spasskii, no. 182, 344–45
242. Riazan', no. 37, 47–50
243. AFZKh 2, no. 435, 490–91—Ivan Korobov
244. AFZKh 2, no. 435, 490–91—Boldyr' Simanov

245. Simonov, no. 186, 234–35
246. Solovetskii 2, no. 529, 49—Semen Fedorov syn Mishurin
247. Solovetskii 2, no. 529, 49—I. D. Sobakin
248. Sadikov, no. 64, 273
249. Klin, no. 34, 104–05
250. Riazan', no. 40, 52–53
251. ARG, no. 5, 22–23
252. ASZ 3, no. 235, 191–92
253. Solovetskii 2, no. 623, 93—Postnik Dmitriev syn Khvorshchin
254. Solovetskii 2, no. 623, 93—Il'ia Oseev
255. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 81, 222
256. Riazan', no. 83, 116–21—Prince Fedor Ivanovich Khvorostinin
257. *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, v. 25 *Akty Kholmogorskoï i Ustiuzhskoi eparkhii*, kniga tret'ia v prilozhenii: *Akty Lodomskoi tserkvi* (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaja kommissiia, 1908), CXIX, 74–75
258. Iaroslavl', no. 23, 48–49
259. Iaroslavl', no. 24, 49
260. ARG, no. 81, 197–200—Danilo Petrov syn Zhitov
261. ARG, no. 81, 197–200—Fedor Komynin
262. AFZKh 2, no. 369, 411
263. ARG, no. 83, 200–10
264. ASZ 3, no. 131, 111–12—Prince Ivan Danilov syn Gagarin
265. ASZ 3, no. 131, 111–12—Afanasii Ivanov syn Isakov
266. Solovetskii 2, no. 701, 131
267. Solovetskii 2, no. 702, 131–32
268. Kostroma, no. 109, 215–16
269. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 82, 222–30
270. RIB 32, no. 285, 563–64
271. Kashtanov, no. 15, 163–65
272. ASZ 1, no. 185, 153
273. ASZ 2, no. 434, 369–70
274. ASZ 1, no. 253, 228–29
275. ASZ 1, no. 36, 35
276. ASZ 1, no. 39, 37
277. ASZ 1, no. 209, 178
278. ASZ 1, no. 217, 188–89
279. ASZ 1, no. 300, 292–93
280. ASZ 3, no. 379, 307–8
281. ASZ 1, no. 92, 71–72
282. ASZ v. 1, no. 93, 72–73
283. ASZ v.3, no. 13, 12–13

- 284. ASZ v.3, no. 85, 72
- 285. Sluzhilykh 1, no. 24, 26–27
- 286. ASZ 1, no. 256, 231–32
- 287. RIB 32, no. 305, 598–99
- 288. RIB 32, no. 311, 606

Social History

Chapter 6

Clergy in the Documentary Life of the Muscovite Laity

That religion influenced the daily lives of lay Muscovites, including during the reign of Ivan IV, is hardly a new conclusion, but recent publications have provided considerable additional evidence of that influence. Religion contributed significantly to the names the laity bore, mostly taken from the liturgical calendar; to what they ate and when, in observance of fasts; and, judging by when children were born, to when they had sex.¹ The higher up on the social scale, the better this aspect of daily life can be documented. The life of Ivan's royal court was dominated by the liturgical, ritual, and ceremonial observation of Russian Orthodox Christian holy days.² Religious sentiments even found their way into otherwise bland official government documentation generated by the professional bureaucrats (*d'iaki*) who ran the central government bureaus.³ Religious beliefs were also the foundation of spiritual

I wish to express my sincerest appreciation to Barbara Skinner and Jennifer Spock for consultation in the preparation of this chapter. I am solely responsible for all remaining errors.

¹ Daniel H. Kaiser, "The Seasonality of Family Life in Early Modern Russia," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 46 (1992): 21–50; Kaiser, "Naming Cultures in Early Modern Russia," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 19 (1995): 271–91; Kaiser, "Quotidian Orthodoxy: Domestic Life in Early Modern Russia," in *Orthodox Russia: Belief and Practice under the Tsars*, ed. Valerie A. Kivelson and Robert H. Greene (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 179–92.

² Michael S. Flier, "Chapter 17: Political Ideas and Rituals," in *Cambridge History of Russia*, 1: *From Early Rus' to 1689*, ed. Maureen Perrie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 387–408.

³ Charles J. Halperin, "The Culture of Ivan IV's Court: The Religious Beliefs of Bureaucrats," in *The New Muscovite Cultural History: A Collection in Honor of Daniel B. Rowland*, ed. Valerie Kivelson, Karen Petrone, Nancy Kollmann, and Michael Flier (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2009), 93–105.

healing and witchcraft.⁴ Clergy played a major role as the human agency transmitting religious concepts to and performing religious ceremonies for the laity. Priests performed baptisms, weddings, funerals, and the Eucharist and holy day liturgies. Monks played a crucial role in praying for the dead.⁵ The neighbors of the Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery who donated or sold land to the monastery, facilitated monastic economic activities, and arranged to be buried in the monastery constituted, in David Miller's apt phrase, a "community of venerators."⁶

Only evidence of lay elite behavior survives, not expressions of belief. Perhaps social conformism played a role. However, in an age of religion, in a confessional society, if the lay Muscovite elite acted as if they believed in Russian Orthodox Christianity, then, even with allowances for the multiplicity of motives behind human behavior, we may ascribe sincerity of belief to those who through their actions played the role of pious Christians so consistently.

One element of the clerical role in lay life, their role as participants in and witnesses to elite lay documentary transactions, has never been the subject of quantitative study. Jack Kollmann noticed the presence of parish priests as witnesses to testaments and property transactions, some of which they also wrote. He cited sixteen transactions with parish priest signatures and nine written by them during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.⁷ Unfortunately no one has pursued this line of inquiry.

Many elite lay transactions contained an obvious religious element. Thoughts of the afterlife and the Day of Judgment often graced testaments, so it is no surprise that people composing their wills were often accompanied by their "spiritual fathers" (*dukhovnye ottsy*), an institution discussed below. However, the presence of a spiritual father was not mandatory at the preparation of a will. Obviously a representative of a monastery receiving a donation would participate in a donation charter, but no legal prescription required that lay

⁴ Eve Levin, "Innocent and Demon-Possessed in Early Modern Russia," in *Culture and Identity in Eastern Christian History: Papers from the First Biennial Conference of the Association for the Study of Eastern Christian History and Culture (ASEC), Inc.*, ed. Russell E. Martin and Jennifer Spock, with the assistance of M. A. Johnson (Columbus: Department of Slavic and East European Languages and Literatures, Ohio State University, 2009), 123–61; Valerie A. Kivelson, *Desperate Magic: The Moral Economy in Seventeenth-Century Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

⁵ Ludwig Steindorff, *Memoria in Rußland: Untersuchungen zu den Formen Christlicher Totensorge* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994).

⁶ David B. Miller, *Saint Sergius of Radonezh, His Trinity Monastery, and the Formation of the Russian Identity* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010).

⁷ Jack E. Kollmann, Jr., "The Stoglav Council and Parish Priests," *Russian History* 7, 1/2 (1980): 68.

donors choose outside witnesses among priests or monks not affiliated with the recipient monastery. Moreover, some documentary transactions had no religious connection at all, such as bills of sale or land exchanges between laymen. Yet clergy appear here as well in a variety of discretionary roles at the invitation of a lay participant in the transactions. Such voluntary selection of clerical participants in legal transactions evidences not only the close social ties between the clergy and the elite laity even concerning lay affairs, but also the respect and social esteem in which elite laity held the clergy.

I have assembled a data base in appendix 6.1 of 221 documents illustrating the participation of clerics in legal affairs at the discretion of lay primary actors. Because more than one cleric could be involved in a single transaction, these 221 documents generated 311 records.⁸ I created one record for each cleric in each document. If a cleric played more than one role in a document, for example as witness and signatory in place of a participant, that still generated only one record. Multiple clerics participating in the same transaction generated multiple records. I coded each record according to the type of source, year, status of cleric, name of cleric, description of cleric, whether the cleric was a spiritual father, if so, the name and gender of the spiritual "child," did the cleric sign his name in place of his spiritual child, and if so the name and gender of that person. Appendix 6.1 contains bibliographic citations; eleven tables convey the results of my analysis.

I have not attempted to analyze the geographic distribution of the records or the social identity of the lay-people involved. The data base skews toward those social classes who possessed enough wealth to warrant testamentary distribution and possessed enough land to donate some to a monastery. Consequently we may assume that members of the landowning elite, boyars and gentry from the central agricultural regions, dominated the documentation. Documents from the far north, where gentry, let alone boyars, were few, presumably concerned state peasants. Assuming that all documents from the Solovetskii Monastery do so creates a subset of nineteen documents generating twenty-two records, but the lay elite still dominates the database. Therefore I concluded that there was little to be gained by exploring geography or lay social composition.

Because my primary interest is lay attitudes toward the clergy, I sought to exclude from the data base any documents not generated by elite lay activity, which is easier said than done. Monks executed legal instruments. If a monk turned to a spiritual father who was not affiliated with the monastery in which he was shorn, I infer that the personal relationship between them antedated his monastic vows. However, no hard and fast rule could decide

⁸ Note that because of a mistake in numbering, records 141a–d derive from the same document. The highest record number is 308, but there are 311 records.

more ambiguous cases. I have been forced to exercise my judgment on a case-by-case basis, not explicated in appendix 6.1. For women who became nuns no such analysis was necessary because no nuns appear in any document among ancillary participants.

Different parameters created different problems. It seemed sufficient to utilize year for the date, but that created the problem of split years in the standard Muscovite calendar from the creation of the world, whose year began on 1 September. When only a year from the creation was available or when the potential dating of any document crossed CE year boundaries, I always chose the latest possible CE year. As a result there are several years for which I have no records, but which probably contained evidence appearing under a later year. This practice should not significantly distort my chronological analysis of the data.

The status of the cleric involved was more complicated. The most difficult cases were identifying spiritual fathers and priest-monks. Any similarity between “spiritual fathers” and Catholic father-confessors is problematic. A Russian Orthodox spiritual father played many roles in the life of the laity which a Roman Catholic confessor did not, and need not have served as a confessor, so I did not refer to spiritual fathers as father-confessors. A priest had to marry before his ordination, and widower priests were supposed to reside in monasteries. A visiting priest could perform liturgies at a monastery, and often did so at more remote monasteries or those with an insufficient number of in-house priests, as well as at all convents, where no priest could reside. As a result identifying priest-monks is difficult.⁹ It did not matter if a priest became a monk or a monk because a priest. The documents identify “black priests” (*chernye popy*) who were undoubtedly hieromonks, whose descriptions always reference a church. Therefore a spiritual father associated with a monastery might not have been a monk and a monastic elder identified as a spiritual father need not have been a priest. I took a minimalist approach of only classifying a cleric as a priest-monk when the document explicitly says both priest and monk. As a result I probably underestimate the number of priest-monks in the data base.

The Moscow central government recognized that members of the laity might not be literate (they did “not know letters” [*gramota ne umeet*]) and therefore might solicit the services of their spiritual fathers to sign documents on their behalf. When the government summoned an inquest or grand jury of members of various social groups, including gentry, peasants, artisans, and

⁹ Andrei Sergeevich Usachev, *Knigopisanie v Rossiï XVI veka po materialam datirovannykh vykhodnykh zapisei*, 2 vols. (Moscow–St. Petersburg: Al’ians-Arkheo, 2018), 1: 250, 256, found evidence of the widespread presence in monasteries of priests who were not monks.

clergy, to provide necessary information or take some necessary action in administrative, fiscal, or criminal affairs, it required these participants to “affix their hands” (*ruki prilozhiti*) that is, sign their names, to the written records of the proceedings.¹⁰ The documents ordering the convening of such meetings stipulated that the spiritual fathers of illiterates could sign their names for them. I have found thirty-one documents, listed in appendix 6.2, that contain such a provision. These documents must be separated from the data base in appendix 6.1 because they go no further than allowing spiritual fathers to sign in place of their spiritual children without naming any clergy who did so.

While the paucity of data on so many of the individuals, clerical and lay, referenced in these sources made detailed prosopographical analysis impractical, I did to the best of my knowledge code the ecclesiastical status of each cleric. Given differences in spelling and orthography of clerical names and in their descriptions, identifying the same cleric in different documents to determine how many individual clerics appear in the data was challenging. The prevalence of priests named “Ivan” affiliated with churches named in honor of St. Nicholas, the most popular Russian Orthodox saint, necessitated many judgment calls. A priest and an igumen with the same name, or two priests with the same name separated by four decades, can reasonably be considered different people. The frequency of cleric-document occurrences is of greater interest than identifying “overachieving” clerics who spread their document-participation around. Some laypeople do show up more than once, but no one layperson involved so many clerics in his or her transactions as to distort the data. Finally, the manuscript of appendix 6.1, no. 62 is defective; all we know is that the cleric was a spiritual father.

We may now proceed to the statistics produced from appendix 6.1.

Table 6.1 displays the chronological distribution of documents and records by year:

Table 6.1. Documents and Records by Year

Year	Number of documents	Number of records	Appendix 6.1 record nos.
1533	0	0	
1534	2	2	1–2
1535	4	5	3–7
1536	1	3	8–10
1537	0	0	—

¹⁰ Charles J. Halperin, “Three ‘Hands’ and Literacy in Muscovy during the Reign of Ivan IV: ‘I Affix My Hand,’ ‘By My Own Hand,’ and ‘My Man’s Hand,’” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 51 (2017): 29–63.

Year	Number of documents	Number of records	Appendix 6.1 record nos.
1538	2	3	11–13
1539	1	2	14–15
1540	0	0	—
1541	5	8	16–23
1542	2	4	24–27
1543	1	4	28–31
1544	3	5	32–36
1545	5	7	37–43
1546	4	4	44–47
1547	0	0	—
1548	3	9	48–56
1549	0	0	—
1550	1	1	57
1551	6	10	58–67
1552	2	4	68–71
1553	0	0	—
1554	5	7	72–88
1555	5	8	79–86
1556	0	0	—
1557	5	6	87–92
1558	10	11	93–103
1559	6	8	104–11
1560	4	6	112–17
1561	6	10	118–27
1562	1	1	128
1563	5	7	129–35
1564	8	17	136–49
1565	8	9	150–58
1566	10	12	159–70
1567	11	13	171–83
1568	8	9	184–92
1569	17	18	193–210
1570	13	20	211–30
1571	9	13	231–43
1572	12	15	244–58

Year	Number of documents	Number of records	Appendix 6.1 record nos.
1573	8	13	259–71
1574	1	1	272
1575	3	4	273–76
1576	3	3	277–79
1577	7	11	280–90
1578	3	3	291–93
1579	4	5	294–98
1580	3	3	299–301
1581	3	3	302–04
1582	2	2	305–06
1583	2	2	307–08
1584	0	0	—

I have no documents for the partial first and last years of Ivan's reign, 1533 and 1584, or from 1537, but late dating split-CE year documents accounts for the absence of documents from 1540, 1547, 1549, 1553, and 1556. Thus for the fifty years within the chronological limits of the data base, from 1534 to 1583, 6 have no data and 44 contain data. The data base contains 221 documents for fifty years, an average of 4.42 per annum, and 311 records per 50 years, an average of 6.22 per annum.

Distributing the documents and records by decade in table 6.2 is less revealing than distributing them by the sometimes maligned division of Ivan's reign into four periods in table 6.3.

Table 6.2. Documents and Records per Decade¹¹

Decade	Documents (p.a.)	Records (p.a.)	Appendix 6.1 record nos.
1530s (6 years)	10 (1.7)	15 (2.5)	1–15
1540s	23 (2.3)	41 (4.1)	16–56
1550s	40 (4)	55 (5.5)	57–111
1560s	78 (7.8)	102 (10.2)	112–210
1570s	59 (5.9)	83 (8.3)	211–98
1580s (4 years)	10 (2.5)	10 (2.5)	299–308

¹¹ p. a. = per annum

Table 6.3. Documents and Records per Periods of Ivan’s Reign¹²

Period, years, duration	Documents (p. a.)	Records (p. a.)	Appendix 6.1 record nos.
Minority, 1533–46, 14 years	30 (2.1)	47 (3.4)	1–47
Reforms, 1547–64, 18 years	67 (4.8)	105 (7.5)	48–149
<i>Oprichnina</i> , ¹⁴ 1565–72, 8 years	88 (11)	109 (13.6)	150–258
End, 1573–84, 12 years	39 (3.3)	50 (4.2)	259–308

Table 6.3 reflects better than table 6.2 the well-known spike in legal documentation during the *oprichnina*, as members of the landowning elite took to writing testaments in reaction to their uncertain life expectancies during Ivan’s reign of terror and to donating land to monasteries, often retaining life-time usage as laity or as monks and nuns, in a largely unsuccessful effort to achieve financial security in very insecure times. Five of the six double-digit years of document production occurred during the oprichnina, and the other oprichnina years never fall below eight documents per year. The oprichnina years contain the only double-digit annual averages of documents and records. That all the zero years of documents between 1534 and 1583 fall within the years of Ivan’s minority and reforms constitutes no more than a fluke of my late dating practice. Documents could contain from one to as many as a half-a-dozen clerical names, but the ratios of documents to records per the four periods of Ivan’s reign, given in table 6.4, show no significant variations.

Table 6.4. Ratio of Documents to Records per Period of Ivan’s Reign

Period	Ratio of documents:Records
Minority	1.6
Reforms	1.6
Oprichnina	1.2
End	1.2
Overall	1.4

¹² p. a. = per annum.

¹³ Ivan instituted the oprichnina in January 1565, although he began the process that led to its establishment in December 1564. Ivan abolished it in 1572, but the month in which he did so is unknown.

The types of documents (table 6.5) included in the data base occasion no surprises.

Table 6.5. Types of Documents

Type	Documents	Records	Appendix 6.1 record nos.
Agreement ¹⁴	3	3	98, 172, 175
Bill of Sale	13	14	5, 6, 7, 24, 37, 82, 203, 252, 258, 276, 279, 305, 307, 308
Boundary	8	19	21, 35, 36, 84–86, 97, 128, 144–46, 173, 174, 216–21
Contract	1	1	193
Donation	107	133	1, 3, 8, 9, 10, 14–17, 22, 41, 42–44, 48, 49, 57–59, 63, 64, 78, 83, 89, 90, 92, 99, 100, 101, 103, 112, 113, 125, 126, 129, 131–135, 137, 143, 149–154, 158–62, 166–169, 171, 177–84, 187–89, 191, 195–99, 204–07, 209–13, 223–25, 227, 229, 230, 235–43, 253–57, 260–72, 274, 275, 280, 282, 288–92, 294–300, 304
Dowry	1	3	25, 26, 27
Exchange	2	3	116, 117, 228
Mortgage	2	2	157, 302
Note	6	10	102, 130, 138–40, 164, 165, 208, 273, 278
Prenuptial	1	1	170
Receipt	1	1	163
Survey	4	11	11, 12, 74, 75, 93, 94, 141a–d, 14
Testament	72	110	2, 4, 13, 18–20, 23, 28–34, 38–40, 45, 47, 50–56, 60–62, 65–73, 76–77, 79–81, 87, 88, 91, 95, 96, 104–11, 114, 115, 118–24, 127, 136, 147, 148, 155, 156, 160, 176, 185, 186, 190, 192, 194, 200–02, 214, 215, 222, 226, 231–34, 244–51, 259, 277, 281, 283–87, 293, 301, 303, 306
Totals	221	311	

¹⁴ These are “friendly charters” (*poliubovnye gramoty*), usually divisions of family assets.

The predominance of testaments and donations, the types of documents with the greatest connection to religion, makes sense, but surely marriage was a sacrament, and one might expect more than a single unique dowry or prenuptial agreement. Bills of sale, boundary surveys and divisions, labor contracts, land exchanges, mortgages, receipts, and notes of taxes have no religious connection. The presence of clerical participants in them derives from other factors.

Table 6.6 presents the composition of the clerical participants in the data base by type and office.

Table 6.6. Clerics in Appendix 6.1¹⁵

Description	Total
Archimandrite	2
Archpriest	7
Bishop	3
Black priest	12
Deacon	5
Igumen	49
Monk	15
Priest	210
Priest-monk	8
Sacristan	2
Unknown	1
Total	311

Monasteries provided 85 of the 311 clerical participants in the data base, including archimandrites, igumens, monks, and priest-monks, a little over a quarter of the total. Monasteries provided approximately the same percentage of spiritual fathers as well. Archimandrites, black priests, igumens, monks, and priest-monks qualify as monks who were spiritual fathers, and archpriests and priests as priests, as shown in table 6.7.

¹⁵ Because the same cleric never appears twice in the same document, there is no need for document counts.

Table 6.7. Monks and Priests as Spiritual Fathers

Categories	Record count	Appendix 6.1 record no.
Monks		
Archimandrites	1	290
Black priests	10	45, 129, 227, 232, 243, 246, 272, 291, 306, 208
Igumens	33	4, 7, 18, 23, 25, 33, 63, 70, 78, 90, 96, 100, 103, 105, 119, 122, 126, 127, 143, 171, 178, 183, 198–200, 223, 225, 228, 229, 247, 269, 282, 301
Monk	3	22, 60, 281
Priest-monk	8	89, 92, 102, 104, 182, 250, 251, 253
Total monks	55	
Priests		
Archpriest	4	14, 55, 115, 231
Priest	144	1–3, 8, 13, 24, 32, 38, 40–44, 46, 49, 50, 58, 64, 65, 71, 72, 74–76, 79, 81, 82, 84–88, 91, 93–95, 97–99, 101, 106–08, 111, 112, 117, 124, 128, 134–37, 141a–d, 142, 147, 149–52, 154, 156–60, 162–64, 166–68, 170, 173–77, 180, 181, 184–97, 201, 204–11, 213, 215, 222, 224, 226, 233–36, 253–61, 265, 267, 271, 274, 276–78, 283, 285, 288, 289, 292–99, 302, 305, 307
Total priests	148	
Grand Total	203	

The relationship of spiritual father to spiritual children and the gender of the latter entailed some extrapolation. When there was only one spiritual child per spiritual father there was no problem in determining the former's gender. When the spiritual children consisted of a mother, whether a widow or not, and what seemed to be minor children, the gender was listed as female, as the mother was the dominant party. When a man and his wife were listed as spiritual children, both male and female genders were counted, the same as when a presumably single mother appeared with any other adult male, presumably a relative. When spiritual fathers represented an otherwise anonymous group, most often of state peasants, the group presumably consisted of males only. The results appear in tables 6.8 and 6.9.

Table 6.8. Spiritual Fathers

Category	Total	Appendix 6.1 record no.
Total Spiritual Fathers	205	1–4, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 22–25, 32, 33, 38, 40–46, 49, 50, 55, 58, 60, 62–65, 70–73, 74–76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84–108, 111, 112, 115, 117, 119, 122, 124, 126–29, 134–37, 141a–d, 142–43, 147, 149–52, 154, 156–60, 162–64, 166–68, 170, 171, 173–78, 180–201, 204–11, 213, 215, 222–29, 231–36, 243, 246, 247, 250, 251, 253–61, 265, 267, 269, 271, 272, 274, 276–78, 281–83, 285, 288–99, 301–03, 305–08

Table 6.9. Spiritual Children by Gender

Gender	Total	Appendix 6.1 record no.
Female	59	3, 7, 22, 24, 25, 33, 41, 43, 45, 65, 78, 90, 92, 100, 102, 103, 122, 129, 135, 143, 147, 151, 152, 158, 164, 171, 178, 183, 184, 186, 196, 206–08, 210, 223, 228, 233, 235, 243, 253–55, 258, 260, 265, 267, 269, 271, 274, 281, 282, 285, 288, 289–91, 296, 308
Female and Male	5	99, 134, 181, 195, 225
Male	141	1, 2, 4, 8, 13, 14, 18, 23, 32, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 49, 50, 55, 58, 60, 62–64, 70–72, 74–76, 79, 81, 82, 84–89, 91, 93–98, 101, 104–08, 111, 112, 115, 117, 119, 124, 126–28, 136, 137, 141a–d, 142, 149, 150, 154, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166–68, 170, 173–77, 180, 182, 185, 187–94, 197–201, 204, 205, 209, 211, 213, 215, 222, 224, 226, 227, 229, 231 232, 234, 236, 246, 247, 250, 251, 256, 257 259, 261, 272, 276–78, 283, 292–95, 297–99, 301–03, 305–07
Total	205	

Of the 311 clerics in the data, 205, or approximately two-thirds of all clerics involved, served as spiritual fathers. Surely this is no coincidence. I will return to the question of spiritual fathers after considering the role of clerics in these documents.

Table 6.10 summarizes the role of clerical participants in the documents.

Table 6.10. Clerical Role in Documents

Role	Number of records	Appendix 6.1 record no.
Archivist	1	303
Deliver voucher	1	232
Executor	23	14, 28, 38–40, 44, 51, 52, 68–70, 73, 91, 106, 114, 120–22, 148, 155, 186, 214, 280
Executor and wrote	1	238
Surety	1	193
Witness	273	2–13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21–27, 29–37, 41–43, 45–50, 53–58, 60–67, 71, 72, 74–82, 84–90, 92–105, 107–09, 111–13, 116–19, 123–47, 149–54, 156–85, 187–92, 194–201, 203–13, 215–31, 233–37, 239–41, 243–69, 271–79, 281–83, 285–302, 304–08
Wrote	11	1, 17, 20, 59, 83, 110, 115, 202, 242, 270, 284
Total	311	

Obviously the most frequent role of clerical participants in documentation was witness.¹⁶ Clerics perform unique functions in three cases—one cleric each preserved a copy of a charter, served as surety in a labor contract, and delivered a voucher. For clerics to serve as executors of agreements, even testaments, is of more note, because such an obligation brought them much more into the world of civil jurisprudence. In twelve cases a cleric, always a priest, although once a black priest, wrote a document, always a testament or donation, in chancery Russian, with enough expertise for it to be operational. It is not that surprising that a cleric could acquire the skills of a professional scribe. Some monks were former bureaucrats, and monastic entrepreneurial and accounting practices entailed secular knowledge.¹⁷ However, the clerics here were priests. Amateur lay document writers included gentry, state peasants, and slaves; if they could master bureaucratic forms, then a priest should

¹⁶ There is some ambiguity here as well. Boyar testaments were probated by the metropolitan of Moscow. It is possible that Bishop Akakii of Tver' (appendix 6.1, nos. 19, 39, 80) was serving as probate judge for high-status gentry testaments rather than as a witness.

¹⁷ Vladimir Ivanovich Ivanov, *Bukhgalterskii uchet v Rossii XVI–XVII vv.: Istoriko-is-sledovatel'skoe issledovanie monastyr'skikh prikhodo-raskhodnykh knig* (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2005), especially 40.

have been able to serve as a public notary for documents with a religious element. We may discount the famous but highly questionable “two cultures” theory of Muscovite society which posited a sharp linguistic divide, even a diglossia, between the Church Slavonic of the Russian Orthodox Church and the chancery Russian of the royal court and bureaucracy.¹⁸ Although the question of how such priests acquired their secretarial skills cannot be answered, the more intriguing mystery is why they chose to apply their expertise in localities with no shortage of professional scribes, including freelancers.

Not just the principals in a document utilized spiritual fathers as surrogate signatories. Anyone involved could also do so. Spiritual fathers represented or signed on behalf of the widow of a vendor (appendix 6.1, no. 258) and the widow of a testator (appendix 6.1, no. 122), for the executors of a testament (appendix 6.1, no. 298) and a bill of sale (appendix 6.1, no. 91), and for a witness (appendix 6.1, no. 37). One wrote a narrative on behalf of the “man” (*chelovek*, probably a slave) of an executor of a donation (appendix 6.1, no. 238).

Clergy signed their names for both men and women, as shown in table 6.11.

Table 6.11. Clergy Signed Document for Laity

Gender of laity	Total	Appendix 6.1 record nos.
Everyone	91	21, 24, 37, 41, 74, 75, 84–86, 91, 93, 94, 97–99, 101, 117, 128, 134, 141a–d, 142–43, 149, 151, 154, 157, 158, 163, 164, 166, 167, 171, 174, 175, 180–82, 184, 188, 189, 195, 199, 204–11, 213, 223–25, 227–29, 232, 235, 236, 243, 253, 254, 256, 258, 265–67, 269, 271, 272, 274–76, 278, 281, 282, 288, 289, 292, 294, 295, 298, 301, 302, 305, 307, 308
Female	31	24, 41, 143, 151, 158, 164, 171, 184, 206–08, 210, 223, 228, 235, 243, 253, 254, 258, 265–67, 269, 271, 274, 275, 281, 282, 288, 289, 308
Female and Male	5	99, 134, 181, 195, 225
Male	55	21, 37, 74, 75, 84–86, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 101, 117, 128, 141a–d, 142, 149, 154, 157, 163, 166, 167, 174, 175, 180, 182, 188, 189, 199, 204, 205, 209, 211, 213, 224, 227, 229, 232, 236, 256, 272, 276, 278, 292, 292, 294, 295, 298, 301, 302, 305, 307
Total	182	

¹⁸ Charles J. Haperin, “The ‘Russian’ and ‘Slavonic’ Languages in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 85, 1 (2007): 1–24.

As a whole women are underrepresented as signatories of this kind of documentation but note that this analysis deals only with clerical signatories in lieu of participants. It does not include male relatives signing for each other or for female participants. Consequently it might be prudent to conclude that the use of spiritual fathers as participants was not gender-biased. In sixty-six cases spiritual fathers participating in the transaction also signed the document on behalf of their spiritual child or children.¹⁹ There seems to have been no prohibition of a cleric signing a document twice in different capacities.

Historians still do not fully understand the import of someone—clerical or lay relative—affixing his name to a document in lieu of a participant. One cannot assume that the person not physically signing the document was illiterate, although some were. Sometimes the non-signer was a minor or physically handicapped. A black priest signed a 1574 donation in place of the donor Aleksei Stepanov syn Fedchishchev, yet Fedchishchev signed the document himself on behalf of his (presumably minor) nephew (appendix 6.1, no. 272). Did Fedchishchev wish to avoid signing the document twice? Not if a cleric could do so with impunity. Equally confusing are two donations by Princess Ul'iana Gundorova, each signed on her behalf by two priests, the first identified as her spiritual father, the second of whom identifies Princess Gundorova as his "sovereignness" (*gosudarynia*, roughly: my lady, my mistress), as if he were her personal priest, on an estate of hers or in a chapel, but without serving as her spiritual father (appendix 6.1, nos. 265, 266, 274, 275). Why two surrogates chose to affix their names twice to the same document on Gundorova's behalf remains as unclear as the status of the second priest who referred to her so respectfully. Such questions exceed the scope of this chapter but deserve separate study.

The appearance of spiritual fathers in appendix 6.1 corroborates what has been known but not fully documented in scholarship, that the choice of spiritual father was personal, else we could not find the variety of patterns of spiritual fathers among members of the same family. Of course the same spiritual father could "serve" both a husband and a wife (appendix 6.1, nos. 134, 188, 195), let alone a widow and her children, but even two brothers participating in the same transaction could each be represented by a different spiritual father (appendix 6.1, nos. 188, 189).²⁰ Moreover, an individual could have more than one spiritual father, not just at different times in different places, but at

¹⁹ Appendix 6.1, nos. 28, 45, 95, 97–99, 101, 117, 128, 134, 143, 149, 151, 154, 157, 158, 164, 167, 171, 174, 180–82, 184, 188, 195, 199, 204–11, 213, 223–25, 227–29, 232, 235, 236, 243, 253, 254, 258, 265, 267, 269, 271, 272, 274, 276, 281, 282, 288, 289, 292, 294, 295, 298, 301, 305, 307, 308.

²⁰ Both priest/spiritual fathers are described as affiliated with a church of St. Nicholas; whether they served in the same church cannot be determined.

the same time in the same place. A 1559 testament by Stepan Golovin syn Oboburov was witnessed by his spiritual father, an abbot, and the executor was his spiritual father, a priest (appendix 6.1, nos. 106, 107). Boyar Mikhail Vorotynskii issued a testament and then on three separate occasions added codicils as his marital and family situation changed; a different spiritual father participated in each codicil (appendix 6.1, nos. 160, 200, 231, 259). Personal discretion best explains these complicated arrangements.

Conclusion

During the reign of Ivan IV members of the landowning elite, primarily gentry with some boyars and richer state peasants, chose to incorporate clergy, including their spiritual fathers, into their legal transactions, regardless of whether those transactions possessed a religious element, as in testaments and monastic donations, or not, as in bills of sale. However, clerical involvement took two forms, both direct participation in a variety of roles, most often as witnesses, and as substitute signatories on behalf of lay participants, not only the primary actors in the transactions, most often by spiritual fathers on behalf of spiritual children. This voluntary and selective pattern reflected elite lay preferences, because the laity individually chose the cleric who served as spiritual father.

In no way was such clerical participation required for the legal validity of any of these transactions, no matter how great their religious content. Neither a testament nor a donation charter required the testator or donor to have his or her spiritual father attend, witness, or sign in his or her place. Yet it seems reasonable to infer that such clerical presence enhanced the validity, authenticity, and solemnity of the promulgation of the legal act, lending it, however superficially, a patina of ecclesiastical, if not necessarily divine sanction.

That clerical participation in lay legal transactions accorded them greater reliability or significance does not preclude that the laity who invited clerics to play a role in lay documentary life did so because of their own religious identity, as a result of which they held clergy in high social esteem. If a layperson who did not personally respect clergy nevertheless utilized clergy in document preparation, such an act reflected his or her acknowledgment of the elevated social status of clergy in Muscovy at large during Ivan's reign.

Therefore, we may legitimately infer that most if not all lay elite held the clergy in relatively high social esteem. This conclusion must be tempered by its class limitations. For lack of evidence we cannot project such attitudes onto the mass peasant and artisan population. Generalizations about peasant respect or disdain for Russian Orthodox clergy in contemporary foreign ac-

counts or in later, especially populist, historiography cannot be confirmed or impugned by the evidence adduced in this chapter.

However, the usage of not only priests, even priest-monks, but igumens, archimandrites, and other monastic elders as spiritual fathers, witnesses, and signatories of private legal acts adds another dimension to this phenomenon. How parish priests reacted to not being chosen as a congregant's spiritual father remains unknowable. It was the common belief that the black or regular clergy, the monks, led lives closer to the Christian ideal than the white or parish clergy, the priests. Monks deserved more respect than priests, and neither the laity nor the priesthood would have contested that hierarchy of values.

Approximately one-quarter of all clergy participating at laity discretion in the documents in the database were monks, approximately the same percentage as monastic spiritual fathers in the records. It would be tempting to infer that the more prosperous, important, or visible laity chose the more prestigious monastic participants and that the monks, particularly igumens, were more attracted to becoming spiritual fathers to those leading figures, but we have no evidence that the laity with monastic spiritual fathers or who successfully invited monastic clergy to witness their legal affairs constituted la crème de la crème of the elite in our data. What we can assert is that a sizeable minority—but no more than a sizeable minority—of the spiritual fathers and clerical participants in secular documentation came from monastic ranks. The shortage of parish priests in many regions of Muscovy, such as the north, may have been a factor in this equation.

In conclusion this documentary evidence supports the assertion that the lay elite held a very favorable opinion of the clergy, both black and white, and for that reason sought to integrate them into their personal as opposed to devotional lives. The laity did not wall off clergy from their "secular" lives nor did clergy, even monks, confine their activities in lay lives to strictly religious pastoral or liturgical acts.

I leave to others to decide whether this pattern of clerical involvement in elite lay legal transactions can be compared to a similar phenomenon in sixteenth-century Protestant and Catholic countries or even in those with Orthodox Christian populations such as the Ruthenian regions of Poland-Lithuania. In addition, specialists in seventeenth-century Muscovite and eighteenth-century imperial Russian social history might be able to trace the later history of this practice,²¹ which may shed further light upon a central issue of early modern Russian social history, lay perceptions of the clergy.

²¹ The Schism (*Raskol*) in the Russian Orthodox Church during the seventeenth century might play a role in lay-clerical interaction.

Abbreviations

AFZKh 2	<i>Akty feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia i khoziaistva</i> , vol. 2 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1956).
AFZKh 3	<i>Akty feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia i khoziaistva</i> , vol. 3 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1961).
Antonov	A. V. Antonov, "K istorii poshekhonskoi votchiny Bogoiavlenskogo Ostrovskogo monastyria," <i>Russkii diplomatarii</i> 5 (1999): 95–113.
Antonov and Baranov	A. V. Antonov and K. V. Baranov, "Akty XV–XVI veka iz arkhivov russkikh monastyrei i tserkvei," <i>Russkii diplomatarii</i> 3 (1998): 3–44.
Arakcheev	Vladimir Anatol'evich Arakcheev, <i>Vlast' i "zemlia": Pravitel'stvennaia politika v otnoshenii tiaglykh soslovii v Rossii vtoroi poloviny XVI–nachala XVII veka</i> (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2014).
ARG	<i>Akty Rossiiskogo gosudarstva: Arkhivy moskovskikh monastyrei i soborov XV–nachalo XVII vv.</i> (Moscow: Ladomir, 1998).
ASZ 1	<i>Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka: Sbornik dokumentov</i> , vol. 1 (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1997).
ASZ 2	<i>Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka</i> , vol. 2 (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 1998).
ASZ 3	<i>Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka</i> , vol. 3 (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2002).
ASZ 4	<i>Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka</i> , vol. 4 (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2008).

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Appendix 6.1. Invited Clerical Participation in Elite Lay Documents²²

1. *AFZKh* 2, no. 138, 136
2. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 34, 86–90
3. *AFZKh* 2, no. 140, 137–38
4. *ASZ* 1, no. 161, 134–35
5. Kaliazin, no. 76, 78–79
6. Kaliazin, no. 77 (Vassian), 79–80
7. Kaliazin, no. 77 (Varosonofei), 79–80
8. Kaliazin, no. 78 (Iosif), 80–81
9. Kaliazin, no. 78 (Vas'ian), 80–81
10. Kaliazin, no. 78 (Gerontei), 80–81
11. Simonov, no. 59 (Grigorii), 64–65
12. Simonov, no. 59 (Ivan), 64–65
13. Likhachev 2, II, 6–10
14. Kaliazin, no. 83 (Afanasii), 85
15. Kaliazin, no. 83 (Vas'ian), 85
16. *AFZKh* 2, no. 154 (Ilarion), 148–49
17. *AFZKh* 2, no. 154 (Ivan), 148–49
18. *AFZKh* 2, no. 157 (Ilarion), 150–51
19. *AFZKh* 2, no. 157 (Akakii), 150–51
20. *AFZKh* 2, no. 157 (Ivan), 150–51
21. S. M. Kashtanov, *Iz istorii russkogo srednevekovogo istochnika: Akty X–XVI vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1996), no. 9, 150–51
22. Chudov, no. 23, 89–90
23. A. V. Mashtafarov, "Dukhovnaia gramota Ivana Iur'evicha Podzhogina 1541 g.," *Russkii diplomatarii* 1 (1997): 34–37
24. A. M. Prokopenko, "Novye dokumenty po istorii zemlevladieniia Nikolo-Ugreshskogo monastyria," *Russkii diplomatarii* 2 (1997): no. 1, 55–56
25. *RIB* 32, no. 149 (Makarii), 261–63
26. *RIB* 32, no. 149 (Terentei), 261–63
27. *RIB* 32, no. 149 (Grigorii), 261–63
28. *ARG*, no. 7 (Kipreian), 134–36
29. *ARG*, no. 7 (Gureit), 134–36
30. *ARG*, no. 7 (Fedor), 134–36
31. *ARG*, no. 7 (Grigorii), 134–36
32. *AFZKh* 2, no. 176, 163–73

²² Record entries contain the names of clerics when multiple clerics appear in the same document.

33. Likhachev 2, IV (Iona), 12–13
34. Likhachev 2, IV (Semion), 12–13
35. Iaroslavl', no. 5 (Sergei), 27–28
36. Iaroslavl', no. 5 (Iona), 27–28
37. *AFZKh* 2, no. 181, 182–84
38. *AFZKh* 2, no. 183, 184–86
39. *ASZ* 3, no. 440 (Akakii), 364–65
40. *ASZ* 3, no. 440 (Pankratei), 364–65
41. *ARG*, no. 100, 236–37
42. Chudov, no. 25 (Vasilii), 94
43. Chudov, no. 25 (Ivan), 94
44. *AFZKh* 2, no. 185, 187–88
45. *AFZKh* 2, no. 191, 192–93
46. *AFZKH* 3, no. 4, 14–16
47. Kostroma, no. 3, 56–58
48. *AFZKh* 2, no. 200 (Eufimyi), 200–01
49. *AFZKh* 2, no. 200 (Seva), 200–01
50. *AFZKh* 2, no. 204 (Ivan), 204–05
51. *AFZKh* 2, no. 204 (Ignatii), 204–05
52. *AFZKh* 2, no. 204 (Iakov), 204–05
53. Likhachev 2, VI (Panteleimon), 18–21
54. Likhachev 2, VI (Iona), 18–21
55. Likhachev 2, VI (Semion), 18–21
56. Likhachev 2, VI (Iona), 18–21
57. Kaliazin, no. 110, 109–10
58. *AFZKh* 2, no. 222 (Nikita), 224–25
59. *AFZKh* 2, no. 222 (Vasilii), 224–25
60. *AFZKh* 2, no. 225 (Sergei), 226–27
61. *AFZKh* 2, no. 225 (Ivan), 226–27
62. *AFZKh* 2, no. 228 [defective], 229–30
63. *AFZKh* 2, no. 233, 236–37
64. Kaliazin, no. 117 (1551), 115–16
65. Likhachev 2, VII (Aleksei), 21–24
66. Likhachev 2, VII (Iona), 21–24
67. Likhachev 2, VII (Vasilii), 21–24
68. *AFZKh* 2, no. 236 (Filofei), 238–40
69. *AFZKh* 2, no. 236 (German), 238–40
70. *AFZKh* 2, no. 236 (Iakim), 238–40
71. Likhachev 2, IX, 26–27
72. *AFZKh* 2, no. 248, 250–52
73. *AFZKh* 2, no. 249, 252–53

74. *AFZKh* 2, no. 250 (Ivan), 253–54
75. *AFZKh* 2, no. 250 (Kostentin), 253–54
76. Kaliazin, no. 124 (Iona), 130
77. Kaliazin, no. 124 (Ivan), 130
78. Kostroma, no. 87, 194–95
79. *AFZKh* 2, no. 253 (Iosif), 257–59
80. *AFZKh* 2, no. 253 (Akakii), 257–59
81. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 88, 158–59
82. Simonov, no. 111, 124
83. Iaroslavl', no. 9, 30–31
84. *RIB* 32, no. 194 (Fedor), 373–80
85. *RIB* 32, no. 194 (Semen), 373–80
86. *RIB* 32, no. 194 (Ivan), 373–80
87. *AFZKh* 2, no. 256, 269–70
88. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 96, 218–19
89. Simonov, no. 116 (Iakov), 128–29
90. Simonov, no. 116 (Feodosii), 128–29
91. Riazan', no. 5, 242
92. Chudov, no. 39, 116–18
93. Solovetskii 1, no. 235 (Maksim), 143–44
94. Solovetskii 1, no. 235 (Arkhip), 143–44
95. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 97, 220–25
96. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 102, 229–31
97. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 105, 233–35
98. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 107, 236–37
99. *ARG*, no. 108, 245–46
100. Simonov, no. 119, 131
101. Sotnitsy, no. 14, 26–27
102. Chudov, no. 42, 120–21
103. Chudov, no. 44, 122–24
104. *AFZKh* 2, no. 274, 272–82
105. *AFZKh* 2, no. 276 (Anofrei), 284–86
106. *AFZKh* 2, no. 276 (Iona), 284–86
107. Kaliazin, no. 132, 138–41
108. Likhachev 2, XI, 30–36
109. Likhachev 2, XII (Semen), 36–39
110. Likhachev 2, XII (Afanasii), 36–39
111. O. E. Kosheleva, "Dukhovnaia Timofeia Busurmenova vtoroi chetverti XVI veka," *Russkii diplomatarii* 7 (2001): 255–57
112. *AFZKh* 2, no. 279, 288–89
113. Kaliazin, no. 136, 143–44

114. Likhachev 2, XIII (Andreiiian), 39–49
115. Likhachev 2, XIII (Semen), 39–49
116. Anonov and Baranov, no. 4 (Sefan), 12–13
117. Antonov and Baranov, no. 4 (Eremei), 12–13
118. *AFZKh* 2, no. 282 (Ivan), 290–92
119. *AFZKh* 2, no. 282 (Iona), 290–92
120. *AFZKh* 2, no. 283 (Filofei), 293–94
121. *AFZKh* 2, no. 283 (Erman), 293–94
122. *AFZKh* 2, no. 283 (Vas'ian), 293–94
123. *AFZKh* 2, no. 283 (Grigorii), 293–94
124. *AFZKh* 3, no. 8, 19–20
125. Kaliazin, no. 137, 144–45
126. Kaliazin, no. 139, 145–47
127. Likhachev 2, XIV, 49–55
128. Sotnitsy, no. 38, 66
129. *ASZ* 1, no. 162, 135–36
130. Kaliazin, no. 143, 149–50
131. Kaliazin, no. 144 (Andrei), 150–51
132. Kaliazin, no. 144 (Ivan), 150–51
133. Kaliazin, no. 144 (Feodosii), 150–51
134. Kostroma, no. 14, 79–80
135. Kostroma, no. 16, 81
136. Solovetskii 1, no. 266, 175–76
137. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 123, 252–54
138. Kaliazin, no. 146 (Semion), 152–53
139. Kaliazin, no. 146 (Ivan), 152–53
140. Kaliazin, no. 146 (Feodosii), 152–53
- 141a. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 77 (Mikhailo Grigor'ev syn), 217–19
- 141b. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 77 (Dementei Dmitriev syn), 217–19
- 141c. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 77 (Sava Agafonov syn), 217–19
- 141d. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 77 (Semen Dmitriev syn), 217–19
142. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 77 (Vasilii Gavrilov syn), 217–19
143. Iaroslavl', no. 15, 39–40
144. Antonov, no. 4 (Pankratei), 110–11
145. Antonov, no. 4 (Avramei), 110–11
146. Antonov, no. 4 (Nezhdan), 110–11
147. Kostroma, no. 17 (Filip), 81–83
148. Kostroma, no. 17 (Vassian), 81–83
149. Chudov, no. 56, 158–60
150. *AFZKh* 2, no. 310, 328–29
151. *ARG*, no. 112, 250–51

152. Kostroma, no. 20, 85–86
153. Kostroma, no. 21, 86–87
154. Kostroma, no. 23, 87–88
155. Kostroma, no. 24 (Vassian), 88–93
156. Kostroma, no. 24 (Iona), 88–93
157. Murom, no. 6, 57–58
158. Sadikov, no. 1, 181–82
159. *AFZKh* 2, no. 315, 333–34
160. *ASZ* 3, no. 86, 72–77
161. Solovetskii 1, no. 286, 188
162. Solovetskii 1, no. 289, 189–90
163. Solovetskii 1, no. 291, 190–91
164. Kaliazin, no. 150 (Ivan), 156–57
165. Kaliazin, no. 150 (Semion), 156–57
166. Kostroma, no. 26, 94–95
167. Riazan', no. 7, 243
168. Riazan', no. 18 (Mark), 253–54
169. Riazan', no. 18 (Stefan), 253–54
170. *RIB* 32, no. 266, 454
171. *AFZKh* 2, no. 318, 336–37
172. *ASZ* 1, no. 88, 68–69
173. *ASZ* 2, no. 459 (Stepan), 289–90
174. *ASZ* 2, no. 459 (Ivan), 289–90
175. Solovetskii 1, no. 222, 137
176. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 145, 283–85
177. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 146, 285–86
178. *ARG*, no. 119 (Feodosii), 257–59
179. *ARG*, no. 119 (Varsunofei), 257–59
180. Simonov, no. 155, 201–02
181. Sotnitsy, no. 16, 28–29
182. Iaroslavl', no. 38, 64–65
183. Chudov, no. 70, 178–80
184. *AFZKh* 2, no. 323, 341
185. *AFZKh* 2, no. 330, 346–47
186. *AFZKh* 2, no. 332, 349–51
187. Simonov, no. 164, 211–12
188. Simonov, no. 172 (Fedor), 220–21
189. Simonov, no. 172 (Gurii), 220–21
190. Likhachev 2, XVI, 56–57
191. Chudov, no. 69, 177–78
192. *RIB* 32, no. 238, 487–94

193. Arakcheev, no. 4, 424, appendix 2
194. *AFZKh* 2, no. 331, 348–49
195. *AFZKh* 2, no. 334, 352–53
196. *AFZKh* 2, no. 335, 353–54
197. *AFZKh* 2, no. 338, 356–57
198. *AFZKh* 2, no. 341, 359–60
199. *AFZKh* 2, no. 344, 362–63
200. *ASZ* 3, no. 86 (Varlam), 72–77
201. *ASZ* 3, no. 488 (Iona), 406–07
202. *ASZ* 3, no. 488 (Mikhail), 406–07
203. *Solovetskii* 1, no. 332, 212
204. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 152, 308–09
205. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 153, 310–11
206. *ARG*, no. 3, 19–20
207. Simonov, no. 169, 217–18
208. Simonov, no. 170, 218–19
209. Simonov, no. 173, 221–22
210. Simonov, no. 174, 223
211. *AFZKh* 2, no. 348, 387–88
212. *AFZKh* 2, no. 349, 388–89
213. *AFZKh* 2, no. 350, 389–90
214. *AFZKh* 2, no. 352 (Paisei), 390–94
215. *AFZKh* 2, no. 352 (Ivan), 390–94
216. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 159 (Mikhailo), 315–16
217. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 159 (Klementei), 315–16
218. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 159 (Ivan), 315–16
219. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 159 (Ermola), 315–16
220. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 159 (Fedor), 315–16
221. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 159 (Andrei), 315–16
222. *ARG*, no. 78, 193–94
223. Iaroslavl', no. 19, 43–44
224. Chudov, no. 74, 183–84
225. Murom, no. 8, 59–60
226. *RIB* 32, no. 243, 501–03
227. Sadikov, no. 39, 239–40
228. Sadikov, no. 40, 240–41
229. Sadikov, no. 80 (Antonii), 295–97
230. Sadikov, no. 80 (Mikhailo), 295–97
231. *ASZ* 3, no. 86 (Kiprian), 72–77
232. *RIB* 32, no. 248, 509–11
233. *Solovetskii* 1, no. 367, 228–29

234. Solovetskii 1, no. 374, 232
235. Kaliazin, no. 163, 168–69
236. Kaliazin, no. 164 (Iurii), 169
237. Kaliazin, no. 164 (Misailo), 169
238. Chudov, no. 80, 191–93
239. Murom, no. 9 (Afanasii), 60
240. Murom, no. 9 (Ivan), 60
241. Murom, no. 9 (Dmitrii), 60
242. Murom, no. 9 (Semeika), 60
243. Sadikov, no. 48, 252–53
244. *AFZKh* 2, no. 356 (Misail), 396–97
245. *AFZKh* 2, no. 356 (Eufimii), 396–97
246. *AFZKh* 3, no. 16, 35
247. *ASZ* 1, no. 282 (Bogolep), 270–71
248. *ASZ* 1, no. 282 (Mikhail), 270–71
249. *ASZ* 1, no. 282 (Filip), 270–71
250. Solovetskii 1, no. 424, 253
251. Solovetskii 2, no. 435, 7–8
252. Solovetskii 2, no. 459, 19
253. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 165, 322–23
254. Kostroma, no. 28, 96
255. Kostroma, no. 98, 202–03
256. Kostroma, no. 99, 203–04
257. Chudov, no. 81, 193–95
258. Sadikov, no. 58, 265–66
259. *ASZ* 3, no. 86 (Ivan), 72–77
260. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 167, 325–27
261. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 175 (Fedor), 336–37
262. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 175 (Grigorii), 336–37
263. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 176 (Aleksei), 338
264. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 176 (Fedor), 338
265. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 179 (Fedor), 341–42
266. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 179 (Ivan), 341–42
267. Kaliazin, no. 174 (Timofei), 178–79
268. Kaliazin, no. 174 (Tret'iak), 178–79
269. Iaroslavl', no. 22 46–47
270. Rozhdestvenskii, no. 25 (Ivan), 116
271. Rozhdestvenskii, no. 25 (Fedor), 116
272. Sadikov, no. 63, 271–72
273. Solovetskii 2, no. 578, 75
274. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 187 (Fedor), 349–50

275. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 187 (Ivan), 349–50
276. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 188, 351–52
277. Solovetskii 2, no. 608, 87–88
278. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 193, 357–59
279. Murom, no. 15, 64–65
280. *AFZKh* 2, no. 363 (Bogolep), 403–04
281. *AFZKh* 2, no. 363 (Ioakin), 403–04
282. *AFZKh* 2, no. 364 (Ekhim), 404–05
283. *ASZ* 1, no. 279 (Foma), 266–67
284. *ASZ* 1, no. 279 (Avakum), 266–67
285. Solovetskii 2, no. 645 (Ontipa), 101–02
286. Solovetskii 2, no. 645 (Deonisii), 101–02
287. Solovetskii 2, no. 645 (Konstantin), 101–02
288. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 195, 363–65
289. *ARG*, no. 4, 20–22
290. Murom, no. 17, 65–66
291. *AFZKh* 2, no. 365, 405–06
292. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 202, 372–73
293. *ARG*, no. 136, 329–32
294. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 207, 378–79
295. Iu. V. Ankhimiuk, "Soligalichskie akty iz 'arkhiva Volynskikh,'" *Russkii diplomatarii* 6 (2000): no. 7, 20–31
296. Chudov, no. 79 (Ivan), 190–91
297. Chudov, no. 79 (Avraam), 190–91
298. Murom, no. 19, 66–67
299. Solovetskii 2, no. 723, 141
300. Solovetskii 2, no. 777, 167
301. Simonov, no. 195, 241–42
302. *ASZ* 1, no. 33, 32–33
303. Solovetskii 2, no. 774, 165
304. Kostroma, no. 34, 101–02
305. *ASZ* 4, no. 497, 370–71
306. Solovetskii 2, no. 808, 181–82
307. Sotnitsy, no. 20, 33
308. Rozhdestvenskii, no. 30, 123–24

Appendix 6.2. Government Authorization of Spiritual Fathers Signing Documents for Illiterate Spiritual Children

1. Kostroma, no. 2, 54–56
2. Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 62, 114–15

3. ASZ 4, no. 132, 96–98
4. Iushkov, no. 175, 151–54
5. RIB 32, no. 193, 370–73
6. Arakcheev, no. 2, 433–34, appendix 3
7. PRP 4, 179–85
8. Iakovlev, no. 3, 113–16
9. Iakovlev, no. 4, 116–20
10. Iakovlev, no. 5, 120–23
11. Murom, no. 5, 56–57
12. ASZ 4, no. 411, 302–05
13. Iakovlev, no. 7, 69–73
14. PRP 4, 363–70
15. Iushkov, 1 no. 178, 55–161
16. *Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheogracheskoiu kommissiei*, vol. 1 (1841), no. 163, 299–314
17. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 91, 161–92
18. Fedotov–Chekhovskii 1, no. 67, 133–44
19. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 92, 192–215
20. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 131, 261–62
21. Spaso-Efim'ev, no. 138, 271–73
22. ASZ 2, no. 458, 388–89
23. ASZ 1, no. 132, 103–04
24. Iakovlev, no. 8, 74–78
25. ASZ 3, no. 430, 350–51
26. Sadikov, no. 60, 267–69. See also no. 61, 269–70.
27. Solovetskii 2, no. 656, 108–11.
28. Solovetskii 2, no. 687, 124–25.
29. ASZ 2, no. 181, 171.
30. D. Ia. Samokvasov, ed., *Arkhivnyi material: Novootkrytye dokumenty pomestno-votchinnnykh uchrezhdenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva XV–XVII stoletii* (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1905), no. 7, 121–25
31. AFZKh 2, no. 373, 416–18

Chapter 7

Who Was Entitled to Sue for Precedence during the Reign of Ivan IV?

In Muscovy the precedence (*mestnichestvo*) system regulated social hierarchy in office holding and ceremonies. Based upon a combination of a man's genealogical "place" (*mesto*) in his clan, for example, was he a first son or a second son, and the service history of his ancestors, he could object to being assigned to a post under the direction of someone or a ceremonial position lower than that of someone from another family whose ancestor had served beneath his ancestor or held a ceremonial position lower than that of his ancestor. Even if the roots of the precedence system date to the fifteenth century,¹ it achieved full development only during the reign of Ivan IV, when it was regulated by legislation and decree. Scholarship on precedence has been dominated in the past by analysis of its political impact, whether it inhibited the power of the autocrat to make appointments by merit or whether it divided the aristocracy (*boiarsstvo*, boyars) by entangling them in disputes with each other over status and office which prevented them from presenting a united class or estate front to limit the authority of the autocrat. Some historians have concluded that it did both.² Recent studies have focused more on its sociological rather than political aspects. Precedence created social coherence that did not rely upon coercion and provided a mechanism for resolving aristocratic tensions without violent feuds.³

¹ Nancy Shields Kollmann, *By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 143–54. Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 15–16, 47–48, 104, on Tatar influence on the origin of precedence is not convincing.

² Kollmann, *By Honor Bound*, 139–43; Iurii Moiseevich Eskin, *Ocherki istorii mestnichestva v Rossii XVI–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2009), 8–24.

³ Kollmann and Eskin have studied this aspect of precedence.

This chapter addresses a different question: who was entitled to object to a job assignment or ceremonial role on the basis of precedence? No source defines the social classes whose members were included in the system and therefore by default the social classes whose members were excluded from the system. Historians have not addressed this question with the requisite degree of clarity. Those historians who treated precedence as a political policy almost invariably imply that it affected only boyars. For example, in his classic study of the reforms of Ivan IV, Aleksandr Zimin wrote that Ivan's policy toward precedence—to regulate it rather than abolish it—was a clear concession to the “princely-boyar elite,” a compromise with the “boyar elite,” who frequently violated Ivan's regulations.⁴ Logically this interpretation of precedence by an advocate of the then reigning Soviet paradigm that Ivan's reign witnessed class conflict between the boyars and the gentry (*deti boiarskie*)⁵ entailed that the gentry were excluded from and therefore neither benefitted from nor defended precedence. Zimin, like many other historians, perpetuated a misleading impression by referring to the “princely-boyar” elite, because not all princes were boyars, most were gentry, and not all boyars were princes. This point of view has outlived the Soviet Union and exceeded the boundaries of Russia. For example, the English historian Maureen Perrie and the post-Soviet Russian historian Andrei Pavlov wrote that precedence served the interests of the “boyar aristocracy” at the apex of the social pyramid,⁶ which, again, implicitly excludes the gentry from precedence. Consistent with this school of thought some historians have interpreted the abolition of the precedence system in 1682 as “anti-aristocrat,” although others see it as a reform in the interests of military modernization.⁷ Nancy Shields Kollmann concludes that “[i]n the juridical realm, the practice of precedence (*mestnichestvo*) and the genealogical and service record keeping it entailed *defined* [my italics—CJH] the privileged elite and worked to keep it circumscribed.”⁸ However, Kollmann

⁴ Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zimin, *Reformy Ivana Groznogo: Ocherki sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi istorii Rossii serediny XVI v.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960), 342–45.

⁵ Historians frequently call the sixteenth-century gentry in Russian the *dvorianstvo*, but that is anachronistic; the term acquired that meaning only in the seventeenth century. During Ivan IV's reign *dvoriane* meant not “gentry” but members of the royal household or court (*dvor*), which included boyars and scribes, not just gentry.

⁶ Andrei Pavlov and Maureen Perrie, *Ivan the Terrible* (London: Pearson, Longman, 2003), 69.

⁷ Paul Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great: The Struggle for Power, 1671–1725* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 120 n. 75.

⁸ Kollmann, *By Honor Bound*, 1, 185.

did not explicate who constituted the “privileged elite.” She refers to precedence litigation among members of the “landed cavalry elite” and Muscovy’s “landed servitors,” phrases which would seem to include gentry as well as boyars, but that inference is not developed.⁹ Iurii Eskin, the author of the most detailed study of precedence, notes in passing that in the sixteenth century clans “fell out” of precedence, and starting in the 1580s and later in the seventeenth century clans “rose” to precedence, but does not specify whether the clans involved who “fell” fell from the boyars into the gentry or whether the clans that “rose” rose from the gentry to the boyars.¹⁰ After linking the concept of “place” to the adage of Leo the Philosopher to his son Basil, quoted in the sixteenth century by Metropolitan Makarii and Iosif Volotskii, that a ruler was obligated to maintain the “place” of his servitors, Eskin concluded that his advice applied to “boyars and magnates” (*vel’mozhi*), not to “princes or *kniazhata*,” which, he observes, indirectly confirms that the system originated among the non-princely Muscovite boyars who were resisting the influx of appanage (*udel’nye*) princes into Muscovy.¹¹ These comments do not help much. Boyars included princes, there is no consensus among specialists as to who the *kniazhata* were, it is unlikely that there were any “magnates” who were *not* boyars, and the princes who began to dominate the Muscovite Royal Council (Duma) beginning at the turn of the sixteenth century were not from appanages but from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, other remarks by Eskin, however unsystematic, suggest that at least by the reign of Ivan IV precedence was not confined to the boyars. Precedence included the “provincial elders” (*gorodnichnye starosty*, literally: urban elders) who were mostly from the provincial gentry, Ivan’s suspension of precedence during the 1549 campaign against Kazan’ applied to “boyars, military commanders [*voevody*], princes, ‘courtiers’ [*dvoriane*], and gentry [*deti boiarskie*].” Precedence was suspended for the 1552 Muscovite army on the Oka River for members of the “upper” Court (Dvor) and for gentry (*deti boiarskie*) at Ivan’s 1574/1575 wedding to Anna Vasil’chikova. Precedence did apply to holders of Royal Council ranks at diplomatic receptions but not to gentry (*deti boiarskie*).¹² Some confusion still applies to these assertions, in part because passages in Muscovite sources frequently list multiple social categories without regard to their overlap. The Dvor was the Royal Court or Household, and included boyars and gentry. Again, “boyars” and “princes” are not mutually exclusive. The “upper” Court might have included the so-called higher-ranked “Moscow”

⁹ Ibid., 195.

¹⁰ Eskin, *Ocherki istorii mestnichestva*, 123–24.

¹¹ Ibid., 145.

¹² Ibid., 181–82, 196, 197, 235, 242.

gentry but definitely excluded the lower-ranked “provincial” (*gorodovye*, literally: city) gentry, but it is impossible to be certain. “Royal Council” ranks included state secretaries (*dumnye d’iaki*), the highest ranking bureaucrats in the Muscovite administration, and conciliar gentry (*dumnye dvoriane*), who were gentry.¹³ At least these scattered remarks raise the possibility that some or all gentry were included in precedence. Finally, Eskin called attention to the fact that in the seventeenth century precedence devolved to lower Court ranks and to provincial gentry.¹⁴ If the lower gentry only partook of precedence in the seventeenth century, then they did not “qualify” for such status in the sixteenth century, but that does not provide direct evidence that, however defined, upper gentry did belong to the precedence system in the sixteenth century.

Eskin deserves enormous credit for providing historians with a reference tool which can be used to address the question of who participated in precedence and provide a preliminary answer, a register, the most comprehensive to date and probably for some time, of all precedence disputes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries until the abolition of precedence in 1682, based upon all published and archival evidence.¹⁵ For Ivan’s reign, even more than twenty years later, Eskin was able to add only a single dispute to his register, and that one, a designated diplomatic envoy to the Crimean Khanate in 1534 who objected that it violated precedence for him to be sent to a recently installed, young khan who lacked nobility (*neznatnost’*), makes no sense.¹⁶ Chingissids in Muscovite service were above the precedence system and certainly outranked even boyars. For this reason, I have not included this case in my data base.

The only evidence as to who was included in precedence is a complaint that an appointment or ceremonial position violated precedence. Usually such complaints took the form of petitions to Ivan for redress, which could result in a trial by Ivan or designated surrogates, usually boyars and a state secretary.

¹³ *Dumnyi dvorianin* is the only term from Ivan’s reign in which *dvorianin* does refer to the “gentry,” not to “members of the court” in general.

¹⁴ Eskin, *Ocherki istorii mestnichestva*, 349–77.

¹⁵ Iu. M. Eskin, *Mestnichestvo v Rossii XVI–XVII vv.: Khronologicheskii reestr* (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1994). The text and the appendices reference the numbers (nos.) assigned to precedence cases in Eskin’s register.

¹⁶ Iu. M. Eskin, *Opisanie podlinnykh mestnichestkikh del* (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2017), nos. 1, 11. The envoy, Prince A. I. Strigin-Obolenskii, would certainly have been within the precedence system; I count his family as boyar class. Cf. Eskin, *Ocherki istorii mestnichestva*, 265 n. 241.

To my knowledge no one has performed a statistical analysis of this evidence to determine the social scope of precedence for Ivan's reign.

Eskin's register includes at first glance 261 entries for Ivan's reign, no. 34 through no. 394.¹⁷ However, the register contains no. 41a and no. 166a, which adds two items to the count. It also contains eleven items of legislation, decrees, and narratives (nos. 68, 83, 90, 95, 102, 103, 113, 118, 187, 201, 211) lacking precedence dispute data, which must be subtracted from the total. Therefore, the total number of precedence conflicts in the register is 252. I created one record for each participant in each precedence dispute, including year, name, and social class. Each case must contain at least two individuals, but some include more. The largest number was seven. Consequently the total number of records in my data base is 782, which is certainly substantial. I was not interested in who won, indicated by an asterisk in Eskin's register, a piece of information, by the way, which is often unavailable. Nor was I concerned with the transcripts of precedence trials, including what evidence was adduced and the logic argued to justify the verdict, when available. Two typographical errors in the dates of entries posed no problem because they were so obvious—the register is in chronological order—and because chronology did not concern me. No. 184 should be 1570, not 1560, and no. 343 should be 1582, not 1592. The names of the participants in the complaints¹⁸ pose greater complications. Unfortunately names in the documents varied in format because of hyphenated last names and the use of nicknames. There were also typographical errors of omission and commission in the names of precedence suit participants in the registry. I relied upon Eskin's "Name Index"¹⁹ to identify which differing names actually referred to the same individual, which was a great help in standardizing names for the purpose of calculating statistics. Unfortunately, there are errors of commission and omission in the Name Index. Consequently to standardize names I could not simply crib from the Name Index. No. 317 omits that Priimkov-Rostovskii was a "prince," no. 38 omitted Mikulinskii's initials, no. 160 erroneously accorded Sheremetev the title of "prince." No. 219 reads "G. I. Chert Dolgorukii" but no. 252 refers to "G. I. Chert-Dolgorukii," which changes a nickname to an element of a hyphenated last name. The Name Index identified Prince I. Iu. Golitsyn and Prince I. Iu. Bulgakov-Golitsyn as the same man, which also applied to Prince V. Iu.

¹⁷ Eskin, *Mestnichestvo v Rossii*, 43–79.

¹⁸ Eskin calls all participants *mestniki*, to judge from the title of a subsection of a chapter in his monograph: "*Mestniki* after the Time of Troubles" (*Ocherki istorii mestnichestva*, 98). Kollmann, *By Honor Bound*, 155, defines *mestniki* as men with equal precedence status.

¹⁹ Eskin, *Ocherki istorii mestnichestva*, 211–61.

Golitsyn but not to every Golitsyn or Bulgakov-Golitsyn. I forego repeating all Name Index errors. Such problems are endemic to working with Muscovite documents, published or unpublished. The final form of the data base on which I based my calculations is as reliable as possible without backtracking every document, which would not have been possible for archival citations.

After due diligence a sort by name produced a list of 336 individuals who were involved in precedence litigation during Ivan's reign. Even for a reign of 54 years, that number ranks as relatively high, all the more so in light of the consideration that the bureaucrats (*d'iaki*) in the Registry Bureau (*Razriadnyi prikaz*) undoubtedly took precedence into account in making military and civilian office assignments and in assigning roles in ceremonies such as weddings and diplomatic receptions.

My primary object was to determine to what social class (or classes) men in the precedence system belonged, which was easier said than done. Very few records mention the social class of a participant by class. Moreover, I was looking for members of families. "Boyar" has two meanings in scholarship, a narrow one, the status of "boyar" in the Royal Council, which was awarded by the ruler, and a broader, generic one, the families from which boyars came. I was concerned only with the latter. Associate boyars (*okol'nichie*) were counted as boyars. I did not try to correlate the date of a precedence dispute with when a participant became a boyar, a matter which has elicited considerable disagreement among historians. Indeed I did not even attempt to determine if the individual involved ever became a boyar. All I needed to know to classify someone as "boyar" was whether *any* member of the family had become a boyar during Ivan's reign. At the same time I applied this logic to all related branches of the same family, even without confirmation, which was often available, despite the common knowledge that different branches of the same family could rise or fall in the boyar class independently of each other. For example, I applied that principle to the multiple spin-offs of Princes Obolenskies. However, despite the boyar status of the Princes Rostovskies, I found evidence that the Princes Priimkovye-Rostovskies, sometimes appearing just as the Princes Priimkovye, were not boyars. Overall, such an expansive conception of boyar undoubtedly overestimated the number of precedent litigants from the boyar class, but at the same time it strengthened the case that anyone I identified as "not boyar" was reliably not a boyar. I made no attempt to clutter up my data base or this chapter by arguing out every such identification. Of course errors in ascribing social status would affect my statistics, but they would, I hope, not impair my conclusion about the role of gentry in precedence.

The default alternative category of "not boyar" was "gentry." I counted "conciliar gentry" (no. 312) just as gentry, but that was easy. The dividing line

between boyar and gentry, it is now recognized, was not impenetrable. Vladimir Kobrin deserves much of the credit for undermining the Soviet Marxist distinction between the two. He argued that they constituted a united economic class of landowners and landholders.²⁰ However, I am not using a Marxist economic concept of class but a social one. Even here, to be sure, there was overlap. A boyar clan could “fall out of” precedence because they fell out of the boyar class, either by dying out entirely, by not producing sons, by royal disgrace, by the forcible tonsuring of all males to preclude the continuation of the line, and, finally, by deliberate extermination at the order of the Terrible Tsar. Gentry clans could “rise” to precedence by becoming boyar, by royal favor, or royal marriage. In the sources the son of a boyar who had not yet been promoted to boyar is usually labeled as gentry (*syn boiarskii*). Nevertheless in social terms the overlap of the two social classes does not equate to their amalgamation. For my purposes that technically accurate characterization of a son of a boyar not yet elevated to boyar office as gentry does not work because such a man belongs to a boyar family. I seriously doubt that anyone in the Moscow Kremlin failed to draw a powerful distinction between a son of a boyar not yet a boyar, called gentry, and the son of a gentry man from a family that did not produce boyars, although one would be hard pressed to document such an inference. Confirming that gentry were gentry sometimes approaches the impossible, because so many gentry are mentioned so rarely in the surviving sources. I leave a definitive prosopographical analysis of both the boyars and the gentry in my data to more knowledgeable hands with greater access than I possess to published and unpublished documents.

Based upon social class, I have produced two appendices, each in alphabetical order by (transliterated) family name, of members of the boyar class (appendix 7.1), and members of the gentry class (appendix 7.2) involved in precedence litigation in order to evaluate the quantity of non-boyars, if any, in the precedence system. Of the 336 individuals in my data base, 247, or 73.5 percent, belonged to the boyar class, and 89, or 26.4 percent, belonged to the gentry (rounding accounts for the failure to account for 100 percent of the data). To avoid the possibility that these numbers are misleading because boyars accounted for a highly disproportionate percentage of the records of the data base—boyars, in higher offices, might plausibly launch far more precedence complaints than lower-status gentry—I computed the percentage of records for participants in precedence disputes from each class. As a percentage of records boyars constituted only a slightly higher percentage than of individuals: 597 out of 782 records for 76.3 percent, as compared to 185 gentry for 23.6 percent. We may safely conclude that approximately one-fourth of

²⁰ V. B. Kobrin, *Vlast' i sobstvennost' v srednevekovoi Rossii (XV–XVI vv.)* (Moscow: Mysl', 1985).

unique individuals and one-fourth of the data base of all individual cases involved in precedence complaints involved gentry. It is not therefore terribly surprising that of the eight individuals who appear in the data base at least ten times, six were boyars, two were gentry, as shown in table 7.1. Percentages of eight items are worthless, but it is impossible to resist the temptation to observe that gentry supply 25 percent of the most-frequent precedence suit participants, paralleling their percentage of individuals and appearances in precedence conflicts.

Table 7.1. Individuals Involved in at Least Ten Precedence Cases

Name	Number of cases	Class
Prince M. V. Nozdrevatyĭ	12	gentry
Prince P. I. Tatev	12	boyar
Prince V. Iu. Bulgakov-Golitsyn	11	boyar
R. D. Buturlin	10	boyar
Prince I. Iu. Bulgakov-Golitsyn	10	boyar
Prince I. K. Kurliat'ev	11	boyar
I. V. Men'shoi Sheremet'ev	10	boyar
M. A. Beznin	10	gentry

Simply put, any political analysis which interprets defenders of the precedence system as exclusively boyars or aristocrats cannot be reconciled with the quantitative evidence that approximately one-quarter of the participants in precedence litigation were gentry. One might assume that boyars tended to sue other boyars or gentry, and gentry to sue other gentry, because only in exceptional circumstances could a member of the gentry win a precedence case against a boyar, but I have not coded my data to generate that sophisticated a conclusion. If three times as many boyars as gentry appear as members of the precedence system then the gentry self-interest in maintaining the system was lower than that of the boyars, all the more so because the boyars in the precedence system constituted a far higher percentage of total boyars in Muscovy than the gentry constituted of the much larger number of gentry in Muscovy, even without taking into account the problems created by the hierarchy of gentry identities discussed below. Nevertheless, gentry involvement in precedence was still substantial. Gentry who initiated precedence suits or defended themselves against precedence suits had just as much motive to oppose the abolition of the system as boyars. While putative gentry "spokesmen" such as Ivan Peresvetov might have favored opening all service careers

to talent, which would have required repealing the precedence system, we have no evidence that anyone in Muscovy during Ivan's reign, including Ivan, actively advocated so radical a step.²¹

Eskin's comment that only in the seventeenth century did "lower" provincial gentry enter the precedence system, as mentioned above, implies that earlier only "upper" gentry belonged to it. One way to explore that possibility, which is beyond the scope of the present chapter, would be extensive prosopographic research on the gentry in my data base who were involved in precedence disputes during Ivan's reign. Unfortunately the most detailed sources about gentry during this period date to the 1550s, the *Book of the Thousand* (*Tysiachnaia kniga*), which allocated Moscow-region conditional estates (*pomest'ë*) to a selected 1,000 servitors, mostly gentry, so as to facilitate their mobilization when needed, and the *Court Quire* (*Dvorovaia tetrad'*), a complicated survey of members of the royal Household or Court (*Dvor*), again, mostly gentry, but this time in a hierarchical structure, which was updated perhaps through the early 1560s, before the major spike in precedence cases during the 1570s. One could also calculate statistics for clans or families, but given the predominance of boyars, it is doubtful that such an analysis would yield particularly valuable results. At present I am inclined to reject the notion that there was some sort of genealogical "threshold" among the gentry below which gentry did not have precedence rights. Rather, I suspect that provincial gentry or even central or northwestern gentry enjoying less successful careers never rose to positions over which a precedence dispute might occur and therefore remained unmentioned in the sources. Most rank-and-file gentry cavalry served as "enlisted men," not even at the level of noncommissioned officer, and were all perceived as equal. We do not know nearly enough about sixteenth-century gentry to attempt to substantiate these suppositions.

The implications of this study of who belonged to the precedence system exceed this conclusion about the political relationship of the gentry to the system. The data inspire a considerable number of suggestive ideas about Muscovite society.

First, we need to mention who was *not* in the precedence system, at least as demonstrated by precedence cases during Ivan's reign, in order to evaluate the conception of the precedence system as defining the Muscovite political elite. By definition members of the dynasty, direct or appanage, were outside the system because they outranked everyone. Members of the dynasty were *above* precedence. Taken literally then if the precedence system defined the elite, then royals did not belong to the elite, which is counterintuitive. Equally noticeable, as mentioned in passing à propos of the 1534 incident concerning

²¹ On Peresvetov, see chap. 4.

Muscovite-Crimean diplomacy, no Chingissid in Muscovite service, even if converted and intermarried with the Muscovite elite, appears in the data base. Given the exceptional status of Chingissids in Muscovite society, that is not surprising. But neither do any non-Chingissid Tatars in Muscovite service, often given high military rank, either pro forma or real, in Muscovite field armies, appear in precedence litigation. In addition, self-evidently, no women, no clerics, no metropolitans or bishops or abbots of the leading Muscovite monasteries, or state secretaries, or select merchants (*gosty*) participated in the system. Neither Ivan Viskovatyi, sometime conciliar secretary (*dumnyi d'iak*) and keeper of the seal (*pechatnik*), nor any Stroganov, founders of a virtual colonial empire in Siberia, appear. To exclude all these people from the political elite strikes me as narrow-minded, although, to be sure, it remains impossible to know from our extant sources who originated any policy measure, let alone who exerted political influence behind the scenes.

Eskin discusses which offices were subject to precedence or would have been if they were not exempted, for example, the ceremonial bodyguards (*ryndy*),²² but I find this approach mistaken. It is true that some conception of the relative status of offices enabled their comparison for the purposes of precedence, but most of his evidence is from the seventeenth century.²³ If *ryndy* were subject to precedence it would have been because of the social status of the men who served as *ryndy*, usually youngsters in their first court service, for whom lifting precedence might make sense to enable them to start their careers without difficulty. The status of offices, however, is irrelevant to deciding if those who held that office belonged to the precedence system. Gentry man Roman Alfer'ev was "keeper-of-the-seal" and sued for precedence violations, but Ivan Viskovatyi, a bureaucrat and state secretary who was also keeper-of-the-seal, did not. This is certainly an argument from silence: if Viskovatyi did not sue and was not sued over precedence, then he did not belong to the precedence system. However, there is a much more fundamental element of sixteenth-century Muscovite society involved. The contrast of Alfer'ev and Viskovatyi illustrates the division of Muscovite society into those who had noble birth (*rodovitost'* or *znatnost'*) and those who did not. Boyars and gentry belonged to the former, and they participated in the precedence system. The quantity and quality of service of the litigant or members of his clan could affect whether he would win or lose a case, but had nothing to do with his eligibility for the precedence system. Secretaries were defined by occupation, not birth, and did not participate in the precedence system. Koll-

²² For example, Eskin, *Ocherki istorii mestnichestva*, on Ivan's ceremonial bodyguards, the *ryndy* (256–57).

²³ *Ibid.*, on treasurer and keeper-of-the-seal (285), in general (281–348).

mann recognizes that nearly everyone in Muscovy had “honor” (*chest’*) but not everyone had “place”; therefore, she argues, the best strategy in a precedence dispute was to impugn the legitimacy of one’s opponent having any “place” at all because of the slave, bureaucratic, or clerical social origin of his ancestors or even illegitimacy of birth.²⁴ Not all members of the Royal Council had precedence status. Again, Viskovatyi, a conciliar state secretary, did not. A conciliar gentry man could invoke the precedence system not because he was a member of the Royal Council, although that raised his status vis-a-vis other gentry, but because he was gentry. Office did not determine precedence eligibility, birth did. Even a lowly liaison (*pristav*) to a diplomatic envoy had a place in the precedence system (no. 351), because he was by birth gentry. It must be remembered that precedence did not regulate just office-holding, but also all ceremonial and ritual functions as well. Whose name appeared first in a state directive, even if all addressees held the same office (such as military commander, *voevoda*) was determined by precedence. For this reason I have not compiled any statistics on the offices held by the individuals in my data base, whether civilian or military. Office and rank affected who won a precedence case, not who could file a precedence complaint. Commands of the divisions of a Muscovite field army figure prominently in precedence disputes and were the object of a specific decree in 1556 not because that military rank carried precedence quality, but because only men who qualified for precedence, overwhelmingly boyars, received such assignments.

In conclusion, from precedence cases during the reign of Ivan IV we can establish that while the boyars dominated precedence procedures, they did not monopolize them. Approximately a quarter of all individuals involved in the precedence system were gentry. Gentry thus had a stake in precedence system reform, which impugns all theories addressing policies about the precedence system as pro- or anti-aristocrat. The well-born landowning and land-holding super-class of boyars and gentry, who could be called the “nobility,” did have sole rights to “place” to the exclusion of members of other social classes who lacked noble birth, even when their social status, such as leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, might have outranked nobles. One must always keep in mind that royalty was above the precedence system, so calling the boyars-gentry fusion the “elite” must be understood in context.

²⁴ Kollmann, *By Honor Bound*, 137. Kollmann uses the terms *nerodovitnye* (not well-born), and *narochitnye* (eminent), which appear in the sources to describe non-precedence and precedence-social level individuals. Kollmann claims that Muscovy lacked pasquils (ibid., 48), but Eskin’s article on seventeenth-century pasquils appeared after publication of Kollmann’s monograph: see Iu. M. Eskin, “Mestnichestvo, rodoslovtsy i ‘rodoslovnye paskvili,’” in *Ot Drevnei Rusi k Rossii novogo vremeni: Sbornik statei. K 70-letiiu Anny Leonidovny Khoroshkevich* (Moscow: Nauka, 2003), 165–78, repeated in Eskin, *Ocherki istorii mestnichestva*, 94–122.

Muscovite society during the reign of Ivan IV underwent major social change. In a traditional society not all status was inherited, some was ascribed. However, the precedence system was the preserve of inherited social status on the part of the entire landed warrior elite, a principle so strongly entrenched that even Ivan the Terrible did not attempt to abolish it.

Appendix 7.1. Boyars in Precedence Disputes during Ivan IV's Reign

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Adashev, A. F.	1	144
Basmanov, A. D.	6	64, 91, 120, 121, 135, 160
Basmanov, F. A.	2	157, 183
Bel'skii, Prince I. D.	3	131, 141, 161
Bulgakov-Golitsyn, Prince I. Iu.	10	130, 142, 174, 227, 234, 235, 243, 275, 276, 339
Bulgakov-Golitsyn, Prince Iu. M.	7	35, 45, 66, 67, 80, 84, 85
Bulgakov-Golitsyn, Prince V. Iu.	11	173, 186, 202, 212, 224, 227, 234, 288, 291, 354, 386
Bulgakov-Kurakin, Prince F. A.	1	74
Bulgakov-Kurakin, Prince G. A.	4	147, 149, 234, 340
Buturlin, A. A.	2	55, 56
Buturlin, D. A.	1	198
Buturlin, E. V.	4	346, 365, 369, 371
Buturlin, F. A.	4	220, 237, 314, 393
Buturlin, F. I.	4	117, 127, 150, 155
Buturlin, I. A.	1	199
Buturlin, I. M.	1	370
Buturlin, I. N.	1	34
Buturlin, L. A.	1	233
Buturlin, N. D.	1	110
Buturlin, R. D.	10	190, 259, 267, 278, 279, 280, 284, 285, 289, 330
Cheremisinov, D. I.	2	302, 385
Chobotov, D. A.	1	117
Chobotov, I. Ia.	2	89, 104
Dalmatov-Karpov, I. N.	1	324
Danilov, A. I.	2	125, 126
Danilov, V. D.	1	120
Dashkov, Prince A. D.	1	128
Dolgorukii, Prince G. I. Chert	2	219, 252

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Fedorov-Cheliadnin, I. P.	2	40, 133
Fomin-Golovin, M. I.	1	248
Gagarin, Prince I. D.	1	265
Gagarin, Prince I. V. Gus'	1	294
Glinskii, Prince Iu. V.	2	46, 50
Glinskii, Prince M. V.	2	107, 141
Godunov, Ia. A.	1	310
Godunov, B. F.	3	188, 262, 311
Godunov, D. I.	2	213, 334
Godunov, F. I.	1	188
Godunov, I. V.	5	287, 314, 318, 342, 343
Godunov, Ia. M.	2	189, 190
Godunov, S. V.	2	205, 391
Golitsyn, Prince A. I.	1	347
Golitsyn, Prince I. I.	1	356
Golovin, F. V.	1	210
Golovin, P. I.	4	244, 245, 286, 374
Golovin, V. V.	5	280, 301, 328, 331, 349
Gorbatyi, Prince A. B.	4	50, 70, 78, 85
Gorenskii, Prince I. V.	1	72
Iakovlia, I. P. (Khiron)	2	169, 178
Iakovlia, S. V.	2	137, 169
Iakovlia, Z. P.	1	114
Iaroslavov-Obolenskii, Prince A. I.	1	148
Iur'ev, D. R.	1	156
Iur'ev, N. R.	7	165, 181, 218, 223, 226, 228, 229
Karpov, D. F.	4	89, 104, 105, 136
Karpov, M. D.	3	222, 225, 232
Karpov, V. S. Lozhka	1	88
Karpov, V. V.	2	143, 152
Kashin, Prince	1	87
Kashin, Prince F. I.	2	112, 121
Kashin, Prince I. A. Kopyria	2	59, 64

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Kashin, Prince I. I.	1	137
Kashin, Prince Iu. I.	4	53, 58, 69, 92
Kashin, Prince M. F.	1	292
Kashin, Prince P. I.	3	54, 63, 81
Katyrev, Prince M. P.	3	306, 307, 382
Katyrev, Prince P. M.	2	339, 344
Katyrev-Rostovskii, Prince I. A.	1	97
Khilkov, Prince A. D.	2	310, 392
Khilkov, Prince D. I.	2	112, 1
Khilkov, Prince V. D.	2	238, 303
Khovanskii, Prince A. P.	7	163, 164, 196, 197, 206, 217, 236
Khvorostinin, Prince A. I.	3	284, 360, 362
Khvorostinin, Prince D. I.	5	171, 203, 240, 258, 267
Khvorostinin, Prince I. M.	1	106
Khvorostinin, Prince M. M.	1	237
Khvorostinin, Prince P. I.	3	189, 241, 260
Kolychev, G. F. Gushcha	3	349, 350, 357
Kolychev, I. A.	1	210
Kolychev, M. I.	1	126
Kriuk-Kolychev, I. F.	5	290, 320, 324, 376, 387
Kurakin, Prince A. P.	8	291, 307, 344, 345, 366, 368, 377, 381
Kurakin, Prince D. A.	1	97
Kurakin, Prince F. A.	2	86, 93
Kurakin, Prince G. A.	2	227, 269
Kurbskii, Prince A. M.	2	101, 129
Kurbskii, Prince M. M.	1	37
Kurliatev, Prince D. I.	5	74, 108, 132, 133, 142
Kurliatev, Prince I. K.	11	204, 216, 217, 253, 273, 285, 318, 337, 343, 359, 361
Kurliatev, Prince Iu. K.	1	206
Kurliatev, Prince K. I.	5	41a, 49, 52, 53, 62
Kurliatev, Prince V. K.	1	173
Kuzmin, V. Ia.	1	259

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Kvashnin, A. I.	1	110
Kvashnin, I. I.	1	264
Kvashnin, Zh. I.	1	220
Lobanov-Rostovskii, Prince I. S.	2	253, 270
Lobanov-Rostovskii, Prince P. S.	3	355, 372, 373
Lobanov-Rostovskii, Prince V. M.	2	349, 350
Lopatin-Obolenskii, Prince V. F.	1	91
Lykov, Prince F. I.	2	239, 240
Lykov, Prince I. Iu.	1	157
Lykov, Prince M. Iu.	2	23, 200, 271
Mikulinskii, Prince V. A.	2	36, 38, 45
Miliukov, A. M. Starogo	1	214
Morozov, I. G.	1	67
Morozov, M. Ia.	3	79, 119, 191
Morozov, P. I.	1	226
Morozov, P. V.	4	127, 209, 227, 229
Mstislavskii, Prince F. I.	1	306
Mstislavskii, Prince F. M.	1	38
Mstislavskii, Prince I. F.	4	84, 141, 161, 276
Mstislavskii, Prince V. I.	3	274, 275, 306
Nagoi, A. F.	2	244, 313
Nagoi, F. F.	2	230, 313
Nagoi, F. M.	1	76
Nagoi, I. G.	1	323
Nagoi, S. F.	1	313
Nemoi-Obolenskii, Prince D. I.	4	69, 81, 114, 119
Nogtev, Prince D. A.	2	273, 359
Nogtev, Prince I. S.	2	40, 57
Ochin-Pleshcheev, F. G.	1	55
Ochin-Pleshcheev, I. G.	1	98
Ochin-Pleshcheev, I. I.	2	138, 149

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Ochin-Pleshcheev, N. I.	6	180, 261, 289, 337, 360, 362
Ochin-Pleshcheev, Z. I.	2	124, 139
Odoevskii, Prince D. S.	2	97, 137
Odoevskii, Prince F. I.	1	36
Odoevskii, Prince M. N.	4	296, 327, 361, 384
Odoevskii, Prince N. R.	1	194
Okhliabinin, Prince A. P.	1	136
Okhliabinin, Prince R. V.	3	304, 305, 360
Okhliabinin, V. F.	2	39, 47
Olenkin, Prince F. A.	1	54
Paletskii, Prince A. D.	6	240, 241, 252, 255, 258, 260
Paletskii, Prince D. F.	1	77
Penkov, Prince I. V.	1	70
Peshkov-Saburov, S. D.	1	70
Pleshcheev, D. I.	2	101, 129
Pleshcheev, F. M.	3	61, 63, 64
Pleshcheev, I. D. Kolotka	4	171, 282, 283, 357
Pronskii, Prince D. D.	1	35
Pronskii, Prince P. D.	2	185
Pronskii, Prince S. D.	4	212, 224, 227, 291
Pronskii, Prince V. K.	1	345
Repnin, Prince A. V.	4	181, 197, 209, 218
Repnin, Prince M. P.	2	94, 134
Repnin, Prince P. I.	2	37, 48
Riumin-Zvenigorodskii, Prince I. A.	1	221
Romodanovskii, Prince A. M.	1	208
Saburov, A. Iu.	1	65
Saburov, B. Iu.	4	251, 269, 316, 340
Saburov, D. G	1	383
Saburov, I. F.	1	263
Saburov, I. I.	2	355, 373
Saburov, V. V.	1	195
Saburov, Z. I.	7	139, 151, 152, 153, 158, 182, 193

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Saltykov, A. E.	2	287, 289
Saltykov, D. B (Daniil)	1	149
Saburov, D. B. (Dmitrii)	1	333
Saltykov, F. I.	2	111, 154
Saltykov, I. L.	1	298
Saltykov, Ia. A.	2	169, 170
Saltykov, L. A.	1	179
Saltykov, M. G.	5	328, 329, 332, 349, 350
Saltykov, M. M. Krivoi	3	246, 310, 246
Saltykov, P. Ia.	7	311, 342, 357, 372, 373, 375, 379
Serebrianyi, Prince P. S.	5	107, 151, 164, 178, 182
Serebrianyi-Obolenskii, Prince V. S.	4	77, 79, 135, 170
Shcheniatev, Prince P. M.	5	62, 96, 97, 166a, 167
Shcherbatyi, Prince D. M.	1	268
Shcherbatyi, Prince L. O.	1	348
Shcherbatyi, Prince M. A.	8	297, 299, 309, 317, 331, 364, 365, 371
Shein, A. I.	1	175
Shein, B. V.	2	227, 228
Shein, I. D.	2	86, 93
Shemiaka-Pronskii, Prince I. V.	2	41, 78
Shemiakin-Pronskii, Prince Iu. I.	1	94
Sheremetev, F. V.	7	216, 231, 240, 252, 256, 266, 271
Sheremetev, I. V.	1	200
Sheremetev, I. V. Bol'shoi	1	160
Sheremetev, I. V. Men'shoi	10	147, 148, 149, 167, 206, 215, 226, 227, 228, 237, 239
Sheremetev, N. V.	2	138, 154
Sheremetev, S. V.	1	124
Sheremetev, V. F.	2	254, 257
Shestunov, Prince D. S.	3	119, 137, 145
Shestunov, Prince F. D.	3	341, 376, 387

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Shestunov, Prince I. D.	3	99, 264, 304
Shuiskii, Prince A. I.	3	347, 354, 356
Shuiskii, Prince I. A.	5	131, 166, 166a, 185, 243
Shuiskii, Prince I. P.	3	196, 235, 288
Shuiskii, Prince P. I.	4	82, 97, 100, 146
Shuiskii, Prince V. I.	2	327, 382
Sidorov, S. G.	1	116
Sitskii, Prince F. V.	1	188
Sitskii, Prince I. V.	7	246, 346, 360, 379, 380, 387, 388
Sitskii, Prince V. A.	7	193, 199, 225, 245, 255, 256, 262
Skopin-Shuiskii, Prince F. I.	2	44, 96
Skopin-Shuiskii, Prince V. F.	1	194
Sliznev-Eletskii, Prince I. I.	1	123
Strekailo, O. I.	1	76
Strigin-Obolenskii, Prince I. A.	1	115
Tatev, Prince A. I.	2	165, 179
Tatev, Prince F. I.	1	159
Tatev, Prince P. I.	12	134, 163, 164, 191, 215, 216, 221, 223, 226, 249, 256, 257
Teliatevskii, Prince A. P.	1	183
Teliatevskii, Prince P. I.	2	61, 97
Teliatevskii, Prince V. I.	1	268
Temkin-Rostovskii, Prince Iu. I.	7	49, 52, 80, 98, 100, 122, 146
Tokmakov, Prince I. Iu.	1	325
Tokmakov, Prince Iu. I.	2	326, 338
Trakhaniotov, I. V.	1	238
Troekurov, Prince F. I.	1	155
Troekurov, Prince F. M.	4	203, 204, 207, 334
Troekurov, Prince I. M.	1	88
Trubetskoi, Prince F. M.	2	174, 386
Tuchkov, Prince M. M.	1	106

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Turuntai-Pronskii, Prince I. I.	6	41, 96, 122, 132, 162, 166
Turuntai-Pronskii, Prince I. P.	1	44
Umnyi-Kolychev, F. I.	1	195
Umnyi-Kolychev, I. I.	1	71, 73, 75
Umnyi-Kolychev, V. I.	5	143, 156, 180, 213, 214
Volynskii, I. G.	1	163
Voronogo-Volynskii, M. I.	1	128
Vorontsov, F. S. Demid	3	39, 47, 65
Vorontsov, I. M.	2	56, 121
Vorontsov, I. S.	2	57, 58
Vorontsov, M. S.	1	34
Vorontsov, V. F.	1	205
Vorotynskii, Prince A. I.	2	108, 162
Vorotynskii, Prince I. I.	1	377
Vorotynskii, Prince I. M.	3	366, 367, 368
Vorotynskii, Prince M. I.	6	62, 82, 97, 186, 194, 202
Vorotynskii, Prince V. I.	2	66, 96
Ziuzin, V. G	4	230, 286, 312, 352
Zvenigorodskii, Prince A. D.	1	353

Appendix 7.2. Gentry in Precedence Disputes during Ivan IV's Reign

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Aksakov, Iu. I.	2	292, 293
Aksakov, S. A.	1	150
Alabyshev, Prince S. F.	1	48
Alfer'ev, R. V.	8	177, 192, 208, 312, 313, 374, 389, 394
Apraksin, A. P.	1	172
Bakhteiarov, Prince V. I.	3	290, 320, 321
Barbashin-Suzdal'skii, Prince V. I.	1	141
Bariatinskii, Prince I. M.	4	172, 301, 364, 390
Bariatinskii, Prince M. F.	1	222
Beznin, M. A.	10	168, 247, 308, 309, 335, 336, 348, 352, 385, 390
Bobrishchev-Pushkin, V.	1	293
Borisov, V. P.	1	71
Borisov-Borozdin, N. V.	2	99, 198
Borisov-Zverev, M. V.	1	99
Buinosov, Prince I. I.	1	123
Buinosov, Prince P. I.	1	340
Buinosov, Prince V. I.	2	251, 316
Bukharin-Naumov, I. I.	1	184
Bulgak-Bariatinskii, Prince A. G.	1	116
Drovnin, V. G.	1	140
Drutskii, Prince F. S.	1	358
Elchaninov, I. E.	1	302
Eletskii, Prince D. P.	2	232, 261
Eletskii, Prince I. M.	1	363
Elizarov-Gusev, D. A.	1	315
Gribakin, S. G.	1	60
Gvozdev, O. F.	1	177
Izmailov, A. Ia.	2	351, 363
Kanbarov, Prince I. U.	2	164, 175
Karamyshev, M. F.	1	60
Koledinskii, G. P.	3	319, 322, 353

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Koltovskii, A. I.	1	300
Koretskii, Prince B. D.	1	42
Kriukov, A. T.	1	351
Krivoborskii, Prince F. I.	1	321
Krivoborskii, Prince V. I.	1	266
Kubenskii, Prince I. I.	1	51
Laskirev, F. M.	5	236, 238, 391, 392, 393
Laskirev, M. D.	1	109
Leont'ev, Iu. P.	2	300, 394
Litvinov-Mosal'skii, Prince V. V.	1	192
Mashutkin-Borisov, V. M.	1	72
Meshchaninov-Morozov, G. I.	6	295, 325, 326, 338, 341, 360
Meshcherskii, Prince G. F.	3	92, 136, 207
Mikhalkov, A. T.	1	378
Nashchokin, G. Z.	2	301, 302
Naumov, Ia. A.	1	265
Nogotkov, Prince I. A.	5	296, 367, 381, 383, 384
Nozdrevaty, Prince M. V.	12	250, 277, 280, 282, 301, 303, 331, 332, 346, 364, 365, 369
Obliazov-Vel'iaminov, N. I.	1	75
Polev, G. O.	1	176
Polev, O. V.	2	111, 144
Polivanov, K. D.	2	176, 184
Priimkov-Rostovskii, Prince A. M.	6	298, 299, 308, 317, 348, 358
Priimkov-Rostovskii, Prince B. A.	1	42
Priimkov-Rostovskii, Prince D. M. Drygan	2	277, 281
Priimkov-Rostovskii, Prince I. F. Gvozď	1	158
Priimkov-Rostovskii, Prince N. I.	1	242
Prozorovskii, Prince A. I.	2	145, 159
Prozorovskii, Prince F. A.	1	69

Name	Count of records	Eskin register nos.
Prozorovskii, Prince I. A. Lugvitsa	2	41a, 46
Prozorovskii, Prince M. F.	2	115, 155
Punkov-Mikulinskii, Prince S. I.	1	52
Pushkin, E. M.	5	247, 272, 294, 295, 378
Pushkin, I. M.	1	336
Snazin, F. G.	1	43
Sugorskii, Prince Z. I.	3	270, 272, 299
Tiufiakin, Prince M. V.	7	231, 247, 248, 250, 252, 258, 260
Tiufiakin, Prince V. V.	5	219, 279, 323, 380, 388
Tiumenskii, Prince V. A.	2	254, 375
Trostenskii, Prince O. T.	1	59
Turenin, Prince I. S.	6	278, 281, 283, 329, 330, 370
Turenin, Prince M. S.	2	325, 338
Turenin, Prince V. P. Musa	3	304, 305, 333
Ushatyi, Prince V. V. Chulok	1	51
Vel'iaminov, D. I.	2	242, 315
Velikii-Gagin, Prince V. A.	1	73
Viazemskii, Prince D. I.	1	168
Vnukov, M. I.	1	335
Volkonskii, Prince A. R.	2	319, 322
Zabolotskii, G. I.	1	43
Zagriazhskii, A. F.	2	319, 322
Zaitsev-Birdiukin, P. V.	2	87, 140
Zalupa-Okhliabinin, Prince I. P.	1	203
Zamytskii, D. A.	2	297, 319
Zasekin, Prince B. P.	1	389
Zlobin, P. S.	1	125

Chapter 8

Fractious Families and Foreign Slaves in Muscovite Society

Some generalizations about Muscovite society during the reign of Ivan IV are not wrong, but do require qualification. Muscovite society was complex. For example, it is true that Muscovite society was hierarchical; each class stood in a position of superiority or inferiority to each other class. However, all, but especially elite, classes also possessed internal hierarchies that ranked different “sub-classes” in a social pyramid.¹ Therefore historians who express conclusions about “the” boyars when they mean the boyars who served the tsar, would do well to clarify what they mean. This chapter will qualify two generalizations about sixteenth-century Muscovite society, the first, that elite landed society was dominated by cohesive, united clans who functioned collectively to advance family interests, and the second, that Muscovite slaves were almost entirely native-born. Much further research on Muscovite society during Ivan’s reign needs to be done before historians will have an adequate understanding of its structure in all its diversity.

Part I. Family Are Not Friends: Intra-Familial Disharmony

Much recent research on Muscovite society, particularly about the boyars, the highest social class and the best documented, has utilized the concept of clan (*rod*)² as the framework of analysis. Clans were united social entities that pursued collective political goals. Membership in the Royal Council (Duma) depended upon genealogical seniority within one’s clan. If a member of a clan accepted a service position in military or diplomatic service or a ceremonial position at a wedding lower than that of a member of a rival clan of lesser “honor” (*chest’*), then, according to the precedence (*mestnichestvo*) system, the entire clan was affected. Marriages within the boyar class pursued clan pur-

¹ Charles J. Halperin, “Hierarchy of Hierarchies: Muscovite Society during the Reign of Ivan IV,” *Russian History* 44, 4 (2017): 570–84.

² *Rod* might also be translated as lineage.

poses.³ Donations to monasteries to fund memorial prayers for relatives defined the extent of the “family” in financial, spiritual, and practical terms.⁴ The same attitudes and practices also applied to the gentry (*deti boiarskie*), far more numerous but not nearly as well documented.⁵

This paradigm presumes clan solidarity; a clan whose members feuded with each other could hardly effectively pursue collective goals. Certainly one would be hard-pressed to deny that members of royal families did not always get along. In England Queen Mary Tudor managed to restrain herself from executing her half-sister, the future Queen Elizabeth I, who in turn ultimately could not restrain herself from executing her first cousin once removed, Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots.⁶ King Johann III of Sweden ascended the throne by overthrowing his brother, King Erik XIV. Ivan IV eventually ordered the death of his first cousin, Prince Vladimir Andreevich. French royals merely let rival religious factions in civil wars assassinate each other. A Muscovite case involving Ivan IV’s grandfather, Grand Prince Ivan III, will be mentioned below. However, boyar and gentry clans seem to have a much better record on this score. To be sure, “high” politics could wreck havoc with even boyar clan solidarity. Two examples from Ivan’s reign stand out. Prince Semen Bel’skii defected to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (from whence the Bel’skie had migrated to Muscovy) and led a Lithuanian army that conquered Muscovite Gomel’ and then advised the Crimean Khan, whilst his brother Prince Dmitrii was part of the government in Moscow responsible for Muscovy’s defense.

³ Nancy Shields Kollmann, *Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987); Kollmann, *By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Russell E. Martin, *A Bride for the Tsar: Bride-Shows and Marriage Politics in Early Modern Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012).

⁴ Ludwig Steindorff, “Wer sind die Meinen? Individuum und Memorialkultur im frühneuzeitlichen Rußland,” in *Das Individuum und die Seinen: Individualität in der okzidentalen und in der russischen Kultur in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit*, ed. Yuri L. Bessmertny and Otto Gerhard Oxle (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 231–58; Steindorff, “Memorial Practice as a Means of Integrating the Muscovite State,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 55 (2007): 517–33; Liudvig Shtaindorf [Ludwig Steindorff], “Kto moi blizhnye? Individui kul’tura pominoveniia v Rossii rannego novogo vremeni,” trans. I. A. Ivanov, in *Chelovek i ego blizkie na Zapade i Vostoke (do nachala novogo vremeni)*, ed. Iurii Bessmertnyi and Otto Gerhard Eksle [Otto Gerhard Oxle] (Moscow: Institut vseobshchei istorii RAN, 2000), 208–39.

⁵ Valerie A. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).

⁶ Mary Stuart’s grandmother, Margaret Tudor, was Henry VIII’s sister, so Mary Stuart’s father, James V, was Elizabeth’s first cousin, and Mary Stuart was Elizabeth’s first cousin once removed.

Obviously individual goals played a major role in Semen's travails.⁷ During the *oprichnina* the boyar Kolychev clan provided *oprichniki* and their victims, including the former Fedor Kolychev, by then Metropolitan of Moscow (head of the Russian Orthodox Church) Filipp, who was removed from office and later murdered. However, court politics lies outside the scope of this chapter.

Rather than the effect of such political machinations upon clan solidarity, I am interested in more mundane affairs in which motives less cosmic than political power intruded into family and clan behavior, everyday concerns with personal relations and, of course, property, which often creates family tensions. Of course Muscovite families and clans very often engaged in collective economic activities. Parents and children, siblings, uncles and nephews, cousins all jointly bought, sold, and mortgaged landed estates. Divisions of opinion over property ownership and boundaries occasioned by testamentary inheritance were quite often settled by "amicable" (*pobiubovno*) legal action, articulated in a "business document" (*delovaia gramota*). Frequently, neutral parties or local experts were called in to verify geographic boundaries, in which case the document would be a "boundary demarcation charter" (*raz"ezzhaia gramota*).⁸ Obviously such a formal step must have been necessitated by some conflict, but those divisive forces were successfully managed. Even so, these charters specified impressively high fines on any party to the agreement who violated or contested it, 100 rubles, or even 500 rubles. Such massive deterrence implies some suspicion about what might or would happen in the absence of such penalty clauses.⁹ On the other hand, individual sales, in particular, habitually contained a clause that other members of the family, either close or distant, had no grounds for contesting the transaction (*dela net*). This legal precaution, plausibly enough, might sometimes have been somewhat more than a formality, but, again, such legal provisions regulated and defused the situation. However, sometimes, perhaps we could say only rarely, even the desire of families and clans not to air their dirty linen in public so as to protect their reputation, status, political influence, and wealth was not strong enough to deter documentary evidence of disharmony. Perhaps

⁷ Hartmut Rüss, "Dmitrij F. Bel'skij," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 38 (1986): 168–84.

⁸ Not all boundary-settlement charters were "amicable," nor did they all declare that they were "amicable," although most did. For a black (state) peasant–gentry boundary settlement charter that did not pretend to be amicable, see *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka: Sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1997), no. 64, 54, 5 December 1553–31 August 1554 (7042).

⁹ *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, no. 235, 1: 238, 1551–52 (7060), 100 ruble fine; A. V. Antonov, "Kostromskie monastyri v dokumentakh XVI–nachala XVII veka," *Russkii diplomatarii* 7 (2001): no. 18, 83–84, 1563/1564 (7072), 500 ruble fine.

clan members would have expressed their antagonisms more freely in private sources, but no memoirs or personal letters survive, so we have only public sources at our disposal.

We now turn to the evidence that family and clan life in sixteenth-century Muscovy was not quite perfect. We shall discuss disputes over a widowed stepmother's choice of where to reside; disputes, including formal litigation, among relatives and clan members over immovable property; a dispute over moveable property seemingly between a grandmother, her son-in-law, and her grandsons; and, finally, three disputes in which widows were evicted from the widow's portion of conditional landed estates by relatives.

An Unwelcome Stepmother

The text of the 1543–44 (7052) testament (*dukhovnaia gramota*) of Grigorii Mikhailovich Valuev seems standard enough.¹⁰ It begins by vouching for the testator's sound mind, lists what he owed to others and what others owed him, details various donations to religious institutions of a quantity suggestive of relative prosperity, mentions a prior agreement (*riadnaia gramota*) on what gifts he had given to his wife Marfa, and enumerates his gifts to his two sons, Fedor and Ivan, who were named as executors. Valuev's spiritual father (*dukhovnyi otets*) witnessed the testament. On the back of the original manuscript of the document are codicils written after the testament had been probated. This is where the document turns into a soap opera. In a codicil the widow Marfa acknowledged receipt of her dowry and everything else due her according to the prior agreement, all very neat and proper. Then comes the bombshell. Marfa also accepts money, 25 rubles (*pol-tridsat' rublev*) **not** [my emphasis—CJH] to live with her stepsons (*pasynki*), which entails that she not reside on their patrimonial estates (*votchiny*) or their conditional estates (*pomest'ia*), or even in the Valuev "court" (*dvor*, compound) in Moscow, along with a promise not to contest the will. Marfa's brother, Mikita Vasil'ev syn Ivanov, signed the testament in her place.¹¹

I do not know enough about the Valuev clan to produce a genealogy of Grigorii Dmitrievich's line. In the fourteenth century the Valuevs were bo-

¹⁰ *Akty feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia i khoziaistva* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1956), no. 176, 2: 169–73.

¹¹ A testament, datable only to the 1530s–50s, noted that the testator's eldest son, Andrei, did not reside in the same hamlet as his stepmother. The testator obviously thought that this residential disconnect of stepmother and son was significant enough to mention but provided no explanation for it. O. E. Kosheleva, "Dukhovnaia Timofeia Busurmenova vtoroi chetverti XVI veka," *Russkii diplomatarii* 7 (2001): 251–57, text of document, 255–57. Kosheleva does not comment on the stepmother-son relationship.

yars, but by the beginning of the sixteenth century had fallen into the gentry. Stepan Veselovskii notes that their legendary clan founder, Okatii Vol or Val, supposedly migrated from Lithuania. The Valuevs owned property in the Novgorod region. He identifies a Grigorii Mikhailovich Mesha Valuev who lived in the first half of the sixteenth century, presumably our testator, but apparently Veselovskii did not have access to the testament. Mesha Valuev witnessed documents of members of the Vel'iaminov clan. Dmitrii's younger brother, Ivan Mikhailovich, served Novgorod's St. Sophia Cathedral.¹² Sergei Kisterev published a 20 February 1554 (7062) Ivan IV immunity charter to Pimen, Archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov, for a village donated to the archbishopric by its majordomo, Ivan Mikhailov syn Valuev, on the condition that Pimen pay Ivan Mikhailov syn Valuev's 100 rubles debt. If Pimen did not meet this condition, then the Kirillo-Belozero Monastery could have the village, or Ivan's brothers or close clan members could acquire it for 400 rubles, and distant clan members for 500 rubles.¹³ This would fit Grigorii Mikhailovich's younger brother identified by Veselovskii. The editor of the anthology containing Grigorii Mikhailovich's testament identified a brother named Andrei who served from Borovsk and Staritsa, while Grigorii himself served from Staritsa. Two additional documents in the same anthology record a purchase of a share of a hamlet in Staritsa in 1527–29 and purchase of another hamlet in Staritsa for 16 rubles.¹⁴ Semen Kisterev also published a donation charter of a village in Moscow district to the Moscow Chudov Monastery from March 1571 by the executors of the testament of Fedor Stepanovich Valuev.¹⁵ The relationship of Fedor Stepanovich to Grigorii Mikhailovich is unclear, but obviously from the patronymic, this is not Grigorii Mikhailovich's son Fedor. This unsystematic information does not allow us to recreate Grigorii Mikhailovich's marital history. From the silence of the testament we can only infer that his first wife died, leaving two sons. Prince Mikhail Ivanov syn Vоротynskii added codicils to his June 1566 testament specifying that his second wife Elena Fedorovna Tateva should receive only the property he had given her, comparable to Grigorii Mikhailovich's treatment of his second wife, but added that if she gave birth to a son, that son would share equally with his sons from his first marriage. (As it happens, she did not leave any sons and

¹² Stepan Borisovich Veselovskii, *Issledovaniia po istorii klassa sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 230–36.

¹³ S. N. Kisterev, "Chastnyi sluchai rodovogo vykupa v seredine XVI veka," *Russkii diplomatarii* 3 (1998): 77–79.

¹⁴ *Akty feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia i khoziaistva*, vol. 2, no. 109, 103; no. 121, 112–13.

¹⁵ S. N. Kisterev, "Akty moskovskogo Chudova monastyria 1507–1606," *Russkii diplomatarii* 9 (2003): 191–93.

predeceased her husband.)¹⁶ The absence of any such provision in Grigorii Mikhailovich's testament permits the inference that his second wife gave him no additional children.

Eve Levin observes that remarriage set up rivalry between the children of the first marriage and their stepmother and half-siblings. The didactic collection *The Bee (Pchela)* warns that a "second marriage is the beginning of war and rebellion."¹⁷ In our case there could be no rivalry between half-siblings, but surely the codicil on Marfa's residence as a widow suggests that her stepsons had no desire to cohabit with her. They were more than willing to buy her off to live elsewhere, presumably on estates their father had settled on her. Excluding her from various provincial allodial and conditional Valuev estates was one thing; depriving her of even a guest house to stay at while visiting Moscow seems to be a deliberate snub.

We have no reason to infer that Marfa was a wicked stepmother. We know only that she was a stepmother.¹⁸ There is nothing in the documents even vaguely approaching the most famous case of bad blood between stepmother and steprelatives, but then, stepsiblings were involved, not to mention royal succession. Ivan III's second wife, Sofiia Paleologina, niece of the last reigning Byzantine emperor, and her son, the future grand prince, Vasiliï III, plotted to assassinate Ivan III's grandson Dmitrii "the Grandson" (*vnuk*), son of his deceased son Ivan "the Younger" (*Molodoi*) by Ivan III's first wife, Mariia Borisovna from Tver', along with Ivan "the Younger's" widow, Elena "the Wallachian" (*volshanka*, actually from Moldavia).

Certainly the fact that Marfa had no sons significantly lessened the impact of the less than amicable relations between her and her stepsons on the fortunes of the Valuev clan, but this fascinating episode, all too tersely conveyed in a codicil to a testament, illustrates that ill-will could be found in a Muscovite family and clan if a male had engaged in serial monogamy.

¹⁶ *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Drevnekhранилище, 2002), no. 86, 72–77.

¹⁷ Eve Levin, *Sex and Society in the World of the Orthodox Slavs, 900–1700* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 113.

¹⁸ Daniel H. Kaiser, "'Whose Wife Will She Be at the Resurrection?' Marriage and Remarriage in Early Modern Russia," *Slavic Review* 62 (2003): 302–23, deals with remarriage as it affects wives but does not examine steprelationships.

Disputes over Land

An 18 September 1541 decree by Ivan IV delegated an official to investigate a lawsuit between Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Volkonskii and Princess Mar'ia, widow of Prince Potula Volkonskii, from a gentry clan. The former claimed that the latter was intruding on the patrimony that he had inherited from his father.¹⁹ Members of the same clan could easily possess contiguous estates, particularly in whatever region qualified as its nest. Prince Potula Volkonskii may be identified as Prince Ipat-Potul Volkonskii or Prince Ivan Vasil'evich Potul Volkonskii, who supposedly died in 1541, which fits the chronology if the lawsuit arose soon after his death, but it is impossible to trace the genealogical relationship between him and Prince Ivan Dmitrievich as they seem to belong to different branches of the Volkonskii clan.²⁰ Nine other Volkonskie appear in the registers; Dmitrii Volkonskii could be Ivan Dmitrievich Volkonskii's father; Fedor Potulov Volkonskii should be Potula Volkonskii's son, but this does not resolve the connection between Ivan Dmitrievich and Potula.

It is probably no more than coincidence that this intrafamilial dispute, which rose to the level of a formal law suit—meaning one or both of the parties petitioned Ivan IV to intervene—was between a man and a widow, as with the Valuevs, because property disputes could easily arise between male relatives too.

A less than entirely amicable boundary dispute produced an affidavit of obligation (*zapis'-obiazatel'stvo*) in 1578/1579 (7087) between Avdei Vasil'ev syn and Andrei Alekseev syn Farafonovye and their "brothers" (meaning cousins, *dvoiurodnye brat'ia*) Timofei, Efrem, and Andrei Obyshkinnye deti Farafonovye on a newly established land boundary on conditional land in Mtsensk district. The gentry Farafonovy parties had to swear not to assault (*nasil'stvo*) each other's shares of farmland, not to intrude by plowing arable land or cutting hay, and not to destroy boundary markers. A 50 ruble fine awaited any party to the agreement who violated it.²¹ The list of potential violations is so specific, although such incursions were hardly rare (cutting timber occurs elsewhere, but not here) that one suspects such intrusions had already occurred in the dispute between the cousins. Moreover, the word "amicably" (*poliubovno*) is conspicuously absent in the document.

Another land dispute among gentry cousins, or at least members of the same clan, also led to a formal trial, but in this case we have a judgment char-

¹⁹ *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, no. 43, 1: 39–40.

²⁰ *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 13, 62, 91 refer to "Potul Volkonskii" without the status of "prince."

²¹ *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, no. 447, 3: 369–70.

ter (*pravaia gramota*) with the court's verdict. On 15 April 1560 (7068) trial was held on the lawsuit of Vasilii and Nikita Ugriumovye deti Korzliny against Aleksei Semenov syn Korzlin over land in Kostroma district. At issue was disputed hamlets or shares of land supposedly mortgaged (*zaklad*) by the latter to the former; the land had previously been inherited by nephews from their uncle. The plaintiffs claimed that they were willing to pay the loan back and reacquire title to the land, but the defendant refused to accept payment and therefore to turn over the land to the plaintiffs. The litigants not only offered to kiss the cross to affirm their testimony, but also to engage in a judicial duel. The court found no evidence of a mortgage and ruled in favor of the defendants.²²

Even though at this time, it has been argued, offering to fight a judicial duel was a formality, a legal fiction, because no judicial duel would be fought, so willingness to fight a duel was merely a sufficient warrant of one's sincerity,²³ nevertheless even offering to duel a relative is a barometer of the level of animosity between members of the same clan. Both parties to the dispute declared that they were ready to engage in potentially lethal combat with each other over a property dispute.

Brotherly love was conspicuously absent in the relations between Feodosei and Grigor'ii, sons of Boris Bachmanov, conditional land estates (*pomest'e*) holders in the Bezhetskaia "fifth" (*piatina*) of the Novgorod region. In a series of petitions from 1573 to 1576 Feodosei charged that while he was away in Korela on military service, his brother Grigor'ii had colluded unfairly with local officials assigned to distribute their late father's holding, as a result of which Feodosei received the worst sections, including abandoned and deserted settlements, in widely separated locales, all in violation of the guidelines sent from Moscow to govern the procedure. Feodosei asked the central government to redress this inequity.²⁴ The documentation does not reveal the resolution of this gentry family dispute. Indeed, we do not even have Grigor'ii's reply to his estranged brother's accusations. However, this case demonstrates that even though technically gentry could not own conditional land estates, which were state property to be allocated at state discretion, gentry could still engage in personal conflicts over access to such resources.

²² *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladet'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, no. 116, 1: 87–93.

²³ George G. Weickhardt, "Muscovite Judicial Duels as Legal Fiction," *Kritika* 7, 4 (2006): 714–32.

²⁴ Janet Martin, "The Bachmanov Brothers' Petitions: A Window into the Pomest'e System in the 1570s," *Russian History* 44, 4 (2017): 540–42, citing D. Ia. Samokvasov, ed., *Arkhivnyi material: Novootkrytye dokumenty pomestno-votchinnykh uchrezhdenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva XV–XVII stoletii* (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1905), 112–17.

A Dispute over Jewelry

In her 1563–64 (7072) testament, Evfrosin'ia, widow of gentry man Danilo Timofeevich Vel'iaminov, declared that her son-in-law (*ziat'*) Nelub Zacheslonskii and her grandsons had taken her ruby or sapphire earrings (*sergi iakonty*), worth 50 rubles, given to her son Ivan by his father and her husband, Danilo Timofeevich. Evfrosin'ia donated several hamlets to the Trinity-Ipat'ev Monastery. She stipulated that if her grandsons wanted those hamlets, they had to pay 50 rubles for the earrings to the monastery for them.²⁵

Ziat' can mean father-in-law or brother-in-law, but son-in-law makes the most sense here because the man is paired with Evfrosin'ia's grandsons. Presumably Nelub Zacheslonskii was married to Evfrosin'ia's daughter, who does not appear in the testament. I infer that the daughter was deceased. A similar assumption can be made about Ivan Danilovich, Evfrosin'ia's son, who had received the earrings from his father, because if he had been alive, presumably he would have taken steps himself to secure the return of the earrings.

A famous dispute in the history of the Muscovite dynastic house took place over a similar woman's accessory, a family heirloom golden belt, of intrinsic material and artistic value, no doubt, but of even greater symbolic significance. The belt played a major role in launching a decades-long dynastic war in mid-fifteenth-century Muscovy.²⁶

Richard Hellie observes that in the seventeenth century earrings could be worth from a few kopecks to a thousand rubles,²⁷ so there are no grounds to suspect that Evfrosin'ia had inflated the value of the jewelry. Obviously Evfrosin'ia was a woman of some means and some will; she donated landed property to a monastery and issued her own testament. It is not clear how she had or would have disposed of the earrings. A gift from a father to a son of women's jewelry suggests that they were intended for a daughter-in-law, but the testament makes no mention of such a person, or of any woman to whom her (widowed) son-in-law or (unmarried?) grandsons (too young? but not too young to be named as family criminals in the testament) had given them or intended to give them. Conceivably Evfrosin'ia could have brought a lawsuit against her son-in-law and grandsons for theft, but she did not. Her goal was not the physical return of the earrings to her, possibly because she had no one else to whom to give them, and/or she was writing a testament in antic-

²⁵ Antonov, "Kostromskie monastyri," no. 17, 81–83.

²⁶ Cherie Woodworth, "Sophia and the Golden Belt: What Caused Moscow's Civil War of 1425–50?" *Russian Review* 68 (2009): 187–98.

²⁷ Richard Hellie, *The Economy and Material Culture of Russia 1600–1725* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 179.

ipation of her own demise, sooner or later. But the injustice of the actions of her family members—I would emphasize, nuclear family members, including her own grandsons, not some in-laws or more distant clan members—rankled her enough for her to seek compensation, if monetary, in her own way. The provision of the testament only makes sense if Evfrosin'ia knew that her son-in-law and grandsons wanted the hamlets that she was donating to the Trinity-Ipat'ev Monastery. The identity of the value of the earrings, 50 rubles, and the fee to redeem the donated hamlets, 50 rubles, was no coincidence, as she explicitly declares: the 50 rubles for the hamlets is the cost of the earrings. It would be churlish not to congratulate Evfrosin'ia on the clever but hardly subtle method she conceived for punishing her son-in-law and grandsons and getting her revenge.

Evicting Widows

Janet Martin has uncovered three incidents of intrafamilial land disputes over widows' portions of conditional landed estates (*pomest'ia*) during Ivan IV's reign. Okulina, the widow of Soshka Evsiukin, was granted a widow's portion for three years, instead of the common tenure for life (or until tonsure or remarriage). She continued to live on that land after the expiration of the three years in 1544, but in 1555 her nephews, sons of Tret'iak Evsiukin, who had received portions of their uncle's estate, evicted her. As a result of a petition on her behalf by her son, some of this land was restored to her, until her death, tonsure, or remarriage, after which it would revert to her nephews.²⁸

In the second case, a slave of a five-year old boy Timoshka, son of Tikhomir Pushkin, in a petition filed in 1555, explained that after Tikhomir's father, Iurii Pushkin, died at Kazan', he, his widowed mother, and other children had been granted a conditional estate, but Timoshka's uncles had evicted him and his family. The government restored the estate to him.²⁹

In the final instance, when Orina, wife of Oleksandr Ushakov, became a widow, her two sons, Ivashko and Verigia, instead of supporting her according to their father's wishes, evicted her from her home. Upon the 1556 petition

²⁸ Janet Martin, "The Pomest'e System as a Means of Support for Women in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy," in *Novye napravleniia i rezul'taty v rusistike/New Directions and Results in Russistics*, ed. Gyula Szvák (Budapest: Magyar Ruzsisztika Intézet, 2005), 70, citing *Dopolneniia k Aktam istoricheskim, sobrannia i izdannia Arkheograficheskoiu Kommissiei* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia II otdeleniia Sobstvennoi EIV kantseliarii, 1846), vol. 1, no. 52.12, 96–97.

²⁹ Janet Martin, "Pomest'e System," 70, citing *Dopolneniia k Aktam istoricheskim*, vol. 1, no. 52.10, 94–95.

of her grandson Prince Fedorets, son of Prince Mikhail Lobanov-Rostovskii (obviously via a daughter), she received some land until her tonsure or death.³⁰

Of course I have discussed only a handful of cases. No matter how many similar episodes or comparable cases of intrafamilial and intraclan disputes could be found in a more extensive search of published documents, let alone archival documents, they would almost certainly still constitute anomalies compared to the hundreds of counter-cases of friendly moveable and immoveable property division within families and perhaps thousands of cases of mutually beneficial joint economic activities by family and clan members. However, it is the qualitative, not quantitative, import of these nine incidents of disharmony that merits discussion, because they prove that *all* Muscovite families and clans did not function together flawlessly. Some Muscovite family and clan members, despite the social norms that governed their behavior, when valuable property of some sort was involved or interpersonal relations intruded into the equation, were more vulnerable than others to the foibles and vices, especially greed, endemic to the human comedy and common to family members everywhere and always.

The noise of high politics in Muscovy during the reign of Ivan IV, capped by the sound and fury of the “terrible tsar” himself, can all too easily drown out the sound of everyday people at the time who were no better, and certainly no worse (definitely not “born to slavery”), than anyone else, neither saints of Holy Rus’ nor devils of a “rude and barbarous kingdom,” living out their lives in ways not so different than anywhere else, with the same very human weaknesses as their contemporaries. Exceptions to the generalization of clan solidarity among the elite landed clans in Muscovy not only qualify our understanding of how Muscovite society functioned, but also humanize the people who lived in Muscovy at the time.

Part II. Foreign Slaves

Historians have studied Muscovite slavery, *inter alia* during the reign of Ivan IV, fairly extensively.³¹ However, these studies pay much more attention to native-born Muscovite slaves than to slaves acquired in warfare, captives or prisoners-of-war, although they do not ignore captive slaves altogether. Of course some captives, primarily members of the elite, were ransomed or exchanged for Muscovite captives, but commoners were not worth ransoming

³⁰ Janet Martin, “Pomest’e System,” 71, citing *Dopolneniia*, vol. 1, no. 52.28, 109–10.

³¹ The two major secondary works are Evgeniia Ivanovna Kolycheva, *Kholopstvo i krepostnichestvo (konets XV–XVI v.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1971); and Richard Hellie, *Slavery in Russia 1450–1725* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

or exchanging. Although it may be assumed that the overwhelming majority of Muscovite slaves were native-born, to some extent that conclusion merely reflects surviving documentation. The predominant form of slavery in Muscovy during the second half of the sixteenth century was "limited service contract slavery" (*kabal'noe kholopstvo*), in which free people in effect sold themselves into slavery, borrowing money they never paid back. This transaction required a written contract (*kabala*), which had to be registered with a government office. The documentation thus produced provides invaluable evidence about limited-service contract slaves, although most surviving documents date to after Ivan's reign. Captive slaves did not enter such arrangements except as female spouses of male Russians who did so; my data includes three such cases. Therefore unsystematic references to captive slaves can only be extracted from a variety of sources. As a result, the "real number [of captive slaves] is substantially greater than what the extant records tell us."³² I will not question here the dominant conclusions in the historiography about captive slaves: that their numbers varied with Muscovite military successes, that women outnumbered men, and that Muscovites enslaved captives regardless of religious affiliation. However, we will adduce circumstantial evidence to suggest that not only was the quantity of captive foreign slaves in Muscovy higher than is generally believed, but that the captive slaves had a qualitative impact that has not been properly appreciated. Therefore our understanding of Muscovite slavery as a whole requires modification.

Some preliminary comments are in order about two of Richard Hellie's most significant conclusions about Muscovite slavery. First, Hellie called attention to the fact that Muscovites invented no mythological genealogies ascribing a different ethnic origin to native-born Muscovite slaves, a phenomenon he variously considered unique, merely rare, or "quite exceptional" among slave-owning societies."³³ Second, Hellie concluded that Muscovite slavery, including limited-service contract slavery, served as a social welfare institution in Muscovy, a safety net for those who would otherwise have perished for lack of adequate support from charity or kinship systems.³⁴ Curiously, I do not think that Hellie ever connected these two conclusions conceptually; it seems unlikely that anyone would invent a slavery system as a form of welfare for slaves if a majority of the slaves were outsiders. In any event Hellie min-

³² Alessandro Stanziani, "Slavery and Bondage in Central Asia and Russia: Fourteenth–Nineteenth Century," in *Eurasian Slavery, Ransom and Abolition in World History, 1200–1860*, ed. Christoph Witzewrath (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2015), 86.

³³ Hellie, *Slavery in Russia*, 720, but compare Richard Hellie, "Muscovite Slavery in Comparative Perspective," *Russian History* 6, 2 (1979): 143.

³⁴ Hellie, "Muscovite Slavery," 153.

imized the labor contribution of slaves when he dubbed Muscovite slavery a safety net, and modified his assertion about the lack of ethnic differentiation between slave owners and slaves by denying that it was a coincidence that Muscovite elite clans began ascribing foreign origin to themselves at about the same time as the enslavement of native Russians rose.³⁵

Overwhelmingly historians of sixteenth-century Muscovy discussing captive slaves analyze almost exclusively Russians captured by Tatar slave-raiding expeditions and sold into slavery, in Kazan' (before its conquest by Muscovy in 1552), Crimea, Central Asia, and the Ottoman Empire.³⁶ However, enslavement of "foreigners" among the East Slavs is as old as that of natives. The first Kievan Rus' dynasty of Varangians claimed different ethnic, or at least tribal, origin than even the East Slavic tribes that they were supposedly "invited" to rule, let alone those they conquered. In the tenth century Grand Prince Sviatoslav listed slaves among the sources of his wealth. Rus' princes sold captive Rus' from other principalities to the Kipchaks (Polovtsy, Cumans).³⁷ Not all these slaves were even Slavic. From the tenth through the fifteenth century, as Jukka Korpela discusses, the East Slavs enslaved Finnic captives acquired in slave raids.³⁸ In the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, Rus' sometimes captured Kipchaks in the steppe and sold them as slaves.³⁹ Until the weakening of Mongol authority in the second half of the fifteenth century, Rus' could hardly raid the steppe for more slaves, but in the sixteenth century, after the balance of power had shifted, slaves flowed across the Russian-steppe border in both directions, if not in equal numbers.

Obviously warfare generated foreign slaves only when the Muscovites were victorious. The first great victory of Muscovite armies during Ivan's reign was the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan' on the middle Volga River in 1552. The contemporary chronicle records that there were so many Tatar cap-

³⁵ Hellie, *Slavery in Russia*, 393–94.

³⁶ In *Eurasian Slavery*, see Lawrence N. Langer, "Slavery in the Appanage Era: Rus' and the Mongols," 145–69; Brian L. Davies, "The Prisoner's Tale: Russian Captivity Narratives and Changing Muscovite Perceptions of Ottoman-Tatar *Dar-al-Islam*," 279–94; Christoph Witzenwrath, "The Conquest of Kazan' as a Place of Remembering the Liberation of Slaves in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Russia," 295–308; and Alexander Lavrov, "Captivity, Slavery and Gender: Muscovite Female Captives in the Crimean Khanate and in the Ottoman Empire," 309–19.

³⁷ Langer, "Slavery in the Appanage Era," 146, 147.

³⁸ Jukka Korpela, "...And They Took Countless Captives': Finnic Captives and the East European Slave Trade during the Middle Ages," in Witzenwrath, *Eurasian Slavery*, 171–90.

³⁹ Langer does not mention this phenomenon.

tives, self-evidently women and children because the Muscovite army massacred the men, that every Russian soldier had a captive as part of his booty from the campaign.⁴⁰ Even allowing for the inflated projections of the size of the Muscovite army and inferring that only gentry-soldiers would have the right to such booty, we could still be talking about over 10,000 Tatar slaves. Muscovite gentry returning home with captive Tatars would have deposited them far and wide throughout Central and Northwest Muscovy. After the successful conclusion of the Muscovite-Swedish war in 1556, the same chronicle observes that there was a glut of "German" (a generic term for Europeans, in this case, obviously Swedish, but perhaps also some Finnic too) slaves on the Muscovite slave markets.⁴¹ During the early years of the Livonian War, which began in 1558, up to the capture of the city of Polotsk in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1563,⁴² another glut overtook the slave market, this time of Germans, Estonians, and Latvians, occupants of Livonia, and "Lithuanians," not only ethnic Lithuanians, but also Ruthenians (East Slavs, primarily future Ukrainians and Belarusians, living in Poland-Lithuania), and Poles, after Lithuania and Poland entered the war on behalf of Livonia.⁴³

Muscovites were permitted to resell their non-Russian captive slaves to the Nogais and other Tatars who traded in Muscovy, to be resold in Central Asian or Ottoman slave markets. Nogai Prince Tineakhmat, who already owned three Germans, was permitted to purchase more. When such Nogai-owned captive slaves fled the steppe to Muscovite cities, especially Kazan' and Astrakhan' (at the mouth of the Volga River on the Caspian Sea, annexed by Muscovy in 1556), they became bones of contention in Muscovite-Nogai relations, because the Nogais wanted the Muscovite state to return those run-aways to them, but the Muscovite government refused to return them if they had converted to Orthodox Christianity.⁴⁴ Each Nogai *mirza* (noble) was allowed to purchase a specific number of European captives, Lithuanians, Poles, and Germans. Nogais could not purchase Muscovites as slaves, but they could acquire prisoners of war. In April 1562, Ivan granted Ismail, *bii* (or *beg*, chief) of the Nogais, the right to purchase as many captive German women as he want-

⁴⁰ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter *PSRL*] 13 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 218–19.

⁴¹ *PSRL* 13: 265.

⁴² Now Polatsk in Belarus.

⁴³ Hellie, *Slavery in Russia*, 326.

⁴⁴ Hellie, *Slavery in Russia*, 350, called attention to the anomaly that Orthodox Christian Russians could sell themselves into slavery, but a non-Orthodox slave who converted to Russian Orthodox Christianity had to be emancipated.

ed.⁴⁵ Consequently, the number of European captive-slaves passing *through* Muscovy must have been greater than the number that entered Muscovy and stayed there.

The Nogais who did not acquire foreign slaves while serving in Muscovite campaigns bought them from Muscovite soldiers who had. Hellie did not take this second-hand slave commerce into account, and therefore his minimization of the extent of the slave trade in Muscovy should be qualified.⁴⁶

Alessandro Stanziani comments that Muscovites seized captives for ransom and enslavement in both Muslim and Catholic areas.⁴⁷ He understates the cosmopolitan nature of the Muscovite slave pool. The population of Livonia and Lithuania subject to captivity by Muscovite armies during the Livonian War did not consist only of Catholics; many ethnic Lithuanians and Ruthenians, and many inhabitants of Livonia, were Protestants (Calvinists in Lithuania, Lutherans in Livonia). The majority of Ruthenians were Orthodox Christians.

After 1560, according to Hellie, it was common for truces or treaties between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania or Sweden to contain a clause providing for the mutual free return of all military captives. He speculated that such a clause would have dampened prices for Polish or Swedish captive slaves, who could be expropriated from the purchaser without compensation upon the conclusion of such a truce or treaty. Hellie added that he knew of no such clause involving Tatars.⁴⁸ Hellie was correct in positing the absence of any such clause involving Tatars. However, if civilian captives far outnumbered military captives (which I take to mean soldiers), the effect on the sale price of civilian captives would not have been significant. Females were not, I would imagine, military captives.

⁴⁵ V. V. Trepavlov, ed., *Posol'skaia kniga po sviaziam Rossii s Nogaiskoi Ordoi* (1576 g.) (Moscow: IRI RAN, 2003), 14 n. 7, 20, 26–38, 54, 55; *Prodolzhenie drevnei Rossiiskoi Vvoliofiki*, vol. 10 (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia AN, 1795), 192.

⁴⁶ Although Cornelia Soldat is aware of the Nogai role in transmitting foreign slaves, she still follows Hellie in minimizing the number of foreign captives from the Baltic region enslaved during the Livonian War, a phenomenon graphically portrayed in the *Flugschriften* (printed pamphlets), which she considers to be, like all clichés in the pamphlets, fiction, simply copied from earlier anti-Ottoman pamphlets. Cornelia Soldat, *Erschreckende Geschichten in der Darstellung von Moskovitern und Osmanen in den deutschen Flugschriften des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts/Stories of Atrocities in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century German Pamphlets About the Russians and Turks* (Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellon, 2014), 126–37.

⁴⁷ Stanziani, “Slavery and Bondage,” 96.

⁴⁸ Hellie, *Slavery in Russia*, 350.

To be sure, captured artisans, as at Polotsk, were more likely to be recruited to enter Ivan's service than to be enslaved, but the rest of the captive population was distributed to boyars, bureaucrats, officials, and gentry, according to one military register, totaling over 11,000 persons, presumably an inflated estimate.⁴⁹ On 24 February 1556, Ivan directed that captured Swedes who possessed expertise in mining and metallurgy should not be sold, but should enter his service.⁵⁰ Not all captive Swedes benefitted from this partial amelioration of their fate. Just twelve days earlier, on 12 February 1556, Ivan instructed his Novgorod officials to use a Swedish (literally: German, *nemchin*) captive in prison or, if the prison contained none, a Swedish captive belonging to a member of the gentry, as a courier to deliver an epistle from the Novgorod governor to the king of Sweden. If the outbreak of Swedish-Muscovite hostilities closed the Swedish border, the emissary should be returned to prison!⁵¹ Ivan also freed Livonian War captives if they would enter his military service,⁵² but that applied only to professional soldiers, mostly mercenaries, not to the mass of civilian commoners.

Hellie's study encompassed Muscovy from 1450 to 1725. Consequently it is impossible to extract numbers which pertain only to Ivan IV's reign. However, we can extrapolate some data suggestive that the number of foreign slaves, like that of slaves as a whole, far exceeds Hellie's data base. Table 12.1 of prices per slaves by nationality⁵³ records 225 foreign slaves out of 5, 575 total slaves, or 4 percent of the total slave population. Of course the size of Muscovy's population and of its slave class varied, but overall Hellie estimated that for the entire early modern period, slaves constituted at least 10 percent of Muscovy's population.⁵⁴ Just as a heuristic experiment, if we assume that Muscovy's population during Ivan's reign was 9,000,000, that would entail a slave population of 900,000, of whom 36,000 would be foreigners. Such a number dwarfs Hellie's data. The percentage of foreign slaves in Muscovy's total population would be .4 (four-tenths) of a percent, a puny amount, but foreign

⁴⁹ Kolycheva, *Kholopstvo i krepostnichestvo*, 38–39; K. V. Petrov, ed., *Kniga polotskogo pokhoda 1563 (Issledovanie i tekst)* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Rossiiskaia Natsional'naia Biblioteka, 2004), 64.

⁵⁰ *Dopolneniia k Aktam istoricheskim, sobrannym i izdannym Arkheograficheskoiu Kommissieiu* vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia II otdeleniia Sobstvennoi EIV kantseliarii, 1846), no. 102, 151–52, .

⁵¹ V. G. Geiman, ed., *Materialy po istorii Karelii XII–XVI vv.* (Petrozavodsk: Gosudarstvenoe izdatel'stvo Karelo-Finskoi SSR, 1941), no. 80, 181–82.

⁵² Hellie, *Slavery in Russia*, 527.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 356.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 309, 666, 685, 688.

slaves in the tens of thousands could hardly be invisible. If Hellie assumed that the number of slaves in Muscovy was much larger than the number of slaves in his data base, we can assume that the number of foreign slaves was greater than the quantity we can document.

This circumstantial evidence suggests that captive foreign slaves were a presence in Muscovy disproportionate to their numbers. They were visible and known everywhere. A baptized foreign captive remained a foreign captive (see appendix 8.1, no. 24), just as baptized Tatars became "Newly-Baptized," not Orthodox Russians, and remained a clearly distinctive social group.⁵⁵

Sometimes captive slaves were treated differently than native-born. A 1556 decree stipulated that military captives could be slaves only for the duration of the lifetime of their owners, and that the captives' children did not "inherit" slave status.⁵⁶ However, there is evidence either that this decree was not in force for very long or that it was simply violated; captive slaves did pass from one generation to the next and their children were classified as slaves.⁵⁷ Even when they were treated the same as native-born slaves, with whom they frequently intermarried (how that worked if the foreigners were not Orthodox Christians is a moot point), they remained identified by Muscovite society and no doubt identified themselves as foreigners. This is attested by their description in the documentary sources in which they appear by their ethnic affiliation and/or foreign place of origin.

The 1556 decree on the chronological limits on captive slavery, even if soon repealed or moot in practice, is suggestive in another respect. The issuance of such a decree indicates that the question of the status of captive slaves and their offspring came up often enough to warrant government regulation. If there were only a few dozen foreign slaves around, then it is much less likely that anyone would notice or care that much about their status. One might interpret the failure of the decree in practice to the fact that it violated the vested interests of too many families of slave owners who wanted to keep their slaves "in the family" upon the death of the original slave owner. This analysis thus suggests that slavery of foreign captives was more, rather than less, prevalent in Muscovy.

I have identified 29 sources that mention at least 33 foreign-born slaves, summarized in appendix 8.1. Presumably there are more sources which do so, in publications to which I have not had access, and certainly in the archives where circumstances precluded my researching. This is admittedly a

⁵⁵ Janet Martin, "The Novokshcheny of Novgorod: Assimilation in the 16th Century," *Central Asian Survey* 9, 2 (1990): 13–38.

⁵⁶ Hellie, *Slavery in Russia*, 59.

⁵⁷ Kolycheva, *Kholopstvo i krepostnichestvo*, 46.

very small number of foreign-born slaves, which cannot be dignified as a data base. Its value is only as illustrative evidence that was not taken into account by Hellie or aggregated by any previous student of slavery.

In the best of all possible worlds, we would know the date, document type, nationality, name, and gender of every foreign captive. I do not. I have not entered “unknown” in its sequential place in the records to mark omitted information because it would be gratuitous.

On dates, the Byzantine calendar, in use in Muscovy during Ivan’s reign, dates from the Creation, 5508 BCE, unlike the CE dating from the birth of Jesus. Because the Byzantine year began in Muscovy on 1 September, transactions from September to December took place in one year earlier CE than those between 1 January and 31 August. Without knowing the months it is impossible to supply precise CE years, so by convention historians “translate” the Byzantine date into CE to encompass the entire twelve-month period of the former. 1533/1534 means “from 1 September 1533 to 31 August 1534.”

The quantity of records precludes any meaningful chronological analysis. The circumstantial evidence adduced above has already established the peak periods of importation.

The type of document contains no surprise (table 8.1). The “unknown” cases all come from Evgeniia Kolycheva’s monograph, because she does not always specify document type.

Table 8.1. Type of Document

Type of document	Number	Appendix 8.1 no.
Cadaster	1	1
Dowry	1	29
Gift (<i>dannaia</i>) ⁵⁵	10	2, 5, 7, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 26
Limited-service slavery contract ⁵⁶	3	25, 27, 28
Memo (<i>delovaia zapis'</i>)	1	23
Testament	10	3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 20, 24
Unknown	3	6, 13, 22

⁵⁸ These were personal gifts, usually to family members. *Dannye gramoty* are most often gifts to monasteries.

⁵⁹ *Kabala*. The foreign female captive accompanies a native Muscovite husband entering the contract.

The type of document suggests why the qualitative value of the evidence of foreign slaves is greater than its quantitative value. Only members of the elite could afford to own foreign slaves. Such ownership did not require public registration of limited-service slavery contracts, so only private legal documents would mention foreign slaves. Like most slaves, foreign slaves were used as house servants, not farm labor, and would be unlikely to appear in cadastral surveys. Obviously, from the documents I have managed to find, slaves were valuable property, to be given as gifts, dowries, or inheritances. As property, slaves did not owe taxes and were absent from tax records. No family archives survive from the sixteenth century, so preservation of documentary evidence that might mention foreign slaves is random. There is no way to judge how representative our surviving evidence is. However, we do know that the quantity of boyar and gentry families who were wealthy enough to own slaves and whose menfolk had served in campaigns where they might have acquired foreign slaves is far greater than the number of surviving testaments, dowries, and gift transfers.

"Nationality" (table 8.2) is quite problematic. "Tatar" is clear enough, but, as mentioned above, "Lithuanian" could refer to ethnic Lithuanians or Ruthenians and "German" from Livonia may mask Estonians or Latvians, although in two cases Latvians are specified.⁶⁰ Note that the number of "Germans" and "Tatars" are low-ball figures because in two sources the number of captive slaves for either is not indicated (appendix 8.1, no. 10). The plural guarantees at least two, but we cannot say anything more than that. I have not utilized personal names to suggest nationality, just designations. I found no references to Polish or Swedish captive slaves, although we know that there were Swedish prisoners of war.

Table 8.2. Nationality

Nationality	Number	Appendix 8.1 no.
German	12	1, 4 (2 captives), 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 24, 27, 29)
Latvian	2	19, 28
Lithuanian	8	2 (2 captives), 6, 8, 16, 18, 25, 26
Tatar	6	3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 23
Unknown	5	4, 5, 7, 21, 22

Gender (table 8.3) displays the predominance of women. Given transliteration complications, I have not tried to derive gender from personal name.

⁶⁰ The sources I have seen do not, apparently, refer to Estonians.

“Unknown” means that the source itself did not specify the gender of the captive slave. When it did, the most frequent terms are “girl” (*devka*) or, if married, woman (*zhena*). In one case (appendix 8.1, no. 10), we do not even know the gender breakdown of the captive slaves from two nationalities. The text reads “men and women, boys and girls” of both Germans and Tatars. There were therefore at least two females, and that is the minimum number included in the table.

Table 8.3. Gender

Gender	Number	Appendix 8.1 no.
Female	20	2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
Male	6	1, 4 (2 captives), 6, 8, 23
Unknown	7	2, 3, 9, 11 (at least 2), 12, 22

In at least ten cases I do not have personal names of captive slaves.⁶¹ Sometimes even groups of native-born slaves remain collectively anonymous in documentation, so the use of group references to captive slaves is not ethnic-specific. However, if only one native-born slave is mentioned, it is absolutely customary to provide a name. Not so for foreign slaves. Depriving a captive slave even of his or her personal name reflects the low social status of all slaves, but particularly of captive slaves.

We may note in passing that in the seventeenth century Muscovite territorial expansion brought yet more foreign slaves. Raids, such as Cossack incursions into the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the steppe, led to the importation of Muslim slaves, who were given a special name, *iasyry*.⁶² The increasing incursion of male Muscovite trappers and Cossacks into Siberia led to a great increase in the number of native Siberian, largely animist, concubine-slaves. In short, foreign slaves persisted in Muscovy until the abolition of slavery in Russia by Peter the Great, which turned all slaves, native and foreign, into serfs. Muscovite expansion westward could also have contributed to the number of new foreign captive slaves.

Certainly more research, especially archival, is likely to uncover more evidence of foreign captive slaves in Muscovy during Ivan’s reign. However, it is unlikely that the numbers of foreign slaves will ever constitute more than a small minority of all slaves. In any event we will never know the number

⁶¹ Appendix 8.1, nos. 3, 9, 11 (at least 4), 12, 20, 22, 24, 29.

⁶² Hans-Henrich Nolte, “*Iasyry*: Non-Orthodox Slaves in Pre-Petrine Russia,” in Witzewrath, *Eurasian Slavery*, 247–64.

of slaves residing simultaneously in Muscovy because we cannot quantify the number of foreign slaves passing through Muscovy on their way to the steppe, Central Asia, Crimea, or Istanbul. The number of foreign slaves in Muscovy at any given time encompassed both permanent and temporarily resident foreign slaves. It would also include those foreign captives who would eventually be ransomed or exchanged. Trying to estimate the number of foreign slaves in Muscovy, both in absolute and relative terms as a percentage of Muscovy's aggregate population, faces insuperable obstacles. The number of foreign slaves and the number of people residing in Muscovy changed constantly as a result of political, economic, and military factors. Often these causes were at odds with one another. We have seen that spikes in importation of foreign slaves occurred in 1552 and after the start of the Livonian War in 1558, especially in 1563. The import of foreign slaves from the western front probably declined to nil after 1577, when Muscovite armies began retreating from Lithuanian and Livonian territory, but that did not diminish the number of foreign slaves already in Muscovy. However, the number of foreign slaves already in Muscovy would have declined in tandem in the decline in total Muscovite population beginning in 1565, when Ivan established the *oprichnina*. Political repression, epidemic, crop failure, economic depression, and the devastating Crimean raid of 1571 which resulted in the burning of the city of Moscow almost to the ground all produced demographic loss. Speculative quantitative estimates would be of little value.

However, it is still possible to draw one conclusion about the qualitative presence of foreign, particularly "European," slaves in Muscovy during Ivan's reign. Certainly foreign slaves were visible in the elite families who owned them, as evidenced by occasional documentation. They would therefore have been visible *to* elite society; house servants were a status symbol and would hardly have been kept hidden. Foreign slaves would also have been visible *outside* elite society, in the military parades of returning victorious troops on display as booty when they first arrived in Muscovy, and, after that, in everyday life, if they accompanied or ran errands for their owners. That visibility might have had a social impact.

Muscovy's territorial expansion and widening diplomatic horizons during Ivan's reign resulted in the arrival in Muscovy of many foreigners from many countries, either as diplomatic personnel, merchants, mercenary or artisan job-seekers, and included Greeks, Armenians, and Serbs, Central Asian Muslims, Germans and Austrians from the Holy Roman Empire, English, Italians, Scots, Dutch, Poles, Lithuanians, Danes, and Swedes. All of these visitors and immigrants were privileged in one way or another, socially, politically, or economically. The "average" Muscovite, rural or urban, might have con-

ceived the notion that “foreigners,” especially “Europeans,”⁶³ were as a whole privileged. However, the presence of “European” captive slaves in Muscovy should have dispelled any notion that *all* “Europeans” in Muscovy received special treatment as superior to natives. Of course, in Muscovite eyes both elite and captive “Europeans” were inferior because they were not Russian Orthodox Christian; even Orthodox Ruthenians, Greeks, and Serbs were inferior to Russian Orthodox Christians because they lived under non-Orthodox rule. This same logic would apply to Tatars in the contrast between privileged serving Tatars and Tatar delegations from Muscovite allies, let alone Chingissids, and Tatar slaves; not all Muslims were equal. Certainly antiforeign sentiment in Muscovy in the sixteenth century, sometimes exaggeratedly labeled xenophobia by historians, was not entirely absent, but it was much less than in the seventeenth century after the Polish and Swedish invasions of the Time of Troubles (*Smutnoe vremia*). The destitute state of captive “European” prisoners and slaves might have discouraged such generic anti-“European” prejudice. Obviously, not *all* “Europeans” exploited Muscovites, and the Muscovite state did not favor *all* “Europeans.” The Muscovite aristocracy, like all aristocracies, looked down on everyone else regardless of religion or ethnicity, so we need not be concerned with them. If the quantity of foreign slaves in Muscovy has been underestimated, then the social impact of their presence might also have been overlooked.

Conclusion

If the broad outlines of the nature of Muscovite society during Ivan IV’s long reign are reasonably well established, its details, nuances, and ambiguities remain largely unknown. By exploring qualifications to the generalizations that coherent clans dominated Muscovite elite society and that foreign slaves were absent or insignificant, this chapter has tried to explore the complexities underneath the surface that require modifying accepted generalizations. Paucity of evidence, of course, complicates such a search, but should not preclude it. Even a little evidence—of fractious families and foreign slaves—is an improvement over no evidence, and merits consideration in trying to comprehend sixteenth-century Muscovite social history comprehensively.

⁶³ Who Muscovites during Ivan’s reign perceived as “European” is ambiguous, hence my quotation marks, but certainly not Muslims, and perhaps not all Christians, certainly not Arab Christians, and probably not Armenians or Georgians.

Appendix 8.1

Abbreviations

- AFZKh 2 *Akty feodal'nogo zemlevladeniia i khoziaistva*, pt. 2 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1956).
- Antonov A. V. Antonov, "Kostromskie monastyri v dokumentakh XVI–nachala XVII veka," *Russkii diplomatarii* 7 (2001): 52–218.
- Arkhiv *Arkhiv istoriko-iuridicheskikh svedenii, otnosiashchikhsia do Rossii*, kniga 2, pervaiia polovina (Moscow, 1855).
- ASZ 2 *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevadel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 1998).
- ASEM *Akty Suzdal'skogo Spaso-Efim'eva Monastyria 1506–1608 gg.* (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli. RGADA Akty Russkikh Monastyrei, 1998)
- Kolycheva E. I. Kolycheva, *Kholopstvo i krepostnichestvo (konets XV–XVI v.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1971).
- Likhachev N. P. Likhachev, *Sbornik aktov sobrannykh v arkhivakh i bibliotekakh*, 1: *Dukhovnye i sgovornye gramoty*, vypusk 2: *Gramoty pravye* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1895).
- Materialy 1 *Materialy i soobshcheniia po fondam otdela rukupisnoi i redkoi knigi Biblioteki Akademii Nauk SSSR*, vol. 1 (Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1966).
- RIB 17 *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vol. 17 (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaia komissiia, 1898).
1. 7047/7048, 1539, cadaster, "German" (*nemchin*) "man" Igul" Tumashov: *Novgorodskiiia pistsovyia knigi*, 4: *Perepisnye obrochnye knigi Shelonskoi*

- piatiny. I. 1498 g. II 1539 g. III. 1552–3 gg.* (St. Petersburg: Arkheogra-ficheskaia kommissiia, 1886), 251.
2. 7048, 1539/1540, gift, Anka, Lithuanian, Spirkia, Lithuanian: *RIB* 17, no. 500, 182–88.
 3. 7051, 1542/1543, testament, Tatar: *Akty Rossiiskogo gosudarstva: Arkhivny moskovskikh monastyrei i soborov XV–nachalo XVII vv.* (Moscow: Ladomir, 1998), no. 47, 134–36.
 4. Before 7052, 1543/1544, testament, German, Iakovets; German, Ganus; Ovdot'itsa: *AFZKh* 2, no. 172, 164–66.
 5. 7052, 1543/1544, gift, Ovdot'ia:⁶⁴ *RIB* 17, no. 109, 37.
 6. 7054, 1545/1546, Lithuanian, Sergei: TsGADA [now RGADA], GKE, Kostroma, no. 45/5012, cited in Kolycheva, 37.
 7. 7056, 1547/1548, gift, Oksen'ista: *RIB* 17, no. 330, 119–20.
 8. 7057, 14 December 1548, testament, Lithuanian, Sergei: Antonov, no. 3, 56–58.
 9. 7076, 1557/1558, testament, Tatar, Stenia: *ASEM*, no. 102, 230.
 10. 7067, 1558/1559, testament, German and Tatar men and women, girls and boys: *AFZKh* 2, no. 274, 278–82; also Likhachev, xi, 30–36.
 11. 7068, 1559/1560, testament, Tatar: Antonov, no. 6, 60–67.
 12. 7068, 7 June 1560, testament, Tatars: Likhachev, xiii, 39–49.
 13. 7070, 1561/1562, German, Molchanka: *Arkhiv*, otdelenie 2, 68, cited in Kolycheva, 46.
 14. 7073, 1564/1565, gift, German, Ofimka: *RIB* 17, no. 292, 104–05.
 15. 7074, 1565/1566, gift, German, Ofim'itsa: *RIB* 17, no. 449, 165–66.
 16. 7075, 1566/1567, testament, Lithuanian, Anna: *ASEM*, no. 145, 283–85.
 17. 7075, 1566/1567, gift, Greman, Ovdokimka: *RIB* 17, no. 284, 101.
 18. 7075, 1566/1567, gift, Marishka: *RIB* 17, no. 531, 198–99.
 19. 7075, 1576/1577, gift, Latvian, Savka Latysh:⁶⁵ *RIB* 17, no. 191, 69.
 20. 7077, 1568/1569 testament, German, girl: *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka*, vol. 3, comp. A. V. Antonov (Moscow: Drev-lekhranilishche, 2002), no. 488, 406–07.
 21. 7078, 1569/1570, gift, Manitsa: *RIB* 17, no. 440, col. 162–63.
 22. 7079/7080, 1571: *Arkhiv*, otdelenie 2, 41, cited in Kolycheva, 46.

⁶⁴ As I read this document, Ovdot'ia was the “captive” of Ivashko, whose Latvian (*latyshkoe*) name was Indrik. I infer that a Latvian converted to Russian Orthodoxy, although the presence of this Latvian in Muscovy in 1543/1544 could not have had anything to do with the Livonian War, which began in 1558.

⁶⁵ The document does not call Savka Latysh a “captive” (*polonianik*), but I infer that he was.

23. 7080, 1576/1577, note, Tatar, Karaul:⁶⁶ ASZ 2, no. 387, 332–33.
24. 7085, 1576/1577, testament, German: *Materialy*, 179.
25. 7085, 1576/1577,⁶⁷ limited-service slavery contract, Lithuanian, Ogafei: *Materialy*, 160.
26. 7086, 1577/1578, gift, German, Polaginita Petrova doch': RIB 17, no. 54, 18.
27. 7089, 14 November 1580, limited-service slavery contract, German, Annitsa: RIB 17, no. 138, 47–48.
28. 23 April 7088, 1580, limited-service slavery contract, Latvian, Latyshka: RIB 17 no. 139, 48.
29. 7090, 1581/1582 dowry, German: ASZ 2, no. 210, 194

⁶⁶ The document calls Karaul an emancipated convert, but obviously “Karaul” was not his baptismal name. In Turkic the word means “scout” and could easily be used as a Tatar personal name.

⁶⁷ This document follows “in the same year” as the previous document dated 7094, 1587/1588 but is followed by another limited-service slavery contract not involving captives for the same owner family dated 7085, 1576/1577; I have preferred the latter dating.

Chapter 9

Law and Disorder: Apolitical Violence in Muscovy

A comprehensive examination of violence in Muscovy during the reign of Ivan IV would encompass government political violence, violent government punishment for non-political crimes, non-governmental political violence, everyday criminal violence, domestic violence, and violence against slaves. Historians have paid the most attention to government-initiated political violence—the *oprichnina* with its punitive campaign against the northwest region, gruesome public executions in Moscow in 1571, the murder of former metropolitan Filipp, and countless other acts of murder, looting, torture, and mayhem. This level of violence was exceptional, indeed unprecedented.¹ Sergei Solov'ev attributed the increase in violence and cruelty in Muscovy and the disdain for the value of life to the baneful influence of Ivan IV's horrific example.² This chapter will not discuss state political violence, or violent punishment within the criminal justice system, including torture, corporal punishment, and capital punishment,³ or political violence not committed by the government such as the assault of one boyar by another or the 1547 Moscow riot,⁴ or violent abuse of power by central or provincial government officials such as governors (*namestniki*) or county administrators (*volosteli*), or violence

¹ Nancy Shields Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 304. In general, see 303–31 on “high” crimes in Muscovy during Ivan IV's reign.

² S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, bk. 4 (vols. 7–8) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1963), 141.

³ Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment*, does a masterful job of surveying this material for the entire Muscovite period: torture (133–56), corporal punishment (203–40), capital punishment (280–302).

⁴ The violence of northern peasants against Basarga Fedorov syn Leont'ev in 1569–70, which apparently included the murder of four men, constituted anti-oprichnina political violence, so it is not included here. *Akty sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii severa Rossii kontsa XV–XVI v.: Akty Solovetskogo monastyria 1479–1571 gg.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1988), no. 341, 216.

committed by or for church authorities, such as burning heretics, or the run-of-the-mill use of corporal punishment as discipline in monasteries or the fisticuffs that broke out among monks. Nor will it discuss domestic violence, spousal abuse, child abuse, or the abuse of household servants. The Muscovite *Book of Household Management* (*Domostroi*) authorized a husband to administer corporal punishment to his wife, a father to his children, and the master of the household to servants, but advised moderation in all cases to avoid inflicting permanent physical harm. It also advocated moral instruction and Christian mercy to enhance the efficacy of such punishment.⁵ Of course, the lack of sources renders it exceedingly difficult to trace domestic violence because only a handful of extreme cases appear in administrative and legal documentation. Finally, we will not examine violence by slave owners against slaves. Richard Hellie argues that the picture drawn by his mostly late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources can be applied to the second half of the sixteenth century as well. Once again the "Book of Household Management" counseled humane treatment of slaves, but in pre-Muscovite Rus' legislation a slave owner who killed his slave answered only to God, even if a slave owner could not beat a returned runaway slave to death. In general Hellie concludes that moral admonitions against extreme physical abuse of slaves were efficacious. In the seventeenth century public lashing of a slave was condemned. Yet in the same century August von Meyerberg wrote that mistreated slaves turned to crime, burgled homes, set houses afire in order to loot them under the pretense of fighting those fires, and habitually drew knives in drunken brawls. In addition, sales descriptions of slaves show "manifestations of violence" including scars left by knives and dog bites.⁶ Therefore violence against slaves was surely not absent from Muscovy during Ivan IV's reign.

Our focus here is exclusively on run-of-the-mill physical criminal violence, committed by private citizens, either amateurs or professional criminals. Therefore verbal abuse, the most common form of dishonor activity, also falls outside its purview.⁷

The frequency and nature of such "average" physical violence raises several questions about the nature of state control over society, the efficacy of

⁵ Carolyn Johnston Pouncy, trans., *"The Domostroi": Rules for Russian Households in the Time of Ivan the Terrible* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 96, 143–44.

⁶ Richard Hellie, *Slavery in Russia 1450–1725* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 118, 139, 504–06, 510.

⁷ Nancy Shields Kollmann, *By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). The physical acts which violated honor, such as pulling a man's beard or touching a woman's headdress, were more symbolic than violent.

anti-crime measures undertaken by the central government, and the “class” nature of crime in Muscovy.

Defining violence encounters several practical difficulties. Theft and robbery in and of themselves need not entail violence. A cut-purse, the medieval and early modern equivalent of the pickpocket, did not commit a violent crime. Simply stealing crops, hay, honey, or timber by trespassing on someone else’s plowed fields, meadow, beehives, or forest would not be violent unless the intruders responded physically to opposition. Arson was considered not only a felony but a capital offense; in a society in which wooden dwellings predominated, fire entailed an enormous risk to public safety.⁸ However, any armed robbery not only included the threat of violence, but with great frequency the committing of violence, at least beating up the victim, so in practice few cases of mugging lacked violence.

The most studied form of criminal violence in early modern Russia is banditry, which often involved not only theft and assault but murder. Anti-bandit legislation in Muscovy during the period of Ivan IV’s minority (1533–47) and the period of reforms (1547–64) created anti-banditry (*guba*) institutions, local elders (*starosty*) and sworn-men (*tseloval’niki*) authorized to hold grand juries and exercise swift justice against professional bandits almost at the level of vigilantes. At first the legislation was enacted locally via district charters, but later it was expanded to most regions of the country with the creation of a central Moscow Felony or Anti-Brigandage Bureau (*Razboinaia izba* or *Razboinyi prikaz*) and the issuance of a Felony Chancellery Handbook (*ustav*). The rhetoric of these government documents linked brigandage inextricably to violent crime.⁹ The Russian Orthodox Church, in its 1551 Council of One-Hundred Chapters (*Stoglav*), linked Russian minstrels (*skomorokhi*) to banditry by describing bands of minstrels of sixty, seventy, or one hundred roaming the

⁸ Carol B. Stevens, “Banditry and Provincial Order in Sixteenth-Century Russia,” in *Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1539–1584*, ed. A. M. Kleimola and G. D. Lenhoff (Moscow: ITZ-Garant, 1997), 580 n. 11.

⁹ Nikolai Evgen’evich Nosov, *Ocherki po istorii mestnogo upravleniia russkogo gosudarstva pervoi poloviny XVI veka* (Moscow–Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo AN SSSR, 1957), 201–339; Horace W. Dewey, “Muscovite Guba Charters and the Concept of Brigandage (*Razboi*),” *Papers of the Michigan Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters* 51 (1966): 277–88; Tat’iana Il’inichna Pashkova, *Mestnoe upravlenie v russkom gosudarstve pervoi poloviny XVI veka. Namestniki i volosteli* (Moscow: Drevlekhraanilishche, 2000), 110–19; Vladimir Valentinovich Bovykin, *Mestnoe upravlenie v Russkom gosudarstve XVI v.* (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2012), 178–209, 301–18, 324–42; Stevens, “Banditry and Provincial Order,” 578–99.

countryside and committing robbery,¹⁰ but this is probably a deliberate exaggeration, a conflation of two separate phenomena.

Brigandage was a recurrent problem. Armed bands attacked monasteries, merchants, and even pilgrims traveling in convoys for protection, pillaged villages, and committed piracy on Russian rivers.¹¹ The expenditure account books of the Iosifov Monastery note compensation payments to priests and monks who were robbed on the road; we may infer that the robbers were armed and at least threatened violence.¹² Naturally in a hierarchical class society, the elite blamed the lower orders for such violence. A chronicle sub anno 1556 blamed "filthy peasants" (*muzhich'ia*) for the murder of administrators sent to districts and counties by the central government,¹³ which is partially true, although the number of murder victims is greatly exaggerated. Vadim Koretskii assumed that nearly all bandits (except for a few gentry criminals) were peasants, slandered by government agencies for engaging in class warfare. For that reason he always utilized the word "bandits" in quotation marks, a practice I will not follow. He did convincingly cite one source as evidence, a new provision of the 1550 Law Code (*Sudebnik*) which accused peasants of brigandage (*razboi*).¹⁴ For our purposes, the social background of bandits is not of primary importance, only their identity as professional criminals.

Based upon readily accessible publications of sources and secondary works, I have compiled a data base (appendix 9.1) of 61 instances of apolitical physical violence during Ivan IV's reign. Undoubtedly publications inaccessible to me and the archives contain additional evidence. However, sixty-one cases are sufficient to support tentative conclusions.

In the best of all possible worlds we would know the date, source type, location, nature of violence, weapons used, perpetrators by social class, victims by social class, and whether the dispute was related to patrimonial land own-

¹⁰ D. E. Kozhanchikov, ed., *Stoglav* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imporatorskoi Akademii nauk, 1863), 137.

¹¹ Stevens, "Banditry and Provincial Order," 578.

¹² Arkadii Georgievich Man'kov, ed., *Votchinnnye khoziaistvennyye knigi XVI v. Prikhodnye i raskhodnye knigi Iosifo-Volokolamskogo monastyria 70–80-kh gg.*, v. 1 (Moscow-Leningrad: II AN SSSR, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1980), 209, 213, 222.

¹³ Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zimin, *Reformy Ivana Groznogo: Ocherki sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi istorii Rossii serediny XVI v.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960), 404, citing *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, vol. 13 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 267.

¹⁴ Vadim Ivanovich Koretskii, *Zakreposhchenie krest'ian i klassovaia bor'ba v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVI v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 237. For a translation of this provision, see H. W. Dewey, ed., *Muscovite Judicial Texts 1488–1556* (Ann Arbor: Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, 1966), 71.

ership (*votchina*), holding of conditional land grants (*pomest'ë*), or boundary disputes in every case. We do not, especially but not only for incidents culled from secondary works. For the edification of the interested reader, appendix 9.1 contains capsule narratives for each record, sometimes with references to relevant scholarly literature. Here I will present an analysis of the data base as a whole.

For chronology, there is no need to be more precise than year. Given the number of records, table 9.1 summarizes the data by decade. Of course the 1530s and 1580s are partial decades, the former beginning with Ivan IV's succession in 1533, and latter ending with his death in 1584. Yearly averages are of limited value in a data set of this size, but it is notable that the years between 1580 and 1584 averaged over three incidents a year, versus less than one a year during the partial 1530s and complete 1540s and 1560s, one a year during the 1550s, and 1.5 during the 1570s. By this measure, the last years of Ivan IV's reign witnessed the highest rate of apolitical criminal violence.

Table 9.1. Chronology by Decade

Decade	Count	Appendix 9.1 record nos.
1530s	6	1–6
1540s	7	7–13
1550s	10	14–23
1560s	7	24–30
1570s	15	31–45
1580s	16	46–61

Table 9.2 presents chronology according to the traditional division of Ivan IV's reign into four uneven periods, which, although legitimately contested, sometimes still retains its utility.

Table 9.2. Chronology by Periods of Ivan IV's Reign

Period	Years	Count	Appendix 9.1 record nos.
Minority	1533–46	11	1–11
Reforms	1547–64	16	12–27
<i>Oprichnina</i>	1565–72	3	28–30
Post- <i>Oprichnina</i>	1573–84	31	31–61

By this periodization, we have less than one case a year during Ivan IV's minority, supposedly a time of great disorder, and during the reforms, sup-

posedly a time of progress, and the lowest annual average during the oprichnina, only three cases in seven years, as if political violence drove out average criminal violence the way bad money drives out good money. However, the post-oprichnina period of fourteen years averages over two cases a year, impelled by the higher frequency of records for the 1580s displayed in table 9.1. In both tables this seeming anomaly reflects a cluster of cases generated by a single petitioner, the Suzdal' Pokrov Monastery, an aristocratic convent that showed no hesitation in uncovering injustice. Therefore, the statistics might have been distorted by the survival of all these petitions. At first sight, nevertheless, we can draw two conclusions. First, central state legislation did not eradicate apolitical popular violence; even the supposedly hypertrophic Muscovite state could not do that.¹⁵ Second, even if nonpolitical violence abated during the oprichnina, it not only resumed but increased after the abolition of the oprichnina.

Not much need be said about document type (table 9.3). Virtually all forms of legal and administrative documentation are represented. Most of the "unknowns" come from citations in secondary works to archival documents or inaccessible publications.¹⁶ A nondocumentary religious treatise (appendix 9.1, no. 31) is not included in table 9.3.

Table 9.3. Document Type

Document type	Count	Appendix 9.1 record nos.
Cadastre (<i>pistsovaia kniga</i>)	4	13, 30, 37, 47
Decree (<i>ukaz, ukaznaia gramota</i>)	5	18, 19, 20, 39–52
Instruction (<i>nakaz, nakaznaia gramota</i>)	1	35
Memo (<i>pamiat'</i>)	1	34
Judgment Charter (<i>pravaia gramota</i>)	8	2, 4, 5, 10, 15, 17, 25, 38
Obedience Charter (<i>poslushnaia gramota</i>) ¹⁷	1	33
Peace Charter or Note (<i>mirovaia gramota</i> or <i>zapis'</i>)	3	1, 21, 40
Petition (usually <i>chelobitnia</i> but also <i>iavka</i> [declaration in person] or <i>iavochnaia gramota</i>)	23	7, 21, 22, 28, 29, 41–48, 48–51, 53–56, 58–61

¹⁵ Charles J. Halperin, "Muscovy as a Hypertrophic State: A Critique," *Kritika* 3, 3 (2002): 501–07.

¹⁶ Some of these references may be to saints' lives, which should not be included in a data base of documents.

Document type	Count	Appendix 9.1 record nos.
Receipt (<i>otpis'</i>)	1	12
Testament (<i>dukhovnaia gramota</i>)	1	8
Trial Record (<i>sudnyi spisok or sudnoe delo</i>)	3	6, 9, 23
Unknown	10	3, 11, 14, 16, 26, 27, 31, 32, 36, 57
Total	61	

The data on location can be found in table 9.4. The number of locations is arbitrary. Vladimir could have been amalgamated with Suzdal', North with Novgorod, and Center with Moscow, but the numbers would still not tell us very much. On the whole the geographic distribution is fairly wide, with one unavoidable exception. The default location for any petition from the Suzdal' Pokrov Monastery documents is, of course, Suzdal'. In one case at least the subject of the petition concerned an incident of violence in Vladimir district, a refinement that would be lost if we joined the two districts together. Consequently it is safest to dismiss the Suzdal' number as an outlier and assert that no district or region of Muscovy was more prone to violence than any other.

Table 9.4. Location

District	Number of records	Appendix 9.1 record nos.
Arkhangel'sk	1	36
Briansk	1	52
Center	2	8, 11
Galich	1	5
Iaroslavl'	1	9
Kaluga	1	6
Kashira	5	2, 3, 10, 30, 37
Kolomna	2	16, 35
Korela	1	39
Kostroma	1	25
Moscow	1	26
Nizhnii Novgorod	2	15, 17
North	3	7, 24, 32

¹⁷ Peasants were informed that a new owner or holder of their lands was arriving and instructed to obey him, her, or them.

District	Number of records	Appendix 9.1 record nos.
Novgorod (all "Fifths")*	7	1, 19, 21, 22, 23, 31, 57
Pereiaslavl'	1	33
Riazan'	2	4, 38
Roslavl'	1	27
Rzhev	2	18, 20
Suzdal'	18	34, 41-43, 45, 46, 48-51, 53-56, 58-61
Tver'	2	13, 47
Vladimir	1	29
Vologda	2	14, 28
Unknown	1	40
Total	61	

* The provincial region attached to the Novgorod district was divided into "fifths" (*piatiny*) usually specified in documents. I have disregarded that geographic refinement.

The nature of the crime displayed in table 9.5 displays some variety. A given case can contain more than one type of crime, so there are 102 "crimes" from 61 documents. "Battle" (*boi*) does not denote a fixed battle but something more akin to a raid or a gang rumble. Therefore it does indicate larger-scale violence; one man or several people killing another man does not constitute a "battle." The groups involved might be a gentry man with his servants or a peasant village. The numbers confirm that theft of property and looting were ubiquitous in violent crime. As the narratives graphically illustrate, looters and thieves would steal anything, including livestock, clothing, tools, and food, not just valuables such as coinage and jewelry. Murder was probably no more prevalent in Muscovy than anywhere else in the violent sixteenth century; it is no surprise that it occurs in one-third of the cases.

Table 9.5. Nature of Crime

Nature of crime	Count	Appendix 9.1 record nos.
Battle	13	1, 2, 15, 18, 29, 34, 35, 41–43, 46, 49, 55
Looting/Robbing	48	1, 2, 4–10, 12–17, 19–23, 25, 27, 29, 30, 34, 35,* 37–39, 41–51, 53–56, 58–61
Arson	10	7, 13, 19, 23, 27, 30, 31, 36, 38, 57
Banditry [†]	11	2–4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 35, 37, 53
Murder [‡]	20	5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 22, 24, 27–30,** 33, 35, 37, 40, 41, 50, 51, 54.
Total	102	

* I counted illegal confiscation as stealing.

† This is a count of accusations of banditry, whether the criminals were actually bandits or not. It does not include cases where banditry occurs in the narrative but not in the list of criminal charges.

‡ “Murder” denotes cases where the list of crimes committed included “murder,” not the larger number of instances of crimes in which people were killed or possibly killed (missing or abducted but fate unknown).

** In appendix 9.1, no. 28 the victim is described as “near death”; sometimes this is an exaggeration, but here I have presumed that he expired.

Table 9.6 reveals that all classes and categories of people participated as perpetrators in violent crime. More than one social category could be involved as one party to a violent dispute, so the total is 76 perpetrators from 61 documents. Gentry and monasteries, for example, could mobilize their peasants to fight each other on their behalf. Local government official violence usually constituted abuse of power, extortion, and malfeasance. Calling perpetrators “bandits” might be elitist slander, and need not refer to professional criminals. Priests could accompany their parishioners in violent actions and monks usually mobilized their peasants and servants.¹⁸ The absence of boyars does not mean that boyars were non-violent law-abiding citizens. Their violent acts, however, were usually political. Non-political violent acts were mostly beneath their dignity. If a boyar had a grudge with a neighbor, he would send his flunkies to deal with him. Gentry, the most numerous armed class in the countryside, were just as liable to engage in violent criminal activity as peasants or artisans. Criminal behavior was not a class attribute.

¹⁸ See Charles J. Halperin, “Neighbors Are Not Always Friendly: Conflicts between Muscovite Monasteries and Their Neighbors during the Reign of Ivan IV,” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 53, 3 (2019): 219–45.

Table 9.6. Perpetrators

Perpetrator	Count	Appendix 9.1 record no.
Anti-brigandage officials	2	53, 58
Bandits	6	8, 11, 14, 21, 25, 52
Clergy		
Monks	6	14, 26, 30, 37, 46,* 51
Priests	3	14, 26, 30, 37, 46, 51
Total	9	
Gentry	16	1, 3–6, 15, 17–20, 23, 34, 35, 43, 48, 56
Peasants		
Generic	13	4, 7, 27, 31 (heretics), 32, 33 (?), 36, 38 (sovereign's beekeepers), 39, 49, [†] 59–61 (Court villages)
Of gentry	3	43, 47, 58
Of monastery	4	24, 29, 45, 51
Total	20	
Servants		
Generic	3	1, 18, 33
Of bishop	1	4
Of boyar	3	2, 9, 28
Of Court village	3	59–61
Of gentry	5	15, 23, 47, 48, 56
Of monastery	2	29, 51
Total	17	
Suburban (<i>posad</i>) [‡]	6	5, 10, 40, 42, 54, 55
Grand Total	76	

* I assume that the treasurer of a monastery was a monk.

† A Court village belonged to the Sovereign's Court (Dvor) or Household.

‡ A *posad* was a suburb or settlement of a city, occupied usually by artisans and petty traders, although musketeers and various foreigners could also occupy their own suburbs.

Table 9.7 enumerates the handful of cases which identified the type of weapon employed. One source (appendix 9.1, no. 14) listed three kinds of weapons, most sources listed none. It appears that the lower classes had access to swords. In a largely peasant society everyone would carry a knife, so

one would expect knives to figure far more prominently than they do.¹⁹ Peasants could certainly have bows and arrows and spears, for hunting. During Ivan IV's reign only professional soldiers, all musketeers (*strel'tsy*) and some town Cossacks, had gunpowder weapons.²⁰

Table 9.7. Weapons

Weapon	Count	Appendix 9.1 record no.
Bow and arrows	3	14, 43, 51
Knives	2	28, 45
Spears	2	14, 37
Swords	5	2, 6, 14, 43, 51
Total	12	

Table 9.8 tries to categorize the types of casualties involved. We have evidence of 35 instances from 61 documents. "Beaten" includes all physical abuse short of homicide. The number of beating victims probably exceeded the number of instances in which beating is specifically listed in the documents. One would expect a larger number of knife wounds. Almost a third of these cases include fatalities, but incidents involving fatalities might have been reported more often.

Table 9.8. Type of Casualty

Type of casualty	Count	Appendix 9.1 record no.
Beaten	14	4, 5, 9, 20, 44, 46 (and chained), 48, 50, 53, 55 (imprisoned), 58 (tortured and imprisoned), 59 (tortured), 60 (expelled), 61 (and imprisoned)
Cut	2	23, 45
Killed	19	2, 6, 7, 11, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 35, 40–43, 50, 52 (killed or kidnapped), 54, 59
Total	35	

¹⁹ Peasant knife violence was so rife that utopian reformer Ermolai-Erazm proposed that blacksmiths produce only dull knives to minimize resulting injuries. L. A. Dmitriev and D. S. Likhachev, ed., *Pamiatniki literatury drevnei Rusi: Konets XV–pervaia polovina XVI veka* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1984), 662.

²⁰ Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV's Professional Infantry, The Musketeers (*strel'tsy*): A Note on Numbers," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 30, 1 (2017): 96–116; Halperin, "Ivan IV's State Cossacks," *Journal of Military History* 82, 2 (2018): 357–71.

Technically, identifying the victims of crimes enumerated in table 9.9 presupposes knowing who was guilty, which sometimes can only be inferred. Peace agreements settling criminal proceedings out-of-court via private settlements usually indicate who was at fault. Victims came from all classes save boyars, who only assaulted each other in political crimes, and elite merchants (*gosty*), too few in number to show up, although “suburban” includes trading people, i.e., “common” merchants. The “Lithuanian” gentry man was a resident of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, not necessary an ethnic Lithuanian.²¹ When the Pokrov Monastery was reporting a crime against someone else I did not include them (nuns would be subsumed under “monks”) among victims. “Generic” peasants might be “black peasants,” who had no private owner or holder, but we cannot exclude the possibility that the document just omitted the name of a private owner. “Servants” here includes not only “servants” (*slugi*) but also “people” (plural *liudi*),²² who were probably slaves. I was not concerned with class when women were mentioned. Because there could be multiple victims in any given case, the total is 70 instances from 61 documents.

Table 9.9. Victims

Category	Count	Appendix 9.1 record no.
Gentry	11	6, 11, 16, 18, 19, 27, 28, 33, 40, 52, ³¹ 57
Monks	8	14, 17, 26, 30, 32, 37, 38, 55
Peasants		
Generic	6	2, 5, 18, 21, 39, 47
Of boyar	1	35
Of gentry	3	4, 20, 58
Of monastery	16	3, 9, 15, 17, 23, 29, 34, 42, 43, 45, 48–51, 54, 59
Total	26	
Priests	1	53
Servants		
Of bishop	1	60
Of gentry	3	22, 53, 59

²¹ The members of diplomatic delegations from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Muscovy had a tendency to get involved in violent scrapes with the natives, but these episodes will not be included here.

²² Singular “a man” (*chelovek*)

²³ *Litvin* (Lithuanian) meant a resident of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, not necessarily an ethnic Lithuanian.

Category	Count	Appendix 9.1 record no.
Of monastery	8	2, 7, 10, 23, 24, 33, 46, 61
Total	12	
Suburban resident (<i>posad</i>)	4	40, 41, 44, 56
Women		
Mothers	2	27, 39
Wives	5	3, 4, 43, 60, 61
"Women"	1	58
Total	8	
Grand total	70	

Table 9.10 compares the social breakdown of perpetrators and victims. Because gender is not a class category I did not include "Women" in table 9.6 of perpetrators, but I did include "Women" in table 9.9 of victims. I therefore excluded women from table 9.10 comparing the social identity of perpetrators and victims. Anti-brigandage officials and bandits never appear as victims. Given that monasteries preserved the documents of all lawsuits and cases in which they participated, it is quite expected that peasants of monasteries were more likely to be victims than perpetrators. The prominence of gentry in both lists attests to the vulnerability of the gentry as a class, which compelled some gentry to turn to crime to survive and rendered others incapable of defending themselves.

Table 9.10. Comparison by Social Class of Perpetrators and Victims

Social identity	Perpetrators, no. of cases	Victims, no. of cases
Anti-brigandage officials	2	0
Bandits	6	0
Clergy		
Monks	6	8
Priests	3	1
Total	9	9
Gentry	16	11
Peasants		
Generic	13	6
Of boyar	0	1
Of gentry	3	3

Social identity	Perpetrators, no. of cases	Victims, no. of cases
Of monasteries	4	16
Total	20	26
Servants		
Generic	3	
Of bishop	1	1
Of boyar	3	
Of Court villages	3	
Of gentry	5	3
Of monasteries	2	8
Total	17	12
Suburban	6	4
Grand total	76	62

Land was the primary form of property in Muscovy during the sixteenth century. Muscovy lacked a national survey definitively delineating the boundaries of properties. As a result, boundary disputes abounded in the countryside. Such disputes could easily degenerate into violence, up to and including open warfare between neighbors. Surprisingly, only seven records specify disputes over land ownership (appendix 9.1, nos. 3, 4, 10, 15, 18–20, 23). Of course, many disputes may have originated in boundary and ownership conflicts without saying so. One element of the data base is a conspicuous disinterest in motive, even in cases of personal assault or murder (appendix 9.1, nos. 24, 28, 44, 45).

The role of the rural labor shortage in the development of serfdom is well established. The forcible seizure of peasants—paying their exit fees, or not paying them as the case may be, and compelling them to relocate by force—was called the “export” (*vyvoz*) of peasants. The data base contains three such instances (appendix 9.1, nos. 20, 34, 46). Two cases of kidnaping may subsume cases of “export” of peasants, or may approximate modern kidnaping for ransom (appendix 9.1, nos. 43, 51).

Finally, I have identified six instances of urban crime, by which I mean crimes committed within city limits, not crimes committed by urban or suburban residents (appendix 9.1, nos. 28, 40, 44, 55, 56, 60). Appendix 9.1 contains my rationale for the categorization of these cases and other instances in which I did not include cases among urban crime (appendix 9.1, nos. 45, 54). Given the size of the data base, the percentage of these six urban cases compared to the entire data base is not that helpful, almost 10 percent. However, that percentage would be higher than what most historians consider the percentage

of the population residing in cities (2 percent), although such estimates derive from differing definitions of "city." The most intriguing aspect of the data concerning cities is the absence of even a single incident of street crime in Moscow, which, if true, would have made Moscow the safest city not only in early modern Eurasia, but in history. Recording-keeping and survival probably explain this anomaly.

The use of hagiography (saints' lives, *vitae*, *zhitiia*) as evidence of non-political violence requires separate consideration. In his master's dissertation Vasilii Kliuchevskii vigorously denied that the "facts" in saints' lives had any value at all,²⁴ and then proceeded to use those "facts" freely in his lectures on Russian history. Many subsequent historians have followed Kliuchevskii's practice rather than his methodological theory.

Concerning violence against monks Elena Romanenko observes that hermits sometimes chose to live among bandits in order to reform them, but usually bandits raided their cells or monasteries looking for booty, sometimes murdering them in the process. More often, however, local peasants, afraid that a monastery would acquire their land, did the looting and killing. Romanenko refers to instances of both bandit and peasant attacks and murders of monastic founders before, during, and after Ivan IV's reign.²⁵ To illustrate, Antonii Siiskii died in 1556. At an unspecified time but presumably during Ivan IV's reign, Vasilii Verb, tax collector for the archbishop of Novgorod, supposedly hired bandits to loot Antonii's monastery.²⁶ While he was at prayer at night the bandits encountered an armed crowd (the reader is expected to infer angels) protecting the monastery and ran away. Verb later confessed his sin and in tears asked Antonii for forgiveness.²⁷ In an incident that could have taken place in the early 1580s before Ivan IV died but probably occurred later, gentry man Bogdan Karpov, who held a conditional-land estate near the Andreian and Ferapont Monzenskii Monastery in Vologda and Kholmogory, thought to loot the monastery, but miraculously a fire broke out on his own lands first and prevented the raid.²⁸

²⁴ Vasilii Kliuchevskii, *Drevnerusskiiia zhitiia sviatykh kak istoricheskii istochnik* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988).

²⁵ Elena Romanenko, *Povsednevnaia zhizn' russkogo srednevekovogo monastyria* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2002), 24–32.

²⁶ Lay episcopal officials were no angels, but this detail is not convincing. Verb would more likely have used episcopal servants or peasants to perform the dirty deed.

²⁷ Romanenko, *Povsednevnaia zhizn'*, 39–40, 324; Elena Aleksandrovna Ryzhova, *Antonievo-Siiskii monastyr': Zhitie Antonii Siiskogo. Knizhnye tsentry russkogo severa* (Syktyvkar: Izdatel'stvo Syktyvskarskogo universiteta, 2000), 265–67.

²⁸ Romanenko, *Povsednevnaia zhizn'*, 40, 323.

We may infer that it was a hagiographic topos for saintly monks to reform bandits, to be protected from bandits by miracles and angels, and to be martyred by bandits. Someone writing a saint's life could for convenience lift language describing any of these events from an earlier vita, although the event might still have happened, or he could simply invent it.

In appendix 9.2 I have excerpted such cases from seven vitae that either depict events that reliably took place during Ivan's reign or that were written during Ivan's reign about events that occurred before Ivan's reign. Obviously Muscovites were not surprised that saints founded monasteries in regions afflicted with bandits. Drawing this conclusion does not necessitate accepting as accurate depictions of saints befriending and reforming bandits or bandit chieftains, or of angels protecting hermits, monks, or monasteries from violent harm, or of any miracles. While the death of monastic saints at the hands of bandits or peasants was certainly presented in order to establish their martyrdom, these events can probably be considered more reliable, because bandit and peasant violence against monks and monasteries can be corroborated by documentary evidence.

Conclusion

The violence that Ivan IV perpetrated upon Muscovite society during his bloody reign should not obscure the fact that daily nonpolitical violence was a fact of life in sixteenth-century Muscovy. Even leaving aside domestic violence and the mistreatment of slaves, everyday nonpolitical violence affected virtually all social classes, including clergy, and no government legislation could eliminate it. Brigandage remained a chronic problem. Moreover, members of virtually all social classes participated in violent acts of looting, robbery, assault, arson, and murder against members of their own and other classes. Even the orgy of state violence during the oprichnina did not alter this state of affairs. Nonpolitical violence diminished during the oprichnina but returned with a vengeance after its abolition. The experience of watching violent government crime run rampant during the oprichnina did not induce Muscovites to give up their proclivity to resort to violence for personal or economic motives. Even when it came to law and disorder, the oprichnina did not fundamentally change Muscovite society.

Appendix 9.1. Documents

Abbreviations

ASZ 1	<i>Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka</i> , vol. 1 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Arkheograficheskii tsentr,' 1997).
ASZ 4	<i>Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev XV–nachala XVII veka</i> , vol. 4 (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2008).
Dopolneniia 1	<i>Dopolneniia k Aktam istoricheskim, sobrannia i izdaniia Arkheograficheskoiu Kommissiei</i> , vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia II otdeleniia Sobstvennoi EIV kantseliarii, 1846).
Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1	A. Fedotov-Chekhovskii, comp. <i>Akty otnosiashchiesia do grazhdanskoi raspravy drevnei Rossii</i> , vol. 1 (Kiev: Tipografiia I. and A. Davidenko, 1860).
Koretskii	Vadim Ivanovich Koretskii, <i>Zakreposhchenie krest'ian i klassovaia bor'ba v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVI v.</i> (Moscow: Nauka, 1970).
Mashtafarov	A. V. Mashtafarov, "Iavochnye chelobitnye 1568–1612 godov iz arkhiva Suzdal'skogo Pokrovskogo Devich'ego monastriia," <i>Russkii diplomatarii</i> 9 (2003): 273–338.
Pistsovyia knigi	<i>Pistsovyia knigi Moskovskago Gosudarstva</i> , chast' 1: <i>Pistsovyia knigi XVI veka. Otdelenie II. Mestnosti gubernii Iaroslavskoi, Tverskoi, Vitebskoi, Smolenskoi, Kaluzhskoi, Orlovskoi, Tul'skoi</i> (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskoe russkoe geograficheskoe obshchestvo, 1877).
Pamiatniki	<i>Pamiatniki russkoi pis'mennosti XV–XVI vv.: Riiazanskii krai</i> (Moscow: Nauka, 1978).
RIB 2	<i>RIB</i> , vol. 2 (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskii kommissiia, 1876), no. 186, 771–93.

- RIB 25 *Akty Kholmogorskoï i Ustiuzhskoi eparkhii*, kniga tret'ia v prilozhenii: *Akty Lodonskoi tserkvi* (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, 1908)
- RIB 32 *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vol. 32 (Petrograd: Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, 1915).
- Sadikov, "Iz istorii" P. A. Sadikov, "Iz istorii oprichniny XVI v.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 3 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1940), 113–303.
1. Peace agreement after battles and looting: *RIB*, vol. 17 (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, 1898), no. 503, 185.
 2. A monastic "servant" accused the steward of the governor of Kashira and his "people" (slaves and servants), who resisted arrest, of banditry, theft, and murder: Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, nos. 45, 47–52.
 3. A gentry man led a bandit attack on a monastic hamlet which he considered his property: Vladimir Borisovich Kobrin, *Vlast' i sobstvennost' v srednevekovoi Rossii (XV–XVI vv.)* (Moscow: Mysl', 1985), 183.
 4. Episcopal servants were accused of brigandage and looting when they invaded a patrimonial new hamlet (*pochinok*), beating the wives of the residents, ravaging the houses, seizing livestock, silver vessels and crosses, tools and clothing, and burning rye: *Pamiatniki*, no. 66, 103–04.
 5. "Urban inhabitants" (*gorodskie*) were accused of invading a hamlet, looting, trampling fields and meadows, running off livestock and horses, expelling peasants, and beating two men sent to them afterward to protest:²⁹ *ASZ* 1, no. 314, 304–12.
 6. A man was murdered by a husband and wife and their "man," who entered his house and killed him with swords, committing banditry and looting: *RIB* 2, no. 186, 771–93.
 7. Peasants burned four churches and buildings, killed servants, and looted a monastery: Koretskii, 237; Margarita Vladimirovna Kukush-

²⁹ I have included this case in appendix 9.1 despite the plaintiff's inability to substantiate his accusation.

kina, *Monastyrskie biblioteki russkogo severa: Ocherki po istorii knizhnoi kul'tury XVI–XVII vekov* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1977), 27.

8. Bandits looted a village: Koretskii, 235–36.
9. A monastery's village administrator and peasants accused two "men" of a boyar of driving away peasants from a monastery hamlet; assault; and theft of livestock, clothing from furs to underwear, household goods of towels, dishes, spoons, frying pans, agricultural implements of plows with moldboards, axes, scythes, sickles; jewelry; money; and grain: Ann M. Kleimola, *Justice in Medieval Russia: Muscovite Judgment Charters (pravye gramoty) of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1975), 23.
10. A monastery servant claimed that suburban people, including priests, destroyed and looted a monastery and its mill, stealing grain and killing a monasterial servant: Fedotov-Chekhovskii 1, no. 57, 92–110.
11. A patrimonial landowner was killed on the road by bandits: Koretskii, 236.
12. Taxes and fines were collected for battles and looting: *RIB 25: Akty Kholmogorskoi i Ustiuzhskoi eparkhii*, kniga tret'ia v prilozhenii: *Akty Lodomskoi tserkvi* (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, 1908), xxxiv, 23–24.
13. Bandits attacked property, looted, burned, and committed murder on conditional land estates: Koretskii, 236.
14. Peasant bandits, aided by a village priest, attacked a monk with swords, bows, and spears, robbing and killing him: Koretskii, 240.
15. Gentry and their "people" seized land belonging to a monastery by force, and stole money from beekeepers, one of whom disappeared: Nikolai Petrovich Likhachev, *Sbornik aktov sobrannykh v arkhivakh i bibliotekakh*. 1: *Dukhovnye i sgovornye gramoty*, vyp. 2, *Gramoty pravye* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1895), xii, 220–36.
16. A man was robbed of money on the road: *Dopolneniia* 1, no. 51/IX, 76–77.

17. Monastery elders and peasants accused gentry of looting a disputed village in a night attack, and stealing clothing, tools, money, and grain: A. V. Antonov, "Pravaia gramota 1555 goda iz arkhiva Nizhegorodskogo Dudina monasterya," *Russkii diplomatarii* 6 (2000): 159–67.
18. A dispute that erupted involving the "man" of a gentry man and another gentry man, his relatives, "people," and peasants degenerated into violence and theft: *Dopolneniia* 1, no. 51/I, 72.
19. Gentry accused other gentry, their "people" and peasants of seizing disputed land by force, violating a previous judgment charter, burning down a house, and stealing clothing, money, and horses: *Dopolneniia* 1, no. 51/V, 73–75.
20. Gentry accused other gentry of the forcible removal of peasants. Those peasants who refused to leave were beaten, put in irons, tortured, and imprisoned: *Pamiatniki russkogo prava*, 4: *Pamiatniki prava perioda ukrepleniia russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva: XV–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1956), 111–12.
21. Peasant wives declared that their husbands had been robbed and killed by bandits: *Dopolneniia* 1, no. 51/ XI, 77.
22. A gentry-man "man" was robbed and murdered: N. P. Likhachev, *Razriadnye d'iaki XVI veka: Opyt istoricheskago izsledovaniia* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Belashova, 1888), 282 n. 4.
23. A gentry man's "man" accused a monastery's bailiffs and peasants of attacking and looting their conditional land estate, committing violent assault and looting. The monastery counterclaimed that the accuser led a raid that burned their settlement, stole 31 horses, and wounded people by cutting their arms and legs: *Fedotov-Chekhovskii* 1, no. 70, 147–65.
24. A monastery servant and peasants reached an agreement over the murder of a servant of another monastery: *RIB* 32, no. 213, 436–37.³⁰

³⁰ Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment*, 170, notes that although church institutions were expressly forbidden by law to settle criminal cases, they did so anyway to avoid state courts and possible punishments, but only in cases that did not involve professional criminals.

25. Brigands robbed an estate: *ASZ* 1, no. 116, 87–93.
26. A monk was murdered: Jennifer B. Spock, “Administering a Right Life: Secular and Spiritual Guidance at Solovki in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” *Russian History* 39 (2012): 164 n. 48.³¹
27. Nineteen peasants killed their conditional estate holder and nineteen other people, including his mother, wife, and children, who were burned:³² Koretskii, 249.
28. A “man” or slave (*kholop*) of a boyar knifed a man on the square, who now lay near death: *RIB* 32, no. 237, 487; A. A. Zimin, *Oprichnina* (Moscow: Territoria, 2001), no. 4, 420–21.³³
29. Servants and peasants of a monastery accused servants and peasants of another monastery, at the order of their abbot, of starting a battle, robbery, cutting down a beekeeping forest, stealing beehives, and absconding with personal belongings after killing some beekeepers: Mashtafarov, no. 1, 275–76.
30. Monastic elders killed and robbed their abbot: *Pistovoyia knigi*, 1522.
31. Supporters of a heretic set fire to and destroyed many churches: Koretskii, 245–48.³⁴
32. Peasants burned a monastery to the ground: Koretskii, 255.
33. A boyar³⁵ was liable for murder: Sadikov, “Iz istorii,” no. 50, 254–56.
34. A monastery servant claimed that gentry coercively removed peasants from their villages, started a battle, and looted property: *Opisanie aktov sobraniia grafa A. S. Uvarova: Akty istoricheskie*, ed. M. V. Dovnar-

³¹ Cf. A. A. Zimin, *Krupnaia feodal’naia votchina i sotsial’no-politicheskaia bor’ba v Rossii (konets XV–XVI vv.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 154.

³² By setting fire to a dwelling?

³³ No motive is given. The “square” can only have been in a city.

³⁴ This is not a documentary source, but not a saint’s life either, so I have included it in this appendix.

³⁵ I do not think that this boyar personally committed murder, but he would be liable for the actions of the likely perpetrators, either his peasants or his servants.

- Zapol'skii (Moscow: Tipografiia G. Lissnera and D. Sovko, 1905), no. 45, 50–54.
35. The Banditry Bureau ordered the arrest of a gentry man for acts of brigandage, robbery, the looting of property, and the murder of twenty-two men on the patrimonial village of a boyar: ASZ 1, no. 235, 210–11; Sadikov, "Iz istorii," no. 60, 267–69; *Akty otnosiashchiesia do iuridicheskago byta drevnei Rusi*, 2 (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia, 1864), no. 230, II, 667–69;³⁶ Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment*, 126, 215.³⁷
 36. Peasants burned down a monastery: Petr Alekseevich Sadikov, *Ocherki po istorii oprichniny* (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1950), 370.
 37. Monastic elders killed their abbot and stole money:³⁸ *Pistsovyia knigi*, 1522.
 38. The sovereign's beekeepers forcibly seized the meadows of a monastery. Previously the beekeepers had been found guilty of brigandage: *Pamiatniki*, no. 83, 116–21.
 39. A gentry man accused another gentry man and his son of beating his mother, burning his household, and looting property: ASZ 4, no. 187, 148–49.
 40. Gentry made peace with a woman and her brother for the murder of her husband.³⁹ *RIB* 32, no. 276, 547.⁴⁰

³⁶ Two weeks later another "instruction" ordered the bishop of Kolomna to assist the gentry man assigned to summon a grand jury, arrest the bandit, confiscate his ill-gotten property, and send both to Moscow (Sadikov, "Iz istorii," #61, 269–70; ASZ 1, #236, 212).

³⁷ Cf. Igor' Vladimovich Kurukin and Andrei Alekseevich Bulychev, *Povsednevnaia zhizn' oprichnikov Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2010), 232–33.

³⁸ See appendix 9.1, no. 30 above for their first offense.

³⁹ Because this document was written by a "square scribe" (*ploshchadnoi d'iak*), it can be included among urban crimes, but the specific location remains unknown.

⁴⁰ See Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment*, 170.

41. A merchant/industrialist was killed by bandits: Andrei Aleksandrovich Vvedenskii, *Dom Stroganovykh v XVI–XVII vekakh* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1962), 46.
42. Suburban residents were accused of engaging in battle and robbing residents of an island, stealing dogs, hares, wolves, foxes, horses, personal belongings, clothing, gold and silver jewels, traps, and knives. One man was missing, two men were known dead: Mashtafarov, no. 2, 276–77.
43. A monastery village administrator and peasants claimed that a Royal Household village administrator sent his peasants, ninety-three of whom are named, to engage in battle and rob them, shooting arrows, using swords, stealing money, clothing, food, goods, and a mill (?), and dishonoring their wives and kidnapping two peasants: Mashtafarov, no. 3, 277–80; *RIB* 32, no. 287, 566–72.
44. A priest claimed that a man attacked him in the street while he was counting money, overthrew his money board, seized him by the throat and wanted to strangle him, ripped his clothing, and dishonored him:⁴¹ *RIB*, vol. 14 (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaiia kommissiia, 1894), no. 62, 117–18.
45. A man accused a man of imposing serious injury and losses on him while he was talking to his brother. The assailant and his mother accosted him and an accomplice inflicted a knife wound. Money was stolen:⁴² Mashtafarov, no. 4, 280.
46. A monastic servant accused the treasurer of another monastery of assault (“battle”) when confronted on behalf of peasants who had left the estates of the second monastery at the designated time, received a release, and paid all fees, but had been seized, beaten, and robbed; the victim was also robbed of monastery money and then kept him in chains:⁴³ Mashtafarov, no. 5, 280–81.

⁴¹ No motive is given. Counting money on a board in the street suggests urban crime.

⁴² No motive is given. I assume that the street was in a village, not an urban suburb, because the location is not described as a square or in relation to a church. I infer that both perpetrator and victim were monastery peasants.

⁴³ Concerning peasant departure usually the charge of violence was made against men supposedly stealing peasants, not those refusing to honor legal departures.

47. Peasants presented a petition accusing an administrator (*prikazshchik*) and his peasants of expropriating a grove of trees by force, and looting residences. *Pistsovye materialy Tverskogo uyezda XVI veka*, comp. A. V. Antonov (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2005), 378–80.
48. A gentry man and his “people” were accused of beating and robbing the personal belongings of a monasterial peasant: Mashtafarov, no. 7, 282–83.
49. A peasant and his sons and others of a court village were accused of invading monastic lands, committing robbery, destroying a monastic horse barn, and taking seven Nogai horses, ten mares, and a total of twenty-seven horses: Mashtafarov, no. 8, 283–84.
50. Monastery patrimony (peasants?) and a householder (*dvornik*) were beaten and robbed of the monastery treasury they were carrying as well as their personal belongings, and two horses were stolen. Two of them were murdered:⁴⁴ Mashtafarov, no. 8, 283–84.
51. A Royal Household peasant village accused the elders, servants, and peasants of two monasteries of assaulting village officials with bows and arrows and swords when they were returning to their village and murdering several in the process of robbing them. Two peasants were seized, and their whereabouts remained unknown: Mashtafarov, no. 9, 284–85.
52. A newly arrived former resident of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was seized at night on his conditional land estate by many bandits and peasants. It was not known if he was killed: ASZ 4, no. 84, 65–66.
53. “Men” of two gentry chased the brigand who was guilty of assaulting a priest, caught him, and sent him to Suzdal’, where an anti-brigandage head of one-hundred (*guba soten’naia golova*) and the anti-brigandage sworn-men (*tseloval’niki*) refused to accept the prisoner and physically drove the “men” off:⁴⁵ Mashtafarov, no. 11, 286.

⁴⁴ The incidents in appendix 9.1, no. 49 and no. 50 are contained in the same document, but they are separate, although they occurred at approximately the same time.

⁴⁵ Technically, the perpetrators here were government agents, but these are locals, not governors or commanders (*voevody*), so I did not classify their actions as state violence. They were, nevertheless, guilty of malfeasance. “Driving” men off entailed violence.

54. A female peasant of monastery land accused named suburban people of murdering and robbing her husband.⁴⁶ Mashtafarov, no. 12, 287.
55. A *zakupshchik* ("kupchina"—indentured laborer?) of a monastery and a leather-worker, sent with cash by the monastery's treasurer to a village and county to buy supplies, cloth, and vegetables, accused suburban residents, including a blacksmith and a butcher, of attacking them near the custom's house at the city gates on the square, beating him, robbing him of the monastery's and his own money, and improperly imprisoning him.⁴⁷ Mashtafarov, no. 14, 288.
56. Suburban residents accused a gentry envoy (*poslannik dvorianin*) and his "people" of brigandage (*vorovstvo*). While spending the night at their household, they forcibly evicted them, and stole men's and women's personal belongings.⁴⁸ Mashtafarov, no. 15, 289.
57. Sovereign's linen-producing county (*polotnianitskie volosti*) peasants burned the residence (*usadishche*) of four Court "men" (*liudi dvorovye*): *Agrarnaia istoriia severo-zapada Rossii XVI veka: Novgorodskie piatiny* (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1974), 206.
58. Peasants of a gentry-man accused an anti-brigandage sworn-man, a clerk (*d'iachok*), the peasants and peasant elder, and the "people" of an official of unfounded confiscation of property from a conditional land estate and abducting women who were "tortured" (*muchali*). The accused extorted money from these women, and also stole horses, clothing, and utensils from the two petitioners.⁴⁹ Mashtafarov, no. 17, 290–91.
59. A monastery servant [see appendix 9.1, no. 43] accused a village administrator, thirty of his "people" and court peasants of attacking a monastic patrimonial hamlet, stealing goods, and seizing and imprisoning two monastery peasants, who were robbed and dishonored. Complaints against the perpetrators resulted in further insult

⁴⁶ These were urban criminals, but I assume that the victim was already out of the city and its suburbs, so the crime is not urban.

⁴⁷ This was clearly an urban crime.

⁴⁸ Government officials on official business were authorized to commandeer local housing as needed, but forcibly evicting the residents constituted abuse of power.

⁴⁹ This is another case of malfeasance by antibrigandage personnel.

and robbery of monastic and personal funds. Peasants were tortured three times, from which one died: Masthtafarov, no. 18, 291–92.

60. An episcopal official (*nedel'shchik*) accused a court village administrator and a dozen court peasants⁵⁰ of freeing two men arrested for the theft (*tatebnoe delo*) of horses, grain, and other goods, as well as forcibly seizing a wife from a village with all her and her husband's property, livestock and grain. The victim was robbed and nearly beaten to death.⁵¹ Mashtafarov, no. 19, 292–93.
61. A monastery servant accused a village administrator, his "people" and court peasants and a total of fifty-one peasants, local-government clerks (*zemskie d'iaki*), and a village elder of unwarranted imprisonment, looting, and dishonor. A victim who refused to pay extorted money was put in irons. Over three hundred men attacked, taking monastic money and personal belongings. The victim was starved (almost) to death together with his wife, children, and "people," beaten and imprisoned. Money was extorted from him.⁵² Mashtafarov, no. 20, 293–95.

Appendix 9.2: Saints' Lives

Additional Abbreviation

<i>Biblioteka</i>	<i>Biblioteka literatury drevnei Rusi</i> , 13: XVI vek (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2005).
Budovnits	Isaak Urielevich Budovnits, <i>Monastyri na Rusi i bor'ba s nimi krest'ian v XIV–XVI vekakh (po zhitiam sviatykh)</i> (Moscow: Nauka 1966).

1. Kornilii Komel'skii vita
Kornilii Komel'skii's vita was written in the middle of the sixteenth century, although it was set earlier. Kornilii ordered the bandits and demons who infested the Komel'sk forest in Belozero to depart. When

⁵⁰ See appendix 9.1, no. 51, where they are the plaintiffs, not the defendants.

⁵¹ This crime was committed both in the city of Suzdal' and in the countryside.

⁵² Appendix 9.1, no. 61 features the same perpetrators and accuser as appendix 9.1, no. 60, but constitutes a separate incident.

the chief of the bandits died, his confederates were dispersed by Kornilii's prayers. The bandits who stole Kornilii's books and reveled all night repented in the morning and returned the books: *Biblioteka*, 304–353, here 308.

2. Kirill Novoezerskii vita

Kirill Novoezerskii's vita was written in the middle of the sixteenth century. A bandit named Ivan with his confederates arrived by boat on the island on which Kirill lived, wishing to rob him. He told them that his silver was in his cell. As one bandit entered his cell, all the rest were blinded. The bandit in the cell said that two youths (angels) beat him and he could not leave. All the bandits asked Kirill for forgiveness and swore not to return. Kirill freed all of them from their illnesses, and they left: *Biblioteka*, 354–415, here 376.

3. Adrian Poshekhonskii vita

Adrian Poshekhonskii's vita was written after 1572. In 1550 Belozeltsy⁵³ led by a local priest robbed Adrian, killed him,⁵⁴ and then launched a full-scale armed assault on his monastery, killing the elder David and stealing honey, wax, books, oil, church vessels, horses, and clothing: *Budovnits*, 301–04, here 303–04.⁵⁵

4. Andrei Zavalishin/Adrian vita

Adrian made a deal with "bandits" but was killed by "evil people:"⁵⁶ *Budovnits*, 329–31, here 331.

⁵³ According to Romanenko, the Belozeltsy were "white villagers" (Romanenko, *Povsednevnaia zhizn'*, 27–30, 323); according to Koretskii, peasants (Koretskii, *Zakreposhchenie krest'ian*, 238). Presumably a "white village" was one which had received a tax exemption via a royal privilege charter (*zhalovannaia gramota*).

⁵⁴ According to Zimin, *Reformy Ivana Groznogo*, 314, the peasants who killed Adrian later killed founders of a neighboring hermitage.

⁵⁵ Romanenko, *Povsednevnaia zhizn'*, 27–30, 323; Koretskii, *Zakreposhchenie krest'ian*, 238.

⁵⁶ According to Stevens, "Banditry and Provincial Order in Sixteenth-Century Russia," 592–93, Adrian converted the chieftains of two bandit groups. She cites I. M. Kontzevitch, *Northern Thebaïd: Monastic Saints of the Russian North* (Platina, CA: St. Seraphim Rose Foundation, 1975), 135–36 (in the 1995 edition accessible to me, 139). Adrian was later killed by robbers, presumably not from those two bandit groups.

5. Nila Solbenskii vita
The seventeenth-century vita of Nila Solbenskii refers to bandits: Budovnits, 349–53.
6. Nikandr Pskovskii vita
The Nikandr Pskovskii vita, written twenty years after he died in 1584, records that bandits stole icons from him: Budovnits, 354–56.
7. Gerasim Boldunskii vita
The Gerasim Boldunskii vita was copied in 1576 but survives only in seventeenth-century manuscripts. It recounts that in 1528 Gerasim came to a place where bandits resided, established a monastery in honor of John the Baptist in 1530, and consecrated his church in 1540. Banditry, murder, and bloodletting abounded in the region: E. V. Kru-shel'nitskaia, "Zaveshchanie-ustav Gerasima Boldinskogo," *Trudy ot-dela drevnerusskoi literatury* 48 (1983): 268.

Diplomacy

Chapter 10

The Khan and the Elite: The Muscovite Perception of the Political Culture of the Crimean Khanate

Discussion of the question of Mongol (Tatar) influence upon Russia's political structure has varied with changing interpretations of the nature of Mongol political culture. During the Cold War the Mongol Empire and its successor states were considered examples of oriental despotism, so it was asserted that the Juchid ulus, usually anachronistically called the Golden Horde, the Tatar successor state that governed medieval Rus', transformed Russia into an oriental despotism.¹ When Inner Asian historians began emphasizing the collegial and consensual elements of steppe empires, including the Mongol Empire, some Muscovite historians began to interpret such features of Muscovite political culture as the Royal Council (Duma) and Assembly of the Land (Zemskii sobor) as products of Tatar influence.² Now Michael Hope has reconciled these seemingly contradictory interpretations of Mongol political culture, to be sure minus the Eurocentric prejudice of the concept of "oriental despotism," by making a persuasive case that Mongol political culture contained two political traditions, one of virtually unlimited royal power, ex-

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¹ Karl August Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

² Donald Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions," *Slavic Review* 49, 4 (1990): 525–42; Ostrowskii, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1–132; Ostrowski, "The Façade of Legitimacy: Exchange of Power and Authority in Early Modern Russia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, 3 (2002): 534–63; Ostrowski, "The Assembly of the Land (Zemskii sobor) as a Representative Institution," in *Modernizing Muscovy: Reform and Social Change in Seventeenth-Century Russia*, ed. Jarmo Kotilaine and Marshall Poe (London: Routledge, Curzon, 2004), 117–41.

emplified first and foremost by the authority of Chinggis Khan himself, and the other, of consensual, collegial rule, institutionalized, among other ways, in the holding of *quriltais* (councils) to decide political and military issues.³ Therefore, it is now possible to argue that Muscovy could have “inherited” or “borrowed” *both* authoritarian and consensual models of political culture from the Tatars.

Michael Cherniavsky investigated the image of the khan in Rus'/Muscovite political ideology,⁴ but to my knowledge no historian has asked how the Rus' perceived Mongol political culture in practice. Did the Muscovite political elite consider Mongol khans unlimited rulers or the first among equals who in their actions had to take into account the opinions of the Tatar elite, not only other Chingissids but also the tribal and clan elite? For the thirteenth to fifteenth century very few Rus' sources, mostly narratives such as chronicles and hagiography, address this question,⁵ although they are sufficient to attest to intimate Rus' familiarity with the institutions, society, and geography of the Juchid ulus.⁶ However, a body of texts survive from the reign of Ivan IV that provide fascinating evidence on this issue.

The “Crimean Affairs” (*Krymskie dela*) of the “diplomatic books” (*posol'skie knigi*) supply detailed information about Muscovy's relations with the Crimean Khanate. Previously published volumes on Crimean-Muscovite relations before the reign of Ivan IV have been utilized to analyze the Crimean clan system.⁷ Historians have long utilized the unpublished documents from Ivan IV's reign.⁸ Recently two of these books have been published, giving his-

³ Michael Hope, *Power, Politics and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the Ilkhanate of Iran* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁴ Michael Cherniavsky, “Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory,” in *The Structure of Russian History*, ed. Cherniavsky (New York: Random House, 1970), 65–79.

⁵ Chronicles present incidents in the Muscovite dynastic disputes of the middle of the fifteenth century in a way that suggests the role of the elite in Horde politics, but by then the Juchid ulus had already begun to fragment. Charles J. Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke: The Image of the Mongols in Medieval Russia* (Bloomington: Slavica, 2009), 157–69.

⁶ Charles J. Halperin, “Know Thy Enemy: Medieval Russian Familiarity with the Mongols of the Golden Horde,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 30 (1982): 161–75.

⁷ Beatrice Forbes Manz, “The Clans of the Crimean Khanate, 1466–1532,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, 3 (1978): 282–309.

⁸ Aleksei Vladimirovich Vinogradov, *Russko-Krymskie otnosheniia 50-e–vtoraia polovina 70-kh godov XVI veka*, 2 vols. (Moscow: IRI RAN, 2007).

torians who cannot work in the archives full access to their rich evidence.⁹ The diplomatic books are based upon unedited primary sources. The bureaucrats of the Ambassadorial Bureau (Posol'skii prikaz) constructed a coherent diplomatic narrative from the raw material of the memos, instructions, epistles, and reports of its officials, which often included untouched documentation.¹⁰ Muscovite-Crimean diplomatic contacts were particularly intense during the period covered by these two books, which included the 1569 Ottoman-Crimean attempt to conquer Astrakhan' and the 1571 Crimean burning of Moscow. The books end just as Muscovite forces defeated the Crimean khan at the battle of Molodi in 1572.

These Crimean diplomatic documents from Ivan IV's reign are particularly valuable because the comparable sources for Muscovite relations with the Kazan' and Astrakhan' khanates have been lost, and we can only infer that their contents would reveal a similar picture of the political and social structure of those khanates.

As Aleksandr Malov observes, Muscovite translators had no difficulty dealing with the Ottomanized Crimean Turkic language of Crimean diplomatic correspondence to Moscow, even if copyists frequently garbled Turkic names.¹¹

The Muscovite elite possessed intimate knowledge of the political situation in Crimea. Most of all Muscovy knew the identity of all of the political players in the Crimean Khanate.¹² Indeed, Ivan, or sometimes his eldest son, Tsarevich Ivan, corresponded with most of them, receiving and replying to epistles (*gramoty*) which were faithfully translated and preserved in the state archive, although apparently a series of correspondence with second-tier members of the elite was not included in the diplomatic books.¹³ Correspondence was exchanged not only with khan (*tsar'*) Devlet-Girei, but with his

⁹ I. V. Zaitsev, ed., *Posol'skaia kniga po sviaziam Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymom 1571–1577* (Moscow: Fond "Marzhdani," 2015) [hereafter PK 1571–1577]; M. V. Moiseev, ed., *Posol'skaia kniga po sviaziam Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymom 1567–1572* (Moscow: Fond "Russkie Vitiazii," 2016) [hereafter PK 1567–1572]. These volumes overlap chronologically. A. V. Malov, "Trinadsataia posol'skaia kniga v deloproizvodstve Posol'skogo prikaza: Sostav, struktura, formirovanie," in PK 1567–1572, 4.

¹⁰ Nikolai Mikhailovich Rogozhin, *Posol'skie knigi Rossii kontsa XV–nachala XVII vv.* (Moscow: IRI RAN, 1994).

¹¹ Malov, "Trinadsataia posol'skaia kniga," 20.

¹² The Rus' always paid close attention to the elite and administrative personnel of the Juchid ulus during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries (Halperin, "Know Thy Enemy," 168–70, 173–75).

¹³ A. V. Vinogradov, "Chetyrnadsataia krymskaia posol'skaia kniga v russko-krymskikh otnoshenii, 1571–1577," in PK 1571–1577, 33.

heir-apparent, the *kalga*, *tsarevich* (sultan) Magmet-Girei (sometimes written as Mukhamed-Girei), and with other tsarevichi (sons of the khan): Adyl-Girei, Alp-Girei, Islam-Girei, Kazy-Girei, Biti-Girei, Mubarek Girei, and Saip-Girei, as well as the eldest son of the *kalga* Seadet-Girei.¹⁴ Moscow was sensitive to the role royal women, wives, and mothers of Chingissids, played in Crimean politics. It was more than courtesy that motivated Moscow not only not to discourage epistles to Ivan from *tsaritsa* (khansha, wife of a khan) Anabiiim-tsaritsa, also called Aisha-Saltan or Aisha-Fatma-Saltan, first wife of Devlet-Girei and mother of the *kalga* Magmet-Girei and tsarevich Ayl-Girei, and his other wives Khansiur', also called Khan Suiuer or Khan Suret, as well as Khanikei, Perkan, Khantotai, and Shirvan, but to attempt to fulfill whatever requests they made.¹⁵ In addition, Moscow communicated with politically prominent non-Chingissids led by Prince (bek) Sulesh (*amiat*, intermediary in diplomatic relations between Muscovy and the khanate, who called himself Ivan's *slug*, servitor),¹⁶ also called Suleiman-shakh, and his sons, also beks or princes, Suleiman-ishan or Suleimanshi, Murad-Murza, Sefer-Murza, Akhmed-murza pasha, Araslan-Murza, and Ianshi-Pasha, all sometimes called "sons of Sulesh" (Suleshov), plus Murtaza-Miraz and his brother Mustafa-Aga, Prince Kasym or Kasim, a member of the divan, Prince Divei, a *qarachi* beg,¹⁷ head of the Mangyt or Mansur clan, and Prince Azi of the Shirin clan, all considered "privy people,"¹⁸ along with Musly-Atalyk and Derbysh-Aatalyk. Couriers from Crimea brought Ivan epistles and petitions from the khan, *kalga*, tsarevichi, tsaritsy, princes, and murzas (or mirzas, non-Chingissid nobles) (PK 1571–1577, 223–24).

The Ambassadorial Bureau developed intelligence assets in Crimea, beginning with the highly influential Prince Sulesh and his sons, but did not

¹⁴ Consult PK 1567–1572 name index (*imennoi ukazatel'*) (380–91) and PK 1571–1571 annotated name index (*annotirovannyi imennoi ukazatel'*) (343–65) s.v. all names of Crimeans mentioned in this paragraph.

¹⁵ Bruno De Nicola, *Women in Mongol Iran: The Khatuns, 1206–1335* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017).

¹⁶ I think "servitor" here is generic. Sulesh was not comparing himself to the Muscovite "servitor" (*slug*) Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Vorotynskii, a unique high status.

¹⁷ The *karachi* (literally: black) *begs* were the heads of the four or five main Crimean clans who comprised the apex of the non-Chingissid clan-tribal elite. Uli Schamiloglu, "The *Qaraci* Beys of the Late Golden Horde: Notes on the Organization of the Mongol World Empire," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 4 (1984): 283–97.

¹⁸ Vinogradov, "Chetyrnadtsataia krymskaia posol'skaia kniga," 54.

confine itself to one family alone. Prince Mustafa-Aga wrote Ivan that his right shoulder served Khan Devlet-Girei and his left shoulder served Ivan.¹⁹

Nor was Moscow above trying to influence personnel decisions in Crimea, specifically of who the khan would send to Moscow. The Muscovite envoy told the khan to send one of three privy people as ambassador (*posol*):²⁰ Gamza-mirza, brother of Mustafa; Sefer-Mirza, brother of Murat; or atalyk Dervish, or at least someone of good breeding (literally: from a good tribe, *plemia* in Crimea).²¹

Given this expertise in Crimean politics, it is well worth asking whether the government in Moscow perceived the political structure of the Crimean Khanate as analogous to that of Muscovy or essentially different from it.

In no uncertain terms the Muscovite diplomatic records depicted the political culture of the Crimean Khanate as collegial and consensual, requiring the khan, Devlet-Girei, to consult his elite on all important decisions. Indeed, Muscovy insisted that the elite ratify the khan's actions, such as signing an alliance with Muscovy. The Crimean Khanate reciprocated by insisting that its political decisions had been ratified by the khan, the royal clan, and the elite. Even more intriguing is the fact that Muscovite bureaucrats, diplomats, and scribes projected Muscovite political terminology onto the Crimean Khanate, using vocabulary and concepts taken from Muscovite political discourse to narrate Crimean behavior.

The diplomatic books describe the khan as "taking counsel" with his elite by holding a *duma*, the term for the Moscow Royal Council. The act of consultation was expressed with the verb derived from that noun, *pridumati*, literally: to think with.²² The khan held a "meeting" and a council (*s'ezd, дума*).²³ Not only did the khan "think" (*dumati*) with the ulans (oglans, elite cavalry), princes, and *qarachi* begs, but the Crimean Affairs papers utilize the same verb to signal the assent of those consulted as that in standard Muscovite political discourse: the *qarachi* beys "agreed" (*prigovorili*) with the khan.²⁴ In Muscovite

¹⁹ PK 1571–1577, 253.

²⁰ Most of the time Crimea sent envoys (*gontsy*) to Moscow, a lower diplomatic rank.

²¹ PK 1571–1577, 258.

²² PK 1567–1572, 78, 96.

²³ Ibid., 101.

²⁴ Ibid., 114.

decrees, "the tsar and grand prince decreed and the boyars agreed" (*tsar' i velikii kniaz' ukazal i boiare prigovorili*).²⁵

Devlet Girei and the tsarevichi *dumali* whether to attack the Muscovite border with Prince Selim (PK 1571–1577, 65). Devlet also discussed Ivan's communique with the tsarevichi, the qarachi, the ulans, princes, and murzas (PK 1567–1572, 161, 172). Envoys from the (Crimean) tsar', tsarevichi, tsaritsy, princes, and mirzas traveled to Moscow (PK 1571–1577, 61). Moscow insisted that it was insufficient for Devlet alone to take an oath to abide by the terms of the proposed Muscovite-Crimean alliance; the kalga, tsarevichi, qarachi, ulans, princes, murzas, *atalyki* (guardian or mentor, literally "uncle," of a Chinggissid, usually a minor) all had to take the oath (PK 1567–1572, 91). In his commentary Malov describes the assembly at which the khan and the elite took this oath as a quriltai (PK 1567–1572, 362 n. xxi). Devlet-Girei promised that if Ivan gave him and his sons Kazan' and Astrakhan', then the tsarevichi, qarachi, princes, good "courtiers" (*dvoriane*), another Muscovite term for members of the "court" (*dvor*), the royal household, princes, and all ulans would take a solemn loyalty oath (*sil'naia shert'*) to Ivan (PK 1571–1577, 83–84).

Kalga Magmet-Girei wrote Ivan that his father had announced before all the qarachi and the "best people" (*lutshchie ludi*, a common expression in Muscovite sources to refer to the Muscovite upper classes) his desire for friendship between the two yurts (the Turkic term for polity) of Muscovy and Crimea (PK 1571–1577, 87),

The diplomatic papers recorded that Devlet with the assent (*privorili*) of the tsarevichi, qarachi, ulans, princes, mirzas, and the "entire land" (*vsia zemlia*) had agreed to ally with the king of Poland (PK 1567–1572, 95). The tsarevichi, princes, mirzas and the "entire land" told Devlet to attack Belev, Odoev, and Kozel'sk, and the khan, tsarevichi, and the "entire land" agreed (*prigovorili*) to attack Kozel'sk (PK 1571–1577, 75–76). A Crimean envoy insisted to Moscow that khan Devlet, kalga Magmet-Girei, tsarevichi, and the entire Crimean Land (*Krymskaia zemlia*) wanted peace and friendship with Muscovy (PK 1571–1577, 159). Referring to the "entire land" or the "Crimean Land" projected the Rus' "land" system of denoting polities and societies articulated during the Kievan period, best known for the concept of the Rus' Land (*Russkaia zemlia*).²⁶ Such "land" terminology did not originate among pastoral nomads, whose self-identity was structured around people, not territory. However, some historians interpret allusions to "lands" among the Tatars as references to a

²⁵ Curiously, I have not found any sentence in the "Crimean Affairs" books in which the khan "decrees" (*ukazal*).

²⁶ Charles J. Halperin, "The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Century," *Russian History* 2, 1 (1975): 29–38.

quriltai, an institution Ostrowski asserts provided the model for the Muscovite "assembly of the land" (*zemskie sobor*).

Moscow asked the khan to send to Ivan a "privy person" (*blizhnyi chelovek*) (PK 1567–1572, 80), the same term used for "privy people" (*blyzhnye liudi*) in the Moscow Kremlin and to denote members of the "Privy Council" (*Blizhnaia дума*).²⁷ Many princes were privy people (PK 1571–1577, 172). Muscovite envoys should learn which princes and mirzas were privy people (PK 1571–1577, 178). Ivan's epistle to Alei-mirza of the Shirin clan, the leading clan of the four qarachi clans, flattered him by noting that Ivan had heard that the khan and the kalga paid attention to him in "all kinds of privy consultations" (*vsiaкои blizhnoi dume*) (PK 1567–1572, 339). I do not think that this is a reference to an institution called the "Privy Council," as in Muscovy. Aleksei Vinogradov suggests that *blizhnaia дума* translated *divan* meaning "council."²⁸ It has also been interpreted as the "council of the four qarachi beys." Ostrowski claims that in the fourteenth century the institution of the Muscovite Royal Council was borrowed from the Horde council of four qarachi beys.

The Muscovite envoy to Crimea insisted that not only the khan, but also the tsarevichi, qarachi, princes, ulans, and "people close to the khan" (*priblizhennye liudi*) swear to do right (*pravda*) to their oath to Ivan (PK 1571–1577, 94–95). If at first Devlet alone had sworn to do right by Ivan, without the princes, tsarevichi, qarachi, and ulans, then later he issued a charter oath (*shertnaia gramota*) in which he, all his tsarevichi, qarachi, princes, and ulans swore to do right by Ivan (PK 1571–1577, 149).

When Ivan asked Devlet to send his son Murat-mirza to Putivl' as envoy, the khan's qarachi and princes, not Devlet, answered that this was not convenient (PK 1571–1577, 108). Muscovite envoys in Crimea were instructed to house with princes, murzas, a "tsar's person" (*tsarskii chelovek*), or any privy tsar's person (PK 1571–1577, 127).

The analogies between Crimea and Muscovy even extended much farther down the social scale. Muscovite diplomats were instructed to ascertain the opinion of a Muscovite alliance of commoners, literally the "black people" (*chernye liudi*), the ubiquitous term for commoner taxpayers in Muscovite sources (PK 1567–1572, 318). Muscovy's representative in Crimea reported that the tsarevichi, all the princes, mirzas, and the commoners (*chernye liudi*) wanted to be at peace with Moscow. He identified the current privy people to the khan: Prince Murat Suleshev syn, Prince Kasym Kuliukov, and Prince

²⁷ Whether the Muscovite *Blizhnaia дума* was a separate institution from the Duma per se, or a subset of the Duma is contested

²⁸ A. V. Vinogradov, "Russko-krymskie otnosheniia 1567–1572 v trinadtsatoi krymskoi posol'skoi knige," in PK 1567–1572, 34; PK 1571–1777, 66 n. 37, 350.

Murat-Kazy. The khan is always surrounded by Prince Mustafa and his brother Prince Murtoza-Aga. The kalga is everywhere accompanied by Sulesh, prince of Perekop, and Muslui-Atalyk. Tsarevich Abdyl goes nowhere without Prince Sefer Suleshev syn Muratov, a younger son of Prince Sulesh (*PK 1571-1577*, 187, 261).

The Muscovite representative in Crimea was instructed to respond to any query by Sulesh or any privy people, by other princes or mirzas as to why Moscow had sent no letters or gifts on a particular mission to the khan's mother, other tsaritsy, or lesser tsarevichi, but only to Devlet, the kalga, and the other senior tsarevichi, that this was because currently there was no friendship between Moscow and Crimea, but Moscow would resume delivering its largess to the larger circle of the elite once that friendship had been restored (*PK 1571-1577*, 103, 174).

Muscovy appreciated the lack of unanimity even among the Gireids, let alone the elite as a whole, which could only occur if the khan could not impose obedience. The Ambassadorial Bureau instructed an envoy to find out secretly if the kalga was feuding with the tsarevichi, his brothers. Did the princes and mirzas love the kalga Magmet-Girei? Did they want Magmet-Girei to assume the throne when Khan Devlet-Girei died, or did they favor his brother, Adyl-Girei, or some other tsarevich? (*PK 1571-1577*, 181). If Devlet-Girei was not on the throne, here presumably dead (as he soon would be) rather than deposed, and no one else had as yet replaced him, then the gifts Ivan sent to Devlet should be given to kalga Magmet-Girei's mother, tsaritsa Anabiim, for her to give to her son Magmet, and the gifts Ivan had sent to Magmet should also be given to Anabiim to be given to the next tsarevich in line for the throne, Abdyl-Girei. The envoy was to address whoever was khan, and cultivate whichever princes and mirzas had become new privy people. If the Ottoman Sultan had intervened and installed as khan neither of Devlet-Girei's sons, then the envoy should adjust (*PK 1571-1577*, 281-85). Two elements of these contingency plans stand out: first, the continued respect for the khan's senior wife, and second, the total impossibility of viewing Devlet-Girei as an absolute ruler. If Devlet had possessed unlimited authority, all he had to do to settle the succession was name one of his sons as his heir, regardless of what the Crimean elite, let alone the sultan, wanted.

To summarize: the Muscovite diplomatic establishment, which knew its way inside and out of the political structure of the Crimean khanate, had no delusions that the Crimean khan was an oriental despot who could unilaterally decide the foreign policy of his khanate. The khan had to and did consult his elite, Chingissid and non-Chingissid, in making decisions. The khan knew that he had to demonstrate that the elite agreed with his decisions and he repeatedly insisted to Moscow that the elite had done so. Muscovite dip-

lomats insisted that the elite confirm those decisions, lest the khan use lack of consent as an excuse for plausible deniability in not carrying out his diplomatic and political commitments to Moscow. The Crimean khan, as portrayed in Muscovite diplomatic sources, did not act unilaterally, did not claim to act unilaterally, and was strongly enjoined by Moscow not to act unilaterally. In Moscow's eyes, the political structure of the Crimean Khanate of the second half of the sixteenth century followed the consensual, collegial tradition of the Mongol Empire.

Moreover, the political structure of the Crimean Khanate also bore strong similarities to that of Moscow. I do not have in mind that both were headed by a *tsar'*, the Rus' translation of "khan" as well as the translation of the Byzantine *basileus*, the title with which Ivan was crowned in 1547 and which was born by Russian rulers until 1917, but rather that the ruler in both, regardless of title, functioned within the same discourse of consultation, even if both rulers had easy recourse to ideologies that assigned much more authority to him than he apparently exercised on a daily basis in dealing with his elite.²⁹

This conclusion should be seen in the context of two other aspects of the Muscovite perception of its steppe neighbors whose polities and societies reflected their nomadic origins. First, the monastic compilers of the *Book of Degrees* (*Stepennaia kniga*), a 1560s narrative of Rus' history sponsored by the metropolitan of Moscow, attributed decisions in the khanate of Kazan', before its conquest by Moscow in 1552, to both the members of the khan's court and to the Muslim religious establishment. The compilers employed all the vocabulary for the social composition of the court as the diplomatic books, but also all the categories of members of the Muslim religious elite.³⁰ I found no mention of the Crimean *ulama* in the Crimean Affairs diplomatic books.

Second, in their reports (*stateinye spiski*) of their diplomatic missions, the ambassadors and other personnel of the Ambassadorial Bureau projected Muscovite social and political terminology onto the courts of Sweden, England, and the Holy Roman Empire, but did not do so to nearly the same degree when discussing the Ottoman Empire. Rather, the Muscovite report of an embassy to Istanbul employed unique Ottoman Turkish terminology far more than Swedish, English, or German in relating embassies to Stock-

²⁹ Sergei Bogatyrev, *The Sovereign and His Counsellors. Ritualised Consultations in Muscovite Political Culture, 1350s–1570s* (Saarijärvi: Gummerus, 2000).

³⁰ Charles J. Halperin, "The Muscovite Attitude Toward the Outside World During the Reign of Ivan IV: *Stepennaia kniga*," in *Aktual'nye problemy istorii i kul'tury tatarskogo naroda: Materialy k uchebnym. V chest' iubileia akademika AN RT M. A. Usmanova*, comp. D. A. Mustafina and M. S. Gatin, ed. I. A. Giliyazov (Kazan': Izdatel'stvo MOiN RT, 2010), 188–201.

holm, London, or Vienna.³¹ Muscovite diplomats were obviously capable of distinguishing between polities of Mongol origin such as the Crimean Khanate and others of equally pastoral nomadic but not Mongol origin, such as the Ottoman Empire. The selective, very discerning Muscovite perception of the steppe deserves further study. It suggests that historians still underestimate Muscovite (and earlier Rus') expertise on the present and former inhabitants of the Eurasian steppe.

³¹ Charles J. Halperin, "Russia Between East and West: Diplomatic Reports During the Reign of Ivan IV," in *Saluting Aaron Gurevich: Essays in History, Literature and Other Subjects*, ed. Yelena Mazour-Matusevich and Alexandra S. Korros (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010), 81–103.

Chapter 11

Muscovite Diplomacy toward Lithuania: Mythology and Logic

Ritual, ceremonial, and ideology so dominated Muscovite diplomacy during the reign of Ivan IV that it is easy to get the impression that rigid protocol and fanciful mythology constituted the entirety of Muscovite foreign relations. However, the diplomatic sources also offer tantalizing tidbits indicative of creativity and attempts at logical discourse on the part of Muscovite diplomats, a term that encompasses the whole Muscovite diplomatic establishment. That establishment included the professional bureaucrats (*d'iaki*) who worked for the Ambassadorial Bureau (*Posol'skii Prikaz*), who wrote position papers, and participated in embassies and negotiations; the boyars and gentry who served as ambassadors, envoys, and couriers, conducted negotiations, and participated in foreign policy formulation meetings of the Royal Council (*Duma*); and, beginning no later than 1547 and increasingly after it, Ivan IV himself.¹ Although quantitatively dwarfed by examples of close-minded dogmatism, these examples are qualitatively significant as indicative of the intellectual capabilities of Muscovy's diplomatic corps when free of ideological constraints. To be sure, not all these passages succeed logically or empirically. They are sometimes marred by gross factual errors or hypocrisy, both constants in all European² diplomacy of the sixteenth century.

Diplomatic negotiations can fail or succeed not only because of conflicts of interest between the parties involved, but also because of miscommunication resulting from cultural misunderstanding. One of the enduring clichés of Muscovite history is that Muscovy “missed” the Renaissance, which could conceivably have created barriers to communication between Muscovite diplomats and those representing her more “civilized” and “advanced” European

¹ The best-studied professional diplomat of Ivan's reign is Ivan Viskovatyi. See Ieronim Gralia, *Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovatyi: Kar'era gosudarstvennogo deiatelia v Rossii XVI v.* (Moscow: Radiks, 1994).

² This is not the place to debate whether the term “Europe” has any historical validity or utility. See Charles J. Halperin, “A Comparative Approach to Kievan Rus’,” *Russian History* 42, 2 (2015): 149–57.

neighbors. However, it would be too easy to attribute any individual development in Muscovite foreign policy to such obstacles to communication without testing the influence of relevant cultural differences in play. This chapter will examine how Muscovite diplomatic representatives negotiated during Ivan's reign with those from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,³ Muscovy's western neighbor. Border disputes and incidents were endemic to Lithuanian-Muscovite relations; a short war in the 1530s⁴ was followed by repeated truces until Lithuania entered the Livonian War (1558–82).⁵ Diplomatic exchanges were frequent and intense, amply documented in the "Lithuanian affairs" (*litovskie dela*) diplomatic books (*posol'skie knigi*). (I have made one exception to utilizing only these sources in order to cite a very illuminating passage concerning Muscovite relations with Sweden.) Let us begin not with the atypical and more intriguing assertions by Muscovite diplomats but with the standard diplomatic fare they served up to their Lithuanian counterparts.⁶

Muscovite diplomats seemed to be obsessed with protocol, which they insisted had to be followed without exception (in theory only, as we shall see). Diplomacy, they claimed, had to respect traditional formalities, to remain faithful to the way things had always been done, to custom (*obychai*)⁷ and ancient ways of doing things (*starina*).⁸ Which country sent envoys to the other country and whose representative, upon their first meeting on horseback, dismounted first, were matters of prime concern. The most important,

³ In Muscovite diplomatic and other Muscovite sources, the "Grand Principality" (*Velikoe kniazhestvo*) of Lithuania.

⁴ Mikhail Markovich Krom, *Starodubskaiia voina 1534–1537: Iz istorii russko-litovskikh otnoshenii* (Moscow: Rubezhi XXI, 2008).

⁵ Aleksandr Il'ich Filiushkin, ed., *Baltiiskii vopros v kontse XV–XVI vv.: Sbornik nauchnykh statei* (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2010); Filiushkin, *Izobretaia pervuiu voinu Rossii i Evropy: Baltiiskie voiny vtoroi poloviny XVI v. glazami sovremennikov i potomkov* (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2013).

⁶ "Lithuanians" did not necessarily denote ethnic Lithuanians but rather residents of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Many were Ruthenians, the future Ukrainians or Belarusians, some were ethnic Poles. "Lithuanian" delegations to Moscow included both Ruthenians and Poles. Members of other ethnic groups living in Lithuania, such as Germans, Jews, Armenians, and Tatars, did not serve as diplomatic representatives of the Grand Duchy.

⁷ *Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* [hereafter *SRIO*] 59 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1887) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim*, 2: 1533–1560, 1–10, 21, 561.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 35.

of course, was the full and accurate rendition of the ruler's titles.⁹ European ambassadors chafed loudly at these technicalities, which they blamed on Muscovite barbarity, but they protested too much. Such details reflected back symbolically upon the status of the ruler, a premise shared by Muscovite and European alike. If envoys to Moscow resented the heavy-handed supervision of their activities, deliberately intended to keep foreigners from making any contacts with civilian Muscovites, i.e., gaining intelligence information, then Lithuania practiced the same national security procedures. Indeed, the Lithuanian official assigned to "escort" envoys the same way as the Muscovite "aide" (*pristav*) bore the same designation, *przystawa*. Foreigners complained that the Muscovite representative wanted to dismount second because the foreigners wanted to dismount second. The semiotic elements of diplomacy cannot be overestimated.¹⁰

Muscovite ideology presented a closed circle of historical and genealogical justifications for Muscovite foreign policy pretensions;¹¹ unfortunately, most of these were legends. Ivan claimed to be descended from Prus, the brother of Augustus Caesar, via the legendary founder of the Kievan dynasty, Riurik.¹² As such, he inherited as his patrimony all territories which had been ruled by any Riurikid prince during the tenth to thirteenth centuries, including Kiev,¹³ part of Lithuania until 1569 and after 1569 located in Poland, and

⁹ Leonid Abramovich Iuzefovich, "*Kak v posl'skikh obychaiakh vedetsia...*": *Russkii posol'skii obychai kontsa XVI–nachala XVII v.* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1988); Iuzefovich, *Put' posla: Russkii posol'skii obychai. Obikhod, Etiket. Tseremonial konets XV–pervaia polovina XVII v.* (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Ivana Limbakha, 2007).

¹⁰ Iuzefovich, "*Kak v posl'skikh obychaiakh vedetsia...*," 39; Jan Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe: Ritual and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1648–1725* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). The risks of projecting the conclusions of studies of seventeenth-century Muscovy onto sixteenth-century Muscovy should not be ignored, but because Muscovite diplomacy was very conservative, Hennings's superb study can be applied to Ivan's reign.

¹¹ Konstantin Iur'evich Erusalimskii, *Istoriia na posol'skoi sluzhbe: Diplomatii i pamiat' v Rossii XVI v.* (Moscow: GU VshE, 2005).

¹² SRIO 59, 519; SRIO 71 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1892) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim*, 3: 1560–1571, 231.

¹³ Now Kyiv in Ukraine. See Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV and Kiev," in *Rus' Writ Large: Languages, Histories, Cultures. Essays Presented in Honor of Michael S. Flier on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. Harvey Goldblatt and Nancy Shields Kollmann = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28 (2006): 461–69.

Polotsk¹⁴ in Lithuania,¹⁵ or even all of Lithuania,¹⁶ based upon a legendary genealogy of the Lithuanian dynasty as descended from a minor Riurikid prince of Polotsk.¹⁷ Ivan had been legitimately crowned “tsar” in 1547 because his ancestor Saint Vladimir of Kiev (ca. 958–1015) had borne that title, as did a later ancestor, Vladimir Monomakh (1053–1125), who received Byzantine sanction to bear it, materialized in Byzantine regalia from Byzantine emperor Constantine Monomakhos.¹⁸ In fact Constantine Monomakhos and Vladimir Monomakh were not contemporaries, and the translation of regalia was entirely invented. In other sources Ivan also claimed as his patrimony Dorpat in Livonia, because it was founded as the city of Iur’ev by his ancestor Iaroslav the Wise (*Mudryi*) (ca. 978–1054), Kazan’, because its predecessor Grand Bolgar was conquered by his ancestor, Suzdal’ Grand Prince Andrei Bogoliubskii, and Astrakhan’, because its predecessor Tmutorokan’ had been part of Kievan Rus’. In fact Grand Bolgar was not the predecessor of Kazan’, and Astrakhan’ and Tmutorokan’ were not even in the same region. Overall, in fact, Ivan and his diplomats exaggerated their fidelity to tradition in diplomacy,¹⁹ but then again he and all his contemporaries habitually described innovations in both domestic and foreign policy as restorations of previous states of affairs.

Muscovite diplomats fervently, frequently, almost monotonously repeated these axioms in their encounters and correspondence, ignoring, for example, Lithuanian objections that Prus never existed. When Lithuanian envoys insisted that Muscovite conquest of Livonia no more made Livonia a Muscovite patrimony than the Tatar conquest of Moscow made Muscovy a Tatar patrimony,²⁰ the Muscovite negotiators blithely insisted that it was nowhere written in Muscovite chronicles that the Tatars had conquered Moscow, which was consistent with Rus’ ambivalence during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries at admitting that the Tatars had changed Rus’ sovereignty but inconsistent with, indeed a direct lie about, sixteenth-century chronicles such as the *Nikon Chronicle* which explicitly narrate that the Tatars “took” (*vziali*) Moscow

¹⁴ Now Polatsk in Belarus.

¹⁵ SRIO 59, 274.

¹⁶ SRIO 71, 108.

¹⁷ Erusalimskii, *Istoriia na posol’skoi sluzhbe*, 39.

¹⁸ SRIO 59, 287–88, 309–10, 437, 571–72. See Rufina Petrovna Dmitrieva, *Skazanie o kniaz’iakh vladimirskikh* (Moscow–Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo AN SSSR, 1955).

¹⁹ Iuzefovich, “Kak v posol’skikh obychaiakh vedetsia...,” 87.

²⁰ Erusalimskii, *Istoriia na posol’skoi sluzhbe*, 43.

in 1237.²¹ These historical liberties come as no surprise. Ivan IV and his diplomats were notorious liars, perhaps most famously in consistently denying to Lithuanian diplomats that Ivan's *oprichnina* even existed.²² Confronted in 1571 with queries about oprichnina atrocities, the sack of Novgorod, and the gruesome public executions in Moscow shortly thereafter, both well-known outside Muscovy from pamphlets and defector accounts, Muscovite diplomats rather rudely asked their Lithuanian counterparts where they had gotten their information (*ali vam to vemodo?*, "How do you know that?"). The Muscovites attributed this anti-Muscovite propaganda to Muscovite traitors, whose "information" should not be believed.²³ The more important point is that reliance on bogus facts and lying were endemic to all sixteenth-century European diplomats. If Ivan claimed Roman descent, then so did the English, French, and Lithuanians.²⁴ Diplomacy was in part theater, but it was acted out throughout Europe by the same set of conventions and etiquette.

The misconception that Muscovite diplomatic formalism was unique in sixteenth-century Europe surfaces in evaluations of foreign policy during Ivan's reign, which included the successful annexation of the Kazan' Khanate on the middle Volga River and the Astrakhan' Khanate at the mouth of the Volga River on the Caspian Sea, and the unsuccessful attempt to annex Livonia during the Livonian War. Much recent research focuses on how much credit for its successes and blame for its failure should be assigned to Ivan IV.²⁵ For example, Aleksandr Filiushkin accuses Muscovite diplomats, directed by Ivan, of valuing form over content in trying to negotiate an anti-Crimean alliance with Poland-Lithuania.²⁶ However, the mistakes committed by Mus-

²¹ SRIO 71, 395; Charles J. Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke: The Image of the Mongols in Medieval Russia* (Bloomington: Slavica, 2009); *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter PSRL] (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 10: 106.

²² The *oprichnina* was Ivan's state-within-a-state, and the instrument of his mass terror. He created it in 1565 and abolished it in 1572. See Charles J. Halperin, "Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Ivan IV's *Oprichnina*," *Kritika* 18, 1 (2017): 95–124.

²³ SRIO 71, 777, 786–87. Their question might be translated as "Who the hell told you that?," which better expresses its emotional tone.

²⁴ Frances A. Yates, *Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

²⁵ For differing opinions, see A. V. Vinogradov, "Vneshniaia politika Ivana IV Groznogo," in *Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii: Konets XV–XVII vek. Ot sverzheniia ordynskogo iga do Severnoi voiny*, ed. A. V. Ignat'ev (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1999), 134–94; and Anna Leonidovna Khoroshkevich, *Rossii v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii sere diny XVI veka* (Moscow: Drevnekhranilishche, 2003).

²⁶ Filiushkin, *Izobretaiia pervuiu voynu Rossii i Evropy*, 117.

covite foreign policy during Ivan's reign cannot be blamed upon excessive Muscovite attention to the symbolic aspects of diplomacy.

Historians have not engaged other, admittedly less numerous, examples of Muscovite diplomatic logic that demonstrate that no cultural barriers inhibited Muscovite understanding of what their foreign counterparts were saying or their ability to explain their own policies to them. These scattered, unsystematic, and heterogeneous examples of successful communication (not necessarily successful diplomacy), even when constructed upon erroneous evidence or when practiced hypocritically, nevertheless are still indicative of the intellectual capacities of Muscovite diplomats. These passages, however few and far between, manage to shed some light on the mentality behind the Muscovite diplomatic ideological facade. They demonstrate that Muscovite diplomats were human beings using their minds and their knowledge to analyze what their opposite parties said and to respond critically rather than mechanically, to be sure without violating their ideological conceptual framework. Their atypicality derives not from intellectual incapacity but lack of opportunity; traditional ideological premises almost always sufficed in negotiations. On the other hand, these examples stand out precisely because they illustrate a feature of Muscovite diplomacy missing in most standard diplomatic exchanges.

In 1536 Muscovite diplomats informed Lithuanian envoys that the pope and the Holy Roman emperor sent envoys to Moscow, the Muscovites did not initiate relations by sending their envoys to Rome or Vienna. As the pope and the Holy Roman emperor outranked the king of Poland, he should send his envoys to Moscow.²⁷ In 1572–73 Muscovite diplomats applied the same logic to Sweden, informing Swedish diplomats that if Ivan were the equal of the Holy Roman emperor and the Holy Roman emperor outranked the king of Sweden, then Ivan was superior to the king of Sweden. This was elementary algebra²⁸ or perhaps a syllogism:

IF A (Ivan) = B (Holy Roman Emperor)
AND B > C (King of Sweden),
THEN A > C.²⁹

²⁷ SRIO 59, 38.

²⁸ Metaphorically speaking; I am not inferring Muscovite familiarity with algebra.

²⁹ SRIO 129 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1910) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Shvedskim*, 1: 1556–1586, 231.

In effect, this logical approach derived from the principles upon which the precedence (*mestnichestvo*) system was based: no noble could be compelled to serve under someone whom he or his ancestors outranked. Cases frequently invoked the principle that A could not serve under B because B's ancestor had served under A's ancestor.

This example illustrates Muscovite diplomatic knowledge and manipulation of the European state system. Muscovite diplomats reasoned out the implications of diplomatic relations not involving them for diplomatic relations involving them.

An entirely different mindset appears in the records for 1543. Muscovite diplomats objected to a proposed meeting on the Muscovite-Lithuanian border of representatives of Lithuania and Muscovy to resolve border disputes in winter, because of snow.³⁰ The Muscovite negotiators did not feel the need to elaborate upon their argument, but I infer that the problem would not be the impossibility of traveling to the border in winter, which could be and was accomplished by sled, but rather the impossibility of identifying landmarks to demarcate the frontier if they were buried by feet of snow.

Muscovite diplomats similarly applied a line of reasoning based upon European history and the European state system to defend the legitimacy of Ivan's title of tsar, both inherited and conveyed by coronation in 1547, against inflexible Polish-Lithuanian refusal to recognize it. In 1549 Lithuanian diplomats insisted that because the ruler of Muscovy had never before been addressed as "tsar," only as "Grand Prince," to do so now violated tradition. Muscovite diplomats replied that when Grand Duke Jogailo was crowned king in 1386, the Muscovites recognized his title.³¹ Olgerd (Algirdas) had not been a king, but Jogailo was.³² If the Muscovites addressed the ruler of Lithuania by the title he used, Muscovite diplomats argued in 1554, it ill-behooved the Lithuanians not to address Ivan by the title he used, indeed, it dishonored him.³³ In 1567 Muscovite diplomats filled in part of the context. Jogailo became "king" when he married Jadwiga, heir to the Polish throne, and became Jagiello.³⁴ Because Muscovy had recognized the Lithuanian ruler's change of title via coronation, so Lithuania should recognize the Muscovite ruler's change of title via coronation. Such scrupulous reciprocity seems to be common sense.

³⁰ *SRIO* 59, 206.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 288.

³² *Ibid.*, 312–13.

³³ *Ibid.*, 422–25.

³⁴ *SRIO* 71, 474.

Unfortunately Muscovite reasoning was deeply flawed, and in all probability the Muscovites knew it. Jogailo became king of Poland because Poland was already a kingdom. Lithuania remained a grand dukedom and its future rulers, when they also ruled Poland, were kings only in Poland. The status of Lithuania and its ruler in Lithuania had not changed.

Muscovite diplomats justified Ivan's repression of treason by invoking parallels in history and current events: Ivan's actions against appanage Prince Vladimir Staritskii matched those of Jagiello against Keistut (Keistutis), the defection of Prince Andrei Kurbskii matched the flight of Svidrigailo (Svidrigiello) from Jagiello, and King Johann III of Sweden considered supporters of his brother King Erik XIV, whom he deposed, as traitors.³⁵

Muscovite diplomats applied additional arguments to defend Ivan's right to the title "tsar." In 1553 Muscovite diplomats informed Lithuanian diplomats that the pope and the Holy Roman emperor, who, as we have seen, outranked the king of Poland, had recognized Ivan's title of tsar, so they should too.³⁶ In 1554 Muscovite diplomats explained that Ivan IV's grandfather, Ivan III, and Ivan IV's father, Grand Prince Vasili III, had not utilized the title "tsar" because they had not been crowned tsar, but Ivan IV had been crowned and should be addressed as such. Moreover, Ivan had conquered Kazan', which was a *tsarstvo*; if Ivan ruled a *tsarstvo*, then he should be addressed as tsar.³⁷ In 1555 Muscovite diplomats added that the Turkish Sultan Suleiman (the Magnificent) recognized Ivan as tsar.³⁸ In 1556, they argued that Kazan' and Astrakhan' were both *tsarstvos*, and their rulers carried the title "tsar."³⁹ In that same year they listed Spain, England, Denmark, and the Holy Roman Empire as states that acknowledged Ivan's imperial title.⁴⁰

This first seemingly logical argument—if everyone else accorded the title "tsar" to Ivan, so should Poland-Lithuania—simplified reality, and the second seemingly logical argument—if Ivan conquered *tsarstvos*, he is a *tsar*—distorted reality. Some of the states cited as acknowledging Ivan's imperial title were inconsistent in doing so, notably the Holy Roman Empire. The conquest of Kazan' might make Ivan tsar' of Kazan', as likewise the conquest of Astra-

³⁵ Erusalimskii, *Istoriia na posol'skoi sluzhbe*, 18.

³⁶ *SRIO* 59, 397.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 437.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 476.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 505.

khan' would make him tsar of Astrakhan';⁴¹ Ivan's full title did include "Tsar of Kazan'" and "Tsar of Astrakhan'." However such conquests did not alter Ivan's title as ruler of "Vladimir, Moscow, and All Rus'." Ivan became not only "Grand Prince" of this state but "Tsar and Grand Prince" because of his coronation,⁴² before Muscovite annexation of Kazan' or Astrakhan'. By the reign of Ivan III, the *tsarstvo* of Kasimov or Gorodets had become a Muscovite serving khanate. Although the ruler of Moscow selected the occupant of its throne, he remained a grand prince. Having a vassal khan/*tsar*' did not make the Moscow grand prince a "tsar." The contentions of the Muscovite diplomats were clever sleight of hand, but still sleight of hand.

In 1559 Muscovite representatives advanced a novel, geographic justification for their territorial claims to Kiev. Kiev was located on the Dnieper (Dni-pro) River, which originated in Muscovite territory. Therefore, like all cities and lands along the river, it belonged to Muscovy.⁴³

Muscovite-Lithuanian wars created a significant number of prisoners of war on both sides. How to equate captives for prisoner exchanges stymied negotiations for years. When in 1537 Lithuanian diplomats insisted that their Muscovite captives were "better people," meaning of higher social status, than Muscovy's Lithuanian captives, so a one-for-one exchange unfairly favored Muscovy, Muscovite diplomats replied that Muscovy held more Lithuanian captives than Lithuania held Muscovite captives, so the equality problem evened itself out.⁴⁴ In 1542 Muscovite diplomats added a religious consideration difficult to refute intellectually, although, apparently, not difficult for the Lithuanian diplomats to ignore altogether, that all prisoners-of-war on both sides had Christian souls, and should be treated equally, even if they differed in other ways, such as age, gender, and social status. Besides, out of Christian respect for the dead and for families, it was common to release the corpses of

⁴¹ This contention plays upon the Rus' translation of "khan" as *tsar*', the same word translating the title of the Byzantine emperor, *basileus*. See Michael Cherniavsky, "Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory," in *The Structure of Russian History*, ed. Cherniavsky (New York: Random House, 1970), 65–79. On the ambiguities of Muscovy's status as a successor state of the Juchid ulus (usually and anachronistically called the Golden Horde, which ruled the Pontic and Caspian steppes and Rus' as a successor state of the World Mongol Empire), see Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV and Chinggis Khan," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 51 (2003): 481–97; and Halperin, "Muscovy as a Successor State of the Juchid ulus," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 18 (2011): 5–20.

⁴² Ivan's coronation was, in fact, Byzantine, not Mongol. See David B. Miller, "The Coronation of Ivan IV in 1547," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 15 (1967): 559–74.

⁴³ *SRIO* 59, 583.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 119.

dead captives for reburial in family cemeteries in their homelands.⁴⁵ Unfortunately for the persuasiveness of this Muscovite argument, in 1563 Muscovite diplomats objected to the proposed exchange of a Lithuanian noble captive for several Muscovite gentry and petty bourgeois captives because the Lithuanian noble captive was “worth more,” meaning, he could command a higher ransom price, and in 1566 the Muscovites were still haggling over whether a captive was “big” or “small,” meaning whether he merited a larger or smaller ransom. Thus the Muscovites violated the principle they had so piously articulated that all prisoner-of-war souls were equal in the sight of God.⁴⁶

Muscovite diplomats understood full well the complex relationship between the Kingdom of Poland (Corona Polska) and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which, before the 1569 Union of Lublin, shared the same ruler but otherwise constituted separate states.⁴⁷ The chancellor of Lithuania enjoyed a monopoly on conducting foreign relations with Muscovy.⁴⁸ His envoys therefore spoke for their ruler not only as grand duke of Lithuania but also as king of Poland. In 1536 Muscovite diplomats proposed that a truce between Muscovy and Lithuania also apply to Wallachia, but Lithuanian diplomats replied that they had no instructions on the matter (an excuse common to envoys on both sides), because Poland was at war with Wallachia. Muscovite negotiators wondered how Wallachia could be at war with Poland but at peace with Lithuania.⁴⁹ Muscovite diplomats adroitly caught Lithuanian diplomats playing the other side of the coin in 1563, when Lithuanian diplomats claimed that Kamenets-Podolsk in Podolia and Galicia were part of the Kingdom of Poland (which they were, actually), invalidating Muscovite claims to those territories, when those same diplomats purported to represent Lithuania, not Poland.⁵⁰ It is hardly surprising that Muscovite diplomats possessed accurate information on the geographic and political dimensions of Polish-Lithuanian relations, but it must still be added that they understood that information, and processed it very competently to sustain arguments on behalf of Muscovite policy goals.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 159.

⁴⁶ SRIO 71, 297–99, 409, 413–14.

⁴⁷ Robert Frost, *The Oxford History of Poland-Lithuania, 1: The Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union, 1385–1569* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁴⁸ Andrej Kotljarchuk, *In the Shadow of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the Mid-17th Century* (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2006), 40; Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland, 1: The Origins to 1795* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 287.

⁴⁹ SRIO 59, 88–91.

⁵⁰ SRIO 71, 266.

In 1563 Muscovy annexed the city of Polotsk in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Negotiating the boundaries of Muscovite Polotsk, Lithuanian diplomats attempted to isolate the city from its surrounding district (*povet*). Muscovite diplomats objected by asking how a city could be separated from its district. They then conceded that when Muscovy conquered Smolensk in 1514 from Lithuania it had permitted that city to be delimited from its district, but they insisted that they had done so only at the behest of the pope and the Holy Roman emperor.⁵¹ Still, Muscovite diplomats had invoked a sound economic principle. No early modern city fed itself; it needed the surrounding countryside to avoid food shortages.

Also in 1563 Ivan personally asked how Poland-Lithuania could claim both that Livonia was a Polish patrimony and that the Holy Roman emperor had granted Livonia to the king of Poland as a fief. Ivan called these claims contradictory. Did the king, he asked rhetorically and with typical sarcasm, not know the identity of his patrimony?⁵² Examples of multiple and also seemingly contradictory Muscovite claims, for example to Kazan', did not impair Ivan's astute deconstruction of Polish-Lithuanian assertions.⁵³ Muscovite diplomats might also have been aware that such jurisdictional anomalies were by no means absent at the time. The Hohenzollern duke of Prussia was a vassal of the king of Poland, but he was also elector of Brandenburg and therefore a subject of the Holy Roman emperor.⁵⁴

In 1566 Smolensk itself was the subject of discussion between Lithuanian and Muscovite diplomats. The cities from which delegations crossed the border between the two countries in each direction were carefully regulated. Diplomatic staff from Muscovy were supposed to depart Muscovy westward via Smolensk. Muscovite diplomats objected that King Sigismund Augustus had disrespected the Muscovite diplomatic liaison (*pristav*) Andrei Sherefedinov because he had not entered Lithuania from Smolensk. Ivan criticized the rationale for the mistreatment of Sherefedinov by observing that Smolensk was currently quarantined for epidemic; everyone knew, Ivan declared, that

⁵¹ Ibid., 278.

⁵² Ibid., 107, 215–16.

⁵³ Jaroslaw Pelenski, "Muscovite Imperial Claims to the Kazan Khanate," *Slavic Review* 26, 4 (1967): 559–76, revised and reprinted in Pelenski, *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus'* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs 377, 1998), 189–212.

⁵⁴ Davies, *God's Playground*, 292.

no one could leave a quarantined city.⁵⁵ Public health procedures should have overruled diplomatic protocol.⁵⁶

In 1570 Muscovite diplomats explained to their Lithuanian counterparts that Ivan was delaying his return to the city of Moscow until rivers flooded by the spring thaw, which had melted the snow, had subsided, a geographic and weather-related argument of impeccable common sense.⁵⁷

Finally, in 1536 Muscovite diplomats explained to the visiting Lithuanian delegation that Ivan, then six years old, was too young to host a formal diplomatic banquet, usually considered *de rigueur* for a high-level negotiations. He would grow tired. Instead, the Muscovite diplomats explained, the appropriate food would be delivered to the Lithuanian quarters. The court staff who presented the food and drink to the Lithuanian delegation repeated this rationale for the Muscovite failure to observe procedure.⁵⁸ This incident, and the preceding Sherefedinov case, attest very concretely that Muscovite diplomats did not adhere to normative requirements so rigidly as to disregard common sense. Concerning Ivan's youth, the limitations upon the actions of the Muscovite grand prince imposed by his tender age were fully appreciated not just by Muscovite diplomats but by the entire court establishment, for domestic affairs as well, and are carefully enunciated in the Muscovite chronicles, supposedly written by monks in Moscow who were not part of the court but were equally intimately informed about the royal family.⁵⁹

Taken collectively, these passages from Muscovite diplomatic sources dealing with Lithuania reveal a particular aspect of the nature of Muscovite-Lithuanian diplomatic discourse, even when concerned with ideology, that reflects other than ideological modes of thought, namely empirical and commonsensical. It is legitimate to ask if this element of Muscovite diplomacy was effected by factors unique to Lithuania.⁶⁰ The extent to which Poland and Lithuania were fully integrated is a separate and contentious issue which, for-

⁵⁵ SRIO 71, 445.

⁵⁶ On quarantines in Muscovy during Ivan's reign, see D. N. Al'shits, "Neizvestnye poslaniia Ivana Groznogo," *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* [hereafter TODRL] 12 (1956): 429; V. B. Kobrin, "Novaia tsarskaia gramota 1571 o bor'be s chumoi," TODRL 14 (1958): 26–27; PSRL 13 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 404.

⁵⁷ SRIO 71, 667–68.

⁵⁸ SRIO 59, 43–45, 66–67.

⁵⁹ Charles J. Halperin, "The Minority of Ivan IV," in *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom Revisited: Essays in Russian History in Honor of Robert O. Crummey*, ed. Chester Dunning, Russell E. Martin, and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2008), 41–52.

⁶⁰ For this purpose the single passage from Muscovite-Swedish relations can be considered an exception.

tunately, is not relevant to my concerns. Suffice it to say that the ethnic Lithuanian magnates who dominated Lithuanian politics certainly knew Polish, and some knew Latin. Historians who have compared Lithuania and Muscovy, although not always in agreement amongst themselves, invariably wind up emphasizing their differences, particularly in political structure, contrasting decentralized Lithuania to autocratic, centralized Muscovy.⁶¹ These analyses predate or ignore that school of recent US historiography that foregrounds the collegial and consensual elements in Muscovite political culture. These comparisons also exaggerate the significance of the concept of the ruler of Muscovy as an autocrat during Ivan's reign.⁶²

Culturally Poland-Lithuania as a whole was part of the Latin world and participated fully in the Renaissance and the Reformation. For example, the Lithuanian envoys to Moscow made occasional reference to "Fate" (*fortuna*). Even if the phrase "Christian fate" appears once, this concept of Fate was Renaissance and secular.⁶³ (The Latin word *maiestas* appeared once.⁶⁴) The concept of Fate was tied to astrology. Orthodox clergy in Muscovy took an extremely hostile attitude toward astrology, which did not inhibit some of the lay elite, including Ivan, from having an unhealthy interest in it, but it is apposite to mention that secular notions of Fate in particular aroused the ire of the Greek monk and former Renaissance scholar in Italy Maksim Grek.⁶⁵ Muscovite diplomats plausibly could have understood the concept regardless of whether they shared it or abhorred it.

⁶¹ Margarita Evgen'eva Bychkova, *Russkoe gosudarstvo i velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe s kontsa XV v. do 1569 g. Opyt sravnitel'no-istoricheskogo izucheniia politicheskogo stroia* (Moscow: IRI RAN, 1996); M. M. Krom, review of Bychkova, in *Lithuanian Historical Studies* 3 (1998): 157–61; Krom, "Rossiia i Velikoe Kniazhestvo Litovskoe: Dva puti v istorii," in *Ezhegodnik "Angliiskaia naberezhnaia, 4,"* ed. B. V. Anan'ich and L. E. Shepelev (St. Petersburg: Liki Rossii, 2000), 73–100; Krom, "Die Konstituierung der Szlakhta als Stand und das Problem staatlicher Einheit im Grossfürstentum Litauen (15./16. Jahrhundert)," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 42 (1994): 481–92; and, again with due allowances to the risks of utilizing scholarship on seventeenth-century Muscovy to understand sixteenth-century Muscovy, Andrzej Sulima Kaminski, *Republic versus Autocracy: Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 1686–1697* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1993).

⁶² Charles J. Halperin, "Muscovy as a Hypertrophic State: A Critique," *Kritika* 3, 3 (2002): 501–07; Halperin, "Ivan IV as Autocrat (*samoderzhets*)," *Cahiers du monde russe* 55 (2014): 197–213.

⁶³ *SRIO* 59, 453–54, 460, 508, 588–89.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 603–05.

⁶⁵ Paul Bushkovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 17.

The question of Ruthenians in Lithuania is paramount in discussing Muscovite-Lithuanian diplomacy. There was a strong Orthodox Ruthenian element in the Grand Duchy in terms of the language of government, political structure, and legal norms, as well as chronicles. Catholic Lithuanians discriminated against Orthodox Ruthenians. Until 1563, Orthodox Ruthenians could not legally hold government office in Lithuania. Orthodox bishops, unlike Catholic bishops, could not belong to the Royal Council (Rada). However, probably because at least the bans on lay office holding and intermarriage between Catholic and Orthodox were not enforced,⁶⁶ this second-class treatment of Ruthenians by ethnic Lithuanians did not impugn Ruthenian loyalty to the Grand Duchy or weaken Ruthenian anti-Muscovite resolve. Although some Lithuanians thought of Ruthenians as second-class citizens, Ruthenians did not think of themselves as second class citizens, especially the lay Orthodox Ruthenian magnates in Volhynia, the only group of Orthodox Ruthenians to exercise major statewide political influence.⁶⁷

Because of the Ruthenian role in Lithuania, Muscovite-Lithuanian relations did not suffer the same handicap that, it has been argued, marred Muscovite-English relations. Anna Bertolet makes the case that diplomacy between England and Muscovy during Ivan's reign was severely inhibited by the fact that the two countries literally did not speak the same language: Elizabeth I did not know Russian, and Ivan IV knew neither English nor Latin.⁶⁸ The diplomatic papers manifest Muscovite close attention to the question of "Lithuanian" use of the Ruthenian language. The Muscovites distinguished between "Rus'" (Ruthenians) and Poles (*liakhi*) within Lithuanian delegations to Moscow.⁶⁹ They identified Orthodox members of Lithuanian delegations, those who followed the "Greek Law" (*zakon*, which could be translated here as "confession" or "rite," as opposed to the Latin *zakon*), who alone could be permitted to attend Russian Orthodox liturgies, because non-Orthodox Christians, let alone non-Christians, were not permitted to enter Orthodox churches. In one case they even envisaged letting an Orthodox Ruthenian stay at the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, although unrelated circumstances de-

⁶⁶ Harry E. Dembkowski, *The Union of Lublin: Polish Federalism in the Golden Age* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1982), 151–52, discusses family ties between Orthodox Ruthenians in Volhynia and Polish Catholics.

⁶⁷ Frost, *The Oxford History of Poland-Lithuania*, 120–21, 158–67, 174–76, 200, 308–23, 419, 422, 460, 461, 488.

⁶⁸ Anna Riehl Bertolet, "The Tsar and the Queen: 'You Speak a Language that I Understand Not,'" in *The Foreign Relations of Elizabeth I*, ed. Charles Beem (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 101–23.

⁶⁹ SRIO 71, 40, 191.

railed that intention.⁷⁰ Finally, they specified that “Lithuanian” prisoners of war could converse with Lithuanian envoys only in “the Rus’ tongue” (*ruskim pismom*), not in Polish or Latin, so that their jailors could guarantee that nothing that was said violated national security. This requirement assumes both that the “Lithuanians” spoke Ruthenian, and that their guards understood Ruthenian.⁷¹ Ivan even reassured a Lithuanian ambassador that he would understand spoken Ruthenian even if it were mixed with Polish expressions.⁷²

Ruthenian-speaking diplomatic personnel from Lithuania to Muscovy would have had a much easier time communicating with their Muscovite counterparts because they did not need interpreters, a feature unique to Muscovite-Lithuanian relations which, it seems, has been overlooked in studies of Muscovite-Lithuanian diplomacy. It bears repeating that not all Ruthenian-speakers were ethnic Ruthenians; ethnic Lithuanians also spoke Ruthenian. Indeed, not all ethnic Ruthenians were Orthodox; some were Catholic, some Protestant, like ethnic Lithuanians. Therefore facility at Ruthenian speech was not confined to any one ethnic group or religious affiliation. Certainly the Ruthenian factor in Lithuanian society and politics did not make Muscovite-Lithuanian relations any more peaceful, but it is intriguing to inquire whether it facilitated the phenomenon of atypical uses of logic discussed in this essay. If the same expressions, concepts, and arguments occurred in diplomatic papers with other European countries such as England or the Holy Roman Empire, then the answer would perforce have to be negative.⁷³

Geography dictated that Lithuania and Muscovy shared a strategic interest in the Crimean Khanate. Each developed considerable expertise on the political and social structure of the Crimean Khanate and expended considerable human and financial resources trying to bribe the Crimeans to raid the other country’s land and enslave the other country’s people.⁷⁴ However,

⁷⁰ SRIO 59, 107, 556, 560; SRIO 71, 122–35.

⁷¹ SRIO 71, 281–82, 285.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 289. Ivan did not purport to understand Polish *per se*.

⁷³ It is conceivable that the issues that arose in Muscovite negotiations with European countries other than Lithuania were not conducive to eliciting the kinds of logical reasoning found in communication with Lithuania. This circumstantial explanation of the lack of comparable passages in non-Lithuanian Muscovite diplomatic papers would seem to apply to Muscovite negotiations with eastern, steppe and Muslim polities, such as the Nogai Tatars and the Crimean Khanate, which subscribed to some extent to a different model of cultural behavior.

⁷⁴ Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (Fifteenth-Eighteenth Centuries). A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Aleksei Vladimirovich Vino-

it is difficult to separate Lithuanian from Polish expertise in dealing with the Crimea, and it is unclear if Lithuanian and Muscovite knowledge of the Crimea intruded into Muscovite-Lithuanian diplomacy.

The job of a diplomat was to assist his monarch to achieve his foreign policy objectives and in the process to defend his honor. If doing so required repeating ideological fantasies or telling lies, then diplomats repeated ideological fantasies and told lies. Most of the time, Muscovite diplomats, including at times Ivan IV himself, could give the appearance of being no more than mindless automatons mechanically spewing Muscovite ideological nonsense to far-from-unsuspecting diplomats from other countries. In fact, Muscovite diplomats, as evidenced by Muscovite diplomacy with Lithuania, needed brains to process information and formulate talking points based upon the arguments of their counterparts across the table. Doing so provided rare moments when Muscovite diplomats could, whether improvised or scripted, move outside the narrow confines of myth and legend, and mobilize what might be called nonideological reasoning or empirical induction, logic of one sort or another, to advance their cause. Sometimes this involved nothing more than what we would call common sense, although given its rarity, common sense is a misnomer. Muscovite diplomats negotiating with Lithuania invoked *inter alia* mathematical logic to determine the place of Muscovy in the international pecking order; the weather in justifying not looking for boundary markers in winter and not trying to travel over rivers swollen with melted snow, economic concepts in defining a city so as to include the entire metropolitan area, child rearing to justify not imposing protocol obligations on a child too young to fulfill them, political theory to dissect the relationship of a vassal to a patrimony and the ambiguities of the relationship of two countries united in a union, theology to justify treating all captives equally as having souls, public health practices to explain the inadvisability of breaking a quarantine, geography to explain sovereignty over a city on a river by whoever was sovereign over the river's sources, and philosophy and ethics in dealing with issues of reciprocity in recognizing titulature. This discursive field exceeded analyzing a particular political conjuncture in historical context. Muscovite diplomats did not just *listen* to what their counterparts across the negotiating table said, they *heard* what they said and responded substantively. Although the exercise of such intellectual ingenuity did not lessen Muscovite diplomatic hypocrisy or obviate the use of diplomatic lies, nevertheless this was a rational, mental activity, one which, unfortunately, appears only rarely in our sources, but which makes the passages which do illustrate it far more

intriguing for revealing something of the Muscovite intellect otherwise virtually inaccessible in stylized and formalized diplomatic discourse.

Chapter 12

Elizabeth I on Ivan IV's Taste in Women

In 1582–83 Tsar Ivan IV dispatched Fedor Andreevich Pisemskii to Queen Elizabeth I of England on a diplomatic mission one of whose goals was to negotiate Ivan's marriage to her distant kinswoman Lady Mary Hastings, a daughter of Sir Henry Hastings, Lord of Huntington. Inconveniently Ivan was married at the time, to Tsaritsa Mariia Nagaia, his seventh wife, but Pisemskii was instructed to inform Elizabeth that Ivan did not find her suitable, she was low-born, and Ivan would have no problem sending her to a convent. Unfortunately for these excuses, Elizabeth then learned from English merchants in Moscow that Tsaritsa Mariia had just given birth to a son,¹ which impugned Ivan's "separation" from her. Pisemskii had to resort to lying by claiming that the news of the birth of Tsarevich Dmitrii was false. In any event Elizabeth tried, as diplomatically as possible, to dissuade Ivan from the match with Lady Mary. In a private conversation with Pisemskii, as reported in a secret memo (*pamiat'*) he authored after his return to Moscow, Elizabeth observed: "I have heard that your sovereign loves beautiful women" (*Slyshala esmi, chto gosudar' vash liubit krasnye devitsy*).² Alas, the Lady Mary Hastings was ill, had a poor complexion, and was not beautiful, so Ivan would not love her,³ an unflatter-

¹ Mariia Nagaia's son Tsarevich Dmitrii, of Uglich, outlived his father and was later canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church after he was, some believe, murdered at the behest of Boris Godunov. The second Tsarevich Dmitrii is not to be confused with the first Tsarevich Dmitrii, born in 1552 and died in 1553, the son of Ivan's first wife, Anastasiia Iur'evna Romanovna.

² "Women" as a translation of *devitsy* is a compromise. It is probably how Elizabeth would have phrased it. The word can mean "girl," but I doubt that Elizabeth would have said that Ivan loved "girls." It also means "virgin" or "maiden," the sense in which Ivan applied it to Elizabeth (see below), but I doubt that Elizabeth would describe Ivan as loving "beautiful virgins" or "beautiful maidens."

³ The memo is printed in D. S. Likhachev, ed., *Puteshestviia russkikh poslov XVI–XVII vv.: Stateinye spiski* (Moscow–Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1954), 149–55, quotation on 150. It can also be found in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s*

ing description of Mary Hastings later repeated, on Elizabeth's instructions, to Ivan in Moscow by her ambassador, Sir Jerome Bowes. As it turns out, Ivan did not marry Lady Hastings.

Although this episode is well-known to historians, no one, it appears, has analyzed Elizabeth's fascinating reference to Ivan's taste in women. In Livonian War propaganda, pamphlet literature, some travel accounts, Livonian chronicles, and the memoirs of Germans who had entered Ivan's service and later defected, Ivan is portrayed as a sexual pervert and rapist, a sex-crazed maniac, which is consistent with his reputation as a sadistic and despotic tyrant⁴ and with the Western obsession with Muscovite sexual mores, supposedly seriously lacking in any morality,⁵ but hardly as someone who appreciated feminine beauty. Elizabeth's characterization of Ivan should be examined within the context of several salient issues of Muscovite social, sexual, and marital mores, and with the process by which a Muscovite ruler chose a bride. Elizabeth's observation constitutes a curious case of English-Muscovite cross-cultural communication and miscommunication.

The actual diplomatic context is pretty well established. Ivan had long wanted an offensive-defensive military alliance with England that would put the English navy at his disposal in the Baltic Sea. The lack of a Baltic war fleet ultimately doomed Ivan's attempts to win the Livonian War, because Riga and Tallinn could withstand Muscovite sieges indefinitely if supplied from the sea. Elizabeth had no intention of agreeing to such an alliance, which would have cut off profitable English trade with Muscovy's enemies. However, she could not reject Ivan's proposal outright lest her refusal imperil English trade with Muscovy, so she dissimulated and prevaricated. Ivan's marriage proposal to Hastings was an instrument Ivan hoped would secure that Muscovite-English alliance. Even if, by 1582–83, the Livonian War was officially over with the Treaty of Jam-Zapol'skii, Ivan was still planning a future recovery of Livonia from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden; the treaty of

derzhavami inostrannymi = Pamiatniki diplomaticeskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Anglieu, 2: S 1581 po 1604, 65–70.

⁴ Andreas Kappeler, *Ivan Groznyi im Spiegel der ausländischen Druckschriften seiner Zeit. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des westlichen Russlandbildes* (Bren: Herbert Lang, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1972); Marshall T. Poe, "A People Born to Slavery": *Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography, 1476–1748* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Cornelia Soldat, *Erschreckende Geschichten in der Darstellung von Moskovitern und Osmanen in den deutschen Flugschriften des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts/Stories of Atrocities in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century German Pamphlets About the Russians and Turks*, with a Foreword by David Goldfrank (Lewiston, ME: The Edwin Mellon Press, 2014)..

⁵ Marshall Poe, "The Sexual Life of Muscovites: Evidence from the Foreign Accounts," *Russian History* 35, 3 (2008): 409–27.

Plyusa with Sweden in 1583 also constituted a stopgap measure, not a renunciation of Muscovite territorial aspirations in the Baltic region.

The Lady Hastings proposal did not in fact founder on the question of her physical attributes. It was true that she did not want to leave dear old England to move to Muscovy, but neither she nor Elizabeth would ever have agreed to her conversion to Russian Orthodox Christianity, a prerequisite for the wedding in Ivan's eyes. It is difficult not to suspect that Ivan knew that the religious barrier could not be overcome, so the proposal might have been more a negotiating tactic than a serious prospect. Offering any offspring of the marriage appanages in Muscovy—of course Tsarevich Fedor, Ivan's surviving eldest son after the death of Tsarevich Ivan, was Ivan's heir—was a generous gesture, but hardly likely to bribe Hastings into agreeing to marry Ivan.

To determine whether Ivan would or could have ranked physical beauty as a major factor in choosing a bride we must examine the process whereby royal brides were chosen in Muscovy. Standard operating procedure in Muscovy during Ivan's reign utilized the bride show to select a wife for the tsar. Theoretically all prospective candidates were screened and then presented to Ivan for his approval. While physical appearance was a criterion, a base qualification, mentioned prominently in the process and described at great length, it was hardly paramount. Russell Martin concludes that looks were taken into account "to the extent that beauty might be regarded popularly as a sign of health, vigor, and the promise of agreeable-looking children." Acceptable appearance augured well for good health, and hence years of fertility to supply the ruler with healthy heirs, but no more.⁶ Beauty figured much more significantly as a factor in the Byzantine bride-shows which probably inspired the Muscovite practice,⁷ which is hardly surprising given Byzantium's Hellenistic heritage of the cult of physical beauty. Of course, when Pisemskii was permitted to view Ivan's prospective bride, the Lady Mary, he proclaimed her to be beautiful, but disagreeing with Elizabeth's and Bowes's assessment was mandatory courtesy toward Lady Mary on the part of Pisemskii's master, Ivan.

We cannot confirm that Ivan preferred beautiful wives from reliable contemporary portraits of any of his wives, because none is extant.⁸

⁶ Russell E. Martin, *A Bride for the Tsar: Bride-Shows and Marriage Politics in Early Modern Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012), on the bride show in general 57–94, here 76–78.

⁷ Gilbert Dagron, *Emperor and Priest: The Imperial Office in Byzantium* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 48.

⁸ One physical description of a "candidate" in 1547 to be Ivan's first wife survives. The twelve-year-old Princess Ovdot'ia Vasil'evna Gundorova had a "well proportioned figure, is not too thin and not too fat, black eyes, a nose that is not too long for her

Elizabeth opined that Ivan “loved” beautiful women and therefore would not “love” Lady Mary. In all probability Elizabeth was not using the word “love” in the same sense that Muscovites used it. A Muscovite chronicle observed that in 1561 upon first seeing Kuchenei, Ivan’s future second wife, daughter of Circassian Kabardinian ruler Temriuk, Ivan “fell in love with her” (*poliubil*), but that did not mean what “love” meant to Elizabeth. Muscovy lacked the modern conception of romantic love. The word “love” denoted a spiritual, not a physical, attraction, no “chemistry” was involved. Other Muscovite sources applied it to other royal betrothals as well, that of Ivan’s cousin, the appanage prince Vladimir Andreevich, and even that of Ivan’s supposedly deaf-mute younger brother, Prince Iurii Vasil’evich.⁹ Ivan was primarily attracted by the prospect of utilizing Kuchenei’s father’s strategic location in the north Caucasus to outflank Muscovy’s dangerous enemy, the Crimean Khanate.

Elizabeth would have understood physical beauty in sixteenth-century English terms. She did not need to look very far to imagine a ruler with a fondness for beautiful women, indeed, no farther than her father, King Henry VIII. The analogy of Henry VIII to Ivan is only partial. True, Ivan married seven times, Henry VIII only six, but Henry VIII was promiscuous, bedding (almost always) whoever he wanted when he wanted. In my judgment Ivan’s serial monogamy and the lack of royal concubines suggests that he never had sex with any woman to whom he had not been married by the Russian Orthodox Church.¹⁰ It must be remembered that the Muscovite court, probably uniquely among contemporary European courts, lacked loose sexual practices; Muscovite rulers and nobles had no mistresses or illegitimate children. The English Puritans would have approved their sexual propriety, if they could have surmounted their religious bigotry at Russian idolaters (Russian icons did not ap-

face, dark brown hair” (Martin, *A Bride for the Tsar*, 77). Gundorova was not selected to marry Ivan but it is not possible to attribute that rejection to her looks.

⁹ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 13: 333; O. V. Gladkova, “‘Vozliubikh bo razum ea i blagochestie’: Obraz ideal’noi liubvi v drevnerusskoi literature,” and P. V. Snesarevskii, “Predstavleniia o liubvi v pamiatnikakh pis’mennosti Rusi XIV–XV vv.,” in “*A se grekhi zlye, smertnye...’: Liubov’, erotika, i seksual’naia etika v doindustrial’noi Rossii (X–pervaia polovina XIX v.). Teksty. Issledovaniia.* (Moscow: Nauchno-izdatel’skii tsentr “Ladimir,” 1999), 1: 492–500, 516–50; *Drevniaia Rossiiskaia Vivilofika*, 2nd ed., vol. 13 (Moscow: Nikolai Novikov, 1790), no. V, 36–46, here 36; no. VI, 46–57, here 46. On Iurii Vasil’evich, see Charles J. Halperin, “Ivan the Terrible’s Younger Brother: Prince Iurii Vasil’evich (1533–63),” *Court Historian* 22 (2017): 1–16.

¹⁰ Ivan’s serial heterosexual monogamy has not precluded assertions that he was a homosexual, whose womanizing was merely a facade to hide his true sexual orientation. See Boris Paramonov, “Zagadka Ivana Groznogo: Gomoseksualizm,” *Zvezda*, no. 6 (1993): 201–05.

peal to Puritans), but it is impossible to say what Elizabeth thought about such fastidious sexual propriety at Ivan's court. Elizabeth maintained her virginity for political as much as personal reasons but she was hardly naive when it came to love and marriage.¹¹

Elizabeth understood full well the risks of antagonizing Ivan. In 1553 the English joint-stock company, the Muscovy Company, established in London to conduct Russian trade, had received a very generous grant of commercial privileges from Ivan, including a monopoly on foreign trade through the White Sea, exemption from all customs dues, and the right to establish factories in Moscow and several provincial cities. These conditions, ideal from the English point of view, soon encountered difficulties. English interlopers—non-members of the Muscovy Company—successfully inserted themselves into the Muscovite trade, and the Muscovite conquest of Narva in 1558 opened a Baltic outlet for trade with Muscovy to all of England's competitors. Only Ivan could police the English interlopers, which he was loathe to do. Ivan resolutely refused to accede to the English request that their trade monopoly be extended to Narva. Disputes over English trading privileges and Elizabeth's continuing stalling on a military alliance threatened any English trade with Muscovy. To be sure, in 1566 Ivan admitted the Muscovy Company to the *oprichnina*. In 1567 Ivan suggested that Elizabeth and Ivan each guarantee asylum to the other, should circumstances dictate exile. Elizabeth graciously offered Ivan asylum, but declared that she would never need to ask for it because her subjects loved her.¹² Elizabeth risked upsetting Ivan rather than impugning her own legitimacy, because, not despite the fact that some of her subjects obviously did not love her. Ivan was definitely upset with that answer, because it implied that Ivan's subjects did not love him; only reciprocal offers of asylum could have saved Ivan's face. Even in the best of times for English-Muscovite relations, Elizabeth knew that English trading privileges could be rescinded by Ivan at any time if Ivan got too upset at her refusal to accede to his political and military agenda.¹³ In September 1570 Ivan did just that. In October 1570 he unleashed his vicious sense of humor on Elizabeth, writing: "You remain in

¹¹ For Elizabeth's views and actions concerning marriage, her own and those of other players at court, see Alison Plowden, *Elizabeth I* (Sparkford, UK: J. H. Haynes, 2004), 194, 433–34, 469–70, 504, 516, 518. The Elizabethan Court was hardly puritanical.

¹² George Tolstoy, ed., *The First Forty Years of Intercourse between England and Russia, 1553–1593* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1964), 38–40. [Translation of Iurii Vasil'evich Tolstoi, ed., *Pervye sorok let snoshenii mezhdu Rossiei i Anglieiu, 1553–1593* (St. Petersburg, 1875).]

¹³ T. S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company 1553–1603* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956).

your maidenly state, like an old maid" (*ty prebyvaesh v svoei devicheskome chinu, kak est poshlala devitsa*).¹⁴ Ivan soon repealed his suspension of English trade.

In 1582 Elizabeth would not have risked noting Ivan's high standards of female pulchritude if she thought that he would feel insulted. As far as we can tell, she knew her man.¹⁵ She correctly divined that Ivan would not take umbrage at her praise of his taste in women and that the Muscovy Company would not suffer for it.

Ivan did not take offense at her comment. We can be reasonably certain that he did not express his displeasure in an inextant missive to her. We have a very good idea of the ebb and flow of the correspondence between Ivan and Elizabeth.¹⁶ If Ivan had ever taken issue with Elizabeth's assertion, his objection would have found some resonance in their overall correspondence, and it did not. However, given the role of physical appearance in the royal bride-show and Muscovite conception of love between spouses, Ivan should have taken umbrage at Elizabeth's comment. He might very well have responded that a Christian marriage was far too serious to be decided on the basis of mere corporeal considerations. Of course, I doubt that Ivan would have admitted the variety of political considerations that infused the process of selecting a royal bride.

However, if Ivan did not deny Elizabeth's words, neither did he confirm them. Instead, he maintained a discrete silence on the subject. Without taking any negative actions against the Muscovy Company, he could have replied with a pro forma disclaimer about the relevance of beauty to his choices of wives, either by giving Bowes a private oral message or sending a written

¹⁴ D. S. Likhachev and Ia. S. Lur'e, ed., *Poslaniia Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1951), 139–43, quote 142. Contemporary English translation: "You flowe in your maydenlie estate like a maide" (Tolstoy, *First Forty Years*, 106–15, quote on 114).

¹⁵ Elizabeth and Ivan never met, except in fiction, in Matthew Reilly's *The Tournament: A Novel* (New York: Gallery Books, 2013), at an international chess tournament in Istanbul in 1546. Ann Kleimola called this novel to my attention.

¹⁶ See the series of articles by Henry R. Huttenbach: "New Archival Material on the Anglo-Russian Treaty of Queen Elizabeth I and Tsar Ivan IV," *Slavonic and East European Review* 49, 117 (1971): 535–49; "The Search for and Discovery of New Archival Materials for Ambassador Jenkinson's Mission to Muscovy in 1571–2: Four Letters by Queen Elizabeth I to Tsar Ivan IV," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 63 (1972): 416–36 [Huttenbach's forthcoming monograph, 421 n. 40, "The Correspondence Between Queen Elizabeth I and Tsar Ivan IV" unfortunately never came forth]; "Anthony Jenkinson's 1566 and 1567 Missions to Muscovy Reconstructed from Unpublished Sources," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 9 (1975): 179–203; "The Correspondence between Queen Elizabeth I and Tsar Ivan IV: An Examination of Its Role in the Documentation of Anglo-Muscovite History," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 24 (1978): 101–30.

reply with him when he returned to England, just to set the record strait. His displeasure need not have impaired ongoing negotiations. However, Ivan chose not to articulate the evaluation of female beauty implicit in his bride-shows and the Muscovite conception of marital love.

This was not the only time that Ivan chose not to comment on a foreign assertion at variance with Muscovite views about him in diplomatic communication. Various Nogai Tatars ascribed Chingissid descent to Ivan, proclaiming him a direct male heir of Chingghis Khan, and/or attributing to him the title "White Khan" (*Belyi tsar'/khan*), in the steppe geographic color scheme, Western Khan, as a quasi-inheritor of the realm of the Juchid ulus (in most historiography called the Golden Horde). Ivan propagated a different and equally fictitious genealogy, from Prus, brother of Augustus Caesar, via Riu-rik, legendary founder of the Kievan Rus' state and dynasty. However, the Nogais, who flattered Ivan from a steppe perspective, suffered no ill-effects from their flattery. Ivan permitted them to repeat their assertions without any denials on his part, but his diplomats did not acknowledge them in any way.¹⁷

If Ivan tolerated Nogai flattery because he needed Nogai military support in the steppe against Kazan' or Crimea, he could also have tolerated English flattery from Elizabeth because he needed (although he never got) English military support in the Baltic. Ivan understood both Nogai and Elizabethan discourse. Even if he were pleased with how he was addressed or described, he did not—for different reasons—deign to acknowledge their assertions. A Russian Orthodox Christian tsar neither needed nor wanted a genealogy beginning with a pagan steppe conqueror. It was acceptable if steppe peoples viewed him as an heir of the Mongol steppe empire, but Ivan could not present himself as a Mongol ruler, certainly not to his very Christian court,¹⁸ his people, or his Christian neighbors. At the same time, even if Ivan did fancy beautiful women, Orthodox propriety precluded admitting the attractions of the female body as a legitimate pursuit for a Russian Orthodox tsar. It would have been unseemly to Ivan's dignity to do so, if not virtually a sin in succumbing to lustful thoughts.

¹⁷ Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV and Chinggis Khan," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 51 (2003): 481–97.

¹⁸ Charles J. Halperin, "The Culture of Ivan IV's Court: The Religious Beliefs of Bureaucrats," in *The New Muscovite Cultural History: A Collection in Honor of Daniel B. Rowland*, ed. Valerie Kivelson, Karen Petrone, Nancy Kollmann, and Michael Flier (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2009), 93–105; Halperin, "Russia Between East and West: Diplomatic Reports During the Reign of Ivan IV," in *Saluting Aaron Gurevich: Essays in History, Literature and Other Subjects*, ed. Yelena Mazour-Matusevich and Alexandra S. Korros (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010), 81–103.

Queen Elizabeth I's very Renaissance but not Orthodox Christian characterization of Ivan evoked no pushback from the not-Renaissance (most historians would say)¹⁹ and very Orthodox Christian Tsar Ivan IV. Whether Ivan secretly enjoyed the praise of his discerning eye when it came to female charms remains unknown, but analysis of Elizabeth's seemingly casual remark illuminates the cultural divides between England and Muscovy and sheds new light on Ivan's ever complex character and deportment.

¹⁹ The most famous case arguing otherwise is Michael Cherniavsky, "Ivan the Terrible as a Renaissance Prince," *Slavic Review* 27, 2 (1968): 195–211.

Economy

Chapter 13

Ivan IV's Coinage

During the reign of Ivan IV money came to play an increasing role in the Muscovite economy. "Money" meant coinage. Muscovites recorded large monetary transactions in terms of rubles, but there was no ruble coin, so how they managed to pay large sums of money merits investigation.¹ Research reveals that for significant money payment someone might have to transport over a hundred pounds of thousands of tiny silver coins, probably in sacks. The sources, of course, tell us nothing about this potentially picturesque feature of Muscovite life. The purpose of this chapter is to raise a question in the hopes that numismatists and specialists in Muscovite economic history can provide a better answer than this writer.

Introduction

According to Daniil Makovskii, money played an increasingly significant role in the sixteenth-century Muscovite economy, in commerce, taxation, and labor.² Use of money by the lay landowning class was widespread for the pur-

I am greatly indebted to Roman Kovalev and Paul Bushkovitch for consultation on Muscovite coinage; neither is responsible for my use, disuse, or misuse of their observations. I also wish to express my sincerest appreciation to Judith Kolbas for reading an earlier draft of this article. I am alone responsible for any surviving errors.

¹ I was inspired to write this article when Barbara Skinner raised exactly this question, for which I owe her my sincerest appreciation.

² Daniil Pavlovich Makovskii, *Razvitie tovarno-denezhnykh otnoshenii v sel'skom khoziaistve russkogo gosudarstva v XVI veke* (Smolensk: Smolenskii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii institut imeni Karla Marksa, 1963); Richard Hellie, "The Foundations of Russian Capitalism," review of *Razvitie tovarno-denezhnykh otnoshenii v sel'skom khoziaistve russkogo gosudarstva v XVI veke*, by D. P. Makovskii, *Slavic Review* 26, 1 (1967): 148–54. Both Makovskii and Hellie concluded that Ivan IV's *oprichnina* put an end to this economic progress. Although the Muscovite economy did enter a depression during the later decades of Ivan IV's reign, the use of coinage did not decline.

chase of land and donations to monasteries, usually in memory of departed relatives.³ Increasing Muscovite foreign trade, especially during Muscovy's temporary possession of the Livonian port of Narva, facilitated importation of silver specie and silver coins, notably Reichsthalers (or simply Thalers), called *efimki* in Muscovy, which could be melted down to mint Muscovite coins.⁴ Importation of silver, or sale of Muscovite goods to foreigners for foreign silver coins, was necessary because Muscovy lacked silver (let alone gold) mines.

The Muscovite currency system at the time is well known. The standard unit of account was the ruble. Until the middle of the fourteenth century the Rus' did not issue their own coinage; for money they either used Jochid ulus (Golden Horde) coins or the *grivenka*, a silver ingot. Russian coins of the late fourteenth century imitated Tatar coins. Prices throughout Northeast Russia were uniformly recorded in rubles, but the denominations of coins worth less than a ruble were not uniform. Rubles consisted of *dengi* (singular: *denga*),⁵ but there were two types of *denga*, the Novgorod, at 100 to the ruble, and the Moscow, at 200 to the ruble. A Novgorod *denga* was worth 2 Moscow *dengi*. Novgorod and Moscow coinage had parallel values for the monetary amounts between a *denga* and a ruble. A *poltina*, or half-ruble, was worth 50 Novgorod *dengi* but 100 Moscow *dengi*. A *grivna*, a tenth of a ruble, was worth 10 Novgorod *dengi* but 20 Moscow *dengi*. An *altyn* was worth 3 Novgorod *dengi* but 6 Moscow *dengi*. In addition, there were *poslushki*, or half-*dengi*; a Novgorod *poslushka* was worth twice as much as a Moscow *poslushka*. The names of these coins reflect oriental influence. Persian *dang* was a standard weight; for coinage it was divided into six parts, perhaps the source of the *zlotnik* discussed below. *Altyn* comes from the Turkish for gold, or *alt* in Mongolian, but does not mean a coin or weight. We can envision the Muscovite currency system by contextualizing rubles as dollars, *poltiny* as half-dollars, *grivny* as dimes, *altyny* as nickels (here the numbers do not correspond), *dengi* as pennies, and *poslushki* as half-pennies (English ha'penny). *Poslushki* were rare and are little studied; I will not examine them further. Nor will the occasional copper coin, worth even less than *poslushki*, be included in our discussion; in the seventeenth century the government's attempt to introduce

³ Charles J. Halperin, "Lay Cash Land Purchases during the Reign of Ivan IV," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 65 (2017): 177–99; Halperin, "Lay Donations to the Trinity Sergius Monastery during the Reign of Ivan IV," *Slavonic and East European Review* 95, 2 (2017): 271–92.

⁴ Alla Sergeevna Mel'nikova, *Russkie monety ot Ivana Groznogo do Petra Pervogo: Istoriia russkoi denezhnoi sistemy s 1533 do 1682 goda* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1989), 36, 33.

⁵ The word derives from Turkic via the Mongols; in modern Russian *den'gi* means "money" generically, including paper money, but in sixteenth-century Muscovy it meant either a specific coin or coinage in general (see below).

copper coinage produced major riots.⁶ This currency system, with separate Moscow and Novgorod poltiny, grivny, altyny, and dengi values, does not seem problematic and is not in itself the problem; the problem lies elsewhere. Moscow and Novgorod coinage continued into the sixteenth century during Ivan IV's reign.

As Mel'nikova aptly and pithily expressed it, "The Russian monetary system was primarily a set of units of account [*schetnoi*]: monetary units—the ruble, *poltina*, *grivna*, *altyn*—did not really exist but were notational [*schetnye*] concepts, expressing a definite quantity of petty silver coins—*kopeika*, *denga*, *polushka*."⁷ The ruble had an exchange value only. The existence of only silver coinage in a low denomination and units of account for higher sums was not confined to early modern Muscovy. In medieval Western Europe from the eighth to the twelfth centuries the silver penny was the sole coin; the schilling was a unit of account of 12 pence and the pound of 20 pence.⁸ In Rus' paying someone a ruble did not mean exchanging a single coin, but rather 100 Novgorod dengi or 200 Moscow dengi, as if one were paying for an item worth a US dollar with a hundred US pennies, which sounds as inconvenient as it would be. (This conceit deliberately overlooks the use of rolls of pennies in the US.) This feature of the Muscovite currency system raises a very practical question: how did Muscovites pay for items in the tens, hundreds, or even thousands of rubles? To address that question, we have to deal with the issue of what a *denga* weighed. To my knowledge no numismatist studying Muscovite coinage during the reign of Ivan IV mentions alloys, so we will have to confine ourselves to speaking of the weight of the silver in the coinage, rather than the weight of coins.⁹

Fortunately, in addition to studying the technology of minting dengi, the location, output, and history of mints, and the varieties of illustrations and inscriptions, especially the ruler's title,¹⁰ issues which need not detain us, nu-

⁶ Mel'nikova, *Ruskie monety*, 25–26, 32. The *pul'* was an early copper coin; its precise value in terms of silver coinage is unknown.

⁷ Ibid., 29–30. The first silver ruble coin was minted in Russia in 1704 under Peter the Great.

⁸ Philip Grierson, *Numismatics* (London: Oxford University Press 1975), 25.

⁹ On coin weights, fineness of silver, alloys, and coin counters, see *ibid.*, x, 25, 33, 96, 106, 146–49, 149–55, 162–65, 177–79. Unfortunately Grierson appears not to know that medieval Rus' or early modern Russia minted coins.

¹⁰ See A. S. Mel'nikova, "Sistemizatsiia monet Ivana IV i Fedora Ivanovicha (1533–98)," *Numismatika i epigrafika* 13 (1980): 77–137; Mel'nikova, "Moskovskaia angliiskaia kompaniia i russkoe denezhnoe delo," in *Rossia na putiakh tsentralizatsii: Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 115–25; Mel'nikova, "Mesto monet Ivana Groznogo v riadu

mismatists have also rigorously studied the question of the weight of the silver in coinage. The weight of the silver in dengi was changed early in Ivan IV's reign, but for context we will begin with some evidence for what the denga weighed before that. It should be noted that absolute precision is impossible in these calculations, because coins were not minted by machines and did not survive unchanged once issued. The weights of silver in different dengi are ideal weights, based upon a range of weights found in varying numbers of dengi. Rounding in calculations induces further distortion. However, this difficulty is not prohibitive because I am interested in the scale of magnitude of the weight that a 1,000 rubles might have.¹¹ This is an extreme case, chosen to make a point. I did not find any land purchases by the lay elite for 1,000 rubles or more, but I did find two of 900 rubles and one of 800 rubles, and 11 of 201 were 500 rubles or more. I did not find any money donations to monasteries by members of the lay elite higher than 500 rubles, but I found 81 of 100 rubles or more among 101 donations. Ivan IV's donations ran into the thousands of rubles.¹² The point is that the monetary system had to be able to handle transactions as large as 1,000 rubles. As we shall see, a variety of methods of calculation produce different total weights in silver in 1,000 rubles. It is unclear if these varying totals are even compatible. Fortunately, all calculations result in scales of magnitude that substantiate the same conclusion, namely, that to pay large sums of money Muscovites must have used very heavy bags of coins.

Pre-Ivan IV Dengi

Ilarion Kaufman's study of the silver ruble provides some very useful measurements of pre-Ivan IV dengi. His analysis uses the zolotnik as an intermediary measure; a zolotnik weighed $\frac{1}{8}$ ounce (perhaps related to the coin dang divided into six parts).¹³ In the fifteenth century, a Moscow ruble contained

pamiatnikov ideologii samoderzhavnoi vlasti," *Vspomogatel'nye istoricheskie distsipliny* 17 (1985): 121–33 (the argument that coins reflect the dynastic crisis of 1553 by portraying Prince Vladimir Andreevich Staritskii, who is not named, is not persuasive); and Mel'nikova, *Russkie monety*, passim, on these subjects.

¹¹ Halperin, "Lay Cash Land Purchases," passim; Halperin, "Lay Donations," passim; Liudvig Shtaindorf [Ludwig Steindorf], "Vklady tsaria Ivana Groznogo v Io-sifo-Volokolamskii monastyr'," *Drevniaia Rus': Voprosy medievistiki* 2 (28) (2002): 90–100.

¹² See the diagrams in Mel'nikova, *Russie monety*, 299, of pre-1533 and 1533–84 dengi weights and frequencies, to which I will return.

¹³ The word denoted a small gold coin in Kievan Rus'; *zoloto* means "gold," so the gold coin was called a *zolotnik* or *zlatnik*, and later became a unit of weight. One zolotnik contained 96 parts (singular: *dolia*, plural: *doli*) and weighed 4.266 grams.

$16\frac{2}{3}$ zolotniki of silver.¹⁴ At $\frac{1}{6}$ ounce per zolotnik, there were 6 zolotniki to the ounce, and 96 zolotniki weighed a pound. If it existed in the material world, the silver in a Moscow ruble would weigh 2.9 ounces. Extrapolating, 100 rubles would contain 290 ounces of silver weighing 18.125 pounds (8,221.355 grams), and 1,000 rubles would weigh 180 pounds (81,646.56 grams).¹⁵

Let us pause here to ponder this calculation. If my chain of calculations is correct, paying 1,000 rubles involved transporting 180 pounds (81,646.56 grams) of silver in coins. At this time there was only one type of denga, 100 to the ruble, the later Novgorod standard, so paying 1,000 rubles required 100,000 dengi. Even with an abacus, 100,000 dengi would have required some time and effort to count. Admittedly very few Muscovites could engage in monetary transactions of that magnitude, and even then but rarely, but counting 10,000 dengi for 100 rubles was no mean challenge and was necessitated far more often. Only a chest, like the kind used to store documents in the sixteenth-century Muscovite state archive, or a bag of some kind could serve as packing for such a hoard of coins. But the weight of silver involved is perhaps even more astonishing. It would take three or even four men to carry 180 pounds (81,646.56 grams) of silver in coins in 50-pound (22,679.6 gram) sacks, or two in a very strong chest, probably using a cart. A rich boyar could not carry even a 10-pound (4,535.95 gram) bag of silver in coins on his belt. Anyone rich enough to spend 1,000 rubles would most likely have access to the necessary labor, either his own servants and slaves or teamsters for hire, but even so neither Muscovite sources nor foreigners' travel accounts during Ivan IV's reign attest to this transportation obstacle. Sergei Chizhov claimed that given the varying weight of silver even in coins of the same denomination from the same mint, let alone, during the period up to and including the fifteenth century, from different principalities and city-states, vendors and buyers just weighed the silver in coins to achieve the ruble price involved in a transaction and used smaller coinage (kopecks) for amounts less than a ruble. Even accepting this procedure for Ivan IV's reign after the coinage reform does not solve the problem. The amount of coinage involved would not change and would still create a transportation problem. Such a practice also entails that vendors not only carried scales with them, which is quite conceivable, but also that everyone knew how to correlate ruble prices to the weight of silver,

¹⁴ Ilarion Ignat'evich Kaufman, *Serebrianyi rubl' v Rossii ot ego vozniknoveniia do kontsa XIX veka* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia B. M. Vol'fa, 1910; Moscow: Librokom, 2012), 52.

¹⁵ 1 pound = 453.592 grams. Because I think in pounds and numismatists in grams, I have provided weights of silver in both systems.

which may be true but, like the practice itself, cannot be demonstrated.¹⁶ Ivan IV supposedly needed an entire wagon train of hundreds of carts to transport Moscow's treasures with him when he left the city in December 1564 on the path that led to the creation of the *oprichnina*, but he packed not just money but valuables, including objets d'art, jewelry, and far heavier objects. But let us return to the pre-Ivan IV data.

Under Ivan III, according to Kaufman, a Moscow ruble was worth 18 $\frac{2}{3}$ zolotniki.¹⁷ That would equate to 3 ounces of silver, so 100 rubles would contain 300 ounces of silver weighing 18.75 pounds (8,504.85 grams), and 1,000 rubles would weigh 187.5 pounds (85,048.5 grams). The weight of silver in a ruble had increased.

Mel'nikova's diagram of pre-Ivan IV dengi, based upon 32 coins, shows that the highest quantities of weights of silver ranged from 0.20 to 0.22 grams, so 100 dengi, a ruble, would have silver weighing between 20 and 22 grams. At 28 grams per ounce, a notational ruble would contain between 1.25 and 1.375 ounces of silver. 100 rubles would contain 125 to 137.5 ounces of silver, or between 7.8 and 8.5 pounds (3,538.0176 and 3,855.532 grams), and 1,000 rubles in turn between 78 and 85 pounds (35,380.176 and 38,555.32 grams) of silver.

Mel'nikova's calculation of the amount of silver in 1,0000 rubles differs greatly from Kaufman's implied weight for pre-Ivan IV coinage of between 180 and 187.5 pounds (81,646.56 and 85,048.5 grams) of silver, although transactions of 100 rubles, requiring between 7.8 and 8.5 pounds (3,538.0176 and 3,855.532 grams) of silver, would be far less inconvenient. Kaufman presents a different calculation of pre-Ivan IV denga silver weights when he discusses the reform of Muscovite coinage during Ivan IV's reign, which I will present in the next section.

Kaufman dates the divergence between the Novgorod and Moscow rubles to the fifteenth century, so when we deal with Ivan IV's dengi we have to calculate both Novgorod and Moscow totals.

Ivan IV's Coinage

During the 1530s, Ivan IV's minority, the government was first led by his widowed mother, Grand Princess Elena Glinskaia, who instituted a currency reform in 1535–38. Scholars have reached different conclusions on the chronology and stages of this reform, which was obviously a process, not a single event. Such disagreements are unavoidable, Mel'nikova astutely observes,

¹⁶ S. I. Chizhov, "Monety Moskovskogo gosudarstva," in *Russkaia istoriia v ocherkakh i stat'iakh*, ed. M. V. Dovnar-Zapol'skii (Kiev: N. Ia. Okhliablin, 1912), 3: 427–58.

¹⁷ Kaufman, *Serebrianyi rubl'*, 58

because the chronicle entries describing it are contradictory, and Muscovite coins did not carry a date.¹⁸ While the reform was justified by the need to replace counterfeit and debased (shaved) dengi, it also itself lowered the weight of the silver in a ruble. The Treasury earned revenue from a customs charge to private individuals who brought in old coins to be reminted. The Novgorod denga eventually began to be called a copeck (*kopeik*) because it showed St. George wielding a spear (*kop'e*), whereas the Moscow denga continued to be called a denga. The word *copeck* does not appear in the monetary transactions from Ivan IV's reign that I have studied, only the word *dengi*. The word came into wider usage only later, eventually becoming the only word for this coin. However, hereafter I will refer to the "Novgorod copeck" to contrast it to the Moscow denga. The Novgorod copeck was worth 2 Moscow dengi. A 1,000 rubles purchase, required physically accumulating, counting, and transporting 200,000 Muscovite dengi or 100,000 Novgorod kopeiki.

A reformed grivenka was now worth 3 rubles, an increase from the previous 2½ rubles. There are several ways to calculate the weight in pounds of the silver in 1,000 rubles of the new kopeiki and dengi. They produce different numbers. Trying to keep track of different calculations is confusing, but the key point is that all lead to the conclusion that the weight of silver in coinage used to pay a large monetary amount was considerable.

Method 1: As mentioned, Muscovites imported Joachimsthalers (*efimki*) to convert to kopeiki and dengi. One Joachimsthaler contained silver weighing 25–29 grams, approximately one ounce (28 grams). A ruble was worth 2 efimki, so a ruble "contained" silver weighing approximately 2 ounces and 8 rubles contained silver weighing a pound, 100 rubles 12.5 pounds (5,669.9 grams), and 1,000 rubles 125 pounds (56,599 grams).

Method 2: From another starting point, the weight of the silver in a grivenka rose from 198.85 grams to 204 grams, now worth 3 rubles.¹⁹ Therefore a ruble would in theory contain 68 grams of silver and at 28 grams per ounce weigh approximately 2.4 ounces, 100 rubles, 240 ounces or at 16 ounces per pound, 15 pounds (6,803.88 grams), and 1,000 rubles, 150 pounds (68,038.8 grams). Put another way, approximately 6⅔ rubles would weigh a pound (453.592 grams).

Method 3: Kaufman argues that Elena Glinskaia actually debased Muscovite coinage by raising the number of Novgorod copecks per grivenka from

¹⁸ Mel'nikova, *Russkie monety*, 14–28, on the reform, here 15. See also Kaufman, *Serebrianyi rubl'*, 62–68; and Mikhail Markovich Krom, "Vdovstviushchee tsarstvo": Politicheskii krizis v Rossii 30–40-kh godov XVI veka (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010), 564–69.

¹⁹ Krom, "Vdovstviushchee tsarstvo," 565, 568. The chronicle source is *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter PSRL] 13 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 93, left column.

260 to 300 and lowering the number of zolotniki per grivenka from 40.5 to 34.56. The increase in dengi per grivenka and the decrease of zolotniki per grivenka are consistent at a 14.5–15 percent change down and up respectively. At $\frac{1}{2}$ ounce per zolotnik, the weight of silver in an old grivenka weighed 6.74 ounces, of a new grivenka 5.76 ounces, again a 14.5 percent change. At 260 dengi for the old grivenka, the silver in a denga weighed 0.0259 ounces; at 300 dengi for the new grivenka, the silver in a new denga/kopeika weighed 0.0193 ounces. Consequently, the hypothetical weight of the silver in a Novgorod ruble fell from 2.59 ounces to 1.93 ounces, over a 25 percent drop. One hundred old Novgorod rubles would contain silver weighing 259 ounces or 16.18 pounds (7,339.11856 grams), 100 new Novgorod rubles silver weighing 193 ounces or 12.06 pounds (5,470.31952 grams); 1,000 Novgorod rubles would have fallen from 161.8 pounds (73,391.1856 grams) of silver to 120.6 pounds (54,703.1952 grams) of silver. These weights derived from the weight of a zolotnik differ from Kaufman's second method of calculating the silver weight of coins during Ivan IV's reign.

Method 4: Per Kaufman, a (new) Novgorod copeck weighed 0.682 grams (very close to Mel'nikova's range of 0.6 to 0.66 grams). Therefore, 100 Novgorod copecks or 1 Novgorod ruble contained 68.2 grams of silver, or 2.43 ounces, 100 Novgorod rubles, 15.8 pounds (7,166.7536 grams), and 1,000 Novgorod rubles, 158 pounds (71,667.536) grams. The silver in Muscovite rubles weighed half as much, so 1000 Moscow rubles would contain silver weighing 79 pounds (35,833.766 grams).²⁰

Method 5: Mel'nikova's second diagram of Ivan IV's coinage, based upon 4,858 coins, shows the highest quantity of Novgorod copecks at 100 per ruble contained silver weighing between 0.6 and 0.66 grams. One hundred copecks, a ruble, would contain silver weighing between 60 and 66 grams, or between 2.14 and 2.35 pounds (970.68688 and 1,065.9412 grams), 100 rubles silver weighing between 21.4 and 23.5 pounds (9,706.8688 and 10,659.412 grams), and 1,000 rubles silver weighing between 214 and 235 pounds (97,068.688 and 106,594.12 grams), the highest weight total derived here.

The inconsistent, to put it mildly, results of differing calculations for the weight of the silver in 1000 rubles, pre-Ivan IV's reform and post-Ivan IV's reform, can be more easily visualized in tabular form (table 13.1):

²⁰ Chizhov, "Monety Moskovskogo gosudarstva," 431–32; and Chizhov, "K istorii denezhnogo proizvodstva na Rusi za tsarskii period," in *Sbornik statei v chest' grafini P. S. Uvarovoi* (Moscow: Tovarishestvo skoropech. A. A. Levenson, 1916), 34, utilized Kaufman's conclusions as to coinage weights.

Table 13.1. Weight of Silver in 1,000 rubles

Method		Pounds	Grams
Pre-Ivan IV			
	Calculation 1	180.0	81,646.5600
	Calculation 2	187.5	85,048.5000
	Calculation 3	161.8	73,391.1856
	Calculation 4	75.0	34,019.4000
	Calculation 5	85.0	38,555.3200
Ivan IV			
	Method 1	125.0	56,599.0000
	Method 2	150.0	68,038.8000
	Method 3	Old New	73,391.1856
			54,703.1952
	Method 4	158.0	71,667.5360
	Method 5	Between and	97,068.6880 235.0
			106,594.1200

This chapter has included Kaufman's calculations despite the fact that his analysis has been seriously questioned. In 1960, Valentin Ianin, a leading Russian historian and archeologist and a specialist on numismatics and metrology, categorized Kaufman's conclusions on weights as suspect because they were based upon an insufficient use of archeological, numismatic, and written sources, and therefore in need of revision.²¹ In 1963, Ianin added, with a touch of disciplinary condescension, that Kaufman was not a numismatist.²² If Mel'nikova's 1989 monograph met Ianin's standards for research—and it certainly rested on far more numismatic evidence than Kaufman's study—then we could consider her statistics far more reliable. However, I have included Kaufman's results in my discussion and in table 13.1 to illustrate the scale of the discrepancies among analyses of the weight of silver in Muscovite coins. Perhaps Russian numismatists will resolve the matter, but for the present it is sufficient for my purpose to note that for pre-Ivan IV coins the weights of silver "contained" in a 1000 rubles range from a low of 75 pounds (34,019.4 grams) to a high of 187.5 pounds (85,048.5 grams), and the weights of Ivan IV's reformed coins range from a low of 120.6 pounds (54,703.1952 grams) to a high

²¹ V. L. Ianin, "Metrologiia," in *Ocherki istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR*, vol. 2, ed. M. V. Nechkina et al. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1960), 678–79.

²² V. L. Ianin, "Numismatika," in *Ocherki istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR*, vol. 3, ed. M. V. Nechkina et al. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1963), 630–31.

of 235 pounds (106,594.12 grams).²³ The numbers for Ivan IV's reign after his mother's currency reform are the most pertinent here, because they attest that someone paying 1000 rubles in coinage would have to transport 100,000 or 200,000 (admittedly fingernail-size²⁴) coins with a silver weight of well over 100, perhaps well over 200, pounds. The implications of that conclusion for the functioning of the Muscovite economy need to be considered.

Coin or Notational Rubles

No matter which calculated weights of silver we derive for 1,000 rubles, because of the sheer quantity of *dengi* required to convey 1,000 rubles in value, it seems at first glance *prima facie* implausible that Muscovites paid out such sums in coinage. 1,000 rubles in money would have consisted of at least 100,000 if not 200,000 coins, containing silver weighing at the absolute minimum over 100 pounds. The possibility must be considered that the Muscovites did not do so. In that case, a bill of sale for 100 rubles did not mean that 100 rubles worth of coins was transferred but something else of equivalent value. It is difficult to believe that Ivan IV expected the 100,000 rubles he demanded in 1565 of the *zemshchina* for the upkeep of the *oprichnina*²⁵ be delivered in coins all at once. I suspect that he intended gradual payment, although even an installment plan to pay a six-digit figure would not have been easy. However, reading financial transaction documents from Ivan IV's reign makes the hypothesis that seemingly monetary transactions did not convey coinage even less convincing than taking mention of 100 rubles literally as a transfer of specie. Logically, the transfer of equivalent value instead of coinage makes sense, but practically it is less plausible.

Land was the primary form of wealth in Muscovy. The only asset of comparable value which could be exchanged, like barter, for land, was, of course, other land. And the Muscovites did exchange land for land, not in a bill of sale (*kupchaia gramota*) but in an "exchange charter" (*menovnaia* or *menovaia gramota*). If the ruble-values of the properties differed, monetary considerations were also given. A 1559/1560 land exchange between Deviatoi Dmitriev syn Rzhevskii and Iurii and Fedor Fedorovich deti Rzhevskie included an

²³ For comparison, a US penny weighs 2.75 grams, so \$1,000US in pennies, consisting of 100,000 pennies, would weigh 275,000 grams, ca. 606 pounds (Grierson, *Numismatics*, x). The silver in sixteenth-century Muscovite coins was nowhere near as heavy.

²⁴ I owe this striking image to Judith Kalbos.

²⁵ PSRL 13, 395.

additional consideration of 250 rubles.²⁶ A 1571/1572 land exchange between Andrei Iakovlev syn Shchelkalov and Princess Anna Nagavitsyna-Zasekina included an additional consideration of 100 rubles.²⁷ It makes no sense to enumerate (rather large) supposedly monetary considerations in a land exchange when also mentioning the estates involved, if the 100 rubles or 250 rubles allusions actually referred to additional land properties. Moreover, land exchanges were far outnumbered by monetary purchases. Monastic account/donation books and testaments name every conceivable form of immovable and moveable property, including land, land usage shares of fisheries and salt-works, food, clothing, livestock, dwellings, and so forth, as well as luxury goods such as icons with jeweled covers and jewelry itself, each with its proper monetary value in rubles. Financial paper—mortgages, pawns, IOUs, and limited service slavery contracts (*kabaly*)—also appears as donations and bequests. Monastic records assign ruble value to labor services rendered to the monastery by commoners who could not proffer money or even goods to pay for their entrance fees to be shorn or for commemorative services for a deceased relative or themselves. All of these assets were clearly distinguished from money, such as “5 rubles *dengi*” (“*dengi*” refers not to the coins called “*dengi*”; it meant “in money”). Monastic treasury inventories listed the exact amount of money-on-hand; there is not the slightest indication that the monetary figure denoted Accounts Payable goods and services of equal value. There is nothing else of value than money that could be conveyed by ruble amounts. Barter could probably be found at all levels of the Muscovite economy, but if recorded in a business document it was not recorded as a money transaction but as barter of goods with monetary values.

Monastic feast books and donation books give values in rubles, *altyny*, and *dengi*. One such donation in the Trinity-Sergius Monastery records 49 *rublia* 13 *altyny* 3 *dengi*.²⁸ Surely the rubles and *altyny* were not in the non-existent coins of those denominations, but just as surely the *dengi* were in coins, making it difficult to imagine that the donor conveyed the rubles in a form other than coins and then listed the petty monetary amounts involved in coins. In addition, a telling revenue book entry noted that a donation of 30 rubles was “in Novgorod *dengi*” (copecks), which makes no sense unless it referred to actual coinage (although here again, *dengi* probably means “in money,” in Novgorod

²⁶ L. V. Cherepnin, ed., *Pamiatniki russkogo prava*, 4: *Pamiatniki prava perioda ukrepleniia russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva. XV–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1956), 63–64.

²⁷ P. A. Sadikov, “Iz istorii oprichniny XVI v.,” *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 3 (1940): 264–65, no. 7.

²⁸ V. V. Shilov, comp., *Vkladnaia kniga Serpukhovskogo Vysotskogo monastyria* (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1993), 87, left column.

money, but still, in money) to distinguish it from donations in coinage in Muscovite *dengi*.²⁹

In addition to Muscovite silver coinage (and the petty amounts of copper coinage), gold coins also circulated in Muscovy, but only in rarified circles. Muscovy lacked gold mines as well as silver mines, so all gold coins were imported. Prince Mikhail Gorbatyĭ's 1534/1535 testament allocated 100 gold coins each to Grand Prince Ivan Vasil'evich and his mother, Grand Princess Elena Glinskaia.³⁰ Five donations to the Trinity-Sergius Monastery included "gold Hungarians," three of which included both rubles and gold Hungarians, two with only gold Hungarians, totaling 141 gold Hungarians (see table 13.2).

Table 13.2. Gold Hungarian Coins Donated to Trinity-Sergius Monastery

Year	Donor	Class	Gold Hungarians	Rubles
1534	Ianov	gentry	91	
1537	Vorontsov	boyar	50	
1540	Ianov	gentry	20	8
1541	Putiatin	gentry	20	
1575	Shchulepnikov	gentry	10	20

Source: B. A. Rybakov, ed., *Vkladnaia kniga Troitse-Sergieva Monastyria* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 71, right column; 52, right column; 71, right column; 79, right column; 82, right column.

In one case the text stipulates that 91 gold Hungarians were valued at 50 rubles, a little less than 2 gold Hungarians per ruble.³¹ I do not know the phys-

²⁹ Ibid., 87, right column.

³⁰ S. N. Kisterev, ed., *Akty Suzdal'skogo Spaso-Evfim'eva monastyria, 1506–1608 gg.* (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 1998), 90–93, no. 35.

³¹ The gold Hungarians could also be used as a unit of account. Ivan gave "moveable property" (*rukhlid*) worth 1,000 "gold Hungarians" to Ioakim, Patriarch of Alexandria, and the same value of goods, worth 1,000 "gold" (omitting the word "Hungarians") to St. Catherine's Monastery on Mt. Sinai. I. E. Zabelin, ed., "Poslanie tsaria Ivana Vasil'evicha k Aleksandriiskomu patriarkhu Ioakim s kuptsom Vasil'em Pozniakovym i Khozhdenie kuptsa Pozniakova v Ierusalim i po inym sviatym mestam 1558 goda," in *Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete*, vol. 128 (1884), kniga 1, I–XII, text 1–32, here 2. Joel Raba, *The Gift and Its Wages: The Land of Israel and the Jewish People in the Spiritual Life of Medieval Russia* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 180, translated *rukhlid* as "furs" and "gold Hungarians" as "Hungarian ducats." The word "ducats" may be historically accurate but it is textually wrong: the Muscovites did not use the word "ducats."

ical weight of the gold. But "gold Hungarians" definitely means "gold Hungarian coins," so it would make sense that "rubles" meant "rubles in Muscovite silver coins." Otherwise the gold coins and the Muscovite small change would constitute outliers in a hypothetical system of using "rubles" as units of account to transfer non-coinage value.

Conclusion

Although sixteenth-century Muscovy during the reign of Ivan IV lacked banks or a financial clearance center like Amsterdam, nevertheless the use of money increased. The very fact that coinage was reformed by Elena Glinskaiia attests to the importance that the government attached to actual physical coinage. The economy required coinage. However, domestic coinage consisted entirely of low-denomination silver coinage, *dengi* and coins of lesser value, *poslushki*, and copper coins. The ruble was a unit of accounting only, but payment in rubles could still mean in coinage, namely in *dengi*. Conveying large sums of rubles in *dengi* faced practical difficulties. The coins had to be counted using an abacus or weighed to discover their ruble value. Although it is impossible to derive definitive consistent weights for the silver in large monetary amounts such as 1,000 rubles, which will require further research by numismatists, all alternative mathematical deductions lead to the conclusion that the silver in 1,000 rubles in *dengi* weighed more than one man, or even two, could carry. However, the manpower to transfer such bulk coinage was available to the elite who could afford to spend, donate, or lend such sums. Therefore, I conclude that Ivan IV's coinage underlay all references to ruble amounts in the sources.

Discussing Chinese cash, the technical term for very low value bronze or brass coins with a hole in the middle so they could be transported on a string holding ten or a hundred (less the charge for stringing) coins, numismatist Philip Grierson wrote: "One would have expected that the inconvenience of having to handle and transport huge masses of low value coins would have resulted in the introduction of gold and silver multiples, as was the case with ancient Rome."³² Even given the higher value of Muscovite silver coinage, the same question might be asked: why did the Muscovites not issue larger coins?³³

³² Grierson, *Numismatics*, 60.

³³ I owe this observation to Judith Kolbacs.

Intellectual History

Chapter 14

Pskov and the Pskov Land

Like its “elder brother” Novgorod, the medieval city-state of Pskov lacked an indigenous branch of the Riurikid (Volodimerovich)¹ clan as its dynasty and for that reason did not and probably could not articulate a self-conception in the form of an ideology of a “land.” The system of “land”-named polities originated in Kievan Rus’ and led to the creation of the myth of the “Rus’ Land” (*Russkaia zemlia*) that has dominated scholarship ever since.² The phrase “the Pskov land” (*Pskovkaia zemlia*), like that of “the Novgorod land” (*Novgorodskaia zemlia*), when it appeared in the sources, carried no ideological weight.³ By the reign of Ivan IV even literary works exhibiting strong local patriotism to Novgorod and Pskov did not deviate from this pattern. Instead, they showed signs of local assimilation of Muscovy’s monopolization of the myth of the Rus’ Land. This chapter will explore the usage of the “Pskov land” in textual and material Pskov sources. It will conclude with comments on two texts from Ivan IV’s reign, one from Novgorod, the other from Pskov, that illustrate the triumph of the Muscovite ideological concept of “land” over regional “lands” in its annexed peripheries.

¹ “Volodimerovich” reflects recent research on Kievan Rus’ by Christian Raffensperger.

² Charles J. Halperin, “The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Century,” *Russian History* 2, 1 (1975): 29–38; Halperin, “The Concept of the *ruskaia zemlia* and Medieval National Consciousness from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Centuries,” *Nationalities Papers* 8, 1 (1980): 75–86; Halperin, “Tverian Political Thought in the Fifteenth Century,” *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 18 (1977): 267–73.

³ Charles J. Halperin, “Novgorod and the ‘Novgorodian Land,’” *Cahiers du monde russe* 40, 3 (1999): 345–64. I have tried consistently to capitalize “Land” in “land”-verbal constructions only when the source or secondary work ascribed ideological significance to it as a concept.

Introduction

Popular and scholarly publications alike elevate the phrase “the Pskov Land” to a level of significance that far exceeds the much more modest usage as “the Pskov land” in medieval sources. Elena Morozkina’s *Pskov Land* is a popular tourist guide to the “beauty of the Pskov Land” and the “artistic treasures of the Pskov Land,” a small format book with numerous (albeit black-and-white) illustrations whose second edition alone numbered 85,000 copies.⁴ She establishes the geographic boundaries of the Pskov Land and defines the Trinity Cathedral in the Pskov *Krov* (Kremlin) as the symbol of the “entire Pskov Land.” She modestly admits that she could not discuss all the architectural monuments of the Pskov Land.⁵ At the same time, she alludes to the *Pskovshchina* in both historical and contemporary contexts as in effect a synonym of the Pskov Land.⁶ That word appears only rarely in medieval Pskov sources. Morozkina’s discussion of partisan activity in the Pskov region during World War II derives from a memorial volume bearing the title *The Unconquered Pskov Land: Documents and Materials, 1941–1944*.⁷

Morozkina’s volume is intended for a popular audience. Professional historians writing for both professional and popular audiences also utilize the phrase “Pskov Land.” Vladimir Arakcheev’s monograph *Medieval Pskov: Authority, Society, Daily Life in the Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries*⁸ contains a fold-out map which purports to illustrate the sixteen districts (*uezdy*) as well as the boundaries of the *guby* (administrative-territorial districts) in the “Pskov Land.”⁹ Arakcheev finesses his own use of “Pskov Land” by referring to the history of “Pskov and its land.” His study, he declares, delineates the geographic boundaries of the “Pskov Land” from the fifteenth to the sev-

⁴ Elena Nikolaevna Morozkina, *Pskovskaia zemlia*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1986), quotations 7, 12.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 12, 22, 164. Modern-day Nevel’ is situated in the Pskov Land (*ibid.*, 147).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 80, 83, 146, 147, 153, 164.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 171 in the bibliography, citing *Nepokorennnaia zemlia Pskovskaia: Dokumenty i materialy. 1941–1944* (Pskov, 1964).

⁸ Vladimir Anatol’evich Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov: Vlast’, obshchestvo, povsednevnaia zhizn’ v XV–XVII vekakh* (Pskov: Pskovskaia oblastnaia tipografiia, 2004).

⁹ *Ibid.*, map 1. See *ibid.*, 331 for the definition of *guba*. Arakcheev does not warn the reader that these *guby* differ from the anti-banditry *guby* instituted in Muscovy in the 1530s and 1540s during Ivan IV’s minority, to which he alludes elsewhere (*ibid.*, 123). To add to the confusion, both sets of *guba* institutions were headed by “elders” (*starosty*).

enteenth centuries.¹⁰ The publisher's blurb in Berngard Kafengauz's *Ancient Pskov: Studies of the History of a Feudal Republic* described it as a study of "Pskov and the Pskov Land," to which Kafengauz himself also makes reference.¹¹ He later equates the Pskov Land and the "territory of the Pskovshchina."¹² Other intrusions of the phrase "Pskov Land" into commentary on sources which do not contain it will be mentioned below, but these should suffice to establish the relevance and currency of the concept of the "Pskov Land."¹³

I will discuss genres of sources separately: chronicles, a saint's life, documents, a law code, seals, and coins, all of which support the conclusion that the "Pskov land" possessed a pragmatic geographic or territorial meaning which was not even exclusive and altogether lacked ideological nuance. I will then analyze why this pattern occurred before completing the chapter with manifestations of Muscovite ideological usage of "the Rus' Land" in sources about Novgorod and Pskov from the reign of Ivan IV.

Chronicles

The Pskov chronicle tradition was late but vibrant. Chronicles arose no earlier than the thirteenth century, probably during the fourteenth century, as Pskov gradually freed itself from subordination to Novgorod.¹⁴ The usage of "the Pskov land" in the First, Second, and Third Pskov Chronicles was substantially consistent, with considerable repetition. We need not concern ourselves with chronology or the relationships among the chronicles and their manuscripts. I will therefore cite instances from all chronicles in chronological order by Byzantine year to illustrate the continuity of usage, using Arsenii Nasonov's standard two-volume publication.¹⁵ It should be noted that the index (found in volume 2) sub versa "Pskov Land" references passages which do

¹⁰ Ibid., 5, 10.

¹¹ Berngard Borisovich Kafengauz, *Drevnii Pskov: Ocherki po istorii feodal'noi respubliki* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 2, 3.

¹² Ibid., 7.

¹³ Of course allusions to the "Pskov land" could be multiplied considerably. For example, Anti Selart, "Vvedenie," in *Pskovo-Pecherskii monastyr' vo vremia Livonskoi voiny (1558–1582): Zemlevladienie v Estonii*, ed. Selart (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2016), 17–47, frequently refers to the "Pskov land" and cites numerous additional publications whose titles mention the "Pskov land."

¹⁴ Hans-Jürgen Grabmüller, *Die Pskover Chroniken: Untersuchungen zur russischen Regionalchronistik im 13.–15. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975).

¹⁵ *Pskovskie letopisi*, 2 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1941–55), hereafter *PL*.

not contain the phrase "Pskov Land" but use either the Pskov *oblast'* (region) or the Pskov district (*vlast'*, *volost'*), as was also true of the index to the Novgorod chronicles.¹⁶ This indicates that the editor (or, if he did not personally compile the index, his assistant) did *not* treat "Pskov land" as a technical term. This semantic nonchalance illustrates the lack of semiotic weight carried by the phrase. I have disregarded possible duplication of events under different years and included annals which extend beyond the end of Pskov independence in 1510 because the Pskov chronicle tradition did not terminate in that year.

In 6849 the Germans (the Livonian Order is meant) attacked the "Pskov land."¹⁷ In the same year (?) Algirdas, grand duke of Lithuania, raided the Pskov "village/villages" (*selo, sela*) or the Pskov "regions" (*oblasti*).¹⁸

In 6851 Algirdas returned to his own land via the Pskov "district" (*volost'*). In retaliation for a destructive German attack on the "entire Pskov region" (*vsia pskovskaia oblast'*), the Pskovites attacked the "German Land" (*Nemetskaia zemlia*).¹⁹ The Pskov chronicles never refer to the Livonian Order as the *Orden*, only as "the German Land." The Pskov chronicler was quite familiar with the "land"-system of political nomenclature.

In 6856 Algirdas attacked the Pskov "villages" (*sela*) in Oreshko. After he had raided the Novgorod "district" (*volost'*), he returned to his own land via the Pskov "district" (*volost'*).²⁰ In 6857 Algirdas returned from Novgorod via the Novgorod "district" (*volost'*).²¹ Note that the Pskov chronicles used the Novgorod "land" (*zemlia*), "region" (*oblast'*), and "district" (*vlast'* or *volost'*) interchangeably,²² as they did the comparable Pskov terms.

In 6912 Pskov Prince Daniil Aleksandrovich and the Pskov "mayor" (*posadnik*) Larion Doinikovich and "all of [vse] Pskov" attacked Polotsk.²³

In 6914 Vytautas, Grand Duke of Lithuania, made war on the Pskov "district" (*vlast'*) by traveling to the Pskov land, or, to phrase it differently, he in-

¹⁶ Halperin, "Novgorod and the 'Novgorodian Land,'" 354.

¹⁷ PL 1: 18; 2: 24, 93.

¹⁸ PL 2: 94–96.

¹⁹ PL 1: 21; 2: 97.

²⁰ PL 2: 98, 99.

²¹ PL 2: 26.

²² Halperin, "Novgorod and the 'Novgorodian Land,'" 354 n. 51, 356 n. 67.

²³ PL 2: 32. The index cites a nonexistent entry for 6912 on 31, but omits this reference on 32 sub anno 6914. I infer typographical errors in the index. Polotsk was then located in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; it is now Polatsk in Belarus.

vaded the Pskov "district" (*volost'*) by personally traveling to the Pskov "district" (*volost'*).²⁴

In 6915 Vytautas attacked the Pskov "district" (*oblast'*). The "Master" (of the Livonian Order) invaded the Pskov "land." Grand Prince Vasilii I of Moscow broke his peace with Vytautas because he had made war on the Pskov "district" (*volost'*).²⁵

In 6916 the Livonian Master attacked the Pskov "district" (*vlast'* or *volost'*).²⁶

In 6917 Vasilii I with the "entire Rus' Land" (*vsia russkaia zemlia*) marched against Vytautas, while the German Master with the "entire German Land" (*vsia nemetskaia zemlia*) and Lithuanians (*Litva*) attacked the Pskov "districts" (*volosti*). Various, Germans attacked the Pskov "land" or the Pskov "regions" (*oblasti*), or Vasilii I raised the "entire Rus' Land" against Vytautas, who, with a German army (literally: strengths, *sila*) and the Lithuanians (*Litva*) had invaded the Pskov "districts" (*volosti*).²⁷ Note that "regions" and "districts" again serve as synonyms here.

In 6933 the Germans attacked all (*vse*) the Pskov "regions" (*oblasti*).²⁸

In 6934 Vitautus with Lithuanians and Tatars attacked Pskov "districts" (*volosti*), while Novgorod fought the brother of Vytautas en route to Pskov "districts" (*volosti*).²⁹

In 6935 Germans attacked the Pskov "land."³⁰

Sub anno 6967 the chronicler observed that Pskov is the land of the Holy Trinity (*Sviataia Troitsa*). In that same year Pskov Prince Alexander Vasil'evich attacked the German Land and Germans attacked the Pskov "land."³¹

In 6974 an epidemic occurred in "all the Pskov regions" (*vse oblasti Pskovskoe*, variant *volosti*).³²

²⁴ PL 1: 28; 2: 111.

²⁵ PL 1: 29; 2: 33, 114. The index's reference to 6915 on 34 would seem to be a typographical error.

²⁶ PL 1: 31; 2: 34, 116.

²⁷ PL 1: 32, 35; 2: 117. The Pskov chronicles use the collective noun *Litva* rather than the plural "Lithuanians" (*litovtsy*, singular: *litovets*).

²⁸ PL 1: 35. The index contains a typographical error, listing the year 6935.

²⁹ PL 1: 36; 2: 122, 123.

³⁰ PL 1: 38; 2: 124.

³¹ PL 1: 56; 2: 145.

³² PL 2: 162.

In 6975 an epidemic struck for two years in Pskov, its subordinate towns (*prigorody*), and in "all Pskov districts" (*po vsei vlasti/volosti Pskovskoi*).³³ It would be tempting to infer from this passage that "all Pskov districts" denoted only the countryside, rural zones, and did not include the city of Pskov or its subordinate cities.

Sub anno 6976 the Pskov chronicler observed critically that widowed priests were performing the liturgy in Pskov "districts" (*volosti*),³⁴ which violated the rules of the Russian Orthodox Church.

In 9977 Germans invaded the Pskov "land."³⁵

In 6979 the worst fire that had ever occurred in "all the" (*vsia*) Pskov "districts" (*volosti*) broke out.³⁶

In 6985 in civil strife all "mayors" (*posadniki*), "well-to-do people" (*zhitie liudi*), and "all of" (*vsei*) Pskov armed themselves, which the index erroneously lists as a reference to the Pskov "land" although it does not reference the Pskov land, districts, or region.³⁷

In 6988 Germans burned and looted the Pskov "district" (*volost'*).³⁸

In 6993 Pskov envoys were killed in the "Tver' Land" (*Tverskaia zemlia*) and there was a grain shortage in the Pskov "land."³⁹ Note the utilization of another "land"-polity phrase.

In 6994 Archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov Gennadii sent a boyar to survey all the churches and monasteries in the "entire" (*vsia*) Pskov "land."⁴⁰

In 7009 Germans attacked the Pskov "land."⁴¹

In 7011 a Muscovite army drove the Germans from the Pskov "land."⁴²

In 7012 it was announced that in the future widowed priests would not serve as parish priests in Pskov and the "entire" (*vsia*) Pskov land.⁴³

³³ PL 2: 163.

³⁴ PL 2: 54.

³⁵ PL 2: 167.

³⁶ PL 2: 181.

³⁷ PL 2: 205.

³⁸ PL 1: 77; 2: 220.

³⁹ PL 2: 66.

⁴⁰ PL 2: 68.

⁴¹ PL 1: 86.

⁴² PL 1: 87.

⁴³ PL 1: 89.

In 7015 Lithuanians (*Litva*) and Rus' (here: Ruthenians, East Slavs residing in Lithuania) attacked the "entire" (*vsia*) Pskov "land."⁴⁴

In 7018 in the Pskov "land" there were ten subordinate cities (*prigorody*) and two fortresses (*gorodishche*).⁴⁵

In 7026 Grand Prince of Moscow Vasilii III sent many Muscovite troops to the Pskov "land" en route to Opochko.⁴⁶

In 7031 the Pskovites began to build the Caves (*Pechera*) Monastery in the Pskov "land."⁴⁷

In 7066 a Muscovite army en route west to campaign against Lithuania looted Pskov villages on the border of the Pskov "land."⁴⁸

In 7068 requisitions for auxiliary labor caused great losses to the entire Pskov "land" during the failed Muscovite campaign against Livonia.⁴⁹

In 7071 Lithuanians (*Litva*) attacked "the Pskov area" (*Pskovshchina*), a unique occurrence of the term in the Pskov sources at my disposal.⁵⁰

In 7096 the Muscovites built Ivangorod to stop Germans from attacking the Pskov "land."⁵¹

In 7126 the extortions of Muscovite governor Prince I. F. Troekurov did great harm to the "entire" (*vsia*) Pskov "land."⁵²

Clearly the Pskov chronicles used the phrase "the Pskov land" not as an ideological concept, "The Pskov Land," but purely as a territorial and geographic concept, to denote the area subordinate to Pskov authority. The "Pskov land" is never reified. It is never an autonomous actor. It was the object of attack—Pskov was at war with the Livonian Order for over 200 years⁵³ but also fought Lithuania, Sweden, sometimes Novgorod, and later Muscovy—but never the subject. It was the land to which Pskov armies abroad returned. Moreover the term did not have exclusive rights to this meaning; Pskov "districts" and "regions" carried the same meaning as "the Pskov land." No one ever fought "for the Pskov Land" as Kievans and later Muscovites fought for

⁴⁴ PL 1: 138–39.

⁴⁵ PL 2: 258.

⁴⁶ PL 1: 99.

⁴⁷ PL 2: 226.

⁴⁸ PL 2: 235.

⁴⁹ PL 2: 240. The index erroneously reads 7068.

⁵⁰ PL 2: 243.

⁵¹ PL 1: 119. (PL 1: 7096, 120 and PL 2: 7115, 269 are bogus index entries.)

⁵² PL 2: 280.

⁵³ Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 18.

"the Rus' Land," as in the epic *Zadonshchina* about the battle of Kulikovo in 1380. No one expresses loyalty to the "Pskov Land." Pskov is not identified as "the Pskov Land" but as the land of the Holy Trinity, to which its main cathedral was dedicated and to which we will return. The "Pskov land" had no social referent. No Pskov prince consulted the "Pskov Land" or led an army of "the entire Pskov Land" into battle. To denote an action or belief of all the residents of the city of Pskov the chroniclers wrote "all Pskov." That is why I translate *vsia Pskovskaia zemlia* as "the entire Pskov land" rather than "all of the Pskov land," to encompass territory, rather than rhetorically "all of [the people—understood CJH] of the Pskov land." The "Pskov land" is a pragmatic, not intellectual, term. Such a pattern of usage of the phrase "the Pskov land" was not confined to Pskov chronicles.

Hagiography

Dovmont was a thirteenth-century Lithuanian prince who immigrated to Pskov, converted to Orthodox Christianity with the name Timofei, and served as prince of Pskov. His *vita* was composed probably during the fourteenth century, and is found within the corpus of the Pskov chronicles. Our focus is on who and what Dovmont fought for, and who and what he did not fight for.⁵⁴

Pskov treated Dovmont as a saint, but the genre to which this text belongs is ambiguous. Valentina Okhotnikova refers to the text as a "narrative" (*skazanie*) based upon its heading, "The Narration of the Blessed Prince Dovmont and His Courage" (*Skazanie o blagovernom kniazi Dovmonte i o khrabrosti ego*), but in the title of her monograph calls it a "tale" (*povest'*), "The Tale of Dovmont" (*Povest' o Dovmonte*). One of the major sources of the text was a redaction of the *vita* of Alexander Nevskii, which also suffers from genre identity problems. Therefore my use of the word *vita* is only for convenience, to distinguish it from the chronicle narratives into which it was usually embedded.

The author of the *vita* of Dovmont was familiar with "land"-polity vocabulary, but used it selectively. He refers to the "Lithuanian Land" (and the "Lithuanians," *Litva*),⁵⁵ but never to the "Pskov Land." Dovmont's supporters

⁵⁴ Valentina Il'inichna Okhotnikova, *Povest' o Dovmonte: Issledovanie i teksty* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1985), 1–187 (analysis), 188–230 (texts). Okhotnikova also published a text with facing modern Russian translation and commentary: "Skazanie o Dovmonte," ed. V. I. Okhotnikova, in *Biblioteka literatury drevnei Rusi* [hereafter *BLDR*], 6: XIV–sередина XV veka (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1999), 56–63 (original on even-numbered pages, modern Russian translation on odd-numbered pages), 520–23 (commentary).

⁵⁵ The First Pskov Chronicle redaction referred to the "Riga Land Master" (*rizhskaia zemlia master*), the Master of the Livonian Order, which was simplified in the

wish to fight “for the Holy Trinity and all the holy churches.” Dovmont urges the Pskovites to fight “for the Holy Trinity and for the holy churches and for our fatherland [*otechestvo*].”⁵⁶ Other passages describe the Germans as raiding “Pskov villages [*sela*],” which might be no more than straightforward description. Dovmont defended “Novgorod and Pskov” without reference to either as a “land.” The vita emotionally records the sorrow of the men, women, and children of Pskov at Dovmont’s death.⁵⁷ The vita of Alexander Nevskii poetically depicted Nevskii’s death by writing that “the sun has set in the Suzdal’ Land,” which was later changed to the “Rus’ Land.” The author of the primary redaction of Dovmont’s vita did not borrow that phrasing. He could easily have written that “the Pskov Land” mourned Dovmont’s death, personifying or reifying the “Pskov Land” with ideological import, but he did not. No subsequent redaction of the vita rewrote his description of the reception of Dovmont’s death by the people of Pskov to include the “Pskov Land.”⁵⁸ The phrase “the Pskov Land” does not appear in Dovmont’s vita even once.

Dovmont fights for the Holy Trinity, meaning the Holy Trinity Cathedral, the emblem of Pskov. Okhotnikova rightfully describes the Holy Trinity Cathedral as the “center of political and religious life” in Pskov. The Holy Trinity functioned as the city’s patron saint. Okhotnikova finesses the vita’s non-use of the phrase “the Pskov land” by commenting that Dovmont “defended Pskov and its land.”⁵⁹

Documents

Documents from Pskov adhere to the same pattern of usage of the phrase “the Pskov land.” If it appears, it carries only geographic meaning. The documents manifest the usual familiarity with other “land”-state names but rarely projected such a linguistic construction onto Pskov. One late document, from 1509, goes beyond that framework in a fascinating way.

Unfortunately, no treaty survives between Pskov and the princes it invited to sit on its throne,⁶⁰ which deprives historians of what might have been very valuable evidence of both Pskov self-identity and princely perceptions of

Expanded redaction as the “Riga Master” (*master risskii*) (BLDR 6: 58; Okhotnikova, *Povest’ o Dovmonte*, 191, 220).

⁵⁶ BLDR 6: 58; Okhotnikova, *Povest’ o Dovmonte*, 189–90.

⁵⁷ BLDR 6: 58, 62; Okhotnikova, *Povest’ o Dovmonte*, 190, 192, 193.

⁵⁸ Okhotnikova, *Povest’ o Dovmonte*, 195, 199.

⁵⁹ BLDR 6: 521.

⁶⁰ Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 45.

Pskov identity. Extant treaties between Pskov and Muscovite rulers date to a period in which Pskov had little choice in the matter.

The 1417 treaty between Pskov and the Livonian Order referred only to "Pleskove" (Pskov) in its German original, written in Riga. In it Grand Prince Vasiliĭ I of Moscow refers to Pskov as his patrimony. The text mentions the Pskov mayor (*posadnik*) and "all [*alle*] of Pskov," matching the Russian circumlocution of "all [*ves'* or *vse*] Pskov" to denote its entire population. It also alludes to the Pskov "districts" (*vlasti*).⁶¹

A 1440 treaty between Lithuanian Grand Duke Casimir and Pskov refers only to "Pskov." It stipulates free travel for merchants to the "Lithuanian Land" and "Lithuania" (*Litva*) from all Pskov and all Pskovian "subordinate cities" (*prigorody*).

A 1462–65 Pskov charter to Riga in response to a complaint was issued by Pskov prince Ivan Aleksandrovich and Pskov "lord mayor" (*stepennoi posadnik*)⁶² Maksim Larivonovich, all Pskov mayors (*posadniki*), Pskov boyars, merchants, and "all of Pskov" (*vsego Pskova*).⁶³

In 1477 Grand Prince Ivan III of Moscow made a treaty with Pskov. The treaty was concluded on Pskov's part by its lord mayors, "senior mayors"

⁶¹ Sigizmund Natanovich Valk, ed., *Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova* [hereafter *GVNP*] (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1949), no. 334, 318–21.

⁶² George G. Pushkarev, comp., *A Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 95, defines *stepennyi posadnik* as "incumbent mayor." I follow Lawrence N. Langer, "The *Posadnichestvo* of Pskov: Some Aspects of Urban Administration in Medieval Russia," *Slavic Review* 43, 1 (1984): 48, in my translation of "lord mayor." The Pskov political structure evolved. Eventually two "lord mayors" headed the city, while all former mayors belonged to the "Council of Lords" (*gospoda, sovet gospod*). The *stepen'* was the rostrum or podium on which the leaders of Pskov stood when conducting meetings of the town assembly (*veche*), like Golgotha (*Lobnoe mesto*) in Red Square in Moscow in front of the Kremlin. Sergei Vasil'evich Beletskii, *Pechati pskovskie* (St. Petersburg: Institut istorii material'noi kul'tury, 1994), 27.

⁶³ *GVNP*, no. 336, 323–24.

(*starye posadniki*),⁶⁴ “deputy mayors” (*synove posadniki*),⁶⁵ merchants, the well-to-do (*zhitie liudi*), and “all of Pskov” (*ves’ Pskov*).⁶⁶

A 1480 charter (*gramota*) in the form of a petition from Pskov Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich to Casimir, Grand Duke of Lithuania (and King of Poland) complaining of a Livonian Order raid mentioned a meeting of all Pskov mayors and “all of Lord Pskov” (*ves’ gospodin Pskov*) at a town assembly (*veche*).⁶⁷ The documents refers to Pskov as the “land of the Holy Trinity” (*zemliu svetoe Troitsy*), an expression we have seen before. The petition to Casimir came from the Pskov mayors, lord mayors, senior mayors, deputy majors, boyars, merchants, well-to-do, and “all of” (*ves’*) Pskov. The Pskov petitioners asked Casimir not to permit the Lithuanians to detain Pskov captives fleeing from the German Land across the Lithuanian Land to return to Pskov.⁶⁸ No “Pskov land” complements the “Lithuanian Land” and the “German Land.”

The expression “Lord Pskov” (*gospodin Pskov*) elevated the status of the city, really the city-state; it is an ideological statement. However, it references Pskov as a city, not the “Pskov Land.” Arakcheev dates the origins of Pskov’s identification as “Lord Pskov” to no earlier than the 1460s.⁶⁹ Novgorod also declared itself “Lord” (*Gospodin*) Novgorod. Pskov originated as a “subordinate city” of Novgorod; historians date its independence from Novgorod to 1348,⁷⁰ when Novgorod acknowledged Pskov’s status as “young brother”

⁶⁴ Pushkarev, *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms*, 95, defines “old mayors” as former mayors, now members of the Council of Lords. I follow Kafengauz, *Drevnii Pskov*, 38, who concluded that “old” mayors were not necessarily former mayors but “senior” mayors by reason of seniority in age or time in office.

⁶⁵ Literally “sons of mayors.” The office of mayor was hereditary, but I doubt that all sons of mayors (including minors?) held a special status in Pskov administration and society. My translation follows Langer, “The *Posadnichestvo* of Pskov,” 63 (although he also translates the term literally, *ibid.*, 61). Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 53–58 too takes the phrase “sons of mayors” literally as evidence that the post of mayor was hereditary.

⁶⁶ *GVNP*, no. 338, 324.

⁶⁷ The “town meeting” (*veche*), an institution derived from Kievan Rus’, was supposedly the highest authority in the Pskov and Novgorod “feudal republics.” Its composition and authority remain subjects of great disagreement among specialists. The word does not appear in Pskov chronicles until the 1450s (Kafengauz, *Drevnii Pskov*, 90).

⁶⁸ *GVNP*, no. 339, 325–26.

⁶⁹ Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 35.

⁷⁰ Kafengauz, *Drevnii Pskov*, 3; Okhotnikova, *Povest’ o Dovmonte*, 66.

(*mladshii brat*) of Novgorod,⁷¹ so it seems to have taken Pskov over a century to aspire to equal the “lord” status of its former master and implicit current “older brother.”⁷² Ironically, by the time Pskov achieved the status of “lord,” at least in its own mind, the authority of the governor (*namestnik*) of Pskov named in Moscow was expanding, in 1467, to include the right to judge cases in all of Pskov’s “subordinate cities.”⁷³

A 1483 judgment charter concerning a territorial dispute involving a monastery records that the trial was held “before Lord [*gospodin*] Pskov Prince”⁷⁴ Iaroslav Vasil’evich and the lord mayors.⁷⁵ I infer that “Lord” applies to “Pskov,” not to Prince Iaroslav Vasil’evich.

A 1503 treaty between Pskov and the Livonian Order was concluded on the Pskov side by the lord mayors, senior mayors, and “all Great” (*vsego Velikii*) Pskov, in German, “alle (corrected by the editor from “alte”) grote Plesckaw.” It also refers to the mayors and “all of Novgorod.” Finally, it stipulates safe passage for Livonian and Pskov envoys to and from the “Pskov land” (*Plesckawer lande*).⁷⁶ This document stands out for presenting the term “Great Pskov,” which is something of an anomaly. Novgorod on the Volkhov River developed the term “Great Novgorod” to distinguish it from Nizhnii Novgorod (literally, “Lower” Novgorod) on the lower Volga River, but there was no “Lower” Pskov to inspire use of the adjective “Great” to Pskov. The treaty also uses the phrase the “Pskov land” in a purely territorial context.

An excerpt of a land survey of the boundaries of a suburb (*sloboda*) of Pskov belonging to the Holy Trinity Cathedral from the beginning of the sixteenth century explains that the survey was ordered by “Lord” (*Gospodin*) Pskov Prince of Pskov Semen Romanovich and all Pskov mayors and all (*ves*) [the people of] “Lord” (*Gospodin*) Pskov in an urban assembly (*veche*). The suburb should be delivered to “Lord” (*gospodin*) Pskov in the presence of “all [the

⁷¹ Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 17; Langer, “The *Posadnichestvo* of Pskov,” 51, dates this development to the late fourteenth century.

⁷² Because Pskov was not independent during the Kievan period, there is no chapter on Pskov in Liubomir Grigor’evich Beskrovnyi, ed., *Drevnerusskie kniazhestva X–XIII vv.: Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975). If there were, it would certainly have been titled the “Pskov land.”

⁷³ Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 45.

⁷⁴ The text omits the word “prince,” but the editor’s heading for the document identifies him as a “prince.”

⁷⁵ A. A. Zimin, comp., *Pamiatniki russkogo prava* [hereafter *PRP*], 2: *Pamiatniki prava feodal’no-razdroblennoi Rusi* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1959).

⁷⁶ *GVNP*, no. 347, 331–37.

people of] Pskov" (*vsem Pskovom*). This excerpt virtually equates "Lord Pskov" and the Holy Trinity Cathedral. "Lord" applies to Pskov, not Prince Semen Romanovich.

A 1509 truce treaty between Pskov and the Livonian Order was concluded in large measure by the governor of Novgorod representing Grand Prince Vasilii III of Muscovy, but Pskov officials and elite members participated. The Pskov governor Prince Ivan Mikhailovich, the lord mayors, the senior mayors, all [the people of] Great Pskov, the Pskov mayors, boyars, a merchant elder, an episcopal governor, and urban and commercial secretaries from Vasilii III's patrimony the Pskov land all approved the treaty. The treaty included permission for merchants from the "Pskov land" to travel freely to the "German Land" and to return freely to the "Pskov land." German merchants could travel freely to the "Pskov land" and return. However, German merchants could not sell salt from the "German Land" in the "Pskov land." Trade was to be conducted as of old between the "German Land" and the "Pskov land." Procedures were established to handle the situation in which a German was executed in the "Pskov land." Yet again the treaty emphasized that the Pskov land was the patrimony of Vasilii III.⁷⁷ The Pskov lord mayor and the "best people" (upper crust) kissed the cross (swore to uphold the truce) "for [za] [= on behalf of] Pskov and all the Pskov cities and the entire [vsia] Pskov Land [and for] the patrimony" of the great sovereign Russian Tsar" Vasilii III and affixed the seal of the Holy Trinity to the truce. (In fact two Holy Trinity seals were attached to the document.)⁷⁸

Obviously the territorial meaning of the "Pskov land" dominates the text of the treaty, but that is not the entire story. The Pskov representatives act "on behalf of" inter alia the "Pskov Land." The "Pskov Land" in this phrase cannot be territorial, it is social, i.e., all the people of the entire Pskov land, implicitly outside the city of Pskov and the subordinate cities. The term also becomes political. This is the only instance I have found of the concept of the Pskov Land as a political and social construct. However, although the document is a truce between Pskov and Livonia and bears Pskov seals, this is not only a very late statement, one year before Muscovy liquidated Pskov independence, but also may not be of Pskov provenance. As often as the text identifies the "Pskov land" as a geographic unit it defines that entity as the patrimony of Vasilii III and therefore not independent. Unlike calling Pskov "Great Pskov," this specific assertion reflected Muscovite, not Pskov ideology. The treaty, despite

⁷⁷ The treaty accords Vasilii III the title "tsar and grand prince" although he was not crowned "tsar." Ivan IV was Muscovy's first crowned tsar; the coronation took place in 1547.

⁷⁸ N. A. Kazakova, ed., "Dogovor Pskova s Livonie 1509 g.," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 1 (1983): 90–98, the text of the treaty appears on 91–95; Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 26–27.

its staunch defense of Pskov commercial rights vis-à-vis the Livonian Order, could still have been composed by Muscovite scribes, most likely employed by the Muscovite governor of Novgorod. While the term "Great Pskov" occurs in the treaty, the phrase "Lord [*gospodin*] Pskov" does not. The exceptional usage of the "Pskov Land" in the 1509 treaty might derive from a non-Pskov origin.

The documentary evidence amplifies the instances in which the "Pskov land" was used geographically but also expands our appreciation of the concepts Pskov authors used in lieu of assigning the "Pskov land" any ideological dimension. Of course the identification of Pskov with the Holy Trinity Cathedral remains, but now that very association may have underlain the application of new attributes to the city's and the city-state's name. "Great Pskov" appears only in two documents; its usage requires further study. However, "Lord Pskov" (*gospodin Pskov*) can only be construed as projecting an attribute of sovereignty onto Pskov. It is no surprise that this only occurred after Novgorod recognized de jure what had been true de facto for some time, Pskov independence from Novgorod. Novgorod attempted to soften the blow to its pride by insisting that Pskov was the "young brother" (*mladshii brat*) of Novgorod,⁷⁹ but that tells us more about Novgorod than Pskov. I doubt that Muscovy was enamored of the title, and it did not appear in the 1509 treaty. The unique social and political meaning ascribed to the "Pskov Land" in that treaty is problematic as an expression of Pskov ideology.

Pskov never achieved ecclesiastical autonomy. Its efforts to emancipate itself from the eparchy of the archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov failed, and it never had its own bishop during this period. Therefore its autonomy, specifically and especially its autonomy from Novgorod, remained incomplete. This limitation on Pskov independence had no effect on its lack of an ideological construct of the "Pskov Land," because Novgorod, which had its own (arch) bishop, also lacked a comparable concept.

Pskov Judicial Charter

The Pskov Judicial Charter (*Pskovskaia sudnaia gramota* or *pravda*) contains layers from the fourteenth and fifteenth century but it certainly belongs to the period of Pskov independence and antedates the Muscovite Law Code (*Sudebnik*) of 1497, of which it was a source. It does not utilize the phrase "the Pskov land." Nevertheless the translation of the text by Aleksandr Zimin graphically illustrates the susceptibility of historians to fall back on "land"-state nomen-

⁷⁹ Langer, "The *Posadnichestvo* of Pskov," 51.

clature. Article 76 reads: “if a dependent peasant [*izbornik*]⁸⁰ runs away across the border [*za rubezh*].” Zimin translates “beyond the border” as “beyond the boundaries of the Pskov Land” (*za predely Pskovskoi zemli*). Article 80 speaks of a Pskovite who has a charter to travel “across the border” (*za rubezh*), which Zimin translates as “beyond the boundaries of the Pskov Land” (*za predely Pskovskoi zemli*).⁸¹ To be sure even here the notion of a “Pskov Land” is territorial, but boundaries belong to political entities, and the “Pskov land” was not a political entity, as Zimin’s translation implied.

Coinage

Issuing coinage was a sovereign right in medieval Rus’; only an independent polity could issue its own coins. Pskov began issuing coins in 1425, and continued to do so for 85 years, until Moscow formally annexed it in 1510. Pskov silver coins contain images of a man with a crown and a sword, perhaps Prince Dovmont, with a four-line inscription “Pskov coinage” (*denga pskovskaia*), or an image of an animal (a snow leopard?) with an inscription, or a symbol which might represent the trident seal of the Riurikid (Volodimerovich) royal clan in Kievan Rus’ or a monogram of Prince Dovmont. A later, rarer, smaller copper coin had similar images, an inscription “Pskovite” (*pskovskaia*), but no images.⁸² There is no need here to resolve the complex issues involved in interpreting the coins. We can confine ourselves to the obvious: No coin reads “Great Pskov,” “Lord Pskov,” or “the Pskov Land.” Pskov coinage contributed to Pskov’s political image but did not articulate an ideology of the “Pskov Land.”

Seals

Pskov seals are an even more problematic subject because of their lack of homogeneity. Pskov instituted a new seal in 1425 to coincide with the reorganization of its administration, the completion of a construction project that created the urban assembly’s architectural site, and the issuance of coinage.

⁸⁰ On *izborniki*, who were certainly peasants, although additional interpretations are all contested, cf. Kafengauz, *Drevnii Pskov*, 9–35; Liudmila Mikhailovna Marasina, *Novye pskovskie gramoty XIV–XV vekov* (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1966), 126, 151–53.

⁸¹ PRP 2: 296, 297 (original text), 315, 317 (translation).

⁸² Iuliia Aleksandrovna Sergeeva, “Monety nezavisimogo Pskova (XV–nachalo XVI v.),” *Pskov* 25 (2006): 16–26 (this is a popular but professionally written and annotated article); Beletskii, *Pechati pskovskie*, 16–17, 21.

Seals used by Pskov private citizens contain the religious illustrations that we would expect—the Holy Trinity, the Mother of God (*Bogoroditsa*), the Life-Giving Cross, Saint-Prince Dovmont⁸³—but are hardly likely to contain and did not contain an inscription referring to the “Pskov land.” Seals with the name of the Grand Prince of Moscow that declare Pskov to be his patrimony (*votch-ina*) derive from Muscovite ambitions, not Pskov sensibilities. Seals issued by the archbishop of Novgorod and Pskov or by his representatives (governors, *namestniki*) in Pskov represent archiepiscopal pretensions, not Pskov’s. The illustration of the Mother of God (*Bogoroditsa*) of the Sign⁸⁴ is certainly ecclesiastical, and might echo the Church of Hagia Sophia, the archbishop’s church in Novgorod. However, when archiepiscopal administrators in Pskov acted as representatives of Pskov rather than the archbishop they used a seal with the Holy Trinity, reflecting Pskov’s Trinity Cathedral. Whether “Pskov seals” (*pechati pskovskie*) belonged to the prince, the mayors’ court, the boyar council, the Pskov state, or some combination thereof remain contested. Seals reading “Pskov mayors’ seals” (*Pskovskie posadnitskie pečati*) contain comparable, in all cases religious, symbols, such as the Cross and the Trinity.⁸⁵ Seals with the Trinity might also represent Pskov’s urban assembly (*veche*) and were declared legally equal to princely seals.⁸⁶ Like Pskov coins, Pskov seals never display inscriptions reading “Lord Pskov,” “Great Pskov” or “The Pskov Land.”

Conclusion

Vladimir Arakcheev writes: “The term “the Pskov land” was used to denote the territory belonging to Pskov as a city-state,” “the territory under Pskov sovereignty.”⁸⁷ The ample evidence of the Pskov chronicles and the scattered evidence from Pskov documents confirms that definition of the phrase, which does not appear in the vita of Dovmont or the Pskov Judicial Statute or on Pskov seals or coinage. Despite this intellectually neutral interpretation of the term in the Pskov sources and because of the highly value-laden system of “land” names in medieval and early modern Rus’, typified by the exalted con-

⁸³ Marasinova, *Novye pskovskie gramoty*, documents no. 4–8, 18–20, 22 described the illustrations. According to Ianin, descriptions of a seal with “glaring eyes” (*glazukha*, *glazuta*), a seventeenth-century neologism, refer to Dovmont (see n. 79).

⁸⁴ The Virgin with outstretched arms, with Jesus in her womb.

⁸⁵ Beletskii, *Pechati pskovskie*; V. L. Ianin, “Sfragisticheskii kommentarii k pskovskim chastnym aktam,” in Marasinova, *Novye pskovskie akty*, 163–78 (174 on *glazukha*); Langer, “The *Posadnichestvo* of Pskov,” 52–53.

⁸⁶ Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 87; see PRP 2: 293.

⁸⁷ Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 9.

cept of the Rus' Land, historians nevertheless sometimes persist in employing the phrase "Pskov land" as if it were the "Pskov Land," loaded with ideological content for independent Pskov. Arakcheev did not ask *why* the phrase "Pskov Land" did not rise to the level of self-identity of the Pskov city-state.

The answer to that question is the same as the explanation for why the phrase "the Novgorod land" did not attain ideological importance in independent Novgorod. Novgorod identified itself with the St. Sophia Cathedral, the seat of its archbishop, who stood atop the Novgorod political pyramid. In Pskov the secular and ecclesiastical administrative apparatuses shared the same elite personnel. Mayors served as "elders" (*starosty*) of the Holy Trinity Cathedral and other churches. These elders controlled the economic life of the Pskov churches and the monasteries.⁸⁸ The fusion of political and ecclesiastical structures in Pskov, as in Novgorod, might explain the prominence of religious concepts, Hagia Sophia, the Holy Trinity. In Pskov political consciousness and identity were framed in religious terms. However, this positive explanation of the ideological insignificance of "the Pskov land" and "the Novgorod land" does not suffice.

Neither Novgorod's political thought nor Pskov's precluded the parallel development of concepts of a "Novgorod Land" or a "Pskov Land," any more than Pskov's city-state political institutions inhibited the simultaneous existence of a princely administrative apparatus.⁸⁹ Rather, the negative explanation for the absence of "land"-concepts comparable to those in other East Slavic polities comes into play. "Novgorod's primary political attribute [was its] lack of an inherited princely line. Novgorod could not articulate a 'land' ideology since that form of ideology depended upon the intimate connection between the Riurikid⁹⁰ clan and the 'land.' In this sense, the lack of a myth of the 'Novgorodian Land' testifies to Novgorodian recognition of its political uniqueness. There was no concept of 'The Novgorodian Land,' only the phrase 'the Novgorodian land,' because Novgorod lacked the essential element of a *zemlia*, its own dynasty." However significant a role the prince played in Pskov, a role that certainly increased,⁹¹ as in Novgorod there was no princely *dynasty* in Pskov, and therefore Pskov, like Novgorod, could not articulate an ideology of a "land"-polity. It was therefore an exaggeration to

⁸⁸ Marasinova, *Novye pskovskie gramoty*, 148–49.

⁸⁹ Aracheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 42

⁹⁰ This should be corrected to read Volodimerovich, not Riurikid.

⁹¹ Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 39–42. Arakcheev cites Iurii Georgievich Alekseev, *Pskovskaia sudnaia gramota i ee vremia: Razvitie feodal'nykh otnoshenii na Rusi v XIV–XV vv.* (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1980), 12–19, as one of the works that demonstrate this conclusion.

attribute a “unique” status and absent “land’-state concept to Novgorod because Pskov shared that status and that intellectual omission. One might even say that Pskov borrowed or inherited those attributes from Novgorod when it managed to terminate its political dependence on Novgorod and to convince Novgorod to recognize that independence, however grudgingly.⁹²

After their annexation by the Grand Principality, later Tsardom, of Muscovy, sixteenth-century authors in Novgorod and Pskov did not anachronistically invest the phrases “the Novgorod land” and “the Pskov land” with patriotic import, even as local or provincial boosterism, a phenomenon to be found in modern scholarship. Historians have not investigated whether such authors assimilated Muscovite ideological monopolization of the “the Rus’ Land.” Two texts, one from each city, address this issue, and can serve in lieu of a comprehensive exploration of later Novgorod and Pskov political identity, a topic that lies outside the scope of the present chapter.

The “Tale of Ivan IV’s Campaign Against Novgorod in 1570”⁹³ describes in gruesome detail the sack of the city in 1569–70 by Ivan IV and his *oprichniki*. The accuracy of the narrative has been questioned,⁹⁴ but there is general consensus that its author was from Novgorod and thoroughly sympathized with Novgorod’s suffering, although not everyone thinks the author was a contemporary of the event because the text survives only in later manuscripts. The phrase “Novgorod land” does not appear in the text. However, its author lamented that such an event had never previously occurred in the “*Rossiiskaia zemlia*.”⁹⁵ The adjective *rossiiskaia* derives from the word *Rossiia*, from the Greek *Ros* or *Rhos*. It was used in various grammatical forms during Ivan IV’s reign as an alternative to *Rus’* to convey imperial (after Ivan’s coronation as “tsar” in 1547) and ecclesiastical ambience.⁹⁶ Although the adjective *rusaskaia* in medieval and early modern history is usually treated as ethnic, the concept of the *Rus’* Land was not ethnic but dynastic, the “land” and people ruled by a particular, later exclusively Muscovite, ruler, whether a grand prince or tsar. *Rossiia* became the dominant imperial, non-ethnic concept for the “Russian” Empire only later, but had already in the sixteenth century partially acquired

⁹² Halperin, “Novgorod and the Novgorod Land,” 362–63.

⁹³ “Povest’ o pokhode Ivana IV na Novgorod v 1570 godu,” in *Izbornik (Sbornik proizvedenii literatury drevnei Rusi)*, ed. L. A. Dmitriev and D. S. Likhachev (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1969), 477–83.

⁹⁴ Hugh F. Graham, “How Do We Know What We Know about Ivan the Terrible (A Paradigm),” *Russian History* 14, 1–4 (1987): 179–98.

⁹⁵ “Povest’ o pokhode Ivana IV na Novgorod v 1570 godu,” 477.

⁹⁶ Charles J. Halperin, “*Rus’* versus *Ros* in Ivan IV’s Muscovy,” *Slavia* 86, 4 (2017): 367–75.

that nuance. In any event, the author of the "Tale" utilized a Muscovite adaptation of the "Rus' Land" for situating the event he described, eschewing a local perspective. He did not write that such a catastrophe had never previously occurred in the "Novgorod Land."

How the Pskov author of the "Tale of the Assault of Stefan Bathory on Pskov" in 1582,⁹⁷ the icon-painter Vasilii, dealt with "land" terminology is quite instructive. Of course the text articulates Pskov pride in its successful resistance to the siege of the city during the Livonian War by Bathory, king of Poland. It should be mentioned that Vasilii particularly extols the courage and skill of the Muscovite governor, Prince Ivan Petrovich Shuiskii, the hero of the text.

The title of the narration describes the Lithuanian king (*korol*) Stefan as attacking Pskov and the "Rus' Land," the Imperial Russian tsardom (*Rossiiskoe tsarstvo*), employing the adjective found in the "Tale of Ivan IV's Campaign Against Novgorod in 1570," quoted above. Ivan IV returned from his campaign (in Livonia) to the "Rus' Land," and then went to Pskov. Bathory attacked Polotsk in the "Rus' Land." He had traveled from Polotsk to the "Rus' Land." His invasion marked the beginning of the decline of the "Rus' Land." Prince Vasilii Mikhailovich Rostovskii-Lobanov vowed to defend Pskov for the Orthodox Christian faith, the holy churches, for Ivan IV, the sovereign (*gosudar*'), and the sovereign's children, and for all Orthodox Christians, even unto death. The gentry and their captains, and the musketeers and their captains all took the same oath. Bathory attacked the "Rus' Land," proclaiming in his pronunciamiento to all lands that he was invading the "Rus' Land" and would instill fear in the "Rus' Land." He advanced into the "Rus' Land" (twice) toward the glorious (*slavnyi*) city of Pskov in the "Rus' Land." At the border of the "Rus' Land," he announced his destination as the "Pskov land." The text invokes the saints of the "Rus' Land" three times. Former gentry warriors, now clerics, entered the field of battle on the walls of Pskov, proclaiming: Today let us die for the Christian faith and the Orthodox sovereign Tsar and Grand Prince Ivan Vasil'evich of all Rus'. Pskovites vow to die defending their faith, their sovereign (Ivan IV), and Pskov. During the siege Ivan sent troops to raid the "Lithuanian Land"; they return safely to the "Rus' Land."⁹⁸

There is only one allusion in the text to the "Pskov land," in its territorial sense. Overwhelmingly the narrative is situated in the Rus' Land ruled by Ivan IV. Pskov is praised as a "glorious city" even by Bathory, and the city's defenders are willing to die fighting for the Orthodox Christian faith, for Ivan

⁹⁷ V. I. Malyshev, ed., *Povest' o prikhozhdenii Stefana Batoriia na grad Pskov* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1952).

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 35, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 49, 50–51, 59, 71, 74–75, 78, 83, 91, 98.

IV, and for Pskov, but *not* for the Pskov Land. With some ambiguity Pskov, and incidentally Polotsk, belong to the Rus' Land.⁹⁹ King (*korol*) Stefan Bathory rules not the Polish "kingdom" (*korolevstvo* in Muscovite diplomatic sources) but the "Lithuanian Land," which is juxtaposed to its opponent, the Rus' Land. Muscovite appropriation of the myth of the Rus' Land, for its state and for its ruler, Ivan IV, finds full expression in this text. The Pskov "patriotism" of the icon-painter Vasilii did not preclude his adherence to the Muscovite ideology of the Rus' Land and certainly did not inspire him to reconceptualize the phrase "the Pskov land." There is no evidence of Pskov separatism or political dissent against Ivan IV in the text.

Therefore, the concept of "the Pskov land" neither expressed Pskov political ideology during its period of independence nor found new life in Pskov as a medium of local loyalty after its incorporation into Muscovy.

⁹⁹ Arakcheev, *Srednevekovyi Pskov*, 93 asserts that the "Pskov Land" was part of the "Novgorod Land," so that when Muscovy annexed Novgorod in 1478, Pskov had already become part of the Rus' Land and the Russian state. This conclusion overlooks the fact that neither the "Pskov Land" nor the "Novgorod Land" possessed juridical value as concepts. It also disregards the obvious opinion of the Pskov government that by 1478, probably since 1348, Pskov had terminated its subordination to Novgorod.

Chapter 15

Ivan IV and the *rusaskaia zemlia*

The *rusaskaia zemlia* (Rus' Land)¹ was a central political myth of Kievan (Kyivan) and medieval Rus' from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries.² How that concept was adapted to the new political circumstances created by the coronation of Ivan IV as tsar in 1547 is therefore of great interest for understanding Muscovite political consciousness. Did the term survive, and if so, did its meaning change? Was it displaced by terms generated by Ivan's new title such as Rus' tsardom (*tsarstvo*, *tsarstvie*) or the more imperial variant, the Ros (*rossiiskaia*) Land?³ Of course sixteenth-century book-men continued to use the "Rus' Land" when discussing earlier history. They were after all quoting earlier sources, even if sometimes they could indulge in anachronism. We will look at applications of the term only to events during Ivan's reign, beginning with descriptions of his accession upon the death of his father, Grand Prince Vasilii III.

Introduction

In his recent stimulating analysis of the birth of the Muscovite state, Mikhail Krom observed that before the sixteenth century the only term available to express loyalty beyond the local level of city or principality was the Rus' Land which "designated the country [*strana*], a religious-cultural community [*religiozno-kul'turnaia obshchnost'*], but by no means a state [*gosudarstvo*]." Even in the middle of the fifteenth century the phrase was not fixed territorially or

¹ For simplicity's sake, I will disregard variant medieval spellings, notably *ruskaia*, and use only the modern Russian form.

² Rather than use the adjectival forms of *ruskii* proposed by some Anglophone linguists and accepted by some historians of Kievan Rus', namely "Rus'ian" (to distinguish the meaning of "Russian/*ruskii*" from the modern implication of "Great Russian"), I will use "Rus'" ungrammatically as an adjective.

³ Charles J. Halperin, "Rus' versus Ros in Ivan IV's Muscovy," *Slavia* 86, 4 (2017): 367–75.

politically. It continued to be used after Ivan's coronation. It was not definitively replaced by "the Russian (Ros) tsardom" (*rossiisskoe tsarstvo*) until the beginning of the seventeenth century during the Time of Troubles (*Smutnoe vremia*).⁴ Previously Krom had defined the Rus' Land as referring to a country, not a state, because it lacked political unity, and dated its demise to the early seventeenth century. He had not, it appears, glossed the term as denoting a "religious-cultural community."⁵ Tracing in detail the appearances of the term in sources from Ivan's reign of course fell outside the scope of Krom's synthesis of evidence on Muscovite state-formation.

Krom's conception of the meaning of "the Rus' Land" before Ivan's reign should be qualified. The phrase did connote a country rather than a state, or even a government, and its territorial referents did vary. However, a case can be made that the term was actually dynastic. It denoted the territory ruled by princely members of the clan of the legendary Riurik, Riurikovich, or, in reality, of Saint Vladimir, Volodimerovich. The potency of the myth made it, in effect, a political football. Whichever prince could speak for the Rus' Land gained legitimacy. Therefore the phrase "migrated" territorially as part of princely ideology, from the Kievan Dnieper (Dnipro) River basin, to all of East Slavdom, to, in the thirteenth century, the Galician-Volynian principality (now in Ukraine) to the southwest both in contemporary Slavonic sources, the local chronicle, and in Latin as the *terra Russiae*, and probably in the second half of the fourteenth century, although reliably dated documentation and evidence does not survive until the middle of the fifteenth century, to the Muscovite principality in the northeast. Thus rulers who ruled Kiev, Galich, or Moscow each in turn claimed to rule the Rus' Land. By the middle of the fifteenth century Moscow's ascendancy was sufficient that it exercised a monopoly over the term. A book-man lauding the Grand Prince of Tver' ambiguously conceded that Tver' belonged to the Rus' Land, although it was not part of the Muscovite principality, but had to invest his major ideological aspirations in lauding the Tverian Land. The failure of Novgorod to develop a strong concept of "the Novgorodian Land" derives from its lack of a dynastic line, its *sine qua non*. This was also true for Pskov.⁶ The *translatio* of the Rus'

⁴ Mikhail [Markovich] Krom, *Rozhdenie gosudarstva: Moskovskaia Rus' XV–XVI vekov* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2018), 222 (quotation), 223, 231.

⁵ M. M. Krom, "K voprosu o vremeni zarozhdeniia idei patriotizma v Rossii," in *Mirovospriiatie i samosoznanie russkogo obshchestva (XI–XX vv.): Sbornik statei* (Moscow: IRI RAN, 1994), 19, 24, and its English-language publication, M. M. Krom, "Christian Tradition and the Birth of the Concept of Patriotism in Russia," trans. Ruth Coates, in *The Emancipation of Russian Christianity*, ed. Natalia A. Pecherskaya (Lewiston, ME: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), 21–22, 28.

⁶ See chapter 14.

Land to Muscovy long preceded Ivan IV's coronation as tsar. At no time did the Rus' Land express "national consciousness," which would have been difficult since, as Krom observed elsewhere agreeing with Vasiliĭ Kliuchevskii, no concept of the "Russian people" (*ruskii narod*) existed until the end of the fifteenth century.⁷ I will return to the issue of the Rus' Land as an ethnic term below.

Following its heritage of dynastic affiliations, we would expect the concept of the Rus' Land during Ivan's reign to refer to the territory that he ruled. Whether it also carried, as Krom suggests, religious, cultural, and social dimensions as well must be demonstrated from specific passages. Only a comprehensive analysis of all occurrences of the term can suffice.⁸ The term "Rus' Land" appears in documentary and narrative sources of state and church provenance.

The Rus' Land

According to the diplomatic papers (*posol'skie knigi*) of Muscovite relations with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (*litovskie dela*, both before and after the Union of Lublin further fused Lithuania with Poland in 1569), in 1550 Metropolitan Makarii, according to Ivan's communique to King Sigismund Augustus of Poland, had crowned Ivan in 1547 as ruler of the Rus' Land.⁹ In 1562 Ivan, again addressing Lithuania, claimed that he ruled the Rus' Land as his patrimony (*otchina*).¹⁰ Clearly, here "the Rus' Land" means the country

⁷ Charles J. Halperin, "The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Century" ["Russian Land" is a mistranslation born of the Great Russian nationalist interpretation of Kievan Rus' history], *Russian History* 2, 1 (1975): 29–38; Halperin, "Tverian Political Thought in the Fifteenth Century," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 18, 3 (1977): 267–73; Halperin, "The Concept of the *ruskaia zemlia* and Medieval National Consciousness from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Centuries," *Nationalities Papers* 8, 1 (1980): 75–86; Halperin, "Novgorod and the 'Novgorodian Land,'" *Cahiers du monde russe* 40, 3 (1999): 345–64; Krom, "K voprosu o vremeni zarozhdeniia idei patriotizma v Rossii," 19; Krom, "Christian Tradition and the Birth of the Concept of Patriotism in Russia," 22.

⁸ The following discussion derives from but greatly expands the brief comments in Halperin, "Rus' versus Ros in Ivan IV's Muscovy," 370. However, here we will explore only *ruskaia zemlia*, not archaic reminiscences of *russtaia zemlia*.

⁹ *Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva* [hereafter *SRIO*], vol. 59 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1887) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim*, 2: 1533–1560, 345.

¹⁰ *SRIO*, vol. 71 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1892) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh*

that Ivan inherited from his father and now ruled. In 1559 and 1569–70 Ivan, addressing Sweden, asserted that the Swedish and Rus' Lands were now at peace, or should be, and also referred to his own country as the Rus' Land.¹¹

In a domestic context in 1571, Prince Ivan Fedorovich Mstislavskii falsely confessed to having betrayed the "Rus' Land" by inviting Crimean Khan Devlet Girei to burn Moscow.¹² (Mstislavskii, more or less voluntarily, let himself play the scapegoat for the Crimean burning of Moscow; if Ivan had actually believed Mstislavskii guilty, he would have had him executed. Instead he suffered no punishment at all.) It is noteworthy that in this highly emotional situation, fraught with implications of treason, Mstislavskii's confession did not refer to the Russian tsardom but the Rus' Land.

The 1551 *Council of One Hundred Chapters (Stoglav)* is the text of the decisions of an ecclesiastical council on how to improve the faith in Muscovy. It refers to the bishops of the Rus' Land and the bishops of the "entire [*vsia*]" Rus' Land.¹³ Here "Rus' Land" denotes the territory included in the metropolitanate of Muscovy and All Rus' headed by Metropolitan Makarii and under his supervision. Its meaning is ecclesiastical and organizational, but not religious. It should be kept in mind that the territorial boundaries of the Moscow metropolitanate depended upon the boundaries of the territory ruled by Ivan. When Muscovy conquered Kazan' in 1552, the archbishopric subsequently established there was subject to the authority of the metropolitan of Moscow. It "joined" the Rus' Land. The same applied to Polotsk (Polatsk), then in Lithuania but now in Belarus, when Muscovy annexed it in 1563. Polotsk ceased to be part of the Moscow eparchy, the Rus' Land, when Poland-Lithuania recovered it in 1579. In short, the "Rus' Land" here is ecclesiastical only derivatively; ultimately it is political, and still dynastic; Orthodox bishops in lands governed by the tsar in Moscow were under the ecclesiastical supervision of the metropolitan in Moscow.

Confirming the conception of Metropolitan Makarii's eparchy in the "Council of One Hundred Chapters" is a 1563 epistle to him, ascribed to vari-

snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim, 3: 1560–1571, 108.

¹¹ SRIO 129 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1910) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Shvedskim*, 1: 1556–1586, 57, 59, 181.

¹² *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khраниashchikhsia v Gosudarstvennoi Kolegii inostrannykh del*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Tipografiia N. S. Vsevolozhskago, 1813), 561–65.

¹³ D. E. Kozhanchikov, ed., *Stoglav* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imporatorskoi AN, 1863; repr., Letchworth, Hertfordshire: Bradda Books, Rarity Reprints no. 17, 1971), 23, 160. Halperin, "Rus' versus Ros in Ivan IV's Muscovy," 370, erroneously included *Stoglav*, 196, which contains a historical allusion to Constantinople Patriarch Photius and St. Vladimir, not an allusion to current events.

ous authors including the monk Gerasim of the Iosifov Monastery, which also describes him as metropolitan over “the entire [*vsia*] Rus’ Land.”¹⁴

Chronicles provide rich information on the semantics of the Rus’ Land during Ivan’s reign, although due allowance must be made for the repetition resulting from their incestuous interrelationship. New chronicles cribbed material from older chronicles. The *Nikon Chronicle* (*Nikonovskaia letopis’*) is the generic name for a series of chronicle compilations that followed the compilation of the “core” *Nikon Chronicle* in 1530. Sub anno 1533 the dying Vasilii III asserted that he had held (ruled) his realm (*derzhava*) the Rus’ Land with his boyars, an echo of the so-called vita of Dmitrii Donskoi. Vasilii III gave his son his realm (*gosudarstvo*), which the boyars should defend against Latins and Muslims abroad and “strong people” (*sil’nye liudi*) at home.¹⁵ In 1541 the Crimean khan attacked the Rus’ Land. In response to the Crimean threat, the young (eleven-year-old) Ivan prayed for God to defend the Rus’ Land from the Crimean raiders. Ivan placed his trust in the sainted Moscow metropolitans Petr and Aleksei to defend the Rus’ Land from the Crimeans. In the last analysis Ivan’s prayers were answered: God defended the Rus’ Land.¹⁶

These chronicle passages are fully consistent with the documentary evidence of the diplomatic papers. Vasilii III’s realm is the Rus’ Land which he bequeaths to his heir and eldest son, Ivan. *Gosudarstvo* clearly derives from *gosudar’* meaning “sovereign,” and does not mean “state” (its modern Russian definition). *Gosudarstvo* and *derzhava* function as synonyms, signifying the entity, the country, the realm which Vasilii III ruled and which Ivan will rule. The Rus’ Land threatened by the Crimeans manifests itself territorially. The protection of God and Russian saints accorded the Rus’ Land does not make the term itself religious. In this instance Ivan prays for the Rus’ Land, as a ruler should pray for the security of his realm and people, but below we shall see a more metaphorical and rhetorical ascription of prayer to the reified Rus’ Land itself.

¹⁴ Arkhimandrit Makarii (Veretennikov), *Zhizn’ i trudy sviatitelia Makarii mitropolita Moskovskogo i vseia Rusi* (Moscow: Izdatel’skii sovet Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, 2002), no. 15.67, 451–52.

¹⁵ “Strong people” is a cliché for those who abused their economic, social, and political power to oppress commoners. In Muscovite sources it can denote boyars, monasteries, or government officials.

¹⁶ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter PSRL] vol. 13 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 76 (twice), 99, 103, 105, 106. Halperin, “Rus’ versus Ros in Ivan IV’s Muscovy,” 370, erred in listing PSRL 13: 112, a historical allusion to the invasion of Rus’ by Temir-Aksak (Tamurlane) in 1385.

The *Resurrection Chronicle* (*Voskresenskaia letopis'*) contains the same passages as the *Nikon Chronicle* concerning Vasilii III's death-bed invocation of the Rus' Land; it served as the source for the *Nikon Chronicle* passages.¹⁷

Even the *Book of Degrees* (*Stepennaia kniga*), written probably during the 1560s, which is totally committed to the concept of the Muscovite tsardom, still recorded that there were bad omens in "all regions (*oblasti*) of the Rus' Land" in 1533, portending Vasilii III's ill-health.¹⁸

The *Alexander Nevskii Chronicle* (*Aleksandro-Nevskaia letopis'*), a part of the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* (*Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*), compiled later than the *Book of Degrees*, which was one of its sources, retained the assertion that in 1541 Crimean Khan Safa-Girei attacked the Rus' Land.¹⁹

Ivan used the phrase "Rus' Land" both in an epistle in his own name and in epistles he putatively ghostwrote for boyars responding to an invitation from the King of Poland to betray him. Ivan's *First Epistle to Prince Andrei Kurbskii* made only an historical reference to the Rus' Land in connection with Dmitrii Donskoi, but in his *Second Epistle to Kurbskii* Ivan wrote that Kurbskii, the priest Sylvester, and the associate boyar (*okol'nichii*) Aleksei Adashev²⁰ "wanted to place the entire Rus' Land [*vsia russkaia zemlia*] under their feet."²¹

The most intriguing uses of "Rus' Land" during Ivan's reign can be found in two epistles to King of Poland Sigismund Augustus in the names of Muscovite boyars. The similarities among these epistles from boyars to Polish-Lith-

¹⁷ Aleksandr Ivanovich Tsepkov, ed., *Russkie letopisi*, 3: *Voskresenskaia letopis': Opis' russkikh gorodov* (Riazan': Izdatel'stvo "Uzoroch'e," 1998), 375, 395. The alternate version of the death of Vasilii III in the *Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom* (*Letopisets nachala tsarstva*) does not refer to the Rus' Land. PSRL 29 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 9–10, also in PSRL 13: 75–77, left column.

¹⁸ N. N. Pokrovskii and Gail Lenhoff [G. D. Lenkhoff], eds., *Stepennaia kniga tsarskogo rodosloviiia po drevneishim spiskam: Teksty i kommentarii*, 2: *Stepeni XI–XVII, Prilozheniia. Ukazateli* (Moscow: Iazyki slavianskikh kul'tur, 2008), 323. Another historical reference to Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi as ruling the "Rus' Land" ambiguously implies that Ivan now also does so (*ibid.*, 322).

¹⁹ PSRL 29: 135.

²⁰ Traditional historiography associated these three men as members of the Chosen Council (*Izbrannaia rada*) that dominated the Muscovite government during the 1550s. This concept has recently been contested.

²¹ J. L. I. Fennell, ed., *The Correspondence of Prince A. M. Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia 1564–1579* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 12–13 (Ivan's *First Epistle*), 188–89 (Ivan's *Second Epistle*, modified from Fennell's translation "all the Russian land"). Whether Kurbskii used the phrase "Rus' Land" depends upon treating the word "holy" in the expression "Holy Rus' Land" as an interpolation in the seventeenth-century manuscripts of Kurbskii's *History* and then working backwards to "Rus' Land" as the original phrase.

uanian figures, all dated 1567, suggest a common ghost-authorship by Ivan or use of a template of his or someone else's design. In any event Prince I. D. Bel'skii offered to partition Poland-Lithuania, allowing Sigismund Augustus to take Poland, while Bel'skii would take the Lithuanian Grand Duchy (*Velikoe kniazhestvo litovskoe*) and the Rus' Land minus whatever lands were claimed by Prince M. I. Vorotynskii. An epistle from Prince I. F. Mstislavskii to Sigismund Augustus suggested the same partition between Bel'skii and Sigismund Augustus, with some lands in Lithuania to himself (he did not proffer any consideration to be given Vorotynskii).²²

The credibility of the partition offer is not at issue here. Indeed, some historians doubt that these replies to Sigismund's missives were ever sent. Iakov Lur'e in his commentary to Bel'skii's epistle glossed "Rus' Land" as all the Belarusian and Ukrainian lands under the authority of the Grand Dukes of Lithuania.²³ It is more likely that the phrase here denoted Galicia. As previously mentioned, in the thirteenth century Galicia-Volynia was called the "Rus' Land" but in Bel'skii, Mstislavskii, and contemporary usage Galicia, under Polish sovereignty, although titled the Rus' Palatine, was still called "Rus' Land." Regardless of whether "Rus' Land" referred only to Galicia or to a larger group of territories formerly part of Kievan Rus' and now incorporated into Poland or Lithuania, the more important context is what "Rus' Land" meant in Ivan's Muscovy. At the time of writing Ivan ruled the "Rus' Land" and Makarii presided over the bishops of the Rus' Orthodox Church in the "Rus' Land," and neither Ivan's realm nor Makarii's eparchy included the regions denoted as "Rus' Land" in Bel'skii's and Mstislavskii's epistles. "Rus' Land" was a term of great political legitimacy, and belonged to the heir of the Volodimerovichi, Ivan. To apply the term to lands belonging to the Lithuanian Grand Duchy and Poland in any way without regard for other uses of the term or Moscow's pretensions took considerable liberties with the concept.

The *Tale of Bathory's Assault on Pskov* (*Povest' o prikhozhdenii Stefana Batoriia na grad Pskov*) is a gripping narrative of the unsuccessful siege of the city in 1581 by Bathory, King of Poland. As expected the text offers much fuel for Pskovian pride, but it does not criticize Ivan, so one would not be surprised to see at least decorous allusions to the *rossiiskoe tsarstvo*. In fact there is only one unmodified reference to the tsardom, and only one reference to the "Ros tsar-

²² D. S. Likhachev and Ia. S. Lur'e, eds., *Poslaniia Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1951), 245, 253.

²³ *Poslaniia Ivana Groznogo*, 674 n. 5. Lur'e utilized the Great Russian nationalist term, "West Russian" [*Zapadnorusskie*] lands."

dom."²⁴ There are thirteen references to the Rus' Land: The title announced that Bathory had attacked Pskov and the Rus' Land. Ivan fought in Livonia and then returned to the Rus' Land. Bathory invaded the Rus' Land and retook their city of Polotsk (captured by the Muscovites in 1563). Bathory chose to attack Pskov as his path to the Rus' Land, an invasion which created "disorder" (*bolezni*) in the Rus' Land. Bathory proclaimed in a speech to his troops at Velikie Luki that he wanted to invade the Rus' Land. Bathory extolled the riches of the Rus' Land to his troops and tried to instill fear of him and his army in the Rus' Land. The text refers twice to the Rus' Land as the object of Bathory's wrath, and within the Rus' Land especially the glorious great city of Pskov. Bathory brought his army to the border of the "Pskov Land,"²⁵ which was the border of the Rus' Land. All the saints of the Rus' Land helped defend Pskov (said three times). While Bathory besieged Pskov, Ivan invaded the Lithuanian Land and return safely to the Rus' Land.²⁶ There can be no doubt that the author of the *Tale* conceived of Pskov as an integral part of the Rus' Land, as a country and a territory, to which he was obviously devoted. This is quite curious in what is, after all, a regional text in which Ivan is barely present and the dynastic context of the Rus' Land is absent. To put it differently, it is as if Pskov appropriated a dynastic myth for regional self-defensive purposes.

More traditional but equally intriguing for a different reason are the appearances of the term "Rus' Land" in the *Kazan' History* (*Kazanskaia istoriia*), a narrative, almost a romance, about the history of Rus'-Kazan' relations crowned by Muscovy's 1552 conquest of the khanate. In addition to historical invocations of the Rus' Land, the term appears seventeen times in passages discussing current events. There was great mourning in the Rus' Land at the death of Vasilii III. The Crimean and Kazan' khanates attacked the Rus' Land during Ivan's minority. Kazan' had ruled part of the Rus' Land for 300 years, and looted and raided the border (*ukraina*) of our Rus' Land. While Batu, grandson of Chingis Khan and the commander of the Mongol army that conquered Rus' in the thirteenth century, went through the entire Rus' Land, the Kazanis did not penetrate as deeply but never left the Rus' Land alone. When the Muscovites captured Sumbek, *khansha* (wife of the khan) of Kazan', she moaned that she would be ridiculed and cursed when held captive in the

²⁴ V. I. Malyshev, ed., *Povest' o prikhozhenii Stefana Batoriia na grad Pskov* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1952), 35 (both).

²⁵ See chap. 15.

²⁶ Malyshev, *Povest'*, 35, 39, 41, 42, 45, 49, 50–51, 56, 71, 98. Sixteenth-century Muscovites still utilized the "land" system of denoting countries endemic to Kievan Rus', sometimes in addition to more specific nomenclature, e.g., *tsarstvo* for khanate or *korolevstvo* for kingdom.

Rus' Land. Captured servants (*otroki*, literally "orphans") of Muscovite officers who refused to convert to Islam were tortured to death and layed down their lives for the Rus' Land. Metropolitan Makarii prayed for the entire Rus' Land. Ivan described the Rus' Land as his "realm" (*derzhava*). The entire Rus' Land prayed for a Muscovite victory at Kazan'. The conquered and now Christian Kazan' had been and now resumed being part of the Rus' Land. News of the victory spread to the Rus' Land, the Rus' Land which was Ivan's patrimony (*otchina*). God protects the Rus' Land. The Rus' Land had been suffering, but was now at peace. The author lauds the entire Rus' Land.²⁷

In the *Kazan' History* the Rus' Land has obvious dynastic and territorial referents. The author's assertion that Kazan' had been part of the Rus' Land before the advent of the Kazan' Tatars derives from his invention of autochthonous Rus' primary inhabitants of the region. Kazan' was once and will once again be part of the Rus' Land, but when it was not part of the Rus' Land it could attack the Rus' Land and the Rus' Land could pray for its conquest. Of course the chronology is not that neat; defeated Kazan' immediately becomes (resumes being) part of the Rus' Land, yet news of its conquest spreads "to" the Rus' Land. There is a strong religious element too. It is not just that God protects the Rus' Land but Muscovites give up their lives for it (and are implicitly martyred for it). However, the concept of the Rus' Land is hardly religious. Metaphorically the entire Rus' Land engages in prayer, which is as close as any source comes to conceiving the Rus' Land as a social unit. I cannot see any cultural connotations to the term in the *Kazan' History*.

The oddity is that although some scholars date the first redaction of the *Kazan' History* to the 1560s, all surviving manuscripts derive from a second redaction written no earlier than 1589 and perhaps after 1598. Only seventeenth-century manuscripts survive. In the absence of any manuscripts of the first redaction it is very problematic to isolate passages in the second redaction that belonged to the first redaction, but the relatively great attention paid to the myth of the Rus' Land makes much more sense in a sixteenth-century context than in a seventeenth-century context when the term had already been superseded by the concept of the "*rossiiskoe*" tsardom. Ivan conquered Kazan' after his coronation as tsar, yet more imperial terms, the "Ros Land" (*rossiiskaia zemlia*), let alone the "Ros' tsardom" (*rossiiskoe tsarstvo*), did not overwhelm the traditional historical term "Rus' Land" in the text.

As far as I can tell, "Rus' Land" appears once in the writing of Ivan Peresvetov, an immigrant who lived in Muscovy in the late 1540s and early 1550s. In the *First Prophecy of the Philosophers and Doctors* (*Pervoe predskazanie filosofov i doktorov*) these scholars predicted that with God's help the Rus' Land would

²⁷ G. N. Moiseeva, ed., *Kazanskaia istoriia* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1954), 72, 74, 75, 110, 119, 137, 147, 163–64, 172, 173, 175–76.

conquer the Kazan' khanate by force and convert it to Orthodox Christianity.²⁸ The Rus' Land is a country.

Despite the ubiquity of references to the Rus' Land in these sources from Ivan's reign, it should not be forgotten that quite a few sources from that period did not invoke the Rus' Land. In some cases the nature of the source is such that we would not expect the phrase to appear; in other cases we know that the phrase could have appeared, because comparable alternatives did show up, but the "Rus' Land" did not.

The phrase "the Rus' Land" is not found, nor would we expect to find it, in domestic official administrative sources, such as the Law Code of 1550 (*Sudebnik*); the *Book of the Thousand* (*Tysiachnaia kniga*), codifying the new land allocations of conditional landed estates (*pomest'e*) to selected servitors who lacked lands close enough to Moscow to be mobilized rapidly in time of need; the *Court Quire* (*Dvorovaia tetrad'*), a personnel register of the Royal Court or Household (*Dvor*), curiously not listing all of its members but including a larger number of potential members in a recruitment pool; or the *Registers* (*Razriady* or *Razriadnye knigi*), lists of primarily military commissions in field armies but also political appointments, largely governors (*namestniki*) of cities and county administrators (*volosteli*). For different reasons mention of the Rus' Land were not required in Ivan's 1547 coronation ordo as tsar, focused entirely upon his tsardom. The unofficial *Book of Household Management* (*Domostroi*) did not need to mention the Rus' Land because it is oriented at the household level. There could have been an allusion to the Rus' Land in the introduction to the private political reform proposal of the cleric Ermolai-Erazm (the priest Ermolai took monastic vows as Erazm) to reform land measurement, ownership, and taxation, *On Administration and Land Measurement* (*Pravitel' nitsa. Ashche voskhotiat tsar'em pravitel' nitsa i zemlemerie*) in order to identify the country in need of reform, but there was not.²⁹ The phrase could have appeared with the same function as the location of the Valaam Monastery, where supposedly two elders debated objections to monastic landowning and to the participation of monks in affairs of state, the *Valaam Discourse* (*Valaamskaia beseda*), but there was not. The first redaction refers to Rus' (*russkie*) grand princes, the second redaction to Ros (*rossiiskie*) princes, but otherwise alludes only once to "the tsardom," and once in an ancillary work, the *Prophecy of Kiril of Novoezero* (*Prerechenie Kirilla Novoezera*) to the "Ros Land" (*rossiiskaia zemlia*).³⁰ The nar-

²⁸ A. A. Zimin, ed., *Sochineniia I. Peresvetova* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1956), 161.

²⁹ L. A. Dmitriev and D. S. Likhachev, eds., *Pamiatniki literatury drevnei Rusi: Konets XV–pervaia polovina XVI veka* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1984), 652–53.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 162, 163, 178, 195.

rative of Ivan's sack of the city of Novgorod in 1569–70, the *Tale of Ivan IV's Campaign against Novgorod* (*Povest' o prikhode Ioanna IV na Novgorod v 1570 godu* or *Povest' o prikhode tsaria Ioanna IV v Novgorod*), sadly observes that nothing like this had ever happened in the "Ros Land" (*rossiisskaia zemlia*), rather than "the Rus' Land."³¹

Conclusion

The myth of the Rus' Land was utilized in a wide variety of sources of different genres and provenances referring to events between 1533 and 1584, almost always denoting Ivan's reign or the territory over which he reigned. Writers of all sorts—government, church, private—continued to employ the myth of the Rus' Land in its traditional meanings. The meaning of the term to refer to Ukrainian and Belarusian lands in the boyar letters to the king of Poland definitely requires further study. In addition, the significant quantity of occurrences of the term in the *Kazan' History* and the *Tale of Batory's Assault on Pskov* merit further discussion. Hints of any social, cultural or religious connotations attached to the Rus' Land seem minimal at best and always problematic. Even the promotion of the ruler from "grand prince" to "tsar" could not erase the bond between ruler and the Rus' Land. Nor could the elevation of Muscovy from a grand principality to a tsardom persuade Muscovite book-men to cease using what might have been considered an obsolete slogan. The "Rus' tsardom" carried an imperial coloration, whether from Byzantium or the Mongols is a separate question. The "Rus' Land" had no such ties to Ivan's new title or the new status of the realm he ruled, but it survived nonetheless. Only the termination of the dynasty itself during the Time of Troubles sounded the death knell of the "Rus' Land" as a current event term for Muscovy.

Two aspects of the intellectual history of the myth of the Rus' Land should also be mentioned. First, Krom does not posit any connection between the Rus' Land and Muscovites/Russians as an ethnic entity. Krom acknowledges that the term had no such referent before the sixteenth century because no Russian "people" (*narod*) existed as yet. However, in his articles but not in his monograph he evaluates the sixteenth century as an important stage in the development of "political and national commonality [*obshchnost'*]," the formation of the Great Russian nationality (*narodnost'*), the formation of a Great Rus-

³¹ L. A. Dmitriev and D. S. Likhachev, eds., *Izbornik: Sbornik proizvedenii literatury drevnei Rusi* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1969), 477; A. I. Tsepkov, ed., *Novgorodskie letopisi*, bk. 2 (Riazan': Aleksandriia, 2002), 394.

sian ethnicity via ethnic consolidation.³² I have not found any sixteenth-century uses of the concept of the Rus' Land with ethnic overtones.

Second, the word "land" (*zemlia*) had multiple meanings in sixteenth-century Muscovy, including, at times, the "state" and/or "society," as in references to the "sovereign's and the land's affairs" in which it designates the state, apart from the sovereign, and in expressions like "the entire land mourned the death of tsaritsa Anastasiia," in which it encompasses Muscovite society as a whole. But when preceded by the adjective "Rus'," "land," the "Rus' Land," rose to the level of myth, a myth that carried extensive ideological baggage by the time Ivan assumed the throne. In this form the concept of the Rus' Land had its own separate history from that of a "land" in general.

The heterogeneity of purposes and shades of meaning conveyed by the concept of the "Rus' Land" in sources from Ivan IV's reign reflects the lack of uniformity we would expect in a manuscript culture, where imposing consistency is more difficult. The resilience of the concept of the "Rus' Land" stands out, attesting to the continued relevance of its historical legacy.

The title of the *Kievan Tale of Bygone Years* (*Povest' vremennykh let*) promised to tell the story of "where the Rus' Land came from ... and from whence the Rus' Land came into being" (*otkudu est' poshla russkaia zemlia ... i otkudu russkaia zemlia stala est'*).³³ The history of the myth of the Rus' Land during Ivan IV's reign contributes to the exploration of the final phase of this story, how the Rus' Land disappeared.

³² Krom, "K voprosu o vremeni zarozhdeniia idei patriotizma v Rossii," 24; Krom, "Christian Tradition and the Birth of the Concept of Patriotism in Russia," 22, 28. I have modified the English translation rendering of the "Greater Russian ethnicity."

³³ Adapted from Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus', 1: From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century*, trans. Marta Skorupsky, ed. Andrzej Poppe and Frank E. Syn with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasichynk (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1997), 289 (I have changed "Land of Rus'" to "Rus' Land").

Ivan IV

Chapter 16

Ivan the Terrible's Temper, or Ivan IV's Terrible Temper

No one ever accused Ivan IV of being laid-back. Both foreign and native sources emphasize Ivan's volatility. Ivan demonstrated his "anger" (*gnev*) and "wrath" (*iarost'*) in his epistles to his own subjects and to foreign rulers, in his diatribes against officials who failed to carry out his instructions or boyars who filed what he deemed frivolous precedence law suits, and in his tirades to foreign diplomats about the injustices committed by Muscovy's enemies and sometimes friends too. But what exactly did the terms *gnev* and *iarost'* denote in Muscovite political discourse? Which actions of Ivan's were attributed to these emotions? Was Ivan the only ruler, or the only person, to whom they were attributed? Were Ivan's temper tantrums always depicted in Muscovite sources negatively, as evidence of his weaknesses as a ruler or vices as a man? This chapter explores these questions. For purposes of analysis I have confined myself to Muscovite sources, because foreign sources pose separate problems, among them, except for English-language texts, how their original prose—in German, Latin, or Italian—was translated into English or Russian. I have also omitted post-Ivan sources. Analysis of the occurrences of *gnev* and *iarost'* in Muscovite sources from Ivan's reign reveals that these emotional states were not applied uniquely to Ivan but also to other rulers, Muscovite, biblical, or contemporary, as well as to God, and that Ivan's episodes of anger and wrath were not always unjustified. Sometimes Ivan's anger and wrath did produce actions consistent with his demonic image, but not always. Moreover, royal "anger" (*gnev*) could serve as a technical term comparable to royal "disgrace" (*opala*), which strips the concept of any emotional significance for an evaluation of Ivan's character. Thus interpreting the instances of "anger" and "wrath" in Muscovite sources reveals the flexible semantics of these words in Muscovite discourse.

Defining the two words is necessary to differentiate them, but not as straightforward as one might hope. Izmail Sreznevskii defines *gnev* as the Latin *ira* (anger), and *iarost'* *inter alia* as modern Russian *gnev*, meaning "an-

ger," and *iarost'*, meaning "wrath."¹ As we shall see, various scholars followed suit and have sometimes translated both *gnev* and *iarost'* as both "anger" and "wrath." While justified by the need for literate translations, such confusion of the two terms is not helpful for elucidating their meanings. As we shall also see, Muscovite authors sometimes used them together, *gnev i iarost'*, so they were perceived as separate words, not necessarily synonyms, and translating them both as "anger" is redundant. For clarity I will always indicate which word appears in a quotation, but my sense is that there was a subtle distinction between the two words. *Iarost'* appears less often, and is more emphatic, more emotional; in some instances it could accurately be translated as "rage" or "fury" (Ivan was "furious"). Defining them each by a unique word, *gnev* as "anger," *iarost'* as "wrath," is heuristically justified by the sometimes formulaic quality of *gnev* and the familiarity in English of the phrase "wrath of God."² Still, the heterogeneity of usages of the terms should be kept in mind.³

For context I will examine each source separately, grouping sources by genre. There is no difference between occurrences in official and unofficial sources, or sources of government, church, or mixed origin.⁴ To be sure neither term is likely to appear in certain types of government sources. One would not expect it to appear in the 1550 *Law Code* (*Sudebnik*). However it does appear in other government sources, such as official state diplomatic correspondence and Ivan's testament. The semantics of the terms were shared by all Muscovite authors, regardless of occupation, status, or provenance.

Not unexpectedly "anger" and "wrath" occur most often in narrative sources, especially chronicles. I have grouped several chronicles together for exposition. What was published as the *Nikon Chronicle* (*Nikonovskaia letopis'*) included two redactions, one of which incorporated the *Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom* (*Letopisets nachala tsarstva*)⁵ for the period up to 1553. In ad-

¹ Izmail Ivanovich Sreznevskii, *Materialy dlia slovaria drevnerusskogo iazyka*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia nauk, 1903), vol. 1, col. 527, s.v. *gnev*; vol. 3, cols. 1662–63, s.v. *iarost'*.

² However, for this very reason some translators translate "anger of God" (*gnev Bozhii*) as "wrath of God," which obscures the distinction in usage between the two words that I am trying to propose.

³ I have not attempted to trace all verbal forms with the root *gnev*, such as "to become angry at" (*razgnevasiti*), but I adduce some instances when appropriate.

⁴ Charles J. Halperin, "What is an 'Official' Muscovite Source from the Reign of Ivan IV?," in "The Book of Royal Degrees" and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness/ "Stepennaia kniga tsarskogo rodosloviia" i genezis russkogo istoricheskogo soznaniia, ed. Ann M. Kleimola and Gail Lenhoff (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2011), 81–93.

⁵ On translating *letopisets* as "chronicle," rather than "little chronicle," see chap. 1.

dition, the editors subsumed three segments of the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* (*Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*), the *Tsar's Book* (*Tsarstvennaia kniga*), the *Alexander Nevskii Chronicle* (*Aleksandro-Nevskaia letopis'*), and the *Lebedev Chronicle* (*Lebedevskaia letopis'*) under the umbrella of the "*Nikon Chronicle*." All four of these chronicles were also published as separate texts. Consequently these publications regurgitate and duplicate passages published as the *Nikon Chronicle*, as well as in each other. I have tried to adduce references to all instances of the same usage of "anger" and "wrath" in all of these venues. Of course I cannot pretend to have caught all appearances of these two words in these sources, and I could hardly even attempt to encompass all usages of both words in all sources, which would entail taking into account translated sources, first and foremost Scripture.

We begin with the *Nikon Chronicle* cohort of chronicles. In 1535 Grand Prince Ivan⁶ and his mother, Grand Princess Elena, sent an army to punish the Kazan' Khanate for its treasonous action of violating its loyalty oath to the ruler of Moscow by improperly choosing a monarch without his permission. The Muscovite army attacked Kazan' territory but did not reach the city of Kazan' itself; meanwhile, the Kazan' Tatars raided Nizhnii Novgorod. Grand Prince Ivan and Grand Princess Elena ordered the Muscovite army to turn back. They also expressed their anger (*gnev*) at and placed in "disgrace" (*opala*) the army's two commanders (*voevody*), Prince Semen Gundorov and Vasilii Zamyts'kii, presumably for their failure and incompetence; they were punished by incarceration.⁷

In 1535 Grand Prince Ivan was five years old. Obviously he was not making his own political decisions. His mother, Grand Princess Elena, acted in his name as regent. Although everyone knew that Ivan was only a child, all government actions had to be ascribed to him to be legitimate.⁸ Ivan himself could hardly have been "angry" at his two generals. His understanding of the relationship between Moscow and Kazan'—Moscow claimed Kazan' was a Muscovite protectorate, the Kazanis resisted—was minimal at best. However, for that very reason the formulaic nature of Ivan's "anger" becomes more obvious. "Anger" was a formal attribute of a ruler who took umbrage at the behavior of one of his subjects or one of Muscovy's neighbors. In this case "an-

⁶ Ivan was not crowned "tsar" until 1547.

⁷ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter *PSRL*] 13 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 105–06, left column (*Nikon Chronicle*); *PSRL* 29 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 29, 23–24 (*Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom*).

⁸ Charles J. Halperin, "The Minority of Ivan IV," in *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom Revisited: Essays in Russian History in Honor of Robert O. Crummey*, ed. Chester S. L. Dunning, Russell E. Martin, and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2008), 41–52.

ger" was mechanically projected onto Ivan and accompanied by "disgrace," a formal term for expressing royal displeasure which could carry as light a punishment as exile from court and as severe a penalty as execution. Imprisonment constituted a relatively severe punishment for "disgrace." Royal "anger" was a cliché; it did not necessarily convey an emotion.

This episode illustrates an endemic problem of Ivan's biography. The sources describe Ivan as acting as an adult in exactly the same way as they did his supposed actions as a child. Whether Ivan was "angry" pro forma because someone acting in his name was "angry" or for real can only be inferred from context. It is easy to categorize this episode when Ivan was five years old, as when he was six, seven, eight, or nine. Dating the transition to when Ivan acted on his own formal or actual anger is problematic and contested. Presumably this was a process begun no earlier than his teenage years, although historians disagree on when such a process was completed, perhaps even if it was completed. I would argue that Ivan began not just reigning but ruling at least to some degree with his coronation and marriage at the age of sixteen.

In 1536 a Lithuanian delegation⁹ arrived in Moscow for the purpose of imploring Grand Prince Ivan and Grand Princess Elena to sooth relations between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Principality of Moscow, who were at war at the time over a border dispute. The Lithuanian envoys asked Grand Prince Ivan and Grand Princess Elena to convert their "wrath" (*iarost'*) to "good will" or "kindness" (*milost'*).¹⁰

The six-year-old Ivan was no more in charge of Muscovite foreign policy than the five-year-old Ivan had been in charge of military policy. It is noteworthy however that the chronicler refers to royal "wrath" (*iarost'*), not just "anger" (*gnev*), perhaps a reflection of the fact that border incidents had escalated to open warfare or perhaps to exaggerate the importance of the dispute.

In 1537 at the instigation of the devil and evil people, Grand Prince Ivan and Grand Princess Elena accused Prince Andrei Ivanovich, Ivan's uncle, of "anger" (*gnev*) against them because in the testament of Ivan's late father, Grand Prince Vasili III, Prince Andrei had not received all the territory he felt entitled to as his appanage. Prince Andrei wished to flee the country. He accused Grand Princess Elena of wishing to imprison him. Prince Andrei left Moscow and went to his patrimony, the city of Staritsa, where he conceived "anger" (*gnev*) against Grand Prince Ivan and Grand Princess Elena. Evil advisors confirmed his suspicion that the Grand Prince Ivan wanted to

⁹ "Lithuanian" here is not an ethnic denomination; it refers to a resident of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who might be an ethnic Lithuanian, a Ruthenian (Ukrainian or Belarusian), or even a Pole.

¹⁰ PSRL 13, 107–08, left column; 36 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 24–25 (*Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom*).

imprison him, and Prince Andrei remained "angry" (*gnevno*). Grand Prince Ivan and Grand Princess Elena sent a message to Prince Andrei in which they acknowledged hearing that Prince Andrei felt "anger" (*gnev*) against them but sought to assure or reassure him that they were not planning to incarcerate him. They urged Prince Andrei to join them in dismissing the evil people who were misadvising both Grand Prince Ivan and Grand Princess Elena, on the one hand, and Prince Andrei, on the other.¹¹

Once again, the seven-year old Ivan was hardly master of his decisions. The political machinations of his mother and uncle based upon mutual misunderstanding and mistrust ultimately had fatal consequences. Prince Andrei wound up in "disgrace" and imprisoned, where he was probably starved to death. How much Ivan understood at the time can be questioned. Ivan's "anger" here is as formulaic as that of his uncle.

In 1540, after the death of his mother and regent Grand Princess Elena, Grand Prince Ivan granted the petition of Metropolitan Ioasaf, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and freed boyar Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel'skii from prison. He lifted his "anger" (*gnev*) and "disgrace" from him and permitted them to see his eyes once again (to enter his presence).¹² In this case the chronicle specifically ascribes the motivation of Ivan's action in lifting his "anger" to the inspiration of Metropolitan Ioasaf's intercession but still adheres to the pretense that Ivan made the final decision himself, which is not likely given that he was ten years old.

In 1541 the same boyar Prince Ivan Fedorovich Bel'skii petitioned Metropolitan Ioasaf to intervene with Grand Prince Ivan concerning Bel'skii's brother, Prince Semen Fedorovich Bel'skii, who had fled the country. He asked that Ivan lift his anger (*gnev*) from his brother occasioned by Prince Semen's youthful indiscretion. Grand Prince Ivan agreed, although the pardon did not work out.¹³ The "anger" of the eleven-year-old Ivan is still unlikely to have been his own.

During the summer of 1546, Grand Prince Ivan was in Kolomna directing military efforts to deflect the intension of the Crimean Tatars to raid Muscovy. The sources present contradictory narratives. In one version, at the instigation of the devil privy state secretary (*blizhnii d'iak*) Vasilii Grigor'ev syn Zakharov-Gnil'evskii denounced several boyars for slandering Ivan; in other versions

¹¹ PSRL 13, 91–92, right column, 117–18 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 13, 428–29 (*Tsar's Book*); PSRL 29, 29–30 (*Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom*); PSRL 29, 132–33 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

¹² PSRL 13, 123 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 34 (*Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom*).

¹³ PSRL 13, 136–37 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 39 (*Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom*).

the accusations are attributed to other boyars or to Ivan, or were warranted. In any case, Grand Prince Ivan "with great wrath [*iarost*]", expressed his "anger" (*gnev*) by placing the accused in "disgrace." Furthermore, Ivan ordered Prince Ivan Kubenskii, Fedor Vorontsov, and Vasilii Mikhailov syn Vorontsov beheaded without allowing them to confess their sins first and receive last rites, Ivan Petrov syn Feodorov to be imprisoned in Belozero, and Ivan Mikhail syn Vorontsov convicted. Not all accounts refer to Ivan's "anger" and "wrath."¹⁴

Regardless of who inspired Ivan, the sixteen-year-old should be held responsible for his actions, whose extremism can quite justifiably be categorized as instances of "wrath," not just mere "anger." Capital punishment itself had previously been only rarely applied to such instances of conflict between the ruler and the elite. Executing someone without last rites meant condemning them to hell for all eternity. If Ivan's victims were guilty, Ivan's punishments might be termed severe but not unjust; if Ivan was misled, then he was not entirely culpable for his decisions. As a whole it seems reasonable to characterize Ivan's actions as strongly emotional. This was not a simple case of formal "anger," but a reflection of genuine "anger" and lethal "wrath." This episode illustrates the potentially negative consequences of "anger" and "wrath," which could induce unjust and cruel criminal sentences.

However, Ivan's relationship to "anger" and "wrath" was neither permanently nor uniformly altered by the events of 1546.

In 1550 Tsar Ivan appealed to his troops besieging Kazan' not to deal with each other in "wrath" (*iarost*) but with love out of their shared fatherland (*otechestvo*).¹⁵ Here actions motivated by "wrath" constitute a national security risk.

In 1551 Ivan temporarily lifted his "anger" against Kazan' and issued a charter of privileges for the khanate.¹⁶ Ivan's "anger" is political, a foreign policy disagreement, and no more.

To sixteenth-century Muscovites, anger and wrath were not just attributes of human beings. In 1552 Metropolitan Makarii wrote an epistle to the Muscovite army besieging Kazan'. He admonished the troops to forgo sin, especially sodomy, lest God's mercy (*milost*) turn to "anger" (*gnev*) and his gentleness (*krotost*) turn to "wrath" (*iarost*).¹⁷ "Anger" and "wrath" are here divine at-

¹⁴ PSRL 13, 149 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 48–49 (*Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom*); PSRL 13, 448–49 (*Tsar's Book*); PSRL 29, 147 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

¹⁵ PSRL 13, 159 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 13, 461 (*Tsar's Book*); PSRL 29, 157 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

¹⁶ PSRL 13, 165 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 161 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

¹⁷ PSRL 13, 182 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 77 (*Chronicle of the Beginning of the Tsardom*); PSRL 29, 171, 175 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

tributes, and no pious Russian Orthodox Christian would question the righteousness of God's anger or of His wrath.

Muscovite rulers were not infrequently compared to Old Testament Hebrew rulers, but the comparison need not always have been of virtues like Solomon's wisdom. Sub anno 1552 the chronicler alluded to the Old Testament King David, who fell from God's grace because of his "wrath" (*iarost'*), for which he suffered much.¹⁸

Before the final Muscovite assault on Kazan' in 1552, Ivan, to avoid further bloodshed, offered to lift his "anger" (*gnev*) against the city if it surrendered to him. The people of Kazan' refused. In Muscovite eyes, Ivan's offer of mercy was laudable, but his "anger" at Kazani perfidy was fully justified.¹⁹

After the Muscovite annexation of Kazan', in 1552 the people of Arsk sent Cossacks to Ivan to petition him for mercy for the common people (*chernye liudi*) by lifting his "anger" (*gnev*). The commoners volunteered to swear to serve Ivan faithfully. Ivan did so.²⁰

In 1559 in response to a request by the envoys of Sigismund, king of Poland and grand duke of Lithuania, Ivan agreed to lift his "anger" against Lithuania and not go to war against it over territorial disputes.²¹ Note that the adult Ivan's ceremonial anger in foreign policy is identical to what was ascribed to the boy Ivan during his minority.

In 1563 Ivan directed his "anger" (*gnev*) at his aunt, Princess Evfrosiniia Staritskaia, and her son, Ivan's cousin, the appanage Prince Vladimir Andreevich (son of Prince Andrei Ivanovich) because their secretary (*d' iak*) Savluk Ivanov had sent him in Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda (soon to become famous as the first capital of the *oprichnina*) a memo (*pamiat'*) recording Princess Efrosiniia's and Prince Vladimir's misdeeds, namely their unjust remarks about the sovereign's affairs, which were none of their business. Ivan had investigated and corroborated Savluk's accusations. As a result Ivan ordered them imprisoned and then shared the damning evidence with Metropolitan Makarii, the bishops, and the Consecrated Council.²² These holy men confirmed Ivan's verdict but expressed the hope that Ivan would be merciful. Princess Efrosiniia asked to be shorn, which Ivan graciously permitted, despatching boyars and secretaries with her spiritual father to Abbot Vassian of the Kirillo-Belozero

¹⁸ PSRL 13, 195 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 184 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

¹⁹ PSRL 13, 214 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 204 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

²⁰ PSRL 13, 221 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 205 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

²¹ PSRL 13, 316 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 277 (*Lebedev Chronicle*).

²² The Consecrated Council (*Osviashchennyi sobor*) included the bishops and the highest ranking heads of the most important Muscovite monasteries.

Monastery to perform the ceremony. Ivan gave Prince Vladimir Andreevich permission to retain his appanage.²³

The chronicler expresses no doubts that Ivan's "anger" at the Staritskie was any less justified than his anger at Kazan'. Traitors, whether foreign or domestic, deserved to be the objects of royal "anger." Righteous "anger" was not solely directed at foreigners; Ivan's subjects could also experience it.

In December 1564, Ivan initiated the series of events that led to the creation of the oprichnina by expressing his anger (*gnev*) at the intercessors, archbishops, bishops, archimandrites, and abbots, and at his boyars, majordomos, master of horse, associate boyars (*okolnichie*), treasurers, secretaries, gentry (*deti boiarskie*), and officials (*prikaznye liudi*), all of whom he placed in "disgrace," the latter for their misdeeds during his minority, in stealing money from the treasury, laying waste to the land, giving away conditional-land grants (*pomest'ia*) and patrimonial lands (*votchiny*) to their relatives, granting feedings (*kormleniia*),²⁴ while paying no attention to the needs of the state and all Orthodox Christians, not defending the land against Crimea, Lithuania, and Germans (Swedes probably), committing oppression, and avoiding service, not opposing Muslims, Latins, and Germans, and the former for not permitting Ivan to punish those miscreants by covering up their crimes and abuses. Ivan could no longer endure such evil. He directed his anger (*gnev*) at the boyars, associate boyars, gentry, and officials and placed them all in "disgrace." The metropolitan and the hierarchy were very sorry to hear that the boyars, associate boyars, gentry, and officials had aroused Ivan's "anger" (*gnev*). Commoners were stunned that the elite had compelled Ivan to "anger" (*gnev*) and "wrath" (*iarost*). They begged the hierarchy to pray for Ivan to lift the "anger" (*gnev*) that induced him to leave the state and to put his elite in "disgrace." A large delegation of clerics, elite, and commoners set off for Aleksandrovskaia sloboda to implore Ivan to grant mercy to the elite and the entire Christian people (*narod*), to lift his "anger" (*gnev*) and "disgrace," and to return to the throne.²⁵

In this lengthy narrative neither cleric nor elite nor commoner questions the legitimacy of Ivan's "anger." Of course this narrative was written in Muscovy, probably at the time of the events described, and it might have been quite imprudent for the chronicler to voice a contrary opinion. However, as we have seen, even seemingly unjustifiable acts could be recorded by miti-

²³ PSRL 13, 368 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 321 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

²⁴ Administrative appointments in which the recipient, instead of receiving a salary, received gifts (he was "fed") by the people in a district or county that he administered.

²⁵ For the entire passage on the creation of the oprichnina, see PSRL 13, 391–95 (*Nikon Chronicle*); PSRL 29, 341–45 (*Alexander Nevskii Chronicle*).

gating Ivan's guilt as the perpetrator by making him the victim of deceitful humans or Satan, or, as we shall see, by blaming "our sins" for the resulting suffering, which was God's will, and not the product of a tyrannical ruler.²⁶

In 1569–70 Ivan and his oprichnina army severely sacked Novgorod with much murder and looting, and inflicted a slightly lesser devastation on Pskov. Ivan's "anger" and "wrath" did not go unnoticed in these accounts.

According to varying versions of the *Tale of Ivan IV Vasil'evich's Campaign on Novgorod* (*Povest' o prikhode tsaria Ioanna IV Vasil'evicha v Novgorod*) included in Novgorod chronicles, because of "our" sins (that is, the sins of the people of Novgorod, among whom could be counted the author of the "Tale") Ivan turned his "anger" (*gnev*) and "wrath" (*iarost'*) against Novgorod, its archbishop, Pimen, Pimen's archiepiscopal boyars, the better people, and all citizens of the city. Thousands were robbed, tortured, and killed, including clerics. Archbishop Pimen was taken to Moscow and imprisoned in a monastery. Ivan's "anger" (*gnev*) and "wrath" (*iarost'*) hardened his heart. His "wrath" (*iarost'*) was especially lethal against Pimen's boyars. Ivan's "anger" was great and his "wrath" uncontrollable (*neukrotimoiu iarostiui*). He even stole the bells in the St. Sophia Church. Ivan denounced Pimen with "wrathful words" (*iarostnye slova*).²⁷

The Pskov chronicles were no more charitable in their depiction of the oprichnina. Muscovy was a near paradise, the *Pskov First Chronicle* recorded, inaccurately sub anno 1562 when it should have been 1564, on the eve of the oprichnina, until, for the sins of the entire "Rus' Land" (*rusaskaia zemlia*), the quintessential political myth of the East Slavs since the eleventh century in Kievan (Kyivan) Rus',²⁸ great "disorder" (*miatezh*) and "anger" (*gnev*) erupted in the realm, internecine struggle and ill-will among all people. In his "anger" (*gnev*) Tsar Ivan created the oprichnina. Tsar Ivan plundered Novgorod and Pskov. Because evil people slandered Novgorod and Pskov, Ivan in his "wrath" (*iarost'*) committed unprecedented evil, including the murder of 60,000 men,

²⁶ Charles J. Halperin, "Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Ivan IV's Oprichnina," *Kritika* 18, 1 (2017): 95–124.

²⁷ "Povest' o pokhode Ivana IV na Novgorod v 1570 godu," in *Izbornik (Sbornik proizvedenii literatury drevnei Rusi)*, ed. L. A. Dmitriev and D. S. Likhachev (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1969), 277–83, here 277, 278, 280; A. I. Tsepkov, ed., *Novgorodskie letopisi*, bk. 2 (Riazan': Aleksandriia, 2002), 337–45, here 338, 341; 393–404, here 394, 401. See also chap. 15.

²⁸ Charles J. Halperin, "The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Century," *Russian History* 2, 1 (1975): 29–38 ("Russian Land" is a mistranslation born of the Great Russian nationalist interpretation of Kievan Rus' history); Halperin, "The Concept of the *ruskaia zemlia* and Medieval National Consciousness from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Centuries," *Nationalities Papers* 8, 1 (1980): 75–86; and chap. 15.

women, and children in Novgorod thrown into the Volkhov River to drown. Ivan in his great “wrath” (*iarost’*) wanted to do the same thing to Pskov with his oprichnina minions but God protected the city. On the other hand, another Pskov chronicler had no problem with describing how Ivan in 1558 had “grown angry at” (*razgnevasia*) the Livonians for their sins, the formulaic foreign policy variant of Ivan’s “anger.”²⁹

Other narrative sources besides chronicles also referred to “anger” and “wrath.” For example, the *Book of Degrees* (*Stepennaia kniga*), a comprehensive thematic history of Rus’ emphasizing rulers and churchmen, in its unfinished narrative of Ivan’s reign observed that Ivan was willing to relent in his “anger” (*gnev*) and show mercy toward the Kazanis if they would only release all Russian captives.³⁰

The colorful *Kazan’ History* (*Kazanskaia istoriia*), a fanciful and often fictitious history of the Kazan’ khanate and its relations with Rus’ and Muscovy, oddly enough, seems never to have used the noun “anger” (*gnev*),³¹ or at least I could not find it. The text does, however, read that Chur Narykovich, a Kazan’ Tatar, “grew angry at” (*razgnevasia*) the political leadership of Kazan’ for betraying Shig-ali, a Muscovite Chingissid client installed as puppet khan in Kazan’, whom he supported. References to “wrath” (*iarost’*) in the text are so intriguing that I will reproduce passages not related to Ivan IV’s reign per se.³² I forgo correcting its historical goofs. The city of Grand Bolgar, which became Kazan’, was founded by Sain of Bolgar in 1177; in his “wrath” (*iarost’*) against Christians he expelled the Rus’ who were native to the region. In 1392 Kazan’ and the Big Horde (*Bol’shaia orda*), on the advice of the Crimean khanate, in their “wrath” (*iarost’*) attacked Rus’ and put all its people to the sword. In 1480 Khan Akhmat of the Great Horde in his “wrath” (*iarost’*) attacked Grand Prince Ivan III of Moscow. The Kazan’ khan with “wrath” (*iarost’*), aided and abetted by the Nogai Tatars, raided Nizhnii Novgorod. Grand Prince Vasili III, having listened to his boyars, magnates, and councillors, changed his “wrath” (*iarost’*) to gentleness (*krotost’*) toward Kazan’ by installing the young Dzhan-ali, a Muscovite puppet, as khan over the Kazan’ khanate. Byzantine

²⁹ *Pskovskie letopisi*, 2 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo AN SSSR, 1941–55), 1: 113, 115; 2: 235. See also chap. 14.

³⁰ N. N. Pokrovskii and Gail Lenhoff [G. D. Lenkhoff], eds., *Stepennaia kniga tsarskogo rodosloviia po drevneishim spiskam: Teksty i kommentarii*, 2: *Stepeni XI–XVII, Prilozheniia. Ukazateli* (Moscow: Iazyki slavianskikh kul’tur, 2008), 362.

³¹ G. N. Moiseeva, ed., *Kazanskaia istoriia* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo AN SSSR, 1954), 81.

³² At least the core of the text seems to have been composed during Ivan’s reign, but all extant manuscripts derive from a later redaction.

emperor Constantine Monomachos sent envoys with regalia gifts to soften the "wrath" (*iarost'*) of Grand Prince of Kiev Vladimir Monomakh. Ivan IV besieging Kazan' was armed (strengthened) by his "wrath" (*iarostiii*). Kazanis realized that they faced Ivan's "wrath" (*iarost'*). Ivan's "wrath" (*iarost'*) returned when the Cheremis', who had supposedly surrendered to him, kept fighting, so he ordered the execution of 7,000 Cheremis' captives. The refusal of Kazan' to surrender produced Ivan's "wrath" (*iarost'*). Ivan in full armor spurred on the Muscovite attack with his "wrath" (*iarost'*). He wanted to lead the attack himself but was restrained by his commanders. Ivan returned to his senses from his "great wrath" (*zelnymia iarost'*).³³

I have translated *iarost'* uniformly here as "wrath"; certainly in English we would say that Ivan was armed by his "ardor" or that the Kazani leaders recognized Ivan's "resolve." The author of the *Kazan' History* applied the multiple meanings of the words not just to Ivan but to previous Rus' and Muscovite grand princes, Chingissid khans, and Tatar nobles. Certainly the term resonates with the chivalric elements of the text; perhaps for this reason the author preferred "wrath" to the more ordinary "anger." However, the author's implicit negative judgment of the consequences of the "wrath" of Tatar khans contrasts sharply with his enthusiasm for the actions of Rus', especially his hero, Ivan IV, inspired by "wrath."

Both "anger" and "wrath" appear in the correspondence between Prince Andrei Kurbskii and Ivan IV. In Kurbskii's *First Epistle to Ivan* he refers pejoratively to Ivan's "intolerable wrath" (*nesterpimovaia iarost'*). Ivan replied in his *First Epistle to Kurbskii* that a tsar without "wrath" (*iarost'*, which Fennell translated as "fierceness"), was not a tsar. "Who could be so insensate or wild, Ivan wrote, as to destroy his own possessions when in anger (*gnev*) with his servants?" "One single little word" caused the priest Sylvester to turn against Ivan's first wife Anastasia, yet Ivan tempered his "anger" (*gnev*, which Fennell translated as "wrath") with mercy by treating Sylvester's son well. Ivan refers to his "anger" (*prognevanie*, which Fennell translated as "wrath") against guilty subjects. He enumerates "wrath" (*iarost'*, which Fennell translated as "rage") as the passion characteristic of Ares, the Greek god of war. Ivan alluded to the "wrath of God" (*iarost' Gospodnia*). He wrote that the holy man Bishop Policarp was "enflamed by the great wrath of his anger" (*zelnymia iarosti gneva razzhegsia*, which Fennell translated as "by the great fierceness of his wrath"). In his *Second Letter to Ivan*, Kurbskii criticized Ivan's *First Letter* to him as written in "untamable anger" (*neukrotimovago gneva*, which Fennell translated as "untamable wrath"), a trait unbecoming to a tsar, and as reeking of

³³ *Kazanskaia istoriia*, 48, 49, 55, 60, 71, 114, 126, 133, 134–35, 146, 150.

scriptural quotations deployed with “wrath and fierceness” (*iarost’ i liutost’*).³⁴ Fennell’s translations are of course superior in literary quality to my own, but monotonous literal translations better bring out the pattern of usage of the words *gnev* and *iarost’* in this correspondence. To Kurbskii, Ivan’s “anger” (*gnev*) and “wrath” (*iarost’*) are always negative, but to Ivan, they are always positive and justified.

Kurbskii’s invocations of “anger” and “wrath” in his *History of the Grand Prince of Moscow* reflected the ambivalence of the terms. After all, it would have been impossible for any sixteenth-century Russian Orthodox Christian to impugn the “anger of God” (*Bozhii gnev*, which Fennell translated as the “wrath of God”), but Kurbskii remains consistent in treating Ivan’s “anger” and “wrath” as exclusively negative. Ivan’s “wrath” (*iarost’*, which Fennell translated as “fury”) induced him to banish Prince Mikhailo Repnin and later order his murder. Ivan impaled one of his victims with a spear in “anger” (*gnev*).³⁵

In Ivan’s epistles to addressees other than Kurbskii, he consistently insisted that his “anger” and “wrath” were always justified, but not necessarily anyone else’s. In his first epistle to Johann III, king of Sweden, Ivan contrasted his legitimate “anger” (*gnev*) against the Swedish Land with Johann’s mental defect, but then graciously lifted that “anger” (*gnev*). In his epistle to the Kirillo-Belozero Monastery Ivan alluded to his “anger” (*gnev*) against the Sheremetev clan. In an epistle to Prince Aleksandr Polubenskii of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ivan explained that because Livonia had promised to pay him the tribute to which he was entitled but had not done so, Ivan unleashed his “anger” (*gnev*) against it with sword and fire. In his epistle to Stefan Bathory, king of Poland and grand duke of Lithuania, Ivan excoriated Bathory for ignoring Ivan’s epistle to him and for, with even greater “wrath” (*iarost’*), expelling the Muscovite envoys to him without even granting them an audience. Finally, Ivan again alluded to his own “anger” (*gnev*) against Livonia.³⁶

Ivan’s diplomats, of course, adhered to Ivan’s diplomatic “line” even before Ivan was old enough to have one. In 1536 they described the “anger”

³⁴ J. L. I. Fennell, ed., *The Correspondence of Prince A. M. Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia 1564–1579* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 6–7, 40–41, 82–83, 98–99, 106–07, 108–09, 124–25, 148–49, 180–81. On the authenticity of the works attributed to Ivan IV and Kurbskii, see Charles J. Halperin, “Edward Keenan and the Kurbskii-Groznyi Correspondence in Hindsight,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 46 (1998): 376–403.

³⁵ J. L. I. Fennell, ed., *Prince A. M. Kurbsky’s History of Ivan IV* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 112–13, 180–81, 290–91.

³⁶ D. S. Likhachev and Ia. S. Lur’e, eds., *Poslaniia Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow–Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo AN SSSR, 1951), 145, 178, 203, 218, 228.

(*gnev*) and disgrace Ivan had imposed on Kazan' as narrated in the *Nikon Chronicle* entry for 1535. In 1549, when diplomats from Poland-Lithuania refused to recognize Ivan's title as "tsar'," Muscovite representatives rejected their declarations spoken "in anger" (*gnevno*) and broke off negotiations. In 1549, seeking a truce with Lithuania, Muscovite negotiators inquired why servants should suffer when rulers act "angrily" (*gnevno*) at each other.³⁷ In 1563 Muscovite envoys informed their Lithuanian counterparts that if they would take a look at Livonian and Lithuanian history as recorded in Polish chronicles, they would appreciate the legitimacy of Ivan's "anger" (*gnev*) against the Livonians for their treason. In 1567 Muscovite envoys were instructed that if they were asked about the disgrace and punishments Ivan had imposed on his elite, they were to reply that the boyars had petitioned him to lift his "anger" (*gnev*), which echoes the chronicle narrative of the creation of the oprichnina. In 1567 Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Vorotynskii denied the assertions of Gregory Chodkiewicz, grand hetman of Lithuania, that in his merciless "anger" (*gnev*) Ivan had divided his one Christian people (*narod*) and one faith into the oprichnina and the "land." Vorotynskii insisted that Ivan had not done so. (Muscovy consistently refused to admit to anyone from Poland-Lithuania that the oprichnina even existed).³⁸ Muscovite diplomats might admit that the rulers of Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania had both spoken in anger, but they carefully avoided declaring who was justified in his anger.

In 1557 Muscovite diplomats observed with a touch of sarcasm that now the Swedes wanted Ivan to lift his "anger" (*gnev*) against them and restore the old boundaries between the two countries specified by the old truce, whereas, it went unsaid, they had not been so accommodating before they started the Muscovite-Swedish war they had lost. In 1561 Muscovite envoys warned King Erik of Sweden that he should not repeat the error of his father, King Gustav, in arousing the "anger" (*gnev*) of the ruler of Moscow by acting toward Livonia in the same fashion. If he did, he could expect more of Ivan's "anger" (*gnev*). In 1561 Muscovite representatives asserted that Ivan did not conquer Kazan' and Astrakhan' for pride but in his "anger" (*gnev*) at their acts of injustice. In 1572 Swedish envoys petitioned Ivan IV's sons, *tsarevichi* Ivan Ivanovich and Fedor Ivanovich, as well as all boyars, that Ivan would grant Sweden mercy by lifting his "anger" (*gnev*) against the country. In 1575

³⁷ *Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* [hereafter SRIO], vol. 59 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1887) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim*, 2: 1533–1560, 136, 293, 323.

³⁸ SRIO, vol. 71 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1892) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim*, 3: 1560–1571, 109, 466, 512.

King Johann III of Sweden wrote Ivan that his predecessor and brother King Erik in “wrath and anger” (*iarost’ i gnev*) had picked up weapons and killed his own soldiers, which could not be tolerated, so he had been removed from the throne.³⁹ In these exchanges Ivan is usually depicted as manifesting his official diplomatic “anger,” which he graciously deigns to lift but which would threaten anyone who aroused it. In King Johann’s comment “wrath and anger” are negative character and behavioral traits—they had to be to justify Erik’s removal—which did not impugn the Muscovite government’s diplomatic *idée fixe* that Ivan’s “anger” and “wrath” were always deserved.

In 1581, negotiating with Antonio Possevino, S.J., the papal envoy, Ivan asked rhetorically how he could not call traitors those boyars who opposed him and fled the country for fear of his “anger” (*gnev*). In 1582 he tried to convince Possevino that it was impossible for them to discuss religion because their differences of faith would lead to anger (*gnev*).⁴⁰ Presumably the first sentiment implied that traitorous boyars were correct to infer that their misdeeds would incur Ivan’s “anger” and the second observation treated “anger” as deleterious to a healthy exchange of opinions without implying that it was wrong to object to religious beliefs that one did not share.

In a more personal but still official government document, his testament, Ivan confessed that among his sins he “[had defiled] my tongue with improper speech, and vile language, and anger and wrath [*gneva i iarost’*]” (translated by Howes as “wrath and indignation”). Ivan left the throne to his eldest son, Tsarevich Ivan, but gave the following advice to his younger son, Tsarevich Fedor: “Fedor, if your brother Ivan has anger [*gnev*] towards you or insults you, do not protest.”⁴¹ Ivan here admits that “anger and wrath” can take verbal form, for himself and potentially after his demise for Tsarevich Ivan once he ascended the throne. Nevertheless Ivan urges Fedor to endure his older brother’s “anger” (*gnev*) and insults patiently, not because they would be justified or unjustified, but implicitly for the greater good.

³⁹ SRIO, vol. 129 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1910) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Shvedskim*, 1: 1556–1586, 30, 91, 215, 304.

⁴⁰ *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi*, 10: *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s papskim dvorom i s italianskimi gosudarstvami s 1580 po 1699 god* (St. Petersburg: Izdanie II otdeleniia EIV kantseliarii, 1871), 233–34, 302.

⁴¹ L. V. Cherepnin, ed., *Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel’nykh kniazei XIV–XVI vv.* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo AN SSSR, 1950), 426–28, 429; Robert Craig Howes, ed., *The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 308, 314.

Excerpts from the 1626 inventory of the archive of the Ambassadorial Bureau (Posolskii prikaz) allude to the 1563 conflict between Ivan and his aunt, Princess Evfrosiniia, and cousin, Prince Vladimir Andreevich, exactly as presented in the chronicles: Ivan's expressed "anger" (*gnev*) at them for treason.⁴²

Finally, we turn to an admittedly didactic text but one removed from the rarified atmosphere of high politics and addressed to a variety of what I would call middle-class audiences, the Muscovite *Book of Household Management* (*Domostroi*), redacted but not composed by the priest Sylvester. This moralizing advice book presents "anger" and "wrath" as vices a good Christian should avoid indulging, but which he may almost expect to encounter on the part of his superiors, economic or political. The *Book of Household Management* advises its reader on how to survive "a superior's anger" (*vlastelin gnev*),⁴³ which Pouncy translated as "a superior's wrath"). It denounces "anger" (*gnev*) as a sin, for which the household whose residents commit it may expect punishment. Specifically, God might cause the tsar to confiscate their property as a result of his "anger" (*gnev*), not to mention torture or execution. A good Christian avoids "God's anger" (*gneva bozhii*, which Pouncy translated as "God's wrath"). It violates God's will if a household is marred by "wrath and anger" (*iarost' i gnev*, which Pouncy translated as "irrational fury").⁴⁴ In sum, "anger" and "wrath" are sins in social inferiors which may be committed by their earthly and heavenly superiors, but the author does not criticize the powers that be for behavior that he labels sinful in his readers.

This all too brief survey of the usage of "anger" (*gnev*) and "wrath" (*iarost'*) in sixteenth-century Muscovite sources, focusing on their application to Ivan IV, does no more than scratch the surface of the subject. It does not address post-1584 sixteenth- or seventeenth-century applications of either term to Ivan.⁴⁵ It cannot claim to be and does not aspire to be comprehensive; my

⁴² *Dukhovnye ii dogovornye gramoty*, 480; S. O. Shmidt, ed., *Opis' arkhiva Posol'skogo prikaza 1626 goda*, pt. 1 (Moscow: Glavnoe arkhivnoe upravlenie pri SM SSSR, TsGADA, Arkheograficheskaia komissiiia pri Otdelenii istorii AN SSSR, 1977), 255.

⁴³ *Vlastelin* is someone with authority, *vlast'*, which could take a variety of forms, including someone who owns an estate on which the reader resides, in which case it could be translated as "a lord's anger." However, I do not think peasants or artisans living on private estates constituted the audience of the *Book of Household Management*.

⁴⁴ Carolyn Johnston Pouncy, trans., *"The Domostroi": Rules for Russian Households in the Time of Ivan the Terrible* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 69, 113, 114, 120; A. Orlov, *Domostroi po Konshinskomu spiski i podobiem* (Moscow: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1908), 6–7, 22, 24, 79.

⁴⁵ For seventeenth-century references to Ivan IV's *iarost'*, see Denis A. Liapin, "Pervoe poslanie Ivana Groznogo Andreiu Kurbskomu' i politicheskaiia bor'ba v Rossii v sere-dine XVII veka," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 52 (2018): 397, 399.

goal has been only to raise the issue. But however modest, this overview has uncovered some interesting tendencies among Muscovite authors in their perception of the concepts of "anger" and "wrath."

On the whole "anger" and "wrath" appear to be facts of life, not always edifying but not apocalyptic in their impact. "Anger" could be employed "officially" in a formulaic way that deprived it of any emotion at all, or at least any personal emotion, unlike "wrath," which was always emotional and never formulaic. Despite overlapping translations of *gnev* and *iarost'*, the terms are better understood as separate, if related. Writing from exile Kurbskii described Ivan's "anger" and "wrath" as unmitigated evils. No one writing in Muscovy during Ivan's reign was obsequious or deluded enough to deny that Ivan threw temper tantrums. However, such writers did not always present Ivan's "anger" and "wrath" as evil, and even when they did, never as unmitigated evils. Ivan's "anger" and "wrath," whether as a boy or an adult, against foreign countries and people, however formulaic, are always defended as justified; his "anger" and "wrath" against native Muscovites is usually presented as warranted, but sometimes qualified as evilly inspired by slander and not necessarily entirely Ivan's fault, as in the 1537 Prince Andrei Ivanovich affair or the 1546 Kolomna debacle, or, the fall-back explanation for all evils in the world in Muscovite discourse, are inspired by God as punishment for man's sins, as in the *oprichnina's* assault on Novgorod and Pskov. God can manifest "anger" and "wrath," but no one suggests that He has a monopoly on righteous "anger" and "wrath." The ambiguity of the moral universe of "anger" and "wrath" mitigates the possibility that Ivan's "anger" and "wrath" were perceived as attributes of a "tormentor" (*muchitel'*), a tyrannical ruler, let alone excrescences of mental illness. To Kurbskii Ivan's "anger" and "wrath" were evil because Ivan was evil, not because they were "anger" and "wrath." At their worst Ivan's "anger" and "wrath" are not incompatible with the still widespread "black book" conception of Ivan as an arbitrary despot, but, significantly, they do not seem to have struck Muscovite book-men living in Muscovy at the time, or implicitly whoever read what these book-men wrote, as definitive and irrefutable evidence that Ivan was an abnormal psychotic, rather than a typical human, but with more authority and power and thus greater opportunity and ability to cause harm when he succumbed to "anger" and "wrath." Ivan's temper tantrums speak for themselves, but his "anger" and "wrath" were not always what they seem.

Chapter 17

Was Ivan the Terrible Charismatic?

Introduction

“Charismatic” is probably not the first word historians think of when the name of Ivan the Terrible is mentioned. The first word they think of is “terrible.” However, as is well known, applied to Ivan *grozny* originally meant “awe-inspiring,” not “terrible,”¹ and the leap from “awe-inspiring” to “charismatic” is not nearly as far as that from “terrible” to “charismatic.” The issue of Ivan’s possible charisma speaks to the important question of Ivan’s place in Muscovite history.² Within the Muscovite perspective no other ruler of Moscow, before or after him, seems to qualify as charismatic until Peter the Great,³ yet rulers contemporary or near-contemporary to Ivan are not infrequently described as charismatic. Unfortunately there seems to be no systematic analysis of Ivan or his monarchical colleagues as charismatic. Still, by the criterion of charisma Ivan might have had more in common with contemporary foreign rulers than with his predecessors or successors in Moscow.⁴ Ambiguity in the

¹ Charles J. Halperin, “The Metamorphosis of Ivan IV into Ivan the Terrible,” in *Miscellanea Slavica: Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu Borisa Andreevicha Uspenskogo*, ed. F. B. Uspenskii (Moscow: Indrik, 2008), 379–97; Edward L. Keenan, “How Ivan Became ‘Terrible,’” in *Rus’ Writ Large: Language, Histories, Cultures. Essays Presented in Honor of Michael S. Flier on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. Harvey Goldblatt and Nancy Shields Kollmann = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28 (2006): 521–42.

² John Potts, *A History of Charisma* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1–2, considers labeling historical figures “charismatic” subjective and, because Weber first proposed the secular concept of charisma in the 1920s (see below), anachronistic.

³ Some historians might consider the First False Dmitrii charismatic. See Chester S. L. Dunning, *Russia’s First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).

⁴ Ivan’s relationship to Muscovite political culture was appropriately complex and contradictory. See Charles J. Halperin, “Ivan the Terrible and Muscovite Political Culture,” in *Seeing Muscovy Anew: Politics—Institutions—Culture. Essays in Honor of Nancy*

term is only partially responsible for this lacuna in scholarship. The chapter will explore Ivan's charisma. It concludes that Ivan can legitimately be characterized as charismatic in both of the term's standard meanings, religious and personality, although, as is typical for studying Ivan's reign, problems abound.⁵

The only place to start any study of charisma is with the publications of sociologist Max Weber, who invented the modern, secular variant of charisma.

Max Weber on Charisma

The *Oxford English Dictionary* offers two definitions of "charisma,"⁶ the first religious and the second secular. A man with religious charisma was blessed with the favor of God. This type of charisma has a long pedigree dating back to the Old and the New Testaments. In his study of religious phenomena, Weber merely endorsed it.⁷ In Weber's unfinished work on authority he invented the secular concept of charisma as a gift or power of leadership or authority.⁸ Charismatic authority constituted one of three ideal types of authority, along with legal (rational) authority and traditional authority. Weber emphasized repeatedly that none of these types ever existed in a pure form; in practice they can be found only in various combinations. Delineating the three types served the purpose of allowing the sociologist to assign different aspects of a specific phenomenon to different categories of authority.

Rational or legal authority is vested in an office, not a person, so it is routine and bureaucratic.

Traditional authority is based on the sanctity of the political or social order handed down from the past. "The object of obedience is the personal authority of the individual which he employs by virtue of his traditional status." Within the traditional sphere a chief was free to confer "grace" "on the basis of his personal pleasure or displeasure, his personal likes and dislikes, quite arbitrarily," and was still owed personal loyalty. Traditional authority is based upon precedent. An individual acquired patrimonial authority, a sub-type, it would appear, of traditional authority, by inheritance.

Shields Kollmann, ed. Michael S. Flier, Valerie A. Kivelson, Erika Monahan, and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2017), 49–65.

⁵ Because of the broad scope of this subject, the documentation presented here cannot be comprehensive, only illustrative.

⁶ *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, www.oed.com/charisma.

⁷ Potts, *History of Charisma*, 12–105.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 108–36.

Charismatic authority rests "on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him." A "charismatically qualified leader ... is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities, so far as they fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma."⁹ In a hereditary monarchy charismatic authority is inherited and no longer depends upon the personal qualities of an individual. A purely charismatic type of political authority would be government by plebiscite. Other examples include elected military leaders (*condottieri*), who functioned as capitalistic military entrepreneurs. "The term 'charisma' will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specific exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader." In primitive as well as modern societies prophets, heroes, and saviors acquire charismatic authority. A charismatic leader has followers or disciples, whether he is a shaman or Joseph Smith, founder of Mormonism. In Weber's presentation he emphasizes that a leader does not himself vouch for his charisma; whether a man has charisma is determined by how his followers or disciples treat him. Weber declares that sociological analysis "must abstain from value judgments" of charismatic leaders. Charisma is validated by "signs" or "proofs" but the key is the *duty* (Weber's italics) of followers to obey the charismatic leader, whether from enthusiasm, despair, or hope. Rephrasing Weber's point, a charismatic leader is charismatic because he is recognized as charismatic, treated as charismatic, and most of all obeyed as charismatic. If the proofs of his charisma fail, then the charismatic leader has lost his divine sanction and/or magical or heroic power. Every true charismatic leader makes up his own rules. Charismatic authority is sacred, outside of daily routine, ergo "charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules." Charismatic authority repudiates the past, it constitutes a "specifically revolutionary force." Napoleon, a genius, illustrates these attributes of charismatic authority.¹⁰

⁹ Weber was criticized as an elitist by a Freudian psychoanalyst for not recognizing "that all leaders, including the charismatic, are to a meaningful degree creations of the people" (*ibid.*, 132).

¹⁰ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), 328–30, 332, 336, 341–42, 358–63, 365–66.

I have restructured Weber's incisive observations in order to improve the coherence of the presentation.¹¹ Several key features of Weber's conception of charisma should be highlighted. Weber's discourse demonstrates that the types of charisma, religious or personality (or personality trait) charisma, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Divine favor can apply to personality charisma as much as to religious charisma. The earliest example of the conveyance of divine charisma to a ruler is the anointing of Saul, future king of Israel, by the Prophet Samuel. Moreover, Weber's three types of authority not only coexist but can also undermine their "ideal" essences. Hereditary charisma is no longer personal; it can become, in a sense, traditional, even legal. It is a moot question whether inherited charisma can be lost if the attributes of charisma, the signs of its efficacy, cease to manifest themselves. Personal charisma, whether deriving from divine favor or personality traits such as dynamic vision, ironically enough, is dependent upon others for its validation. The loss of followers constitutes a loss of charisma. Weber never ironed out these ramifications of his exposition.

I would interpret Weber's somewhat casual observation that value judgments had no place in sociology (or social science) to mean that charisma is a value-neutral concept,¹² something that might have become obvious only after Weber's death in 1920. A popular psychology self-help book categorized Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Adolph Hitler, Billy Graham and Jim Jones, as charismatic.¹³ A charismatic leader need not be a hero; he can just as easily be a villain. This realization is crucial for applying the concept of charisma to Ivan, because it obviates the necessity of deciding whether Ivan was a hero or a villain before we can ascertain whether he can be described as charismatic.

Nothing in Weber's analysis requires that a charismatic leader never fail or that everyone with whom he comes into contact succumbs to his charisma. Therefore Ivan might still be charismatic even though Muscovy lost the Livonian War, even though boyars obstinately filed precedence lawsuits¹⁴ over his

¹¹ Potts, *A History of Charisma*, 117, describes Weber's monograph as unfinished, uneven, and inconsistent. I have omitted Weber's correlation between types of authority and economic activity. He first raised the issue of charisma in his study of the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism. That issue falls outside the scope of this chapter.

¹² *Ibid.*, 115.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 193. I would have preferred Martin Luther King to Billy Graham in this formulation.

¹⁴ The precedence system (*mestnichestvo*) regulated who could hold an office or occupy a ceremonial position inferior or superior to someone else. It was based upon the potential office-holder's place (*mesto*) in his own family's genealogy and the past service of the members of his clan relative to the genealogical place and past service of members of other potential officer-holders' clans.

strenuous objections, even though government officials stubbornly refused to carry out Ivan's orders despite threats of serious punishment, and even though peasants repeatedly persisted in leaving their lands in violation of state law on when and how they could do so. Even if the melodramatic narrative found in interpolations in the *Tsar's Book* (*Tsarstvennaia kniga*) of the *Illustrated Chronicle Compilation* (*Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*) of boyar opposition to the succession of Ivan's infant son Tsarevich Dmitrii¹⁵ to his throne during his life-threatening illness in 1553 is in any degree accurate, this episode could be treated as an exception to his charisma.

After Weber's death the concept of charisma penetrated virtually all aspects of human endeavor.¹⁶ Nowadays journalists and biographers categorize actors, artists, entertainers, and athletes as charismatic. Such people need not be leaders at all, and most of them generate fans, not followers. Of course a charismatic theatrical director can lead his company to stage greatness, a charismatic athlete in a team sport can lead his team to great victories, a charismatic business executive can lead his business or corporation to exceptional profitability. Indeed, any person who inspires others—such as a teacher—can be described as charismatic. The greater applicability or diffusion of the concept of charisma since Weber wrote does not invalidate his observations. Charisma always retains its mysterious, elusive, and mystical nature. No other concept—fame, prestige, aura, celebrity, magnetism, or charm—can replace it.¹⁷ Quoting the most serious student of charisma, John Potts, "charisma is easy to identify but difficult to define." It is a specific form of domination, an individual endowment used by remarkable leaders to command authority over their followers." "It signifies the unfathomable, explaining why certain very rare individuals seem to exert a spell on their contemporaries."¹⁸ To assess whether Ivan the Terrible was charismatic, we may confine ourselves to Weber's application of charisma only to leadership, the "ability to inspire and compel."¹⁹

¹⁵ This refers to the first Tsarevich Dmitrii Ivanovich, son of Ivan's first wife, Anastasia Iur'evna Romanovna, who died shortly thereafter, not the second Tsarevich Dmitrii Ivanovich, son of Ivan's seventh wife, Tsaritsa Mariia Nagaia, who outlived his father, died under mysterious circumstances, and was later canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church.

¹⁶ Potts, *A History of Charisma*, 137–214.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 215–21. Celebrity, prestige, and fame, for example, are not innate, unlike charisma.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 184, 118, 221. *Heerschaft* can be defined as either "domination" or "leadership."

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 188, 189.

Ivan the Terrible as Charismatic in Historiography

To my knowledge no one has attempted to correlate Ivan's charismatic attributes with the aspects of charisma elucidated by Weber. Passing off-the-cuff observations about Ivan's charisma in the enormous historiography of Ivan are few and far between, far fewer than I expected to find. Nevertheless, they do exist, and are often presented as self-evident, common-knowledge judgments, not requiring detailed corroboration.

In general, Russian-language publications about Ivan—which certainly dominate the field of sixteenth-century Muscovite history quantitatively—are particularly sparing in allusions to Ivan as charismatic. Monographs that take an extremely favorable view of Ivan may describe him as a great leader without invoking any concept of charisma. This is not as surprising in an Imperial Russian historian such as Konstantin Kavelin as in a Soviet historian such as Robert Wipper.²⁰ Ivan's charisma or lack thereof is not a major desideratum of post-Soviet Russian historiography about Ivan.²¹ In Russia, the right-wing Russian Orthodox extremists, Great Russian chauvinists, monarchists, and anti-Semites who advocated Ivan's canonization by the Russian Orthodox Church simply did not need the concept. If Ivan were a saint, his charisma per se, both religious and personality, becomes secondary. Mainstream academic research on Ivan (Ivaniana, *groznovedenie*) addresses the issue of personality charisma extremely rarely.²²

²⁰ Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: *Monografii po russkoi istorii. Russkaia istoriia. Razsuzhdeniia, kriticheskie stat'i i zametki* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia M. M. Stasiulevicha, 1897), 47–54; R. Wipper [Robert Iur'evich Vipper], *Ivan Grozny*, trans. J. Fineberg (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947).

²¹ Charles J. Halperin, "Would You Believe *Saint* Ivan the Terrible? Reforming the Image of Ivan IV," *Symposion* 16–17 (2011–12): 1–22; and Halperin, "Anything Goes: Post 1991 Historiography about Ivan IV in Russia," *Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography* 10 (2017): 3–27, mention charisma only in connection with Boris Uspenskii's examination of Ivan's religious charisma from his coronation.

²² I could not find discussion of charisma in Ruslan Skrynnikov's or Boris Floria's books about Ivan, or even in the popularly-oriented Benson Bobrick, nor in the chapters on Ivan in the textbook by Janet Martin or the survey of Muscovite history by Robert Crummey, or the chapter on Ivan by Sergei Bogatyrev in the collective *Cambridge History of Russia* volume edited by Maureen Perrie. I cannot exclude the possibility that I overlooked something. See Ruslan Grigor'evich Skrynnikov, *Tsarstvo terrora* (St. Petersburg: Nauka, Sankt-Peterburgskoe otdelenie, 1992); Boris Floria, *Ivan Groznyi* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1999); Benson Bobrick, *Fearful Majesty: The Life and Reign of Ivan the Terrible* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1987); Janet Martin, *Medieval Russia 980–1584*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 364–415; Sergei Bogatyrev, "Chapter 10. Ivan IV (1533–84)," in *Cambridge History of Russia*, I: *From*

Boris Uspenskii deserves the credit for bringing the question of Ivan's religious charisma to the forefront of scholarship. His 1998 monograph *Tsar and Patriarch: The Charisma of Authority in Russia (The Byzantine Model and Its Russian Reinterpretation)* relates the tsar's charisma to his coronation as tsar in imitation of the coronation of the Byzantine basileus. Uspenskii not only identifies differences between the Russian coronation and the Byzantine, but also between Russian and Western coronations, which we do not have to repeat here. More to the point, he rejects previous views, such as those of David Miller, that Ivan was actually anointed during his coronation. He concludes that the coronation rite with anointing was written after Ivan's coronation but not utilized until the coronation of Ivan's son, Tsar Fedor Ivanovich.²³

Even if Uspenskii's conclusions about the textual evolution of the coronation ordos are correct, Ivan still benefitted from such charisma as automatically attached to any Byzantine-based coronation ritual as "tsar." Moreover, rhetorically Ivan was described during his reign, physical anointing or not, as "God-anointed," and presumably enjoyed the charismatic benefits of that rhetoric.²⁴

Some Western historians follow Kavelin's approach. For example, in their superlative introduction to an anthology of accounts of Muscovy by sixteenth-century Englishmen, Robert Crummey and Lloyd Berry summarize the development of Ivan's image as follows: the portrait of Ivan "evolves from the shadowy, yet dignified and confident, prince of Chancellor's and Jenkinson's accounts through the enigmatic diplomat whom Randolph met to the overpowering personality who usurped the center stage in the works of Fletcher and Horsey, written in the time of his successors."²⁵ Apparently Ivan might have had an "overpowering personality" without being charismatic.

Early Rus' to 1689, ed. Maureen Perrie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 240–63.

²³ Boris Andreevich Uspenskii, *Tsar' i patriarkh: Kharizma vlasti v Rossii (Vizantiiskaia model' i ee russkoe pereosmyslenie)* (Moscow: Shkola "Iazyki russkoi kul'tury," 1998), 13–113. For the older view, see David B. Miller, "The Coronation of Ivan IV in 1547," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osturopas* 15 (1967): 559–74. For a response to Uspenskii, see A. V. Karavashkin, "Kharizma tsaria. Srednevekovaiia kontseptsia vlasti kak predmet semioticheskoi interpretatsii: B. A. Uspenskii, *Tsar' i patriarkh* 1998," *Odissei* 2000, 257–75.

²⁴ For a different interpretation of the history of anointing tsars, see Sergei Bogatyrev, "Ivan the Terrible Discovers the West: The Cultural Transformation of Autocracy during the Early Northern Wars," *Russian History* 34, 1–4 (2007): 161–88.

²⁵ Lloyd E. Berry and Robert O. Crummey, eds., *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth-Century English Voyages* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), xiv.

At least two Western historians do use the word “charismatic” in connection with Ivan. Gary Hamburg, in his massive 2016 study of enlightenment in Russia, takes note of Peter the Great’s “domineering, charismatic, multi-sided personality, the likes of which Russians had not encountered since the reign of Ivan IV,”²⁶ and in an article on a Russian émigré historian, Victor Leontovitsch, Hamburg wrote that “[i]n Hauriou’s thinking,²⁷ both religious and ideological *mentalités* may accommodate charismatic leadership of the sort Ivan manifested, alongside the rationalizing elements of a ‘revolutionary’ world-view like the one Ivan allegedly [per Leontovitsch] adopted.”²⁸ Leontovitsch attributed an ideology of absolutism to Ivan, but did not himself utilize the word “charisma.”²⁹ Implicitly Hamburg did not find any Muscovite ruler between Ivan and Peter charismatic, but he does not explicitly assert that Ivan IV was Russia’s first charismatic ruler.³⁰

Isabel de Madariaga, who did mention Uspenskii’s analysis of Ivan’s religious charisma, when discussing Ivan’s atrocities toward Russians both elite and commoners opined as follows: “Why did Ivan’s courtiers tolerate such appalling treatment? Why did they not kill him? ... Such horrors have to have behind them the authority of an anointed and charismatic ruler, and from what is known of Ivan’s personality from many different sources, the Tsar was an imposing and dominant, even charismatic, figure.”³¹ De Madariaga did not include Weber’s study of charisma in her bibliography, and her highlighting of Ivan’s anointing (real or rhetorical) backtracks to Uspenskii again.

²⁶ Gary M. Hamburg, *Russia’s Path toward Enlightenment: Faith, Politics and Reason, 1500–1801* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 234.

²⁷ Hamburg cites M. Hauriou, *La science sociale traditionnelle* (Paris: L. Larose Publisher, 1896), a pre-Weberian work which seems to have discussed religious charisma.

²⁸ Gary M. Hamburg, “Writing Russian History in Nazi Germany: The Case of Victor Vladimirovich Leontovitsch, (Part One),” *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta*, series *Istoriia* 63: 1 (2018): 262–85; “(Part Two),” 63: 2 (2018): 272–96, here Part Two, 593.

²⁹ Victor Leontovitsch, *Die Rechtsumwälzung unter Ivan dem Schrecklichen und die Ideologie der Russischen Selbstherrschaft* (Stuttgart: F. F. Koehler Verlag, c. 1947).

³⁰ Oddly, Anil Çiçek, “Autocracy in Russia: A Fate, a Necessity, or the Will of the Russian People?,” *International Journal of Russian Studies* 3, 2 (2014): 90–111, here 106, writes: “Russia has along history of strong leadership by a single charismatic figure, as seen in the examples of Peter the Great, Lenin, Stalin, and lastly, Putin,” omitting Ivan but later including Yeltsyn as a charismatic leader (*ibid.*, 103). The issue of autocracy for Ivan’s reign has been exaggerated: Charles J. Halperin, “Ivan IV as Autocrat (*samoderzhets*),” *Cahiers du monde russe* 55, 3 (2014): 197–213.

³¹ Isabel de Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 52 (on Uspenskii), 365 (quotation).

However, her estimate of Ivan's personality, "imposing and dominant, even charismatic" echoes Berry and Crummey but goes further by posing the possibility that Ivan was charismatic based upon his personality.

Another historian, Anna Bertolet, links Ivan's charisma to that of his sometime correspondent, Queen Elizabeth I of England, which raises the issue of the charismatic nature of Ivan's contemporaries. For the moment we may conclude that the issue of Ivan's personality charisma has found little resonance among specialists in sixteenth-century Muscovite history.

Ivan's Charismatic Contemporaries

Bertolet, after contrasting Elizabeth I's charisma with Ivan's paranoid tyranny, draws the following conclusion about their respective literary styles: "Both Elizabeth and Ivan relied heavily on the effect of monarchical presence that allowed them to impress their audience with their personal charisma."³² Several historians comment on the charisma of Elizabeth I's father, Henry VIII. Lucy Wooding interprets Henry's revelries as displays of his charisma and chivalry³³ and David Starkey, looking at Henry's early life, opined that "not for the first time, the advent of a young, able, good-looking and charismatic leader provoked an outbreak of messianic joy."³⁴ Despite the subtitle of her book, *Henry VIII: The Charismatic King Who Forged a Nation*, Kathy Elgin never uses the word "charismatic" in her text, but describes Henry VIII in detail as larger-than-life, volatile, vengeful, mercurial, arbitrary, irascible, self-promoting, restless, hypersensitive to being contradicted, ruthless in getting what he wanted, and in his last years increasingly irrational. In passing she describes the tournaments he staged early in his reign for foreign ambassadors as de-

³² Anna Riehl Bertolet, "The Tsar and the Queen: 'You Speak a Language that I Understand Not,'" in *The Foreign Relations of Elizabeth I*, ed. Charles Beem (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 101–23, here 103 (Ivan's paranoid tyranny), 104 (quotation). Bertolet cites D. S. Likhachev, "Stil' proizvedenii Groznogo i stil' proizvedenii Kurbskogo (tsar' i "gosudarev izmennik"), in *Perepiska Ivana Groznogo s Andreem Kurbskim*, ed. Ia. S. Lur'e and Iu. D. Rykov (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1979), 186, 196, but Likhachev did not use the word "charisma."

³³ Lucy Wooding, *Henry VIII* (London: Routledge, Francis & Taylor Group, 2009), 65.

³⁴ David Starkey, *Henry: Virtuous Prince* (London: Harper, 2008), 298. Nevertheless, Eric Ives, "Henry VIII: the Political Perspective," in *The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics, Policy and Piety*, ed. Diarmid MacCulloch (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 23, 13, finds that Henry VIII lacked the charisma (obviously religious) of a cardinal, despite his "powerful, complex, and contradictory personality."

signed to be awe-inspiring.³⁵ Not only Tudor monarchs have been accorded the attribute of charisma. Gerald Meyer finds Cesare Borgia worthy of that character trait. Even the cynical Florentine and Cesare's enemy Niccolò Machiavelli praised Cesare for his "charisma and magnetism." Machiavelli appreciated Cesare's vision; the two men enjoyed each other's company because both were fascinated by power, one in practice, the other in theory, and both possessed cold intelligence.³⁶ Other contemporary candidates for the quality of charisma might include Lorenzo de' Medici,³⁷ Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, King François (Francis) I of France, Italian condottieri Sigismond Malatesta, and King Gustav Vasa of Sweden,³⁸ but I have not found any serious scholarship exploring the question.

Renaissance and Reformation Europe seems to have enjoyed an age of charismatic figures (Martin Luther comes readily to mind), not just rulers. Aleksandr Bushkov claims that the development of divine ideology under Ivan IV demonstrates that Muscovy was catching up with Europe on the concept of divine charisma.³⁹ However, comparing the personalities of the rulers of Ivan's time with his own personality, whether they are called charismatic in scholarship or not, suggests that contemporary monarchical charisma was not entirely religious, deriving from anointing.⁴⁰ We can apply Weber's concept of charismatic leadership to Ivan based on some direct evidence, but mostly by inference from circumstantial evidence.

Ivan the Terrible as Charismatic

Weber argued that charismatic leadership depended not only upon whether people followed the leader, but more so upon why they did so. A ruler can be called charismatic if his subjects followed him because they thought he

³⁵ Kathy Elgin, *Henry VIII: The Charismatic King Who Forged a Nation* (London: Arcurus, 2013), 31, 46, 51, 88–89, 103, 104, 170, 184, 203, 207.

³⁶ G. J. Meyer, *The Borgias: The Hidden History* (New York: Bantam Books, 2013), 337–38.

³⁷ The only charismatic person Judith Hook found in Lorenzo's Florence was the Dominican friar, preacher, and religious reformer Girolamo Savonarola. Judith Hook, *Lorenzo de' Medici: An Historical Biography* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1964), 81.

³⁸ Although Michael Roberts, *The Early Vasas: A History of Sweden, 1523–1611* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 25–198, did not credit him with charisma.

³⁹ Aleksandr Bushkov, *Ivan Grozny: Krovavyy poet* (Moscow: OLMA Media Grupp, 2007), 128.

⁴⁰ Bogatyrev argues that Muscovite anointing of Ivan was interpolated into the coronation ritual for Ivan after the fact in response to learning that the king of Sweden was anointed.

was charismatic. This sounds redundant, even tautological, but it is not. In the media age, a celebrity is a celebrity because people think he is a celebrity. However, this methodological foundation for identifying charisma runs into a formidable obstacle in dealing with Ivan and his subjects. We have no private Muscovite sources whatsoever which reveal why Ivan's subjects followed his commands, no opinion polls, no newspapers, no magazines, no diaries, no private correspondence, no memoirs, no blogs, no interviews. Only public documents and texts exist, overwhelmingly laudatory, and they relate the obedience of Ivan's subjects to him—when they were obedient—to the people's love of the tsar, and when they were disobedient, to the Devil. Even Prince Andrei Kurbskii's criticism of Ivan was public. Furthermore, it would be quite imprudent to infer popular attitudes toward Ivan from folklore not written down until long after his death.⁴¹ The sources at our disposal do not convey unfiltered attitudes and cannot address whether Ivan was perceived as charismatic.

Foreigners, in pamphlets, travel accounts, and other sources propagated an image of Ivan as a tyrant and demonic⁴² and Muscovy as a barbarian despotism, in which Muscovites obeyed Ivan out of fear, an interpretation applied to more recent Russian history, even contemporary Russia.⁴³ This was no more than a cliché—tyrants ruled by fear, so if Ivan were a tyrant, he must have ruled by fear—but also by taking literally Ivan's oft-repeated suspicions about the loyalty of his people and by his actions of executing domestic enemies. Richard Chancellor wrote that Ivan kept his people "in great subjec-

⁴¹ Maureen Perrie, "The Popular Image of Ivan the Terrible," *Slavonic and East European Review* 56 (1978): 275–86; Norman W. Ingham, "The Groza of Ivan Groznyi in Russian Folklore," *Russian History* 14, 1 (1987): 225–45; Perrie, *The Image of Ivan the Terrible in Russian Folklore* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

⁴² Andreas Kappeler, *Ivan Groznyi im Spiegel der ausländischen Druckschriften seiner Zeit: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des westlichen Russlandbildes* (Bren: Herbert Lang; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1972); Marshall T. Poe, "A People Born to Slavery": *Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography, 1476–1748* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Cornelia Soldat, *Erschreckende Geschichten in der Darstellung von Moskovitern und Osmanen in den deutschen Flugschriften des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts/Stories of Atrocities in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century German Pamphlets About the Russians and Turks* (Leuiston, ME: Edwin Mellon, 2014).

⁴³ Çiçek, "Autocracy in Russia," 102: "The support of the Russian population for Putinism is often explained by scholars by the tendency of the Russian people to show deference to a charismatic and strong leader who has the capacity to mobilize the masses under a common objective. Looking at the history of Russia, this definition does not seem to be entirely accurate, since the obedience of ordinary Russians to strong historical figures such as Peter the Great, Lenin and Stalin was mostly motivated by 'fear' rather than by 'faith.'"

tion,"⁴⁴ which would hardly have been necessary if they fulfilled his wishes out of respect for his charisma. Giles Fletcher wrote that Ivan knew that his subjects hated him,⁴⁵ and Jerome Horsey declared that Ivan lived in fear of treason,⁴⁶ hardly positive reflections on Ivan's charisma. Antonio Possevino, the Jesuit who negotiated the treaty of Iam-Zapol'skii that ended the Livonian War between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while writing that "[t]he deference universally accorded the Prince is something the mind can scarcely comprehend," did not attribute that deference to Ivan's admirable qualities. The Muscovites were a people born to slavery (shades of Sigismund von Herberstein). Ivan's subjects spoke to him "only to curry favor or avoid punishment," that is, either from cynical opportunism or fear.⁴⁷ Attributing the observations of foreigners to bias and treating Ivan's suspicions as exaggerated or sometimes feigned does not compensate for the absence of counterevidence that objectively demonstrates how Ivan's subjects felt about him at the time. Demons, however, seduce vulnerable human beings or impose their will upon them to get them to obey demonic orders; demons do not necessarily control human behavior by fear.

Viacheslav Shaposhnik opines that it was impossible to rule Muscovy after Ivan IV's death as if he had not ruled,⁴⁸ which I think is correct. The conditions that the boyars negotiated with King Sigismund of Poland or with Prince Vasiliu Shuiskii when Sigismund or his son, and Shuiskii, were "candidates" for the Muscovite throne during the Time of Troubles (*Smutnoe vremia*) at the turn of the seventeenth century make sense only in terms of the boyar experience of what they thought were the negative features of Ivan's rule.⁴⁹ However, that Ivan had a major impact upon Muscovite society and history does not necessarily denote that Ivan was a charismatic leader.

Several of the varieties of charisma advanced by Weber apply to Ivan. In terms of domestic inherited charisma, Ivan might have benefitted from a

⁴⁴ Berry and Crummey, *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom*, 56.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 278.

⁴⁷ Hugh F. Graham, trans., *The Moscovia of Antonio Possevino, S.J.*, UCIS Series in Russian and East European Studies 1 (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1977), 11, 49.

⁴⁸ Viacheslav Shaposhnik, *Ivan Groznyi: Pervyi Russkii Tsar'* (St. Petersburg: Vita Nova, 2006), 7.

⁴⁹ Richard Hellie, "Did Russians Ever Hope for Non-Autocratic Rule?," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28, 1-4 (2006): 471-82.

perception of the Daniilovichi of Moscow as unofficial saints.⁵⁰ He certainly invoked the largely religious charisma inherent in his descent from saintly princes and princely saints in Kievan Rus'.⁵¹ In terms of foreign inherited charisma, Ivan did not perceive himself as the successor of the Byzantine emperors, although he had borrowed some Byzantine concepts, rituals, and regalia for his own purposes. Ivan claimed descent not from Constantinople but from Rome, but neither Ivan nor his government ever endorsed the theory of Moscow the Third Rome.⁵² Claims that Ivan saw himself as a successor of Chinggis Khan and Muscovy as a successor state of the Juchid ulus, let alone the World Mongol Empire, are misstated. Ivan let nomads and Tatars attribute Chingisid origin to him and acclaim him as the Western (White) Khan, but he did not claim the charisma of the Golden Kin as his inheritance.⁵³ More important here is Ivan's personality charisma, in Weber's terminology, the personal qualities of his that conform to Weber's concept of charismatic leadership.

We can identify one incident that illustrates the effectiveness of Ivan's leadership in a plausibly charismatic context. In 1552, according to the *Nikon Chronicle*, Novgorodian gentry detachments at Kolomna balked at being sent on the campaign to conquer the Tatar khanate of Kazan' on the middle Volga River. They complained that they had already been serving all spring. Many were suffering privation from lack of supplies. Some did not even hold conditional-landed estates (*pomest'e*) in the Novgorod region to support them. Kazan' was a long way off. Ivan responded personally, guaranteeing that he would supply the troops himself and promising to provide for the families of those who did not return. The Novgorodian troops to a man decided to continue on the campaign.⁵⁴ A later narrative, the *Kazan' History* (*Kazanskaia istoriia*) enhances Ivan's leadership role in the campaign; it is his firm resolve to continue until victory that gives the army the confidence to go on in the face

⁵⁰ Gail D. Lenhoff, "Unofficial Veneration of the Daniilovichi in Muscovite Rus'," in *Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359–1584*, ed. Ann M. Kleimola and Lenhoff (Moscow: ITZ-Garant, 1997), 391–416.

⁵¹ Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV and Kiev," in *Rus' Writ Large*, 461–69.

⁵² Donald Ostrowski, "'Moscow the Third Rome' as Historical Ghost," in *Byzantium: Faith and Power (1261–1557): Perspectives on Later Byzantine Art and Culture*, ed. Sarah Brooks (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 170–79.

⁵³ Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV and Chinggis Khan," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 51 (2003): 481–97; Halperin, "Muscovy as a Successor State of the Juchid ulus," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 18 (2011): 5–20.

⁵⁴ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter PSRL] 13 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 191.

of setbacks.⁵⁵ Whatever Ivan's military talents, especially when he was only in his early twenties, it remains true that his personal presence with the army was absolutely necessary for Muscovite victory.

No Muscovite army led by Ivan was ever defeated. In 1563 Ivan led the Muscovite army that conquered Polotsk in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,⁵⁶ the high point of Muscovite expansion during the Livonian War. In 1577 Ivan led a Muscovite invasion of Livonia that captured more than twenty cities. To what extent Ivan was responsible for these victories is unimportant compared to the prestige that accrued to his charisma from them.

There is a hint of Ivan's exceptionality in Chancellor's astonishment that Ivan knew all his courtiers at a state banquet by name: "the emperor called all his guests and noblemen by their names, in such sort that it seems miraculous that a prince, otherwise occupied in great matters of estate, should so well remember so many and sundry particular names."⁵⁷

To Weber, the charismatic leader was "extraordinary," meaning, quite literally, "extra ordinary," beyond or out of the ordinary, more than the ordinary human, not so much not human but rather more than human, a man who makes his own rules, who stands out in a crowd and from the crowd, who does not need to obey the rules for mere humans and in that sense is irrational, a man who is larger than life, who dominates his environment. Distinguishing between the arbitrariness that Weber characterized as an attribute of a ruler with traditional charisma and the irrationality, i.e., rule-breaking,⁵⁸ of charismatic leadership is somewhere between difficult and impossible. Cherniavsky conceived of arbitrariness as a demonstration of unlimited authority expressive of the untrammelled human personality in Renaissance thought, a trait of all Renaissance princes, including Ivan.⁵⁹

Renaissance or not, it would be difficult to find a foreign account of Ivan which did not call attention to his arbitrariness, his penchant for breaking rules, his volatility, his unpredictability. For courtiers and for foreigners who attended Ivan's court, these personality traits of Ivan dominated their existence, and they conform perfectly to Weber's template of how a charismatic

⁵⁵ G. N. Moiseeva, ed., *Kazanskaia istoriia* (Moscow–Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1954), 137.

⁵⁶ Now Polatsk in Belarus.

⁵⁷ Berry and Crummey, *Rude & Barbarous Kingdom*, 27. I have modernized the form of one word in the passage.

⁵⁸ I do not believe that by "irrational" Weber meant "insane." On Ivan as insane, see Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV's Insanity," *Russian History* 34 (2007): 207–18.

⁵⁹ Michael Cherniavsky, "Ivan the Terrible as a Renaissance Prince," *Slavic Review* 27, 2 (1968): 195–211. Cherniavsky did not refer to Ivan's charisma.

ruler exercised authority. A few examples of his actions will suffice to illustrate the point that Ivan eschewed the ordinary, that Ivan in action can only be described as larger than life.

What Ivan was doing in 1545 when he was a teenager by plowing, planting, walking on stilts, and wearing a shroud in what appears to be a pagan fertility or magical ceremony has avoided explanation, in part, I think, because it was only recorded in a seventeenth-century chronicle and represents seventeenth-century folk culture of some kind, not sixteenth-century court culture. The incident, although it has sometimes been taken literally, might still constitute evidence that later Muscovites realized that Ivan's behavior fell outside the lines, that it exceeded the parameters that should have governed an ordinary man, indeed, a "normal" young ruler, and it is for that reason worth including in this discussion.⁶⁰

The entire episode of the oprichnina represents Ivan's extraordinary behavior par excellence. When in December 1564 he ordered selected boyars, gentry, courtiers, officials, and others to gather with their families, they did. When he ordered the gentry to come in full armor fully armed, they did. When he ordered officials to gather the monetary, religious, and artistic treasures of Moscow together and take them with him, they did. Ivan did not tell them where they were going, but they went. When he established the oprichnina corps, his bodyguards and security police, he ordered the oprichniki to dress in black clothes, ride black horses with brooms and dogs' heads on their necks,⁶¹ and join a monastic brotherhood with him as abbot, and they did. When Ivan ordered his cousin, the appanage Prince Vladimir Andreevich, his wife, and at least one daughter to commit suicide by drinking poison, they did. When he ordered the oprichniki and the musketeers (*strel'tsy*)⁶² of the oprichnina to undertake a campaign of destruction against the cities of the northwest, Tver', Klin, Torzhok, Novgorod, and Pskov, to ravage the countryside, to loot the cities, to execute thousands of men, women, and children, they did. When he ordered the public torture and execution of hundreds of men and women on Red Square in Moscow, including dozens of leading state officials, the oprichniki carried out his orders. When Ivan ordered monasteries to say memorial prayers for the victims of the oprichnina (and other victims of

⁶⁰ O. A. Iakovleva, ed., "Piskarevskii letopisets," *Materialy po istorii SSSR, 2: Dokumenty po istorii XV–XVII vv.* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1955), 73–74; M. N. Tikhomirov, "Piskarevskii letopisets kak istoricheskii istochnik o sobytiakh XVI–nachala XVII v.," in his *Russkoe letopisanie* (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), 236.

⁶¹ Charles J. Halperin, "Did Ivan IV's *Oprichniki* Carry Dogs' Heads on Their Horses?" *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 46 (2012): 40–67.

⁶² Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV's Professional Infantry, The Musketeers (*strel'tsy*): A Note on Numbers," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 30, 1 (2017): 96–116.

his reign), based upon lists of names and anonymous allusions compiled by his officials, they did.⁶³ Whatever the explanation that Ivan provided the *oprichniki* for his actions, always part of the discourse of treason, they appeared to believe him. When Ivan abolished the oprichnina in 1572, all of its public insignia disappeared. Everything unique to the oprichnina “violated” traditional Muscovite political culture, and much of it qualifies as sacrilegious. No Muscovite ruler previous to Ivan had ever launched mass terror against his own population for political ends; no Muscovite or Imperial Russian ruler after Ivan—not even the equally charismatic Peter the Great—imitated the oprichnina. After Ivan the Terrible no ruler in Russia launched mass terror until the twentieth century.

When in 1575 Ivan abdicated the throne of Moscow to a converted Chingissid, Simeon Bekbulatovich, for reasons which historians are still debating, no one questioned his actions, and those men he selected voluntarily joined his new appanage. When in 1576 Ivan removed Simeon from the throne of Moscow and made him Grand Prince of Tver’, neither he, Simeon’s servitors, the population of Tver’, nor Ivan’s servitors seem to have questioned Ivan’s decision.⁶⁴

Ivan’s volatile, arbitrary, and unpredictable actions, which violated Muscovite behavioral etiquette for rulers, matched his wild, uncontrolled, seemingly anarchic literary style, which violated the etiquette of Old Rus’ literature. As mentioned above, Bertolet in effect argues that a ruler such as Elizabeth I or Ivan could convey a charismatic presence to an audience via the choice of an appropriate literary style. The chronicles often do not inform us of why Ivan placed a boyar in disgrace or why he lifted that disgrace, save for generalities like “impudent words” or abstract charges of treason. Ivan’s *First Epistle* to renegade boyar Prince Andrei Kurbskii constantly shifts linguistic registers from lofty Church Slavonic to vulgar Russian, changes topics without any segue, quotes lengthy and seemingly irrelevant passages from scripture or patristic literature with no obvious connection to the topic at hand, and pursues arguments with such vehemence that the prose becomes incoher-

⁶³ Skrynnikov, *Tsarstvo terrora*, 529–44.

⁶⁴ Donald Ostrowski, “Simeon Bekbulatovich’s Remarkable Career as Tatar Khan, Grand Prince of All Rus’, and Monastic Elder,” 269–99; Alexander Filjushkin, “The Mystery of a Political Masquerade (Concerning the Article of Donald Ostrowski),” 301–05; Charles J. Halperin, “Simeon Bekbulatovich and the Mongol Influence on Ivan IV’s Muscovy,” 306–30; Janet Martin, “Simeon Bekbulatovich and Steppe Politics: Some Thoughts on Donald Ostrowski’s Interpretation of the Tsar’s Remarkable Career,” 331–38; and Ostrowski, “Response,” 339–45, all in *Russian History* 39 (2012).

ent.⁶⁵ Ivan's epistle to the Kirillo-Belozero Monastery⁶⁶ and the preamble to his 1572 testament⁶⁷ perpetrate extremes of self-denigration, in effect the humility topos on steroids. Ivan went theatrical when addressing Simeon Bekbulatovich⁶⁸ and went ghost-writer when composing at least a template for the replies of four of his boyars to invitations to defect to Poland-Lithuania from King Sigismund Augustus.⁶⁹ No Muscovite ruler before Ivan invaded Livonia, but that is nothing; Muscovy's power and borders had not previously reached the point where such an expansionist foreign policy was even conceivable. In the registers of appointments (*razriadnye knigi*) Ivan insulted boyars and threw temper tantrums when they refused to obey orders about not engaging in precedence disputes.⁷⁰ In negotiations with Poland-Lithuania Ivan could go on a verbose tirade about the injustices committed against Russian soil and his Russian subjects by Poles and Lithuanians that seemingly went on forever.⁷¹ No other Muscovite or Imperial Russian ruler, before or after Ivan, down to 1917, ever married seven times, exceeding even the record set by Henry VIII.⁷² Imperial envoy Daniel Prinz wrote that Ivan was prone to anger like a madman.⁷³ Ivan threw a temper tantrum in the middle of his theological

⁶⁵ J. L. I. Fennell, ed., *The Correspondence of Prince A. M. Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia 1564–1579* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 12–179; Charles J. Halperin, "Edward Keenan and the Kurbskii-Groznyi Correspondence in Hindsight," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 46 (1998): 376–403.

⁶⁶ D. S. Likhachev and Ia. S. Lur'e, eds., *Poslaniia Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1951), 162–92.

⁶⁷ Robert Craig Howes, ed., *The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 307–60; Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV's 1572 Testament as a Literary 'Mystification'" [Cornelia Soldat, *Das Testament Ivans der Schrecklichen von 1572: Eine Kritische Aufklärung*], *Palaeoslavica* 22: 1 (2014): 199–219.

⁶⁸ Likhachev and Lur'e, *Poslaniia Ivana Groznogo*, 195–96.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 241–77.

⁷⁰ *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 168–69, 308–09, 329.

⁷¹ SRIO, vol. 71 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1892) = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi* = *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim*, 3: 1560–1571, 102–15. This peroration is not officially attributed to Ivan in the diplomatic papers.

⁷² Russell E. Martin, *A Bride for the Tsar: Bride-Shows and Marriage Politics in Early Modern Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012), 112–66.

⁷³ Ivan A. Tikhomirov, trans., "Nachalo i vozvyshenie Moskovii: Sochinenie Daniila Printsa iz Bukhova," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete*, kniga 3 (1876): 27.

debate with Possevino.⁷⁴ Muscovite sources written during Ivan's lifetime did not censor episodes in which Ivan's anger (*gnev*) and rage (*iarost'*) led him to take excessive actions, including having a boyar's tongue cut out and ordering a boyar's beheading.⁷⁵ Ivan's persona in the foreign accounts and the military registers is entirely consistent with Ivan's persona in his literary works.⁷⁶ Ivan wrote the way he lived, in accordance with his personality.⁷⁷ This uncontrolled, extravagant, volcanic Ivan, who was overwhelmingly obeyed by his subjects, qualifies as charismatic in every sense of Weber's secular interpretation of the concept.

Conclusion

Ivan the Terrible, in his actions and in his writings, demonstrates all the personality traits that Weber attributed to a charismatic leader. Therefore Ivan was charismatic, which made him more like foreign contemporary and near-contemporary rulers than his predecessors or successors on the throne of Moscow. Doing justice to Ivan's charisma does not and cannot invalidate judgments as to his failures and excesses, or diminish the moral censure he deserves for taking innocent lives, regardless of his excuses.⁷⁸ Viktor Vasnetsov's 1897 painting *Tsar' Ivan Vasil'evich Groznyi*,⁷⁹ while fictitious, portrays Ivan with all of his charismatic authority. This Ivan is rigid, upright, in authentic royal robes. This is not a man to be trifled with or ignored. This is a tsar, a man of power, a man of inflexible will, a conqueror, a ruler who believed in his own authority over the lives and possessions of his subjects, a ruler who was obeyed. This is the charismatic Ivan the Terrible in all his awe-inspiring fullness.

⁷⁴ *The Moscovia of Antonio Possevino*, S.J., 72.

⁷⁵ See chap. 16.

⁷⁶ Charles J. Halperin, "Sixteenth-Century Foreign Travel Accounts to Muscovy: A Methodological Excursus," *The Sixteenth-Century Journal* 6 (1975): 89–111.

⁷⁷ Likhachev, "Stil' proizvedenii Groznogo," 183–202.

⁷⁸ Vladimir Borisovich Kobrin, *Ivan Groznyi* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989).

⁷⁹ See this book's front cover.

Chapter 18

The Documented Ivan the Terrible: An Epistemological Exercise

Historical studies of Ivan the Terrible overflow with paradoxes, contradictions, and confusion. Part of the problem is that so many of the sources putatively about Ivan's reign are, for a variety of reasons, contested. It is therefore legitimate to wonder what the effect of discarding all problematic sources would have upon our understanding of Ivan's personality and reign.¹ This chapter tries to answer that epistemological query. It argues that even after all sources of supposedly questionable provenance have been removed, the remaining sources paint a picture of Ivan and his reign that is just as paradoxical, contradictory, and confusing as before.

For this exercise I am playing devil's advocate. My own opinions about the provenance and reliability of sources are not germane; the reader should not infer my judgment of any specific source. I have extrapolated the principles adduced to impugn both whole genres of sources and individual sources, and then applied those principles consistently to the entire source base. For convenience I will call the virtual adherent of this virtual approach a "skeptic."

It must be remembered that carrying these skeptical principles to their logical conclusion is precisely what none of the historians I cite has done or would do. No actual historian "belongs" to this hypothetical "skeptical" school. Practicing historians know full well that contemporary, authentic sources, can be unreliable, while later sources can derive from nonextant contemporary sources, and therefore contain reliable information. Moreover, most historians evaluate sources individually. Indeed, many, if not most, practicing historians attribute both reliable and unreliable information to the

¹ Nancy Shields Kollmann, "Convergence, Expansion, and Experimentation: Current Trends in Muscovite History-Writing," in *After the Fall: Essays in Russian and Soviet Historiography*, ed. Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Marshall Poe (Bloomington: Slavica, 2004), 17–18; Carolyn J. Pouncy, "Missed Opportunities and the Search for Ivan the Terrible," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 7, 2 (2006): 309–28; Cornelia Soldat, *Das Testament Ivans des Schrecklichen von 1572: Eine Kritische Aufklärung* (Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellin, 2006).

same source. Historians disagree about which sources are reliable; no historian writing about Ivan IV ever began an article by proposing to use sources uncritically. It would be an exaggeration to declare that no two historians of Ivan's reign ever agree completely on all sources, but not by much. Even if they did, they would almost certainly disagree in their interpretation of the sources. For the purpose of this chapter I am deliberately misusing studies of individual source or source genres to fictionalize a point of view that no one shares for the heuristic purpose of identifying the limits of a skeptical approach to sources in unraveling the mystery of Ivan's reign. I am not creating a strawman to refute, because I have no wish to "refute" any of the scholarship I cite, merely to engage the hypothesis that a rigid skeptical approach to sources would resolve the paradoxes that plague study of Ivan's character and reign.

Let me begin my exercise by enumerating the sources about Ivan and his reign that I am discarding. I have included sources that are not about Ivan personally, but that provide highly relevant context for understanding his life and behavior. The following list is not comprehensive. Our skeptical historian would exclude the following sources:

The correspondence between Prince Andrei Kurbskii and Ivan, because it is not authentic.²

Ivan's other correspondence, such as his epistle to the Kirillo-Belozero Monastery, let alone the epistles Ivan supposedly ghostwrote in the names of boyars responding to King Sigismund Augustus of Poland or other Polish or Lithuanian officials, because these texts cannot reliably be attributed to Ivan, or do not survive in contemporary manuscripts, or do not survive in the archives where they should have been preserved.

Prince Andrei Kurbskii's *History of the Grand Princes of Moscow*, because it is not authentic, and survives only in seventeenth-century manuscripts.³

The *Chronograph of the Marriages of Tsar Ivan Vasil'evich*, because Aleksandr Ivanovich Sulakadzev forged it.⁴

² Edward L. Keenan, *The Kurbskii-Groznyi Apocrypha: The Seventeenth-Century Origin of the "Correspondence" Attributed to Prince A. M. Kurbskii and Tsar Ivan IV*, with an appendix by Daniel C. Waugh (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

³ Brian J. Boeck, "Eyewitness or False Witness? Two Lives of Metropolitan Filipp of Moscow," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 55 (2007): 161–77; Boeck, "Miscellanea Attributed to Kurbskii: The Seventeenth Century in Russia Was More Creative Than We Like to Admit," *Kritika* 13 (2012): 955–63; Boeck, "The Don Interpolation: An Imagined Turning Point in Russian Relations with the Tatar World," in *Dubitando. Studies in History and Culture in Honor of Donald Ostrowski*, ed. Boeck, Russell E. Martin, and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington: Slavica, 2012), 129–38.

⁴ Russell E. Martin, "Truth and Fiction in A. I. Sulakadzev's *Chronograph of the Marriages of Tsar Ivan Vasil'evich*," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 47 (2013): 436–58.

All foreign accounts, whether by contemporaries who traveled to Muscovy during Ivan's reign, or by armchair contemporary or later writers,⁵ because they were ignorant, biased, or just plain liars.⁶ This category of sources includes Livonian chronicles about Muscovite participation in the Livonian War,⁷ and Paul Oderborn's scandalous "biography" of Ivan.

All Flugschriften, because they personify tabloid, sensationalist fiction.⁸

All chronicles, because they are of clerical, not court, origin.⁹ The court did not even understand the Slavonic language in which the monks wrote chronicles. Churchmen projected their own religious identity and sensibility onto the court, ascribing motives and policies to Ivan and his government toward Muslim Tatars that the religiously tolerant Ivan and his court did not share. The court adhered to a Mongol identity, the church to a Byzantine-based Orthodox Christian identity. Contemporary and authentic monastic chroniclers did not share the court's mentality, and therefore distorted that mentality in their narratives by projecting anti-Tatar and/or anti-Muslim prejudice onto the government. As a result, I have rejected all derivatives of the *Nikon Chronicle*, whether in contemporary manuscripts, like the *Book of Degrees* (*Stepennaia kniga*), or not, although dated to Ivan's reign, like the *Illuminated Chronicle Compilation* (*Litsevoi letopisnyi svod*),¹⁰ as well as all Novgorod and Pskov chronicles, which survive only in seventeenth-century manuscripts, and all admittedly post-Ivan chronicles, such as the *Piskarev Chronicle* (*Piskarevskii le-*

⁵ Charles J. Halperin, "Sixteenth-Century Foreign Travel Accounts to Muscovy: A Methodological Excursus," *The Sixteenth-Century Journal* 6 (1975): 89–111.

⁶ For a refutation of a previously widely accepted source, see Paul Bushkovitch. "Possevino and the Death of Tsarevich Ivan Ivanovich," *Cahiers du monde russe* 55, 1–2 (2014): 119–34.

⁷ Charles J. Halperin, "The Double Standard: Livonian Chronicles and Muscovite Barbarity during the Livonian War (1558–1582)," *Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana* 1 (23) (2018): 126–47.

⁸ Cornelia Soldat, *Erschreckende Geschichten in der Darstellung von Moskovitern und Osmanen in den deutschen Flugschriften des 16. und 17. Jahrhundert/ Stories of Atrocities in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century German Pamphlets About the Russians and Turks* (Leuiston, ME: Edwin Mellon, 2014).

⁹ Donald Ostrowskii, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 105, 153 n. 42. See in the present volume chaps. 1 and 2.

¹⁰ See chap. 1.

topisets) (whose reliability can be questioned on the grounds of demonstrated historical errors).¹¹

All narrative sources that survive only in seventeenth-century manuscripts, such as the *Kazan' History* (*Kazanskaia istoriia*),¹² the "tale" of Ivan's attack on Novgorod, *On the Arrival of Tsar and Grand Prince Ivan Vasil'evich of All Rus', Autocrat, Who Punished Great Novgorod, Which Was Called the "Oprichnina" and Destruction* (*O prikhode tsaria i velikogo kniazia Ioanna Vasil'evich vseia Rossii samoderzhtsa, kako kaznil Velikii Novgorod, ezhe oprichnina i rozgrom imenuetsia*), and the *Tale of Stefan Bathory's Campaign against Pskov* (*Povest' o prikhozhenii Stefana Batorii na grad Pskov*).¹³

All tales, allegories, projects for political reform, and what not, such as the works of Ivan Peresvetov and the *Discourse of the Valaam Wonder-Workers Sergii and German* (*Beseda valaamskikh chudotvortsev Sergiia i Germana*, commonly called simply the *Valaam Discourse*¹⁴), that survive only in seventeenth-century manuscripts. This does not exclude the works of Ermolai-Erazm, extant in contemporary manuscripts, or various government draft reform proposals.

Ivan's "speech" at the so-called Council of Reconciliation (*sobor primirenniia*) in 1549, because it was composed in the seventeenth century.¹⁵

Ivan's "Testament," because it survives only in an early nineteenth-century manuscript.¹⁶

Both redactions of Ivan's 1547 coronation as "tsar," because neither contains a literal transcript of the actual ceremony. They refer to Ivan's multiple brothers, although Ivan had only one, and to his wife, although he was as yet unmarried. The "chronicle redaction" survives only within the corpus of the

¹¹ See Charles J. Halperin, "How Quickly They Forgot: Ivan IV in Muscovite Historical Memory," *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, Seriia 2: Istoriia* 63, 1 (2018): 223–43.

¹² Edward L. Keenan, "Coming to Grips with the *Kazanskaya istoriia*: Some Observations on Old Answers and New Questions," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 11 (1964–68): 143–83.

¹³ See chap. 14.

¹⁴ Galina Nikolaevna Moiseeva, *Valaamskaia beseda—pamiatnik russkoi publitsistiki serediny XVI veka* (Moscow–Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1958).

¹⁵ Sergei Fedorovich Platonov, *Stat'i po russkoi istorii (1883–1912)*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia M. A. Aleksandrova. 1912), 201–05; V. N. Aytokratov, "'Rech' Ivana Groznogo' kak politicheskii pamflet kontsa XVII veka," *Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 11 (1955): 255–79.

¹⁶ Soldat, *Das Testament Ivans des Schrecklichen von 1572*.

Russian chronicles, so there is no way to confirm the reliability of the chronicler's quotations from or paraphrase of the ceremony.¹⁷

Ivan's speeches and supposed authorship of the "questions" he posed to the 1551 church Council of One Hundred Chapters (*Stoglav*).¹⁸ Although the text survives in contemporary manuscripts and therefore the historicity of the church council itself cannot be questioned, Ivan may have had "help" preparing the speeches and questions ascribed to him out of ceremonial deference.

Ivan's interrogation of escaped Crimean captives after the Moscow fire of 1571, because the manuscript, although once known and accurately cited, can no longer be located.¹⁹

Ivan's "Reply" to Jan Roktya, because evidence of Ivan's personal authorship has been contested.²⁰

The vitae of Metropolitan Filipp and Vasilii *Blazhennyi*, because they were composed during the 1590s.²¹

Only documentary sources survive this pruning process, hence the title of this chapter. Contemporary, authentic, and reliable documentary sources include the diplomatic books (*posol'skie knigi*), the service registers (*razriadnye knigi*), the *Tsar's Genealogy* (*Gosudarev rodoslovets*),²² the *Law Code* (*Sudebnik*) of 1550, and decrees and charters. While the law code and legislation remain crucial to reconstructing Ivan's reign, the formulaic nature of the language of legislative and administrative documents precludes assigning Ivan—or any—

¹⁷ Olga Novikova, "Le couronnement d'Ivan IV. La conception de l'empire à l'Est de l'Europe," trans. Élisabeth Teiro and André Berelowitch, *Cahiers du monde russe* 46, 1–2 (2005): 219–31.

¹⁸ D. E. Kozhanchikov, ed., *Stoglav* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imporatorskoi Akademii nauk, 1863).

¹⁹ Sergei Konstantinovich Bogoiavlenskii, *Moskovskii prikaznyi apparat i deloproizvodstvo XVI–XVII vekov* (Moscow: Iazyki slavianskoi kul'tury, 2006), 553; Nancy Shields Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 306.

²⁰ Cf. Nikolettta Marchalis, *Liutor" izhe liut": Prenie o vere tsaria Ivana Groznogo s pastorem Rokytoi* (Moscow: Iazyki slavianskoi kul'tury, 2009).

²¹ V. A. Kolobkov, *Mitropolit Filipp i stanovlenie moskovskogo samoderzhaviiia. Oprichnina Ivana Groznogo* (St. Petersburg: Ateleiia, 2004), 554–619; I. A. Lobakova, *Zhitie mitropolita Filippa: Issledovanie i teksty* (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2006), 149–380; I. I. Kuznetsov, *Sviatye blazhennye Vasilii i Ioann, Khrista radi moskovskie chudotvortsy* (Moscow: Zapiski Moskovskogo arkhelogicheskago instituta, v. 8, 1910), 1–121, 177–308, 330–65.

²² I am here deviating slightly from the premise of this chapter. The actual manuscripts of the genealogical books do not date to Ivan's reign. However, no one has ever disputed that the "Sovereign's Genealogy" originated during Ivan's reign.

one else, for that matter—any individual role in their promulgation. Such documents ascribed all initiative to Ivan whether he was a boy of ten, or a man of twenty-five.

Some seemingly documentary sources survive only within the corpus of the chronicles, for example, Ivan's two epistles to Moscow, one to the elite, one to the commoners (*chern'*), in 1564, written from Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda, explaining his abdication. Because we cannot confirm that the chronicle quoted the epistles without emendation, I will, for consistency's sake, disregard these epistles. However, the 1556 decrees on service and precedence, paraphrased in the chronicle, also survive in service registers, and therefore remain methodologically acceptable.²³

Historians do not rely only on written sources. For the last several decades historians have paid increasing attention to nontextual sources of Muscovite history. However, we will discard all artistic evidence as illustrative only of church, not court, belief, including all icons such as *Blessed Is the Host of the Heavenly Tsar* (*Blagoslovenno voiska nebesnogo tsaria*), the murals of the Golden Hall (*Zolotaia polata*) (even if in a government structure), the theology of the Church of the Intercession of the Veil of the Mother-of-God (*Pokrovskii sobor*) on the Moat, better known as St. Basil's Cathedral, and the facade of Ivan's pew (*Tsarskoe mesto*) in the Dormition Cathedral (*Uspenskii sobor*), because acceptable sources cannot confirm Ivan's or the court's understanding of the theological and ideological content of such works. The same caveat applies to behavioral evidence such as the Palm Sunday or Epiphany rituals. Ecclesiastical documentary sources, expense book notations, or ceremonial guides, confirm that such ceremonies took place, even without relying upon foreign descriptions or illustrations of them, but we cannot verify that the participants shared historians' interpretation of their meaning. The significance of archeological and material evidence depends so heavily upon interpretation and context that I cannot formulate a general conclusion of where it fits into the current discussion. The surviving black robe of an *oprichnik* might constitute evidence that the *oprichniki* wore black, but only foreign accounts and a post-Ivan narrative identify the *oprichniki* as wearing black. Therefore, even if someone actually wore the black robe, from the skeptical point of view, we lack reliable evidence that someone was an *oprichnik*. On the other hand, the German doors of the Novgorod St. Sophia Cathedral did not transport them-

²³ *Razriadnaia kniga 1550–1636* (Moscow: Institut istorii Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1975), 8, 11.

selves to Aleksandrovskaia sloboda, where they still reside, so this piece of evidence reliably confirms oprichniki looting of Novgorod.²⁴

The value of the autopsy performed on Ivan's corpse over 350 years after he died is an open question. Skeptics deny that the autopsy reveals not only Ivan's health problems but inferences about how he reacted to those medical problems, let alone to proving that he died of poison. Therefore I will discard the autopsy as evidence.

Excluding this written, visual, behavioral, and material evidence does not just drastically shrink the quantity of evidence for almost everything that happened during Ivan's reign for the years before 1567, based especially upon chronicles, and for the years after 1567, based especially upon foreign accounts. It also significantly affects what historians can write about Ivan qualitatively. On the one hand, Ivan ceases to be a writer. Historians cannot cite Ivan's *First Epistle to Kurbskii* to illustrate his character or ideology. Corroboration of his education disappears. Furthermore, historians need no longer worry about interpreting the significance of the dogs' heads and brooms mounted on the heads of the horses of the oprichniki, because all evidence of their existence—contemporary foreign accounts, a post-Ivan chronicle, and a candlestick base of unknown provenance—vanishes. On the other hand, all evidence that Ivan was a sadist, rapist, adulterer, homosexual, and sexual pervert also evaporates. The most lurid, sensational, and graphic depictions of Ivan's atrocities, in warfare in Livonia, in the *oprichnina*, in the ravaging of the northwest, including Novgorod, and the Moscow executions of 1571, find themselves in the proverbial dustbin of history. No one should underestimate the implications for our understanding of Ivan and his reign produced by the virtual skeptical approach to sources.

Nevertheless, Ivan does not somehow become a more understandable or less mysterious or contradictory figure as a result of these source omissions. Historians can still demonize Ivan as a tyrant who murdered and tortured his subjects without cause (although they cannot blame him for the death of Tsarevich Ivan), or idealize him as a statesman who expanded Muscovy's borders to the south and southeast and at least attempted to do so to the west and who quashed treason to build a centralized state. In my opinion, even if we discard Ivan's sadism and sexual perversion, it is still possible to argue that Ivan was insane. The conundrums of the purpose and consequences of the two least understood and arguably most important episodes of Ivan's reign—the *oprichnina* and the Simeon Bekbulatovich interval—remain untouched by the excision of so many sources. Many, if not most, of the contradictory elements attributed to Ivan's character, piety and sacrilegious activity, arro-

²⁴ Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zimin, *Oprichnina Ivana Groznogo* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury "Mysl'," 1964), 297, 344.

gance and humility, cruelty and philanthropy, emerge unscathed from the alteration of the source base for Ivan's reign. Therefore, removing contested sources will not abate the lack of consensus among historians on the question of Ivan's character in the slightest. No consensus image of Ivan can be constructed from those sources not excluded from usage.

Documentary evidence demonstrates unambiguously that Ivan established the oprichnina and founded the oprichniki corps. The oprichnina assigned oprichniki estates in oprichnina territories and deported non-oprichniki from oprichnina territories. The oprichniki looted, tortured, and murdered civilians. I have found approximately seventy references to the oprichnina in documentary sources such as charters, archival inventories, cadastral surveys, and diplomatic documents that confirm the actualization of the oprichnina.²⁵ The synodicals qualify as church or church-state documents. No methodological rationale justifies excluding them from the category of reliable sources.²⁶ Putting aside the identification of all individual victims, and not for one moment assuming that Ivan included all his victims on the list, the scale of the deaths depicted in the text cannot be questioned. If the synodicals describe the scale of the human losses from the northwest campaign accurately, then we know that nearly 3,000 people, men, women, children, and clergy lost their lives during the winter of 1569–70. The synodicals further confirm many of Ivan's most "notable" individual executions, including those of Ivan Viskovatyi, Ivan's sometime head of the Ambassadorial Bureau, and other leading bureaucrats in 1571; of appanage Prince Vladimir Staritskii, Ivan's cousin, and his second wife, at least one daughter in 1569, and his mother, Ivan's aunt, Princess Evfrosiniia Staritskaia; and of prominent monks such as Abbot Kornilii and the elder Vassian Muromtsev of the Pskov Caves Monastery (Pechersksaia lavra). (Metropolitan Filipp's name, however, did not appear in the synodicals.) Ivan's cruelty remains a fundamental attribute of his *persona*. Moreover, the diplomatic papers defended these "celebrity" executions, which means that Ivan admitted responsibility for those deaths.²⁷

²⁵ A. M. Sakharov, ed., *Sbornik dokumentov po istorii SSSR dlia seminarikh i prakticheskikh zaniatii (period feodalizma)*, pt. 3: XVI vek (Moscow: Vysshiaia shkola, 1972), 60–68.

²⁶ Ruslan Grigor'evich Skrynnikov, *Tsarstvo terrora* (St. Petersburg: Nauka, Sankt-Peterburgskoe otделение, 1992), 529–44; Charles J. Halperin, "What is an 'Official' Muscovite Source from the Reign of Ivan IV?," in *The Book of Royal Degrees and the Genesis of Russian Historical Consciousness*/"*Stepennaia kniga tsarskogo rodosloviia*" i genezis russkogo istoricheskogo soznaniia, ed. Ann M. Kleimola and Gail Lenhoff (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 2011), 81–93.

²⁷ Skrynnikov, *Tsarstvo terrora*, 533, 535, 541; *Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva* [hereafter SRIО], vol. 71 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva, 1892) = *Pamiatniki*

The Simeon Bekbulatovich episode remains as confusing as ever. Charters cannot fully resolve the contradictions in Ivan's titulature during 1575–76. Although Ivan styled himself "Prince of Moscow" in his petition to Simeon, which survives in a contemporary manuscript, he apparently used the title "tsar" in other venues. In his charters Simeon called himself "Grand Prince of All Rus'," but Ivan also sometimes used "of All Rus'." Ivan's motives remain just as obscure as ever.²⁸ However, Ivan's petition to Simeon does provide evidence of Ivan's penchant for role-playing in literature as well as in life.

Ivan remains the warrior. Service registers attest to Ivan's physical command of the 1549–52 Muscovite campaigns against Kazan', the 1563 campaign against Polotsk,²⁹ and the 1577 invasion of Livonia.³⁰

The diplomatic records attest with mind-numbing stubbornness that Metropolitan Makarii crowned Ivan in 1547 as "tsar," and that Ivan considered himself, and was considered by the court elite, as a God-crowned, divinely inspired, and divinely protected tsar.³¹ Ivan employed his new tsarist title in his charters and decrees.

Reliable diplomatic correspondence, preserved in England, substantiates Ivan's expressed desire to assure himself of asylum there, should his subjects' opposition to his rule necessitate it.³²

Ivan's piety was consistent with that of his court. Gratuitous pious exclamations in bureaucratic papers document the religious sensibilities of

diplomatičeskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi = Pamiatniki diplomatičeskikh snoshenii moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim, 3: 1560–1571, 777, 786–87.

²⁸ Donald Ostrowski, "Simeon Bekbulatovich's Remarkable Career as Tatar Khan, Grand Prince of All Rus', and Monastic Elder," *Russian History* 39 (2012): 269–99. Ostrowski identified "at least" nine charters by Simeon as "Grand Prince of All Rus'" but failed to cite two charters: *Zakonodatel'nye akty russkogo gosudarstva vtoroi poloviny XVI–pervoi poloviny XVII veka*, 2 vols. (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1986–87), 1: 57, 2: 60; and K. V. Baranov, "Zhalovannaia gramota velikogo kniazia Simeona Bekbulatovicha Suzdal'skomu Aleksandrovichu devich'iu monastyriu 1576 g.," *Russkii diplomatarii* 1 (1997): 38–41, and Simeon's decision on a precedence dispute: "Dela po mestnichestvu," *Russkii istoricheskii sbornik* 5 (1838): 1–36.

²⁹ Then located in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, now Polatsk, the capital of Belarus.

³⁰ *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598* gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 119–21, 135, 136–38, 197–98, 285–86, 292.

³¹ *SRIO* 59 (1887); *SRIO* 71 (1892).

³² George Tolstoy, ed., *The First Forty Years of Intercourse between England and Russia, 1553–1593* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1964), 38–39, 183–85, 223–24. [Translation of Iurii Vasil'evich Tolstoi, ed., *Pervye sorok let snoshenii mezhdu Rossiei i Anglieiu, 1553–1593* (St. Petersburg, 1875).]

the state secretaries.³³ Viskovatyi's interest in the theology of icons should not come as a surprise. Contemporary manuscripts record Ivan's role in Viskovatyi's trial for heresy because of Viskovatyi's criticism of new icons and murals in the Kremlin.³⁴ Ivan, his boyars, and his bureaucrats lived within the Russian Orthodox Church and abided by its precepts. Church marriages, baptisms, funerals, burials in churches or monasteries, donations to monasteries, naming conventions, and the periodicity of births abundantly display the actualization of the elite's religiously based lifestyle. We lack evidence of Ivan's or the elite's religious beliefs other than behavior, but if they were not religious, they managed to pretend they were with a very impressive degree of hypocrisy because they let their lives be governed by religious beliefs that they did not share. Reliable donation books record Ivan's special generosity to monasteries.³⁵ Ivan and the diplomatic establishment interpreted the conquest of Kazan' as a religious victory, the triumph of Christianity over Islam, at least when addressing Christian rulers, despite their use of Muslim Tatar troops and commanders, even in command of Russian troops, in 1552.³⁶ Ivan and his diplomats also claimed that, because of its heretical Lutherans who destroyed Orthodox icons and churches, God sanctioned Ivan's annexation of Polotsk.³⁷ Later Ivan invoked the need for an all-Christian defense against Islam in correspondence with the Holy Roman Empire, designed to inspire opposition to the "Ottoman" candidate for the throne of Poland-Lithuania, Stephen Bathory, and then with the pope, to inspire his mediation of the Livonian War, in order to launch an anti-Ottoman Crusade, with Muscovite partic-

³³ Charles J. Halperin, "The Culture of Ivan IV's Court: The Religious Beliefs of Bureaucrats," in *The New Muscovite Cultural History: A Collection in Honor of Daniel B. Rowland*, ed. Valerie Kivelson, Karen Petrone, Nancy Kollmann, and Michael Flier (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2009), 93-105.

³⁴ E. B. Emchenko and I. V. Kurukin, "K izucheniiu publikatsii 'dela Viskovatogo' i formirovaniia ego sostava," *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1983* (1985): 68-75; Sergei Bogatyrev, "Reinventing the Russian Monarchy in the 1550s: Ivan the Terrible, the Dynasty, and the Church," *Slavonic and East European Review* 85 (2007): 281 n. 46; Carolyn J. Pouncy, "'The Blessed Sil'vestr' and the Politics of Invention in Muscovy, 1550-1700," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 19 (1995): 555; Pouncy, "Missed Opportunities," 327.

³⁵ Liudvig Shtaindorf [Ludwig Steindorff], "Vklady tsaria Ivana Groznogo v Io-sifo-Volokolamskii monastyr'," *Drevniaia Rus': Voprosy medievistiki* 2 (28) (2002): 90-100.

³⁶ *SRIO* 59 (1887): 369-370, 422-424, 541.

³⁷ Sergei Bogatyrev, "The Battle for Divine Wisdom. The Rhetoric of Ivan IV's Campaign Against Polotsk," in *The Military and Society in Russia 1450-1917*, ed. Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 325-63.

ipation.³⁸ In these cases Ivan opportunistically invoked his Christian identity in pursuit of foreign policy goals, although in the latter instance he had no intention whatsoever of joining an anti-Ottoman military alliance.

Conclusions about many elements of Ivan's distinctive personality—charismatic,³⁹ volatile,⁴⁰ arbitrary, capricious, articulate, emotional, theatrical, capricious, playful—usually rest upon Ivan's *First Epistle to Kurbskii* or foreign accounts, but Ivan's exasperated reaction to superfluous precedence lawsuits, replete with curses, threats, and rants,⁴¹ and his highly informed, partisan, and eloquent, seemingly extemporaneous, rehearsals of Lithuanian-Muscovite relations⁴² or English-Muscovite relations⁴³ in diplomatic negotiations, more than justify assigning those very same qualities to Ivan. These elements of Ivan's *persona* remains unsullied by removing contested sources from the discussion.

Diplomatic records and the *Sovereign's Genealogy* show that Ivan endorsed his descent from Prus and his receipt of the Crown of Monomkah and other regalia according to *The Tale of the Princes of Vladimir*.⁴⁴ Repeated assertions in the diplomatic papers demonstrate that the court took the Kievan inheritance seriously. Ivan claimed descent from St. Vladimir, and sovereignty over Iur'ev (Dorpat) in Livonia because it was founded by his ancestor Grand Prince Iaroslav Mudryi (the Wise), and Kazan' because Andrei Bogoliubskii conquered

³⁸ Charles J. Halperin, "Russia Between East and West: Diplomatic Reports During the Reign of Ivan IV," in Yelena Mazour-Matusevich and Alexandra S. Korros, ed., *Saluting Aaron Gurevich: Essays in History, Literature and Other Subjects* (Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010), 99–100.

³⁹ See chap. 17.

⁴⁰ See chap. 16.

⁴¹ P. N. Miliukov, "Drevneishaia Razriadnaia kniga offitsial'noi redaktsii (po 1565 g.)," *Chtenia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete*, kniga 200 (1902), bk. 1, sec. 1, 196; *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1605 gg.*, vol. 3, pt. 1 (Moscow: Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1984), 139–40, 152–53, 184, 218; *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598 gg.*, 169, 308–09, 329, 333; *Razriadnaia kniga 1559–1605 gg.* (Moscow: Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1974), 147–48; *Razriadnaia kniga 1550–1636*, 70–71; *Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1605 gg.*, vol. 3, pt. 2 (Moscow: Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1987), 9.

⁴² *SRIO* 71 (1892): 102–15.

⁴³ *SRIO* 38 (1883): 108–11, 119–20.

⁴⁴ R. P. Dmitrieva, *Skazanie o kniaz'iax vladimirskikh* (Moscow–Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1955); "Rodoslovnaia kniga po trem spiskam," *Vremennik Obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* 10 (1851), 3; *SRIO* 59 (1887): 373, 437; *SRIO* 71 (1892): 231.

Grand Bolgar. By inheritance both Kazan' and Livonia had become part of Ivan's patrimony (*otchina*).⁴⁵

Ivan defined his royal authority as the freedom to reward or to punish his subjects as he deemed fit (*ved' my svoim kholopei sami volny kazny i zhalovati*). This dictum appeared in Ivan's *First Epistle to Kurbskii*, but it also surfaced in the diplomatic papers.⁴⁶ This doctrine was the key to Ivan's political ideology. It derived from Ivan's status as "tsar," not as "autocrat" (*samoderzhets*).⁴⁷ Authentic epistles, even written in Ivan's name but not personally by Ivan, to Queen Elizabeth I of England, King Johann III of Sweden, and King Stefan Batory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with all their insults, royal elitism, and denigration of rulers who consult with, or were elected by, their subjects, persuasively attest to Ivan's monarchical arrogance.⁴⁸

On a more personal note, the 1572 church council decree authorizing Ivan's fourth marriage proves that he practiced serial monogamy. Indeed wedding documents convincingly track his seven marriages.⁴⁹

Therefore, even applying our virtual skeptical standards for defining what sources from Ivan's reign can be considered authentic, contemporary, and reliable, we cannot avoid the paradoxes of Ivan's character, the contradictions in his persona and behavior, or the mysteries of his rule.

The point of this epistemological exercise has not been to minimize the importance of studies of the provenance, authenticity, authorship, and reliability of sources from and about the reign of Ivan IV. Such studies are the foundation for all scholarship about Ivan. Without them, no historian could even begin to study Ivan's reign. However, eliminating sources which fail to pass muster by our hypothetical skeptical historian fails to ameliorate the historian's difficulties, problems, and dilemmas in analyzing Ivan's reign. The paradoxes, contradictions, and confusion remain. The mysteries—the oprichnina, the Simeon Bekbulatovich episode—remain. A skeptical attitude toward

⁴⁵ Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV and Kiev," in *Rus' Writ Large: Language, Histories, Cultures. Essays Presented in Honor of Michael S. Flier on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. Harvey Goldblatt and Nancy Shields Kollmann = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 28 (2006): 461–69.

⁴⁶ *SRIO* 71 (1892): 109, 230, 465, 775.

⁴⁷ Charles J. Halperin, "Ivan IV as Autocrat (*samoderzhets*)," *Cahiers du monde russe* 55 (2014): 197–213.

⁴⁸ Keenan, *The Kurbskii-Groznyi Apocrypha*, 66–67, 71.

⁴⁹ *Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Arkheograficheskoi Ekspeditsiei Akademii Nauk*, vol. 1: 1294–1598 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia II otdeleniia sobstvennoi E I V Kantseliarii, 1836), 329–32; Russell E. Martin, *A Bride for the Tsar: Bride-Shows and Marriage Politics in Early Modern Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012), 113–17, 121–24, 131–66.

sources by itself is not a methodological magic bullet, a magic wand that will lift the fog of obscurity enfolding Ivan's person and reign. Ivan will continue to confound attempts by historians to understand his rule and character, and historians will continue to disagree with each other on whether Ivan was saint or sinner, regardless of which sources they consider reliable.

Historiography

Chapter 19

Skrynnikov's *Tsarstvo terrora* and *Reign of Terror*

Ruslan Skrynnikov's *Reign of Terror*¹ purports to be a translation of his classic monograph *Tsarstvo terrora*,² but in fact it is both more and less than that. *Reign of Terror* was translated from a Russian-language draft of the *Tsarstvo terrora* that Skrynnikov had revised, by deleting, adding, and rewriting material.³ *Reign of Terror* is not a complete literal translation of *Tsarstvo terrora*. Skrynnikov did not alter his primary conclusions about Ivan IV's reign, which he had formulated in the 1960s and 1970s, although he did, as always, change his opinions on specific points, most of the time without acknowledging, let alone explaining, the change.⁴ A specialist in sixteenth-century Muscovite history, therefore, would need to read both the Russian and the English versions if he wanted to take all of Skrynnikov's views into account.⁵ This chapter compares *Tsarstvo terrora* and *Reign of Terror* to identify how they differ.

A number of Skrynnikov's publications had previously appeared in English, most notably a translation of his 1975 popular (*nauchno-populiarnaia*)

¹ Ruslan Skrynnikov, *Reign of Terror*, trans. Paul Williams (Leiden: Brill and Bronze Horseman, 2015).

² Ruslan Grigor'evich Skrynnikov, *Tsarstvo terrora* (St. Petersburg: Nauka, Sankt-Peterburgskoe otdelenie, 1992).

³ When I wrote the "Introduction" to *Reign of Terror*, "Ruslan Skrynnikov's *Reign of Terror* in the Historiography of Ivan the Terrible," xviii–xxxi, I had not seen the translation. If I had, I would have mentioned the disparity between the original and the translation, which anyone reading *Reign of Terror* is entitled to know.

⁴ For instances in *Reign of Terror* in which Skrynnikov admits correcting himself, taken from *Tsarstvo terrora*, see *Reign of Terror*, 81 n. 69, 238 n. 135, 290.

⁵ Charles J. Halperin, "Ruslan Skrynnikov on Ivan IV," in *Dubitando: Essays in Culture and History in Honor of Donald Ostrowski*, ed. Brian J. Boeck, Russell E. Martin, and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington: Slavica, 2012), 193–207, was of course written three years before the publication of *Reign of Terror*.

"small" book on Ivan, which appeared in 1981⁶ as well as, to my knowledge, eight articles,⁷ but even taken together these do not provide the English-language reader with an adequate exposition of Skrynnikov's interpretation of Ivan IV and his reign.

The quality of the translation by John Williams, as one would expect from the Bronze Horseman Literary Agency, is exceedingly high, no mean achievement considering Skrynnikov's often convoluted prose. Because Williams clearly identifies his interpolations in brackets, I infer that all alterations between *Tsarstvo terrora* and *Reign of Terror* were made by Skrynnikov. Given the length of this version of the book, eight pages of the author's preface and 578 pages of text, the number of typographical errors or stylistic flaws is puny, but still a distraction (see appendix 19.1). All readers of *Reign of Terror* will appreciate the shift from the chapter endnotes of *Tsarstvo terrora* to true footnotes at the bottom of the page. Like *Tsarstvo terrora*, *Reign of Terror* lacks a bibliography but has an index, only of names, not of places or concepts. For the English reader *Reign of Terror* has a glossary (*Reign of Terror*, xiii–xviii), which, given that the translation retains numerous frequently used Russian words, is essential, although of course specialists can always quibble at the definitions,⁸

⁶ Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, *Ivan the Terrible*, trans. Hugh F. Graham (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1981), translated from *Ivan Groznyi* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975)..

⁷ R. G. Skrynnikov: "Who Was the Editor of the Sixteenth-Century Illuminated Codex? (To the Question of the Editorship of the *Tsarstvennaia kniga*)," trans. Avril Payman, *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 13 (1979): 163–65; "The Synodikon of Those Who Fell into Disgrace under Tsar Ivan the Terrible (An Attempt at a Textological Reconstruction of the Lost *Oprichnina* Archive)," trans. Jean Hellie, *Soviet Studies in History* 24, 1–2 (1985): 45–61; "An Overview of the Reign of Ivan IV: What Was the *Oprichnina*," trans. Jean Hellie, *Soviet Studies in History* 24, 1–2 (1985): 62–82; "Edward Keenan's Textological Experiment," trans. Jean Hellie, *Soviet Studies in History* 24, 1–2 (1985): 83–112; "The Early Period of Russia's Annexation of Siberia," trans. Jean Hellie, *Soviet Studies in History* 24, 1–2 (1985): 113–36; "Ermak's Siberian Expedition," trans. Hugh F. Graham, *Russian History* 13, 1 (1986): 1–39; "An Afterword to the Kurbskii-Groznyi Apocrypha," trans. Anesa Miller-Pogacar, in *Imperial Power and Development: Papers from the Third World Congress of Soviet and East European Studies*, ed. Don Karl Rowney (Columbus: Slavica, 1990), 175–87; "State Ownership of Land and Its Influence on the Formation of the Noble Estate," in *Moskovskaia Rus': Spetsifika razvitiia/Muscovy: Peculiarities of Its Development*, ed. Gyula Szvák (Budapest: Magyar Ruzsisztika Intézet, 2003), 9–19.

⁸ On p. xiii *d'iak* is defined as an "official," although p. 6 translates the word as "government clerk" and *dumnyi dvorianin* as "a member of the Boyar Duma" who was not a boyar, although a *dumnyi d'iak* was also a member of the Royal Duma [in this chapter I follow Skrynnikov's usage of the term "Boyar Duma"; rather than "Duma" or "Royal Council"], p. xv defines *okol'nichii* as the second rank of the Duma (when "associate boyar" would have served as an acceptable translation) and p. xiv mentions that the *kaznachei* (treasurer) belonged to the Royal Duma, which obscures the fact that dum-

and, like *Tsarstvo terrora*, a list of abbreviations (*Reign of Terror*, ix–xii) appearing in the notes, which, aside from conversion from Cyrillic to Latin alphabetical order, has been revised to suit the English-language version of the book.

Overall one might describe *Reign of Terror* as an abridged translation of *Tsarstvo terrora*, because Skrynnikov seems to have made a conscientious effort to delete apparatus (there are far fewer footnotes), detail (the detail in *Tsarstvo terrora* frequently overwhelms the reader), and discussions of historiography, particularly when Skrynnikov summarized views of other historians with which he disagreed (of interest only to specialists). There is no need for me to enumerate all instances of these kinds of cuts. Sometimes, however, he deleted observations from which the novice reader would have benefited. The newer material goes beyond providing segues to maintain continuity when paragraphs have been deleted. These additions often derive from Skrynnikov's other publications, but I have not backtracked their origin. In his "Acknowledgments" John Emerich of the Bronze Horseman Literary Agency notes that the project began in the 1990s (Skrynnikov died in 2009).⁹ I did not find any references to publications that appeared after 1992.¹⁰

Skrynnikov retained most of the chapter structure of *Tsarstvo terrora* in *Reign of Terror*, but sometimes he modified the chapter title, and in two instances he conflated chapters of the Russian text into a single chapter of the English text. He also, although not often, relocated material from one chapter to another or within a chapter. Two chapters are new. A systematic chap-

nye dvoriane were not the only non-boyars in the Royal Duma. A simple exposition of the four categories of Royal Duma members—boyars, associate boyars, Council gentry, and Council state secretaries—would have been clearer. The glossary defines *Iur'ev den'* (St. George's Day) as the time when peasants could move from the land of one noble to another; even assuming "noble" here includes boyars and gentry, this is an incomplete description, because peasants could also move to and from monastic lands, state lands, or court lands.

⁹ John Emerich, "Acknowledgments," in *Reign of Terror*, vii, erred in describing this author's ongoing project as writing a "biography" of Ivan IV. Given the lack of any personal papers from Ivan, it is impossible to write a biography of him; I wrote a monograph about Ivan, *Ivan the Terrible: Free to Reward and Free to Punish* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2019).

¹⁰ Halperin, "Introduction," situated Skrynnikov's *Tsarstvo terrora* within the context of Russian- and primarily English-language publications on Ivan which appeared before 1992 but were not cited by Skrynnikov and which appeared after 1992 and explored issues he did not address or which relate to his conclusions. Consequently, the fact that it correlates newer research to *Tsarstvo terrora*, not *Reign of Terror*, does not diminish its currency. One grammatical error should have been caught; on p. xviii, line 1, "that Church" should be "that the Church."

ter-by-chapter comparison of *Reign of Terror* and *Tsarstvo terrora* demonstrates how Skrynnikov fashioned *Reign of Terror* out of *Tsarstvo terrora*.

The "Original Preface" (*Reign of Terror*, xxxii–xxxix; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 5–9) identifies Richard Hellie's paper at the 1984 conference Hellie organized on Ivan the Terrible as the most complete explication of Hellie's interpretation of Ivan's insanity (*Reign of Terror*, xxxix, 36, following *Tsarstvo terrora*, 9 n. 36). For the convenience of the reader either the translator or the editor could have updated the reference to the published version of that paper.¹¹

Skrynnikov moved chapter 1, "Istochniki" (Sources) of *Tsarstvo terrora*, 10–69, to an "Appendix: Sources" at the end of *Reign of Terror*; I will discuss it in its sequence in *Reign of Terror*.

Reign of Terror chapter 1, "The Aristocracy and the Boyars" (1–12), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 2 (70–80), but is not identical. Skrynnikov eliminated his background discussion of landowning in Kievan Rus' and Novgorod. He moved material on the allocation of land to the Chosen Thousand, a 1551 reform (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 76), to a later chapter, which will be mentioned below. Skrynnikov also added a definition of the term *deti boiarskie* (literally "children of boyars," substantively "gentry"), with appropriate references, including an un-referenced rejection of George Vernadsky's view that the institution of *pomest'e* (conditional land grant, although the definition does not appear until *Reign of Terror*, 115) was borrowed from Ottoman Empire. Skrynnikov asserted that there is no evidence of Turkish influence on Muscovy during the fifteenth century when *pomest'e* arose. The new material was definitely designed to suit an English-language reader who would be less familiar with the terms and concepts than readers of *Tsarstvo terrora*.

Reign of Terror chapter 2, "Boyar Rule" (13–25), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 3 (81–89). Skrynnikov deleted several references to secondary works but also his citation of a primary source, Sigismund von Herberstein's "Notes upon Russia," which narrates that Grand Princess Elena Glinskaia's uncle, Prince Mikhail Glinskii, unsuccessfully demanded that Elena, Ivan IV's widowed mother, give up her lover Prince Ivan Ovchin-Obolenskii (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 86–87). Thus the reader is not apprised of the fact that the evidence of this incident comes from a foreigner, not a Muscovite.

Reign of Terror chapter 3, "The Moscow Tsardom" (26–58), derives from but bears a different title than *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 4, "Vremia Reform" (The Period of Reform, 90–107); arguably the Russian title better describes the content of the chapter. Skrynnikov omitted a short paragraph that asserted that

¹¹ Richard Hellie, "What Happened? How Did He Get Away with It? Ivan Groznyi's Paranoia and the Problem of Institutional Restraints," *Russian History* 14 (1987): 199–224. I would have thought that by 1991 when *Tsarstvo terrora* went to press that Skrynnikov would have had access to that publication.

the concept of Moscow-the Third Rome expressed Muscovite political consciousness (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 91). Skrynnikov's motivation for and the significance of this excision remain problematic. The translator's note (*Reign of Terror*, 34) explains his translation of *publitsist*, literally "publicist," as "polemicist." This is a magnificent conceptual translation of the concept of authors of manuscript texts that commented on public affairs. This translation deserves to be emulated by specialists. The readers' access to the chapter is also enhanced by a new explanation of the word *prikaz* (administrative bureau) as a product of the expression *v prikaze* (to follow the orders of) and comments on the evolution of the membership of the Boyar Duma and Royal Domain (*Reign of Terror*, 41–43). Unfortunately, the name of a source cited here, *Dvorovaia tetrad'* (literally: Court or Household Quire), is not translated until later and then inconsistently, "Court Roll" (*Reign of Terror*, 78 n. 60) and "Court Register" (*Reign of Terror*, 117).

After deleting an interesting section on the reform projects of the monk-polemicist Ermolai-Erazm (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 102–03), Skrynnikov provides here an expanded version of his discussion of the Chosen Thousand (*Reign of Terror*, 46–48); the material seems to fit better in this chapter than in its previous location. His expansion of his discussion now included information on other measures to reassign land to servitors, reorganize the Royal Household (court), mobilize servitors, reform taxation, and employ Cossacks. Additional new material treats the conquest of the Tatar khanate of Kazan'. Regrettably his assertion that the Khan of Kazan' was still a nomad illustrates the limits of his understanding of the Tatars, and his insistence that Muscovy tolerated Islam in conquered Kazan' while at the same time noting that the newly-created archbishopric of Kazan' undertook proselytizing efforts illustrates that Skrynnikov had not lost his ability to contradict himself, or, perhaps more generously, not to recognize contradictions in Muscovite policy (*Reign of Terror*, 56, 58).

Reign of Terror chapter 4, "The Chosen Council" (59–88), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 5 (108–41).

Reign of Terror chapter 5, "The Fall of Adashev" (89–107), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 6 (130–41). The translator identifies Kabarda as a small Circassian "feudal" state in the North Caucasus (*Reign of Terror*, 106); "tribal" would have been a better description. Skrynnikov referred to the head of the Circassian state as Temir Guka but in the next chapter as Temgriuk (*Reign of Terror*, 106, 143). The index includes Temgriuk but not Temir Guka (*Reign of Terror*, 588), the Russian index lists "Temgriuk, Temir Guka" as the same person (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 568). Muscovite sources used "Temriuk" as the root of the patronymics of his baptized daughter, Ivan IV's second wife (Maria Temriukovna), and baptized brother-in-law (Prince Mikhail Temriukovich). Either

the editor or the translator should have rationalized these name variations for the reader.

Reign of Terror chapter 6, "The Trial of the Staritskiis" (108–48), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 7, "'Delo' Staritskikh," which could also legitimately be translated as "The Staritskii 'Case.'" The translator rendered "Lithuania-Poland" and "Lithuania and Poland" as the Rzeczpospolita (not translated as "the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth") (*Reign of Terror*, 128, 129; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 154) for events in 1562, which was premature: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was not created until 1569. Some otherwise qualified historians continue to perpetuate Skrynnikov's mistake of calling the ruler of Sibir', Ediger, a "khan" (*Reign of Terror*, 143); the contemporary Muscovite chronicle did not make that mistake, and, as mentioned above, Skrynnikov's understanding of the Tatars was flawed. Ediger was not a Chingissid and could not claim the title "khan"; in Russian he is correctly called "prince" (*kniaz'*), meaning "emir."

Reign of Terror chapter 7, "Boyar Sedition" (148–84), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 8 (170–91).

Reign of Terror chapter 8, "The Dispute with Kurbskii" (185–201), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 9 (193–202). Concerning events in 1564, "Rzeczpospolita" (*Reign of Terror*, 165) is still in error for the Polish-Lithuanian state (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 197).

Reign of Terror chapter 9, "The Establishment of the *Oprichnina*" (202–56), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 10 (203–37).

Reign of Terror chapter 10, "Banishment to Kazan'" (257–85), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 11 (238–65). In this chapter and elsewhere in the volume when dealing with sixteenth-century English sources, instead of translating Skrynnikov's quotation in Russian from a Russian translation of Giles Fletcher the translator supplies the quote in English directly from the original English with the original spelling (*Reign of Terror*, 277), which lends authenticity but sacrifices accessibility.

Reign of Terror chapter 11, "The Search for Compromise" (286–305), conflates two chapters, *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 12, "The Search for Compromise" (266–79) and chapter 13, "The Statement of the Land's Opposition" (*Vystuplenie zemskoi oppozitsii*, 280–98).¹² From the former Skrynnikov omitted key information on the social composition of the Assembly of the Land (*Zemskii sobor*) that convened in 1566, the fact that the assembly was not called an "Assembly of the Land," and the process thereafter of the return of land confiscated from deportees to Kazan' (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 269–70, 272, 274–77), and from the latter, discussion of the introduction of printing in Muscovy (*Tsarstvo*

¹² The "land" here refers to the residents of the *zemshchina*, the territory not incorporated into the *oprichnina*.

terrora, 282–87), although that material was actually moved to a later chapter. On the other hand, Skrynnikov added a section on the terminology of the responses of the various social classes participating in the Assembly of the Land as a reflection of Muscovite political theory (*Reign of Terror*, 288–89).

Reign of Terror chapter 12, “The Boyar Conspiracy” (306–39), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 14 (302–47), entitled “The ‘Conspiracy’ of Master-of-Horse I. P. Fedorov-Cheliadnin” (“‘Zagovor’ koniushego I. P. Fedorova-Cheliadnina,” 302–47). Skrynnikov omitted a paragraph articulating Ivan’s retrospective view of possible asylum in England (*Reign of Terror*, 318; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 314) and discussion of the boyar Fedorov’s suspected treason found in Livonian and Polish chronicles (*Reign of Terror*, 322; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 317–18).

Reign of Terror chapter 13, “The Ravaging of Novgorod” (340–71), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 15 (348–93). Without acknowledgment Skrynnikov altered his level of certainty that Iaroslavl’ had been incorporated into the oprichnina and omitted mention that Belozero was also incorporated (*Reign of Terror*, 540; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 350–51). He omitted his analysis of the weaknesses of Aleksandrovskaia sloboda as the “capital” of the oprichnina, which speaks to the question of why Ivan kept moving the “capital” around, and of the sums of money Ivan and Tsarevich Ivan donated to the Kirillo-Belozero Monastery, which is very significant for indicating Ivan’s mood, both personal and political (*Reign of Terror*, 342, 343; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 352, 353–54). Except for a couple of lines, he eliminated his case that Ivan’s sack of Novgorod grew out of previous Novgorod-Moscow political and economic rivalries (*Reign of Terror*, 347; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 357–61). He also omitted his assertion that Ivan gathered all available oprichniki, 15,000 in number, for the assault on Novgorod (*Reign of Terror*, 349; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 362). The translator (perhaps for the sake of discretion) translated Skrynnikov’s use of the word *pogromiv* (having waged a pogrom) against Tver’ to “after having sacked Tver’” (*Reign of Terror*, 363). The translator translated a second Skrynnikov use of *pogrom* the same way (*Reign of Terror*, 363; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 373).¹³ Skrynnikov omitted his pungent observation on the sacrilege of the oprichniki who tried to impugn Metropolitan Filipp’s authority (*Reign of Terror*, 355; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 365), his sarcastic discussion of the “heroes” of the sack of Novgorod (*Reign of Terror*, 365; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 376), and his conclusion that Ivan failed to take advantage of the removal of Metropolitan Filipp to secularize monastic land, together with a long discourse on the demographic and economic destruction wrought on the northwest cities by Ivan’s punitive expedition, famine, and

¹³ In fact the word *pogrom* does occur in sources from the reign of Ivan IV, but it had no connection to its modern meaning concerning Jews. It does not occur in any source about Ivan’s campaign against Tver’ or any northwest city.

disease (*Reign of Terror*, 366; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 377–82). In the interests of brevity Skrynnikov omitted considerable highly relevant narrative analysis.

Reign of Terror chapter 14, “The Executions in Moscow” (372–83) derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 16 (394–407). Skrynnikov omitted his (typically cynical) observation that Ivan restrained himself from executing all the “secretaries” (state secretaries, professional bureaucrats) because doing so would have disorganized the state’s administrative apparatus (*Reign of Terror*, 277, 381; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 399–400, 403). Skrynnikov advanced the theory, not found in the Russian text, that the names of executed Catholic Poles were not included in the memorial lists (Synodicals) because Orthodox Christians could not pray for Catholics (*Reign of Terror*, 379; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 402), an idea that recurs below.

Reign of Terror chapter 15, “The Oprichnina ‘Paradise’” (384–95), another sarcastic chapter title, derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 17, “Oprichnaia blagodat’” (“Oprichnina Good Fortune”?) (408–20). Skrynnikov omitted much information on the English Muscovy Company’s salt privileges, manufacturing, and the tax and corvée burden on the lower classes (*Reign of Terror*, 388, *Tsarstvo terrora*, most of 412–16).

Reign of Terror chapter 16, “End of the Oprichnina” (396–434), conflates three chapters: *Tsarstvo terrora* chapters 18, “Fire in Moscow” (421–44), 19, “Defeat of the Crimean Horde” (444–52), and 20, “Dissolution of the Oprichnina” (453–64). From *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 18 Skrynnikov’s notable omissions include the remark that when the Crimean Tatars burned Moscow in 1571 it had been 150 years since any Tatars had reached the city (425), an attempt to show that a (folk) song about Ivan and his son is reliable evidence of their relationship (431–32), and the conclusion that by removing Aleksei Basmanov and Prince Aleksei Viazemskii, Ivan had beheaded the oprichnina (435). *Reign of Terror* seems to include new material here, including the observation that the terror erased moral constraints on Ivan, that Ivan’s next bride show consisted of naked women, and that Bulat Artsybashev was killed and his sister raped by musketeers when he tried to promote his sister as Ivan’s next wife (Ivan married Maliuta Skuratov’s relative, Skrynnikov concludes, Maria Sobakina) (340). From *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 19 Skrynnikov omitted its very important conclusions that the defeat of the Ottoman army at Astrakhan’ in 1569 and of the Crimeans in 1572 signified the cessation of Turkic-Tatar expansion in Eastern Europe, and that the 1572 Muscovite victory of a united oprichnina-“land” army hastened the end of the oprichnina (451). From *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 20, after listing the negative consequences of the oprichnina, Skrynnikov omitted his trenchant remark that Ivan did nothing to assist the gentry who were struggling with the economic depression (453–55) but added a segue in *Reign of Terror* that after the Moscow fire of 1571 and the defeat of the

Crimeans in 1572 Ivan now had to confront those consequences, particularly the degradation of the Muscovite army and officer corps (421).

Reign of Terror chapter 17, "The 'Court' and Its Demise" (434–50), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 21, "Krushenie 'Dvora'" (more literally but not better, "The Downfall of the Court," 467–82). The relationship between the Russian and English texts of this chapter is too confused to decipher. Suffice it to say that the focus of the chapter is sharper and its analysis much clearer in the English than in the Russian. Skrynnikov asserts that unlike the oprichnina, the court had no territory, so Ivan kept moving its "capital" around; by doing so, Skrynnikov seeks to undermine the theory that the oprichnina was not abolished in 1572, as he contends, but just renamed the "court." Among the material Skrynnikov omits in the English version is the telling detail that inter alia to make his peace with Novgorod Ivan returned to it two icons his oprichniki had stolen during the sack of the city in 1569–70 (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 474).

Reign of Terror chapter 18, "Simeon Bekbulatovich" (451–72), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 22 (483–507). In this chapter Skrynnikov repositioned his discussion of the astrologer-doctor Elijah Bomel from later in the chapter to earlier in the chapter.¹⁴ In referring to Ivan's popularity among Russian commoners, Skrynnikov replaced a citation to Maureen Perrie's monograph¹⁵ with a quotation from a German-language pamphlet discussed in a forthcoming publication Skrynnikov coauthored, but the reference is somehow distorted.¹⁶ Skrynnikov, without comment (assuming this is not a typographical error somewhere), revised his dating of the famous "Copenhagen Portrait" of Ivan IV, from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, which means that it cannot have been painted from life or by someone who had seen Ivan (*Reign of Terror*, 470, *Tsarstvo terrora*, 503). While this shift in dating matches the shift in the consensus opinion of when this icon-style painting was painted, Skrynnikov did not as a rule change his opinion based upon majority vote. The material Skrynnikov omitted in *Reign of Terror* from the *Tsarstvo terrora*

¹⁴ Standard English-language works such as Maureen Perrie and Andrei Pavlov, *Ivan the Terrible* (London: Pearson, Longman, 2003), or Isabel de Madariaga, *Ivan the Terrible. First Tsar of Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), give his name as "Bomelius."

¹⁵ Maureen Perrie, *The Image of Ivan the Terrible in Russian Folklore* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

¹⁶ Cf. *Tsarstvo terrora*, 502 with *Reign of Terror*, 469 n. 66. Skrynnikov cites Andreas Kappeler and Ruslan Skrynnikov, "Novyi istochnik o Rossii epokhi Ivana Groznogo," *Arkhiv russkoi istorii*, in press, but such an article never appeared in that journal. However, he does not cite A. Kappeler and R. G. Skrynnikov, "Zabyti istochnik o Rossii epokhi Ivana Groznogo," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 1 (1999): 132–44, which seems to be the very same article.

chapter includes the truism that “[t]he mechanism of terror operated according to its own laws, common for all epochs” (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 497), crucial for Skrynnikov’s conception that the policies of the oprichnina changed, and the cliché that Ivan used the tactic of “divide and conquer” against his domestic enemies (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 499). Skrynnikov also did not retain in English his contextualization of Ivan’s behavior as “medieval,” found not only in *Tsarstvo terrora* but in several of his other publications as well. In *Tsarstvo terrora* (501) this passage reads: “Ivan IV’s cruelty cannot be explained as only pathology. The dark gloomy atmosphere of the Middle Ages was impregnated with a cult of violence and contempt for human life, all kinds of superstition. Tsar Ivan Vasil’evich was not an exception in the long line of medieval ruler-tyrants.” This interpretation speaks volumes about Skrynnikov’s broader conception of Muscovite and Western European medieval history.

Skrynnikov omitted *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 23, “Political Results” (“Politicheskie itogi,” 508–18), from *Reign of Terror*. In that chapter he explored possible permanent changes in Muscovy’s political and social structure as a result of the oprichnina. He linked the oprichnina to the introduction of “Conciliar Gentry” (*dumnye dvoriane*) into the Boyar Duma and to the creation of the “bureau” (*prikaz*) system, but not to the creation of the “Assembly of the Land,” instituted during a period of compromise between Ivan and his elite. These conclusions flow from his narrative, but their adept summary definitely benefitted the reader of *Tsarstvo terrora*.

Reign of Terror chapter 19, “The Last Crisis” (473–505) was written especially for the English-language version of the monograph. Skrynnikov first addresses questions of foreign policy during the last years of Ivan’s reign (*Reign of Terror*, 473–86) and then issues of domestic policy (*Reign of Terror*, 486–95). Skrynnikov argues for a political feud between Ivan and his eldest son, Tsarevich Ivan, and even infers that Ivan deliberately caused Tsarevich Ivan’s wife to miscarry because he did not want a grandson with the blood of the boyar Sheremetev clan to ascend the throne.¹⁷ In Skrynnikov’s view, the memorial lists for whom Ivan “paid” monasteries to pray were a political maneuver, not a sign of Ivan’s religious contrition. The remainder of the chapter (*Reign of Terror*, 495–505) deals with the reign of Ivan IV’s son, Tsar Fedor Ivanovich, but devotes most of its attention to the power behind the throne, boyar Boris Godunov. Skrynnikov argued that Ivan IV had unsuccessfully tried to compel his son Fedor to divorce Godunov’s sister Irina, who had not provided Fedor with a male heir, because Ivan feared Godunov would seek the throne upon Fedor’s death without heir (as Godunov actually did). Skrynnikov accused Godunov of arranging the murder of boyar Prince Andrei Shuiskii, but

¹⁷ Ivan selected Tsarevich Ivan’s wives, including the third wife he supposedly struck, causing a miscarriage.

not that of Tsarevich Dmitrii of Uglich, and of destroying the testament Ivan wrote after the death of Tsarevich Ivan, when Tsarevich Fedor became heir apparent. Godunov had to choose between following Ivan's terror policies or seeking a compromise with the boyar aristocracy; by choosing the latter, Godunov definitely ended the oprichnina. In writing about Tsar Fedor Ivanovich's reign Skrynnikov drew upon his previous publications, but not upon *Tsarstvo terrora*.

Reign of Terror chapter 20, "Russian Culture in the Sixteenth Century" (506–24), did not appear in *Tsarstvo terrora*, but some of its text did. In this chapter Skrynnikov considerably expanded the discussion of Muscovite printing that did appear in the Russian version (*Reign of Terror*, 509–19; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 283–87). From suggesting that no reliable evidence attested that Danish printer Hans Bogbinter printed books in Muscovy, Skrynnikov now opined that he did, namely the books which do not mention a printer. That omission was necessary to cover up the fact that Lutherans had printed Orthodox Christian religious works. Skrynnikov also suggested here that Bogbinter trained the first Muscovite printer, Marusha Nefedov. According to Skrynnikov, Ivan then acquired a printing press and type from Constantinople, to overcome clerical opposition to printing by the Danes. This line of reasoning may have originated in the Russian draft of *Reign of Terror*. Skrynnikov's comments on the termination of (at least some) Muscovite chronicle writing in 1567 derive from the Russian text in his "Conclusion" (*Reign of Terror*, 520–21; *Tsarstvo terrora*, 526–27). Skrynnikov briefly mentions the highlights of Muscovite culture during Ivan's reign—St. Basil's Cathedral, the so-called "Church Militant" and "Four-Part" icons, the Golden Palace frescoes, the Cap of Monomakh—but hardly does more than scratch the surface. He never integrated cultural evidence into his political analysis.

Reign of Terror chapter 21, "Conclusion" (525–41), derives from *Tsarstvo terrora*, "Conclusion" (522–28).¹⁸ In addition to repeated material it contains new material necessitated by Skrynnikov's extension of the chronological scope of the book to include the reign of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich. Skrynnikov wrote that Ivan pursued soft policies at the end of his reign but that the guardians for Fedor he chose failed to inhibit Godunov's power-grab. Skrynnikov called attention to peasant flight, resulting in the development of serfdom under Tsar Fedor via first the Forbidden Years (*zapovednye leta*) when peasants could not move, instituted by judicial decisions, not royal decree, and then via the Statute of Limitations (*urochnye leta*) regulating the term of years during which runaway peasants could be recovered. Ivan IV reversed the trend of conditional land becoming more like allodial, instead making allodial land more

¹⁸ In *Tsarstvo terrora* the "Conclusion" is not a numbered chapter.

like conditional land, via compulsory state service, which subordinated the elite to the throne (*Reign of Terror*, 531–34). Unfortunately Skrynnikov omitted his contention that autocracy was inextricably entwined with terror, and that the Terror led to the Time of Troubles (*Smutnoe vremia*) (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 526, 528).

Reign of Terror “Appendix: Sources” (543–78) derives from *Tsarstvo terrora* chapter 1, “Sources” (10–69). Neither the original Russian nor the translated chapter surveyed all the extant sources, Muscovite and foreign, for the reign of Ivan IV. Skrynnikov paid the most attention to the most contested sources about which he had written extensively, the Kurbskii-Groznyi Correspondence and the synodical lists. Concerning the synodical lists, Skrynnikov expanded his observation in chapter 14 that Orthodox monks could not pray for Ivan’s Catholic victims by suggesting that both Lutherans and Catholics were excluded from the memorial lists for confessional reasons, but to avoid contradiction he had to infer that the oprichnina’s Tatar victims had converted to Christianity from Islam (*Reign of Terror*, 578).¹⁹ Skrynnikov added a cross-reference chart of the synodical manuscripts to his discussion (*Reign of Terror*, 573).

Summing up, the translation of Ruslan Skrynnikov’s *Tsarstvo terrora* into English as *Reign of Terror* made his magnum opus available to an English-reading public. Translating the entire work as originally published would scarcely have been feasible; even with systematic cuts, the resulting version of the monograph remains lengthy. However, *Reign of Terror* does successfully transmit the essence of Skrynnikov’s approach to Ivan the Terrible’s reign of terror, its origin, development, contradictions, and impact, and fully demonstrates Skrynnikov’s *modus operandi*, his assumptions, preconceptions, methodology, and mode of analysis. For a specialist, of course, both works are essential reading, but *Reign of Terror* is a major contribution to English-language scholarship on Ivan. Given the complexity of Ivan’s personality and reign, it is no wonder that the history of the revision of the text of *Tsarstvo terrora* in the Russian draft that became *Reign of Terror* is in itself complex. For anyone reading or assigning *Reign of Terror*, it would be a good idea to appreciate its textual relationship to *Tsarstvo terrora*.

¹⁹ No evidence supports the contention that Ivan’s Tatar victims had converted to Orthodox Christianity. At first glance it appears that Catholics, Lutherans, animists, and anonymous victims were all included in the memorial lists, although it should have been impermissible for Russian Orthodox monks to pray for any of them.

Appendix 19.1: Typographical Errors, Translation and Stylistic Corrections

- (xvi) "razaidy" should be "razriady"
- (29) after the semicolon the word "they" should be inserted before "went beyond"
- (100) "and held me," because the verb is plural, should be "they held you"
- (123) close quotation mark missing before the parentheses with the Russian transliteration
- (124) "Nokhtev-Obolenskii" should be "Nogtev," as in the index
- (130) "Kasparov pushka" could have been translated as "Kasparov's cannon"
- (132) "for the first" as a translation of "*na pervykh porakh*" (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 156) should have been rendered as "at first"
- (142) "official" for a "*pristav*" attached to ambassadors of the Nogai Horde is too generic; it would better have been translated as "aide" or "liaison"
- (165) "excauted" should be "executed"
- (182) "from the king" should have a period ending the sentence before the footnote number
- (185) "Later, according to Lur'e's thinking, the tsar influenced by Kurbskii's caustic criticism, made an official revision..." should probably have a comma after "tsar"
- (193) "to the question who" should probably have "of" before "who"
- (197) "rule of law" to translate "*pravda*," rather than translating the word as "justice," is not wrong, but cf. (198) "just man" to translate "*muzha pravdiva*" and (325) "*pravda*" as "law and order"
- (210) "reckon to succeed" for "*raschityvat' na uspek*" (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 207) might have been better as "expect to succeed"

(263) in “the author concluded that the oprichnina, completed the devastation” there should not be a comma after “oprichnina”

(315) “was now the question who would take the throne” would read better if “of” were inserted before “who”

(315) “Evfrosin’ia, who ... in 1553 was” needs to close the clause beginning with “who” by inserting a comma after “was”

(333) in “to kill the Grigorii Sidorov’s nephew” the “the” should be deleted

(337) Ivan “wanted to hear Filipp taking the service” should probably be “performing the service” (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 339)

(337) the sentence with “was defrocked” lacks a subject, which should be “Filipp”

(393) the translator uses the word “toper,” not a common word in the US, meaning “drunkard,” to translate the Russian *guliak* (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 417), which can mean tippler, but also reveler or hellbender

(415) “pomestnik” should be “namestnik”

(420) The translator erred in translating that Khan Devlet-Girei’s grandson was “the son of the *kalga-tsarevich*” (*Tsarstvo terrora*, 450) as “the son of Prince Kalga.” *Kalga* was the title of the heir to the throne of Crimea, held usually by the khan’s eldest son, a sultan. Muscovite sources translated “khan” as *tsar’* and “kalga” as *tsarevich*. Devlet-Girei’s grandson was the son of Devlet’s son, who was the *kalga* (450).

(424) Skrynnikov explained in *Tsarstvo terrora*, 458 that the word *prybylno*, which means “profitable” in modern Russian, did not mean “profitable” in sixteenth-century Russian, and provides quotations from various texts to illustrate the point in translating a passage from Ivan’s Testament in which he authorized his sons to retain or abolish the oprichnina, whichever was *prybylnee*. The translator translated this discussion literally by translating *prybylno* as “profitable,” followed by Skrynnikov’s explication that “profitable” did not mean “profitable” in the modern sense. For an English-language reader, who would not assume that a word in sixteenth-century Russian meant what it means in modern Russian, it would have been simpler just to translate *prybylnee* as “advantageous” (following Robert Craig Howes, ed., *The Testaments of*

the Grand Princes of Moscow [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967], 360), and to omit the rationale. Given how much Skrynnikov revised the book for a different audience, such an edit would not have been too drastic.

(475) "The Swedish army's involvement his navy and waged the military situation" is awkward and ungrammatical; something has been lost in translation.

(481) what should read "in negotiations with Bathory, which began" is improperly formatted on three lines of text

(482) "military alliance against Sweden on main condition that" needs at least "the" after "on"

(483–84) "attacking [ARRESTING] his own personal emissaries" was never copyedited

(495) in "Mstislavskii (Romanov-)Iur'ev": there should be a comma after "Mstislavskii"

(553 n. 21) "G. J. Halperin" should be: C. J. Halperin

(569) "1883" should be "1583"

(569 n. 61) "see" should be "See"